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The dissertation explores the processes through which new norms develop in the field 
of international humanitarian law. In contrast to most studies in International Relations 
that examine processes of norm diffusion and socialization, the current work focuses 
on the early stages of norm emergence. Based on the comparison of two cases of 
norms against weapons that have a severe negative impact on civilians – antipersonnel 
landmines and cluster munitions – and several country cases, including the US, 
France, Belgium, Norway and Canada, the thesis develops a model of the dynamics of 
norm development that emphasizes the linkages among domestic and international 
processes aimed at norm creation. The model involves scale shifts from the 
international level where consensus-decision making stalls progress toward adopting 
new prohibitory norms, to the domestic arena of different countries where 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) mobilize national support, and then back to 
the international level where national mobilizations help propel a new negotiating 
process out of the consensus-based forum. 
Whereas most empirical studies on norm development and the literature on “new 
diplomacy” examine NGO activities and negotiation processes at the international 
level, the thesis pays particular attention to the domestic developments and NGO 
campaigns, which have been a precondition for a more robust international process. 
The study argues that the success of norm creation depends first on the initial framing 
of the problem by NGOs, and second on their ability to foster among states a dynamic 
called “leadership competition” in which a number of countries consecutively adopt 
more progressive positions in support of weapons bans. The study emphasizes the 
important role of individual entrepreneurship and links between NGOs and state 
decision-makers in promoting new norms regarding weapons restrictions.
Whereas models of norm diffusion focus on the exertion of pressure on states to 
accept widely recognized norms through the “mobilization of shame,” in the current 
cases support for a newly emerging norm is generated through the “mobilization of 
pride” and appeals to state identity and ambitions to play important international roles. 
Thus, the study identifies new processes and dimensions in the creation of norms that 
have been neglected by the existing literature.
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1CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Development of International Norms and Weapons Restrictions
Nowadays, new types of conflict and uses of sophisticated weaponry have posed 
questions about the adequacy of existing international humanitarian law (IHL) to 
protect noncombatants and regulate the conduct of military operations. There is 
uncertainty among scholars, legal experts, and practitioners about the direction the 
laws would take and fear that they might be weakened.1 However, while currently 
there are no prospects for further improvement of existing IHL provisions, there is one 
area within it that has steadily progressed in recent years and sought to provide better 
protection of civilians during and after war. In nearly 30 years the only new 
developments in IHL have been in the area of prohibiting or restricting the use of 
weapons that might cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects on 
civilians (inhumane weapons).2
In my thesis I examine the processes of creating new norms prohibiting or 
restricting the use of weapons that have deleterious impact on the civilian population 
                                                
1 There is a wide-ranging debate going on about the adequacy, applicability, and future of IHL. See, for 
example, contributions to the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, “Reaffirmation and Development of IHL;” 
contributions to the Project on the Means of Intervention, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, 
Harvard University; contributions to the Crimes of War Project; Brookings Institution Speakers Forum, 
March 2002, “Counterterrorism and the Laws of War: A Critique of the U.S. Approach”; Social 
Sciences Research Council, “After September 11: New War?”; ICRC (2003f); Wippman and 
Evangelista (eds) (2005); Roberts (2002, 2003); Brooks (2004); Herrmann and Palmieri (2003); 
Münkler (2003); Kellenberger (2002); Butler (2002); Anderson (2003); Lavoyer (2004); PoKempner 
(2003); Wedgwood (2003).
2 Of course, the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court is a major development in the field of
IHL but not in the sense of establishing new IHL rules. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, adopted in 2000 also comes within 
the IHL field, but does not include any new rules on the conduct of hostilities themselves. In 1995 
another restriction on the use of an inhumane weapon was adopted – the CCW protocol IV prohibiting 
the use of blinding lasers. The 1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons is another example of 
development in this area, although the latter treaty made a bigger contribution to the development of 
arms control than of IHL.
2from the 1970s when the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)3 was 
negotiated till the ongoing discussions on explosive remnants of war and cluster 
munitions within the same forum. I focus, in particular, on two weapon categories –
antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions – that are the two most recent cases of 
efforts to curb the use of weapons internationally. I highlight the factors that have 
influenced the course of international negotiations in these cases and pay attention, in 
particular, to the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in stimulating 
interest in the humanitarian problems of weapons and shaping the course and outcome 
of state negotiations on the subject.
First, I will attend to the process of treaty making at the international level and 
make the case for the importance of several factors that facilitated or impeded the 
adoption of comprehensive restrictions on weapons use. Improved international 
climate, negotiations with clearly specified goals, majority voting procedures, and 
NGO participation translated in what has been termed “new diplomacy” after the end 
of the Cold War – a partnership between NGOs and like-minded states in moving 
humanitarian issues forward – best epitomized by the so-called Ottawa Process to ban 
landmines in the 1990s.4 Characteristic of this “new diplomacy” is the ability of 
leading states and NGOs to generate a bandwagon effect of states willing to join their 
ranks and thus provide quick solutions to pressing problems. 
Given the unprecedented success of the NGO landmine campaign, scholars have 
often raised the question about its uniqueness and seen it as the result of a fortunate 
conjuncture of conditions that would hardly be repeated (e.g. Cameron, 2002). Others 
have tried to compare it with other NGO campaigns – on small arms (Brem and 
                                                
3 The full name of the Convention is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects.
4 One characterization of new diplomacy is “a new texture in the international system where negotiating 
tables have new players and shapes, where linkages and networks transcend state limits, and even 
perhaps, where moral sensibilities have a voice” (John English, quoted in Neumann, 2002: 107).
3Rutherford, 2001; Hubert, 2000) or the negotiations of the statute of the International 
Criminal Court (e.g. Hampson and Reid, 2003; Hubert, 2000). However, such 
comparisons have remained focused on the international level, and given the diverse 
problems different campaigns are trying to address, often times authors have ended up 
with explanations that emphasize issue specificity and leave little room for 
generalizations. However, the international level developments of state negotiations 
are only the most visible part of the NGO campaigns and the process of new norm 
formation. In the case of the landmine movement, this is the story of what happened 
once the tipping point of state support had been nearly reached and an entrepreneurial 
individual, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy gave it a push to start the 
snowball rolling. 
An important aspect of the process that preceded the more spectacular 
developments on the international stage has received less sustained attention from 
International Relations (IR) scholars and students of “new diplomacy.” It is the 
process through which national support for the NGO cause is generated in different 
states and thus prepares the grounds from which an international process could be 
launched. In the second part of the thesis, I focus on the domestic processes that 
produce a dynamic of leadership competition on the respective issues and reinvigorate 
international negotiations after progress at this level has been stalled. 
I argue that the exercise of individual entrepreneurship and leadership by state 
decision makers and NGO representatives, both domestically and internationally has 
been critical for the launching of the two processes toward prohibiting antipersonnel 
landmines and cluster munitions. In turn, the assumption of leadership positions on 
these issues has stemmed from shared outlooks and goals between the NGOs and state 
decision-makers, as well as the latter’s desire for status enhancement and greater 
political leverage whether in domestic or international politics. In this process NGOs 
4have both framed the problems in need of action (and thus provided the opportunities 
for the exercise of leadership on the part of decision-makers) and have worked 
together with their domestic and international partners toward overcoming opposition 
to the creation of the new norms. Thus NGOs have been key in setting the agenda of 
domestic and international norm making and indispensable allies in its practical 
achievement. 
National and transnational dynamics of norm development in the social 
movements and International Relations literature
The landmine campaign reviewed
Most of the existing studies of the landmine campaign have focused on NGO activities 
and the processes of norm creation at the international level. Among those, three 
works have striven to provide a more theoretical account of the success of the NGO 
campaign – Price (1998a), Rutherford (2000), and Hubert (2000) – and attributed 
importance for the success of the NGO efforts to a number of factors. 
First, each of the authors points out the importance of establishing a direct and 
simple cause and effect relation between the humanitarian problems and the practice, 
which is targeted for prohibition. Second, the ability of NGOs to shift the debate on 
landmines away from military, disarmament, or political concerns, and place it within 
a humanitarian framework is seen as key to their success. Third, Price and Rutherford 
underline two additional aspects of successful NGO campaigning – the creation of a 
sense of humanitarian crisis and an urgent need that it be addressed, and the use of 
5victim stories and graphic images to stir public attention and interest.5 Fourth, 
Rutherford (1999, 2000) and Hubert argue for the importance of the negotiating forum 
and the adoption of decisions by majority voting instead of consensus. 
Finally, Price (1998a) argues that the adoption of the landmine ban was made 
possible by the existence of the chemical weapons taboo and the “grafting6” of the 
new norm upon prior principles of international humanitarian law, and specifically, on 
the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the other hand, Rutherford (2000: 96) 
mentions the “grafting” of the landmine prohibition on human rights norms, and both 
he and Hubert focus on the importance of the IHL principle of proportionality and the 
prohibition of indiscriminate weapons for the creation of the new norm. 
Whereas Price’s study is most theoretical and focuses on processes of norm 
creation and socialization, Rutherford (2000, 2003) and Hubert pay closer attention to 
the ability of NGOs to set the international agenda on this issue, the importance of 
partnership and coordination between NGOs and a group of like-minded countries, 
and the role of individuals in achieving the landmine treaty.
The importance of most of the above factors has also been highlighted in other 
IR works on norm development. For example, Nadelmann (1990), McElroy (1992), 
Adler (1992), Finnemore (1996a), Checkel (1997a), and Evangelista (1999) have 
pointed out the important role played by individuals as norm entrepreneurs. Legro 
(1995, 1997) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have argued that norms with specific 
and well-defined behavioral injunctions have better chances of success. Crawford 
(1993, also 2002), Finnemore (1996b, also 2003), Cortell and Davis (1996, 2000), and 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have highlighted the idea that new norms are more 
                                                
5 Rutherford, for example, asserts that the use of victim stories was “perhaps the most significant reason 
that the movement to ban landmines garnered so much international political action and attention so 
fast” (p. 92).
6 “Grafting” as defined by Price (1998a: 617) refers to “the combination of active, manipulative 
persuasion and the contingency of genealogical heritage in norm germination.” 
6easily developed when they fit within the existing normative fabric and can draw upon 
the arguments and moral reasoning underpinning prior norms thus leading to the 
nesting of norms within certain moral discourses – what Price calls the “grafting” of 
new norms onto established ones. Finally, Keck and Sikkink (1998) have argued that 
norms about “bodily harm to vulnerable individuals” resonate better with public 
sensitivities and thus fare better – a notion underlined by Rutherford’s assertion that 
the landmine movement was successful because it gave voice to the victims to tell 
their personal stories and used graphic pictures of bodily mutilations caused by mines.
My comparison of the landmine and cluster bomb campaigns at the 
international level also confirms and adds more detailed evidence for the importance 
of certain factors such as the simplification of the problem and the proposal of a clear 
and easy solution to it, the framing of the debate in humanitarian terms, and the 
adoption of decisions by majority voting. I argue, however, that the focus on “bodily 
harm” to innocent victims has been less important for the success of the landmine 
campaign than the invocation of a simple and clear prohibition. I also take issue with 
Price’s core argument that the landmine prohibition was greatly facilitated by the 
“grafting” of the new norm upon the preexisting ban on chemical weapons. Whereas 
the landmine ban was certainly justified by and rooted in existing principles of IHL, 
especially the principle of proportionality and discrimination, the prohibition of 
chemical weapons has been less consequential for the development of the new norm. 
It is true that some of the campaigners, and especially Senator Leahy, have drawn 
parallels between chemical weapons and landmines and tried to make the argument 
that the latter should be banned in the same way the former were, but these arguments 
formed only a small part of the campaign.7
                                                
7 For example, a search of the ICBL reports on the main conferences from 1993 to 1997, including not 
only statements from NGO but also speeches of state representatives and many press articles, produces 
the following results. In 1993 there is no mention of chemical weapons; in 1994 there is one; in two 
conferences in 1995 there are respectively 6 and 2 mentions; in 1996 chemical weapons come up 6 
7Whereas in a broad sense the chemical ban might have opened up new 
opportunities for NGO mobilization and provided sources of argumentation, it is not 
clear that this was a necessary factor, let alone “of singular importance” (Price, 1998a: 
629), for the success of the landmine campaign. According to Price, the “viable 
chemical weapons taboo” made it possible to “countenance a ban on mines – without 
it a ban could not have occurred” (Price, 1998a: 629). However, this argument is 
problematic from the point of view of timing. If one assumes that a really “viable” 
chemical weapons taboo emerged only after the adoption of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (which also provided an immediate example for campaigning 
opportunities on landmines), there is a discrepancy, because the Convention was 
adopted only in the beginning of 1993 – about a year after the NGO campaign on 
landmines had already started.8 Tellingly, the first NGO conference in 1993 makes no 
mention of the parallel with the ban on chemical weapons and during the second one 
in 1994, the question only comes up once in a workshop strategizing about ways to 
counter opposition to the landmine campaign. The analogy with the chemical weapons 
ban has been employed most often by senators and officials in the State Department in 
the US – in fact, the country where the NGO campaign and the landmine ban met with 
less success compared to other countries where chemical weapons did not figure in the 
                                                                                                                                            
times at the Geneva conference and once at the Ottawa meeting; in 1997 there is one mention at the 
conference in Mozambique, 4 in Brussels, 3 in a report on NGO activities in Oslo, and none in the 
report of the Oslo conference and in the report of the final conference in Ottawa. In comparison, 
arguments about the indiscriminateness of the weapons are encountered 4 to 12 times more often.
8 The Chemical Convention was adopted in December 1992 and opened for signature in January 1993, 
whereas the landmine campaign made its first steps in Sept-Oct 1991. It could be argued that the 
chemical weapons taboo had developed into an international norm with the adoption of the ban on the 
use of chemical weapons in 1925 and especially following their non-use in WWII, or that the 
negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) from 1972 to 1992 have strengthened the 
taboo. However, this would not explain why exactly at this point in time NGOs decided to bring up the 
issue of a landmine ban, unless one accepts that they just wanted to emulate the success of the CWC 
after its negotiation was reinvigorated in the early 1990s. That is not the argument Price is making 
however, and it can still be questioned whether the prospects of success of the CWC were evident in 
1991 when the landmine movement started. In addition, there had been bans on exploding and dum-
dum bullets for the last hundred years, as well as, a restriction on the use of incendiary weapons since 
1980, which could have also “allowed a [landmine] ban to be considered the art of the possible” (Price, 
1998a: 640).
8debate so often, if at all.9
Finally, where my study tries to add to and improve upon the existing literature 
is in focusing attention to the processes of norm formation at the domestic level that 
have largely been neglected in the reviewed works. Price looks exclusively at the 
international level and argues that processes of norm adoption there “have often 
overtaken the more idiosyncratic workings of domestic politics” (p. 616-17). In 
contrast, I argue that processes of norm creation at the domestic level have fed the 
developments on the international arena and without examining the “idiosyncratic 
workings of domestic politics” we could not fully understand how norms (or at least 
the norms studied here) emerge internationally.
On the other hand, although Hubert examines the landmine campaign at the 
international level, he does mention in passing that its greatest strength “lay in the 
dozens of well-coordinated country campaigns” (p. 33) without elaborating on this 
observation. In my study I explore exactly this issue – how the domestic campaigns on 
landmines and cluster munitions added up to a successful international campaign. In 
doing so I also develop another thread picked up by Rutherford – the importance of 
individuals and leadership in norm creation. Rutherford highlights the support for the 
landmine campaign provided by Senator Leahy, President Mandela, Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy, and Princess Diana in the USA, South Africa, Canada, and the UK, 
respectively. He also mentions the “leadership games” played at different levels of the 
landmine process but limits his attention to the contest between the US, opposing the 
new treaty, and the like-minded countries supporting it. 
                                                
9 Indeed, as Price himself points out, framing the problem of landmines by analogy to the chemical 
weapons ban was a way to draw the debate into the field of arms control – an approach that was 
consciously avoided by Canada and the other likeminded countries (Price, 1998a: 629).
9Individual and state leadership and the growing “NGO-ization” of politics 
Following Tarrow (2005) I argue that the individuals who have played leaderships 
roles in both the landmine and cluster munition campaigns are “rooted cosmopolitans” 
– individuals who are closely linked with their domestic environments and 
opportunities but could join transnational coalitions in the pursuit of common goals 
either domestically or at the international level.10 Importantly, these individuals not 
only happen to share the NGO goals but also their outlook and broader ideas. Some of 
them have had experience working in the NGO sector before moving to government 
and politics and/or had an academic background and training that predisposed them to 
working on issues that NGOs favored as well. Thus, the shared background of key 
individuals in policy-making positions and NGO activists facilitated communication 
between the two sides of the like-minded coalition. Importantly, this commonality in 
interests and ideas among policy-makers and NGOs was made possible by the opening 
of government positions to former NGO members. In certain countries, such as 
Norway, for example, the movement of NGO people to government, and vice versa, 
from government back into the NGO sector, is notable.11 Whereas this interpenetration 
of certain domains of government, such as development, human rights, and more 
generally foreign policy, and the NGO community should not be exaggerated, it has 
nonetheless been a key factor in moving forward the campaigns on landmines and 
cluster munitions in several countries and thereafter internationally.
This narrowing of the gap between policy makers and NGO activists needs to 
                                                
10 The complete original definition is: “individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international 
resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, 
or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies” (Tarrow, 2005: 29).
11 This is also the case with the ICRC, whose president often times comes from a career in government 
and diplomacy. Even though the direction is always from government to the ICRC and not vice versa, 
this fact contributes to the good connections between the organization and the Swiss government. 
10
be examined in more detail when evaluating arguments about the astonishing growth 
in the numbers of NGOs and their influence in world politics and “global governance” 
(Mathews, 1997a,b; Boli and Thomas, 1999; Edwards, 2000; Sikkink and Smith, 
2002; Collingwood, 2006; Florini, 2000). Whereas the numerical increase of NGOs 
has been vastly documented (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997; Boli and Thomas, 
1999; Sikkink and Smith, 2002),12 fewer explanations accounting for this growth have 
been offered. 
World-polity theory and social movements studies of NGO growth
At a general level, Boli and Thomas (1999) see NGOs as “enacting, codifying, 
modifying, and propagating world-culture structures and principles” (p.19). NGO 
proliferation is one aspect of the processes of “intellectual, technical, and economic 
rationalization” that unfold everywhere in the world (p.45). Thus, NGOs are the agents 
that both diffuse and create world-cultural values and the NGO growth is “part and 
parcel of the general development of the world polity” (p.26) and “the expansion of 
the nation-state system” (p.28). More specifically, the growth in the numbers of NGOs 
and international organizations (IOs) is closely linked, but causality goes both ways –
NGOs give rise to IOs, and the establishment of IOs, and the UN in particular, has 
fostered the creation of NGOs. In addition, various interrelationships connect the two 
types of organizations and lead to a general process of mutual legitimation (pp. 29-
30).13
Other authors, however, have found no unambiguous support for the impact of 
international institutions on the growth of “social change” international NGOs, 
                                                
12 For example, in the decade from 1973 to 1983 the number of transnational social movement 
organizations increased by 90%, in 1983-1993 by 104%, and in 1993-2000 by 35% (Smith, 2004: 266).
13 A volume chapter focusing on environmental organizations establishes a unidirectional relation and 
attributes the growth of NGOs in this sector to “the rise of rationalized scientific discourse” and the 
creation of environmental IOs (Frank et al., 1999). Mathews (1997a) on the other hand, links the growth 
of NGOs to technological changes and the spread of cheap and accessible communications.
11
measured by the entry into force of international treaties and the organization of major 
international conferences in the respective NGO areas of activities (Sikkink and 
Smith, 2002: 43). Where world-polity theory finds corroboration, according to Smith 
and Wiest (2005), is in the impact of IO membership and treaty ratification by 
individual countries on the growth of participation of national groups in transnational 
social movement organizations (also Ball, 2000; Reimann, 2002 on the effect of 
conference participation, cited in Smith and Wiest, 2005). That is, as countries become 
more tightly integrated into the world polity, the opportunities for NGO involvement 
and influence also increase. Thus based on the theory, one would expect that the 
numbers of NGOs would expand in pace with the speed with which world-culture 
values spread (given that NGOs are among the primary promoters and makers of those 
values), but possibly up to a point where the world polity becomes fully integrated 
and/or a degree of saturation of a certain area of activity is reached and NGOs working 
in it consolidate and expand, whereas the numbers of new comers dwindle (Frank et 
al. 1999; Smith, 2004: 267).14
Regarding the impact of international NGOs, Boli and Thomas assert that their 
effectiveness to “shape the agendas and behavior of states” derives from their 
“rational-voluntaristic authority.”15 However, they admit that the theory has little, if 
anything, to say about the conditions under which this effectiveness materializes and 
NGOs succeed in translating their authority into influence (Boli and Thomas, 1999: 
46, 47; Boli, 1999: 294). Thus, whereas the increase of NGOs could be attributed to 
factors such as the creation of new international organizations, the increasing 
institutional density of world politics, new opportunities to engage in new kinds of 
                                                
14 Thus, Smith (2004) documents that the rate of NGO growth from 1993 to 2000 has slowed down 
significantly compared to the earlier periods in the 1970s and 1980s, even though arguably this has been 
the period of their greatest influence in international politics.
15 “Rational-voluntaristic authority” refers to the authority of “freely exercised reason, in which 
fundamentally equal individuals reach collective decisions through rational deliberations that are open 
to all” (Boli, 1999: 273).
12
activities opened by the end of WWII and the Cold War, there are fewer explanations 
of the growth of NGO influence in world politics, which could neither be measured by 
nor simply attributed to their numerical increase. 
The numerical increase per se may not be the best indicator of NGO influence. 
However, the latter could be explained by changes in the structural positions of NGOs 
that can vary during different time periods and across countries and regions. 
It has been argued that what matters for the exercise of NGO influence are the 
links established among NGOs and among NGOs and international organizations 
(IOs) – a process in which international institutions play key roles as sites of 
networking and contestation among various actors (Tarrow, 2001, 2005; Jacobson, 
2000:155-6; Sikkink and Smith, 2002:42). Thus the growth of NGO numbers and their 
increased impact internationally has been linked to the expanding opportunities for 
resource mobilization and political access those organizations came to enjoy at the 
international level. In addition, “the emergence and promotion by IGOs and certain 
activist states of a new pro-NGO international norm from the 1980s that […] has put 
‘top-down’ pressure on states to support and include NGOs in both international and 
national politics” has also strengthened NGO positions internationally (Reimann, 
2006: 46). This new international norm legitimizing an enhanced role for NGOs was 
fed by increasing levels of funding for NGOs, expansion of the range of services and 
functions they perform, and particularly by a turn in the 1980s from a state-led model 
of development assistance toward a more neoliberal approach that placed the emphasis 
on “‘people participatory’ development and private sector actors” and which the 
NGOs could put into practice more efficiently than states and IOs.16 Hence, the greater 
role of NGOs developed from a symbiotic relationship among them, states, and IOs, 
                                                
16 Another trend that contributed to the rise of NGOs in the 1990s was the promotion of democracy and 
civil society all over the world by NGOs funded by Western countries, which in turn pressed other 
governments to accept and facilitate the working of NGOs in their domestic settings as part of the 
process of becoming democracies (Reimann, 2006:60).
13
based on the “functional compatibilities arising from demands associated with the 
growth of international institutions of governance” (Reimann, 2006:63).17
Thus, the conclusion could be drawn that NGOs mattered in international 
politics because and when states and international organizations needed their service-
and legitimacy-providing functions (Charnovitz, 1997; Reimann, 2006). NGOs have 
made inroads in international organizations by achieving observer status, delivering 
services on their behalf, serving as their consultants, and acquiring the right to 
participation in international conferences and treaty negotiations. Moreover, there has 
been an evolving interpenetration of the two types of organizations as staff 
increasingly circulates between NGOs and IOs (Boli, 1999: 292). 
Individual leadership and new partnerships between decision-makers and NGOs
I argue that similar processes at the domestic level of certain countries have 
contributed significantly to the success of NGOs in furthering their agendas regarding 
landmines and cluster munitions. At different times, policy-makers in some branches 
of government in countries such as Canada, Norway, France and Belgium were more 
open to NGO demands because of the outlooks, and often times backgrounds they 
shared with NGO members. Not only were NGO representatives included in the 
delegations of like-minded countries negotiating the issue of landmines, for example, 
but government officials or parliamentarians active on landmines and cluster 
munitions in Norway, France and Belgium had actually previously worked for or 
together with NGOs. Thus, the openness of policy-making in some early-norm-
adopter countries to input from the NGO community has been an important factor in 
                                                
17 This symbiotic relationship between IOs and NGOs, in particular, has given rise to worries that it 
would lead to “global corporatism,” lack of real representation of social interests, and cooptation and 
bureaucratization of NGOs with the ensuing loss of their most valid assets of flexibility, networking and 
informality (Ottaway, 2001).
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moving forward the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions.18
The sector of international development has shown the greatest movement of 
members from the NGO community into national government and international 
agencies. Development assistance has also been the area where the goals of NGOs and 
government agencies have had a close correspondence, and thus one of the places 
where NGOs could find like-minded partners. Similarly, people working for the UN 
and its human rights, humanitarian and development agencies have often shared the
NGO goals and provided a boost to their campaigning.19
To the extent that the interpenetration of the NGO and policy-making sectors 
in some countries represents a stable feature of their domestic politics, one could also 
expect longer-term NGO impact on domestic, and possibly, international policies.20
Alternatively, if NGOs have more in common and better connections with certain 
parties on the left-right spectrum, one would expect that their role would fluctuate 
with change in government. 
The NGO positions and their ability to establish good relationships with 
policy-makers in government vary from country to country,21 and even from one 
period to another within the same country. However, even when such coalitions 
                                                
18 Even though openness to NGO input is necessary to promote the NGO campaign in at least some 
early adopters, it is not a necessary factor in all of the like-minded states. For example, domestic NGO 
input on landmines has been limited in Austria and Germany, but their state representatives have been 
influenced by NGOs at the international level. 
19 For example, the cluster munition campaign found in UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, 
Jan Egeland a helping voice on the problem of cluster munitions use during and after the conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. As the Norwegian junior foreign minister in the 
1990s, Jan Egeland was also the moving force behind Norwegian leadership in the campaign against 
landmines.
20 The increased NGO role in setting the agenda of and participation in treaty making bears similarities 
with the impact of the increased presence of lawyers in state delegations on the development of 
international law and norms regarding military intervention in case of state default (Finnemore, 2003: 
24-51). Similarly, the literature on epistemic communities has focused on the increased role of 
knowledge-based communities and scientists in various issue areas, among which arms control and the 
environment (e.g. Haas, 1992; Adler, 1992; Benedick, 1991; Brenton, 1994; Evangelista, 1995, 1999).
21 For example, even though NGOs initially found supporters for a total landmine ban in the Pentagon, 
especially in the face of Timothy Connolly, the latter could not promote effectively their cause or 
strengthen his position vis-à-vis opponents in the DoD. On the contrary, he actually got dismissed at 
least in part due to his advocacy of the NGO views.
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between NGOs and government officials are established, whether they will impact 
policy decisions also depends on the degree and kind of opposition they will meet 
from other societal or governmental actors, and in the case of weapons restrictions, in 
particular from the military establishment. 
Military establishments and civil-military relations: “Mars vs. Venus”?
However, the opposition NGOs face from the military varies in different countries. 
Three main factors influence the degree of military opposition. On the one hand, 
different militaries have different perceptions of the military utility and necessity of 
weapons, and on the other, even when certain militaries share the same views of the 
weapons’ usefulness, they can have different institutional roles and propensity to 
engage in political actions to defend those views and oppose attempts at banning 
weapons. Finally, civil-military relations in different countries are structured 
differently and thus civilian leaders could attribute more or less weight to military 
views in the decision-making process.
Militaries enjoying higher prestige in society are also expected to be more 
vocal about their views and grievances (Boëne, 2001, 2006). In turn, the prestige and 
legitimacy of the military depends on their roles and effectiveness in providing 
national security against external threats, contributing to nation-making in their own 
state (e.g. through conscription), or performing certain non-traditional functions such 
as delivering domestic and international military assistance. In countries where the 
traditional national defense role of the military is waning because of reduced threat 
perceptions and has not been replaced by new roles, the legitimacy of the military 
would likely decline. On the other hand, when the traditional military role is 
reinforced or new roles, such as peacekeeping for example, are embraced, the 
legitimacy of the military would grow (Forster, 2006: 74-98). 
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Accordingly, the assertiveness and influence of the military would not only 
differ across countries, but also within the same country during different time periods. 
For example, a scandal or operational failures of the military forces could lead to the 
loss of military prestige and significantly weaken its ability to influence policy debates 
even on unrelated issues.22 Whereas such temporary shifts in the position of the 
military could account for the divergent degrees of its involvement in policy debates 
within countries, other factors are needed to explain the variation in the political 
activeness and influence of the military across countries and over time.  
Kagan (2002, 2003) argues that there are fundamental differences between the 
US and Europe on “the all important question of power” – how, when, and why 
military force should be used, including “determining threats, defining challenges, and 
fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies” (Kagan, 2003: 4). Put in 
another way, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree 
on little and understand one another less and less” (Kagan, 2003:3). However, it has 
been shown that European countries still have different strategic cultures, have drawn 
different lessons from the same historical events, identify different threats (Hyde-
Price, 2004; also Lindley-French, 2003; Rynning, 2003), and diverge in their military 
structures, ambitions and ability to use military force (Forster, 2006). Seen from this 
angle, differences within Europe abide and this for reasons other than power 
capabilities. While Kagan himself is also aware of those differences among European 
countries, he prefers to ignore them, asserting that they are much smaller than the 
chasm that separates Europe and the US.23 However, I would argue that paying 
                                                
22 For example, during the landmine campaign the Canadian military has been in a weaker position 
having to deal with the investigation of torture of a Somali boy by Canadian peacekeepers. For the 
impact on Canadian policy debates on peacekeeping, see for example, Hampson (2003: 143-7).
23 This assertion is also questionable in view of the European Security Strategy that identified as key 
threats pretty much the same problems as the Bush administration – terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (EU, 2003). In addition, in
December 2003 the EU Council adopted the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, which “embraced possible resort to coercive measures in the defense against proliferation, 
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attention to the differences as well as the commonalities among states could be a better 
way of understanding what drives their policies, and by extension, the processes of 
developing new norms regarding the proper use of force. 
One could not speak of a sharp dividing line between the US, on the one hand, 
and all the European countries, on the other, regarding the concrete role the armed 
forces are expected to play. In their military planning, for example, the UK and France 
place an emphasis similar to that in the US on expeditionary warfare – sending mobile 
forces in major combat operations abroad. In contrast, the rest of the European 
countries could be placed in three different categories involving different degrees of 
concentration on territorial defense and peacekeeping operations of varying degrees of 
intensity (Forster, 2006: 44-71). Neither could public support for the military as an 
institution and profession be used as a measure of difference between the US and its 
European allies. As already mentioned, on both sides of the Atlantic public support for 
the military has varied together with perceptions of its combat performance, 
effectiveness, and legitimacy, and as a result of changes in the public image of other 
government institutions. Whereas in the US support has been relatively stable, except 
for the fall in the years following the Vietnam War, in France for example, it has 
fluctuated over the years after WWI, but reached a high point of 80% in the late 1990s 
(Moskos, 2000:19-20; Boëne and Martin, 2000:62). 
What has changed, however, is that even in European countries where the 
military retains and develops its traditional functions of state defense and engages in 
major combat operations abroad, its improved public image has become based in large 
part on its taking on functions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. That 
                                                                                                                                            
including ‘as appropriate, the use of force’” (Becher, 2004: 352). Already in 1999, under the influence 
of the UK and France, the EU also moved in the direction of developing rapid-reaction expeditionary 
forces and has since shown “a clear resolve to contribute militarily to international peace and security, 
including through high-intensity operations,” thus willing to back “soft” with “hard” power (Biscop, 
2004: 510; also Menon, 2004: 645-6).
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is, among the important sources of the military’s legitimacy are the public perceptions 
of its being a “force for good” (Boëne and Martin, 2000; Pinch, 2000:163-4, Mingst, 
2003). 
Thus, one could argue that the military authority in most European countries 
and Canada increasingly rests on humanitarian instead of military values. 
Accordingly, the military would strive to preserve public support by fully embracing 
these humanitarian missions and values, including the renunciation of weapons that 
cause severe humanitarian harm to civilians. Nevertheless, even in these countries 
when the armed forces are engaged in major combat operations, the military could 
have greater leverage over policy-making regarding the conduct of operations and 
operational requirements and thus more successfully resist attempts at weapons 
restrictions. On the other hand, countries such as France and the UK, had not based 
their international image on performing “middle power” roles, but rather on great 
power status enshrined in their UN Security Council permanent membership. During 
the Cold War their militaries had limited involvement in peacekeeping operations 
(Boyer et al, 2003; Mingst, 2003) and those had been less constitutive of their 
organizational roles and identity. Thus, to the extent that the legitimacy of the military 
is not strictly dependent on the embrace of humanitarian values, one could expect that 
it would be more resistant to changes framed in humanitarian terms, and arguably, 
shifts toward policies that clash with its interests would be implemented with the 
active involvement of the government in power, and specifically, of left governments 
that share some of the goals pursued by NGOs. In contrast, not only does the military 
enjoy high levels of public support in the US, but this support also flows from the 
embrace of military values by society at large that has led scholars to talk about the 
“militarization” of American culture and society (Sherry, 1995; Bacevich, 2005). I 
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argue that this was a key factor for the inability of the NGOs to sway the US to join 
the Ottawa Treaty although personally President Clinton was in its favor.
In this light, the division that exists is between the great powers that emphasize 
the use of military power, and whose military institutions are influential and respected 
in society; middle and small powers whose societies and militaries embrace 
humanitarian values and limit the use of force to international humanitarian missions; 
and second-tier states, such as the UK and France, that engage in major military 
operations, even though their use of military force needs to be legitimated in view of 
international legal principles and values, and whose identity draws both on notions of 
military and civilian power. In great powers, such as the US the influence of the 
military would ensue from the public support of military values and institutions. In 
middle powers, societal attitudes would influence the military culture and the military 
would find it either difficult or unthinkable to defend the continued use of weapons 
stigmatized by public opinion. Finally, in the second-tier states the promotion of 
humanitarian norms restricting the use of certain weapons within the military would 
be facilitated by governments on the left of the political spectrum.
Norms development and transnational networks in IR
The study of transnational relations in IR has passed through different stages after 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye first focused on the role of transnational actors in 
their 1971 volume Transnational Relations and World Politics.24 Whereas this body of 
literature highlighted the importance of non-state actors, it did not develop a 
                                                
24 For an overview of the field of IR in connection to the study of transnational relations, see for 
example, Tarrow (2001) and Risse (2002).
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theoretical framework about the conditions under which they would be more or less 
influential. This shortcoming was addressed in the 1990s when the study of 
transnational processes was linked to a set of scholarly work on domestic structures 
and institutions, thus trying to delineate the channels through which NGOs influence 
state policy-making.25 The theoretical framework about the constraining or enabling 
conditions of domestic structures or political opportunities was developed both by 
scholars in the field of IR (Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1995b,c; Evangelista, 1995, 1999; 
Checkel, 1997a) and comparative politics (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam et al. eds, 1996; 
Tarrow, 1996, 1998).26
The key concept in this new wave of studies on transnational relations –
“domestic structure” is rather broad and encompasses “the organizational apparatus of 
political and societal institutions, their routines, the decision-making rules and 
procedures incorporated in law and custom, as well as the values and norms embedded 
in the political culture” (Risse-Kappen, 1995b: 20). However, three main variables 
carry the theoretical work – fragmentation of political institutions, polarization of 
societal structure, and type of the coalition-building processes – that in empirical 
studies are often times reduced to a single one, namely, openness of the political 
system and the opportunities for access to policymakers it provides to NGO actors.27
                                                
25 The earlier studies, upon which the new literature on transnational relations built up, were focused on 
the state and the role of different domestic structures in policy formulation and implementation (e.g. 
Katzenstein, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1985; Hall, 1983; Evans et al, 1985). 
26 Arguably, the social movements literature provided a richer understanding of the domestic factors 
that influenced social mobilization. It focused on four core concepts – political opportunity structure 
(“consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment 
that either encourage or discourage people from using collective action,” Tarrow, 1998: 18, quoted in 
Tarrow, 2005: 23), mobilizing structures (formal movement organizations and the social networks of 
everyday life), collective action frames (the cultural constants that orient participants and those they 
themselves construct), and established repertoires of contention (Tarrow, 2005: 23).
27 In terms of political institutions, states can be “centralized” (executive power is concentrated at the 
top of the political system and generally independent of the legislature) or “fragmented” (decision-
making power is diffuse and shared among different branches of government, with the legislature 
exerting a considerable degree of control). In terms of societal structure, defined by the degree of 
polarization along ideological and/or class cleavages and the strength of societal organizations enabling 
mobilization for political causes, societies can be divided into “strong” and “weak”. In terms of the 
“coalition-building process in the policy networks linking the state and society,” polities can be divided 
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According to these criteria, states can be divided into several types, three of which are 
of particular interest to this project: “state-dominated” featuring centralized political 
institutions coupled with polarized societies, relatively strong intermediate 
organizations, and societal actors that play a limited role in the policy-making process; 
“society-dominated” domestic structures, characterized by fragmented political 
institutions and relatively strong societal interest pressures; and “corporatist” 
structures, characterized by strong intermediary organizations operating in a 
compromise-oriented decision making culture (Risse-Kappen, 1995a). Each domestic 
structure in this threefold typology implies differences in the ability of non-state actors 
to gain access to policy-makers, form coalitions with other domestic actors, and 
translate their goals into policy.
In a “state-dominated” domestic structure the policy making power rests with 
the executive, concentrated in a limited circle of officials, supported by a strong civil 
service apparatus. In contrast, the role of the parliament is minimal, especially when 
the governing party (or coalition of parties) enjoys a majority. Under these conditions, 
of power concentration at the top, NGO access to key policy-makers is difficult but 
once achieved, gives them a greater chance of conveying their concerns and eventually 
shaping the government position (Katzenstein, 1977; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1995b,c; 
Evangelista, 1995, 1997, 1999; Checkel, 1997a).
In contrast, in “society-dominated” states with decentralized political 
institutions, NGOs have multiple points of access to policy-makers but have to 
compete with numerous actors for the attention of specific officials as well as direct 
their lobbying efforts at a wider range of officials that represent different institutional 
interests and are more or less accessible. Thus, even if NGOs manage to win the 
                                                                                                                                            
into “consensual” (characterized by strong intermediary organizations operating in a compromise-
oriented decision making culture) and “polarized” (characterized by distributive bargaining and dissent) 
(Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1995a).
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support for their ideas of certain branches of government, or the executive itself, their 
success in translating this influence into policy is not assured, since other political 
forces might block their policy proposals. 
In “corporatist” structures, societal interests are mediated through more 
powerful political organizations, and especially through the political parties that are 
the main conduit for aggregation and representation of societal demands. Under this 
structure, decision-making power is concentrated within consultative bodies that deal 
directly with the government and thus tend to eschew the involvement of the 
parliament that becomes a “rubber stamping machine” rather than being a real law 
making institution. Thus, NGOs have greatest chances of success if their efforts are 
directed at winning the support of the governing parties. The extent to which NGOs’ 
preferences will be adopted by parties will depend on the match between them and 
party orientation. In addition, ideas around which broad-based consensus can be built 
(i.e. moderate as opposed to more extreme ideas) will have better chances of adoption 
and success.  
However, the problem with the “domestic structure” literature is that it 
presents a picture of domestic politics that is too static. Domestic structures are given 
and they determine both the channels through which societal demands can be 
conveyed into policy and the success of NGO or other actors’ attempts to influence 
policy without taking into consideration the role of actors themselves (Tarrow, 2001: 
6-7; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 202). 
A new wave of scholarship sought to combine constructivist insights about the 
role of norms in IR28 with a more sophisticated understanding of agency and the role 
                                                
28 The constructivist turn in IR focused scholarly attention to the role of ideas, culture, national identity, 
and norms. Initially, the focus of constructivism was on the systemic level (e.g. Wendt, 1992, 1994) and 
studied the broad effects of norms in international relations without paying enough attention to agency 
in the process of norm formation, diffusion, or compliance (e.g. Reus-Smit, 1999, Thomas, 2001). On 
the other hand, scholars studied the effects of national identity or domestic organizational cultures on 
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of domestic structures. Most of the IR scholarship on norms focused on the 
international level of norm creation (Price, 1997, 1998a,b), norm socialization (e.g. 
Checkel, 2005; International Organization, 59/4), and especially the promotion of 
human rights norms to societies and states that have been resistant to them (e.g. Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999). 
The two most comprehensive models of the processes through which norm 
entrepreneurs influence state behavior and norm socialization – “the boomerang 
pattern” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and “the spiral model” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 
1999) represent an extension of the domestic structure model to the international level 
where new opportunities for mobilization and coalition building are sought when the 
domestic structure is closed for local NGOs. The models involve the application of 
pressure from international organizations, NGOs, and foreign countries on recalcitrant 
states as a way to empower domestic groups advocating change. This process of 
external mobilization of support aims at overcoming the obstacles that national 
environments pose to the domestic promotion of norms. That is, when a government 
does not pay attention to the demands of certain segments of its society, it has to listen 
to their more powerful or more persuasive international allies.
Other scholars have focused on diametrically different processes of 
socialization whereby state elites, diplomats, or bureaucrats come to embrace new 
norms through social learning based on discussions and persuasion in institutionalized 
settings that are private and non-politicized (Checkel, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005; Lewis, 
2005; Risse, 2000). 
                                                                                                                                            
state policies and interests (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996; Legro, 1995, Kier, 1997). The interest toward 
transnational relations also resurged and attention shifted from the predominantly political economy 
focus of earlier works toward environmental, human rights and security issues that also brought about 
interest in the study of norms in IR. Some of the early work studied the role of epistemic communities 
and scientists in international cooperation (Haas, 1992) and the nuclear arms control policies of the 
Cold War rivals (Adler 1992) but did not specify the conditions under which epistemic communities 
were likely to have an impact.
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Finally, a more general framework that encompasses all of the above models is 
Sikkink’s (2004) model of multilevel governance that incorporates insights about the 
effect of both domestic and international opportunity structures on the chances of 
social activism. Sikkink defines the domestic and international opportunity structures 
only in terms of activists’ access to institutions (open or closed) and derives four 
possible opportunity subtypes with the respective predictions about the chances of
successful activist action. When both domestic and international structures are closed, 
there are diminished chances for activism; when the domestic structure is closed but 
the international open, we have the above-mentioned “boomerang” and “spiral 
models”; when only the domestic structure is open and international institutions are 
closed to activists, the expected pattern is one of “defensive transnationalization” –
activists either try to block the activities of international institutions or to exert 
pressure domestically with the goal of democratizing international institutions; finally, 
when both structures of opportunity are open, there is a chance for activists to form 
“insider-outsider coalitions”, – while working mostly in their domestic political 
environment they also resort to international activism as a complementary and 
compensatory option (Sikkink, 2004: 165). Importantly, actors are not doomed to 
being imprisoned in one of the four situations. Through their work domestically and 
building transnational links activists can reshape the structures of opportunity and 
gradually make them more open.
The cases I study involve different stages at which NGO seek and reshape 
opportunities at different levels. Following Sikkink’s line of argument, I will show 
that neither domestic nor international structures are immutable or deterministic of the 
ways in which NGOs can exert their influence. However, I will also try to go beyond 
the opportunities framework and instead pay attention to the domestic and 
international processes that worked within or around given structures and 
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concatenated in particular ways that led to successful norm creation. In this effort I 
will draw some insight from the recent turn in the social movements literature toward 
the study of mechanisms29 and processes linking “the local and the global” arenas of 
contention (Tarrow, 2005: 24; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). In particular, a set of 
processes that connect domestic and international contention identified as “scale shift” 
– the coordination of collective action at a level different from the one where it began, 
and “transnational coalition formation” – the horizontal formation of common 
networks among actors from different countries with similar claims – will be present 
at different phases of the processes I examine.30   
Argument: domestic support, chain reactions, and leadership competition in the 
creation of norms against inhumane weapons
The cases I study involve different processes, as well as different configurations of 
aspects of the “boomerang” and “spiral” models both at the micro psychological level 
and at the macro level of sequencing processes between the national and international 
arenas. 
                                                
29 Mechanisms are defined as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified elements 
in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 11).
30 The fuller definition of scale shift is “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious 
actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened 
claims” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 331). Four additional processes are identified as: global 
framing – the mobilization of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts; internalization – a 
response to foreign or international pressures within domestic politics; diffusion – the transfer of claims 
or forms of contention from one site to another; and externalization – the vertical projection of domestic 
claims onto international institutions or foreign actors (Tarrow, 2005: 32).
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Micro processes of norm creation
The main mechanism through which NGOs bring states to support a new norm is the 
“mobilization of pride” – praising states and appealing to them to assume new, 
leadership positions. In contrast, in the “boomerang” and “spiral” models, norm 
socialization is achieved through the “mobilization of shame” and pressuring states to 
join the already-established club of “civilized states”.
Leadership dividends: Domestically, finding partners in policy-making positions that 
would embrace the NGO goals has been a key factor for successful campaigning. In 
the process, NGO arguments have focused not only on the moral and legal grounds for 
banning certain weapons, but have also been oriented toward the international arena. 
NGOs have consistently projected a leadership image for the states whose early 
support they have sought and tried to create a dynamic of leadership competition 
among states as part of their campaigning both domestically and internationally. 
Price asserts that “moral proselytism” is more important at the early phases of 
a campaign, since “few decision makers […] are likely to embrace support for an 
incipient norm for instrumental reasons when its success is highly questionable” 
(Price, 1998a: 640). Whereas I do not question the moral motives of early norm 
supporters, I argue that even at this early stage, moral and instrumental reasons for 
support are tightly intertwined. Both for parliamentarians and government decision 
makers domestically and for states internationally, playing a leadership role on human 
rights and humanitarian issues has become an important political asset that yields 
added value in terms of enhanced prestige and leverage at the domestic and/or 
international arenas. Pursuing ethical policies has become for countries not only the 
“right” choice but also the wise choice that pays off. Eager to gain the assets of 
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international recognition as champions of humanitarian protection, countries have 
jockeyed for the leadership position on the issue of landmines (and have started doing 
so on cluster munitions) and thus have sustained the campaign in its initial phases and 
moved it forward to a successful completion.31
Then the question arises, exactly what advantages have different actors 
expected to gain in addition to the moral satisfaction of doing good? The following 
paragraphs outline some of the motivations that play into decisions to assume 
leadership in norm creation.
A/ Costs and dividends for parliamentarians
In general, for parliamentarians, and especially senators, taking the initiative in 
proposing new legislation is a relatively cheap action that entails no particular risks to 
the bill sponsors but could bring some benefits. This may be one of the reasons why 
members of parliament have been quite active in proposing bans on landmines and 
cluster munitions in different countries. Often times, members of the opposition 
parties would table such proposals without investing too much effort in their adoption 
and without much effect – the proposals would not even be discussed in the 
appropriate parliamentarian committees or would fail to garner the necessary support 
from the ruling parties. Thus, such proposals could only register the activeness of the 
sponsors and yield some political dividends against the ruling party that would be seen 
as blocking progressive legislation. 
On the other hand, parliamentarians who are really committed to the proposed 
laws and sharing the cause of NGOs would actively work for garnering support among 
their fellow members of parliament (MPs) and expend precious political capital in 
                                                
31 That instrumental reasoning is also at play in the process of early norm development is evidenced by 
the fact that often times parliamentarians pick up the issue domestically or states become more active 
on the international arena after NGOs succeed in generating media interest to the problems created by 
the use of landmines and cluster munitions.
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convincing others to vote for their proposal. Moreover, if the legislation is 
controversial and meets with serious opposition from other societal interests (such as 
the arms industry and workers in the case of the cluster munition ban in Belgium), its 
sponsors could lose support among parts of their constituency. In that sense, the 
proposal would be costly to parliamentarians both in terms of the prestige and energy 
they have invested in passing it and in terms of losing votes and support in the next 
round of elections. Thus, in order to get engaged in fighting over the passage of a 
weapons ban proposal (which is not usually seen as benefiting the domestic 
constituency) a parliamentarian should be really committed to the cause and/or expect 
that the bill would be easily adopted. 
Alternatively, because of the humanitarian character of a weapons ban, in 
certain countries sponsoring such a law could be seen as an attractive option due to its 
resonance with the values and attitudes of the domestic constituency.32 The benefits 
that a parliamentarian could expect from sponsoring the humanitarian legislation 
would come mainly in the form of increased prestige and visibility in the media, 
provided that the issue is popular with the public. 
On balance, the potential benefits a parliamentarian could draw from 
advocating a national ban on the use of certain weapons are less than the costs such an 
action could entail. Hence, one could expect that only individuals strongly committed 
to the humanitarian cause promoted by NGOs would stake their political capital on 
passing the new domestic legislation. An additional, diffused dividend from 
stimulating parliamentarian action on issues where the government has lagged behind 
accrues to the parliament as a whole. In areas, such as foreign and security policy, on 
which the parliament has played only a marginal role (especially in corporatist 
                                                
32 An early sign of such popular support could be discerned in the media coverage of NGO reporting on 
the problem and the readership reaction to it. 
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domestic settings), the partnership between parliamentarians and NGOs could lead to 
redrawing the balance between the two branches of government and the opening of 
new avenues for a greater parliamentarian role in the respective areas by the 
establishment of committees focused on the legislated issues (e.g. mine action and 
cluster munitions).
B/ Leadership and the foreign affairs ministries 
The motivations behind the assumption of a leadership role in norm promotion 
by the foreign ministries of different countries, or by agencies such as those dealing 
with development assistance, are closely linked to the reasoning stimulating state 
leadership, which is described in the next section. In addition, a narrower set of 
motivations regarding the redistribution of funds and influence among the different 
governmental agencies could also contribute to a decision by policy-makers to assume 
a more active role in the creation of a new international norm. Taking on a leadership 
role and allying with NGOs in carrying it out can strengthen the positions of the 
foreign minister vis-à-vis those of the state development department (when the former 
plays a leading role) and draw some funding traditionally allotted to it to the foreign 
office. Alternatively, in cases where the development minister plays a more prominent 
role, it could result in increased funding of his or her agency. In either case, the 
foreign and development departments benefit from the partnership with NGOs during 
the debates and bargaining over the issues with the defense department. As a result 
they would obtain increased funding for their preferred activities and gain greater 
leverage in policy-making. The close association with NGOs, however, also carries 
some risks when it is perceived as providing the latter with undue and illegitimate 
influence on state policies. 
However, whereas the above calculations might contribute to a decision by 
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parliamentarians or foreign affairs officials to assert a leading role on certain issues, 
they are equally applicable to any issue and thus the choice of staking one’s political 
capital on the risky business of promoting new humanitarian norms cannot be 
explained without reference to the normative value attributed to the cause by the 
political actors.
C/ State leadership
The countries most likely and capable to assume leadership positions on 
developing new humanitarian norms are either great or middle powers. However, 
given the greater security responsibilities of great powers and the stronger opposition 
of their military to wholesale prohibitions on an entire class of weapons such as 
landmines and cluster munitions, those states have tended to support only partial 
measures aimed at curbing the negative weapons effects or have preferred no 
measures at all. In the face of such hesitancy or opposition to a more comprehensive 
solution of the humanitarian problems of those weapons, middle and even small states 
stepped forward and took the opportunity to lead two international processes toward 
banning landmines and restricting the use of cluster munitions. Moreover, these 
“middle powers” did not concentrate their efforts on searching for a consensual 
solution to the existing problems through multilateral forums, such as the UN, which 
they traditionally supported. Instead, they launched alternative processes for a selected 
number of countries willing to accept stronger weapons prohibitions despite great 
power opposition to their initiatives and no overwhelming support from the majority 
of states. What motivations prompted these unconventional initiatives? To shed some 
light on this question, the concept of “middle powers” (to which category the group of 
like-minded countries, led by Canada on landmines and Norway on cluster munitions, 
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is generally assigned) and the roles of the latter in connection with changes in the 
international system need to be examined.
The definition of “middle power” is very vague and ranges from indicators of 
economic power such as GNP and GNP per capita to behavioral patterns such as the 
states’ “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, tendency 
to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and tendency to embrace 
notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their behavior” (Cooper et al. 
1993: 19).33 The concept originated after the end of WWII during the founding of the 
UN when states such as Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands sought recognition of 
their status as “middle powers” (not great powers but neither small ones) and the 
greater influence in international affairs such a status would bestow upon them (Stairs, 
1998c; Chapnik, 2000). 
Whereas the “middle power” status found no recognition in the UN, the Cold 
War years provided opportunities to the states claiming it to assume certain valuable 
roles as mediators and bridge builders between the East and the West or between the 
US and its European allies, or as conciliators and honest brokers defusing international 
conflict, for example. During those years, specific behavioral patterns characterizing 
different middle states emerged. According to Cooper (1997), both Canada and 
Norway engaged in routine (quiet, low-key, consensus-oriented) diplomacy, but 
whereas Canada was active on a wide range of issues, Norway limited its efforts to a 
few issue areas. 
These roles were dictated both by self-interest and a desire to gain international 
prestige and distinguish themselves from the great powers (Neack, 2000; Roussel and 
                                                
33 For more detailed discussions on the concept of “middle power,” see for example, Chapnik (2000), 
Stairs (1998c), Royds (2000), Roussel and David (1998), Cooper (1997).
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David, 1998).34 As middle powers those states were affluent but militarily weak and 
thus had a vested interest in preserving a stable and peaceful world order.35 Their 
dependency on the great powers, on the one hand, necessitated that the middle states 
follow policies that would not antagonize their more powerful ally. On the other, it 
meant that the only way in which they could influence the great power on whose 
policies they depended was by engaging it in multilateral institutions where they could 
form coalitions with other countries, or by performing functions valuable to the great 
power. However, in order to gain international prestige and be perceived as 
independent powers, middle states also had to find ways to distinguish themselves 
from the great powers.   
Given that the security environment and the distribution of power in the system 
to a large extent defined the interests of middle powers and the roles they could play in 
the system, the end of the Cold War was seen as a watershed for the future of their role
model. However, the Cold War’s end was seen both as an opportunity for renewed 
middle power activism and greater influence, and as an end to the middle power 
concept as traditionally understood. The first argument was predicated on the notion 
that following the end of the Cold War the areas of traditional middle power expertise 
such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding, human rights and environmental protection 
expanded together with the increased role of international institutions and thus opened 
new opportunities for them. The second argument about the coming to an end of the 
                                                
34 The desire for establishing a recognized international identity and prestige has been seen in turn as a 
way of building a national identity and promoting national unity in Canada (Chapnik, 2000; also 
Mingst, 2003: 62).
35 For example, in 1998 the Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek stated, that “[i]t is in the 
interest of a small state like Norway to maintain a strong UN and support the role of the UN and its
ability to uphold a degree of peace and order in international relations”. His predecessor Bjorn Tore 
Godal had similarly argued in 1996 that “Norwegian society’s deep respect for humanitarian values had 
made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone of all our policy. This is of special importance to 
our work for peace, where it combines idealism and self-interest. The more respect for Human Rights, 
the safer the World will be for all of us” (quoted in Nustad and Thune, 2003: 170, 173, emphasis in 
original).
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middle powers role rested on two different readings of the international system that 
followed bipolarity. On the one hand, it has been suggested that because of the new, 
improved international climate great powers would no longer need the mediating 
services performed by middle state and would become themselves more engaged in 
multilateral decision-making and move into traditional “middle power” areas of 
competence such as peacekeeping (Roussel and David, 1998).36 That is, in an era of 
multipolarity, the great powers, and especially the US, would place more emphasis on 
working through international institutions and achieving peaceful conflict resolution, 
would gain in legitimacy and overtake the kind of roles previously played by the 
middle powers. On the other hand, in a unipolar world, the US would have no need for 
the kind of roles middle powers traditionally played and thus would curb their freedom 
of action and diplomatic initiatives when those run counter to its interests (Neack, 
2000).
I would argue that even though the end of the Cold War did not relegate or 
constrain the freedom of action of middle powers, it did prompt a change in the roles 
they played. The end of the Cold War reduced the security threats to states in the 
international system and thus provided middle powers with a degree of independence 
from their great power allies. However, the change in the system did not alter the 
middle states’ desire for gaining international status and playing a visible role in 
international relations. If anything, it might have increased it. However, as pointed out 
by Roussel and David, the transitional period in the wake of the Cold War, 
characterized by a “multilateral moment” in US international policy, shrank the range 
of instances when middle powers could distinguish themselves from the great power 
and play a noticeable international role. Thus, I would argue a number of middle states 
                                                
36 In addition, the traditional prominence of Canada in peacekeeping, would be overshadowed by other 
smaller countries, such as Pakistan for example.
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were eager to take up the niches where American leadership lagged behind. American 
hesitancy to lead the way on landmines combined with NGO prodding triggered a 
chain reaction of states bidding to take over the leadership position on this issue. 
Moreover, as I will argue later, the need to distinguish themselves from the US and 
form an identity in opposition to it, might have contributed to the absolutist positions 
about a total ban adopted by the likeminded states. Instead of serving as consensus-
makers and mediators, Canada and Norway (and their group of like-minded middle 
and small states) chose to be true leaders, avoid the consensus-based forum of the 
CCW, and opt for an alternative negotiating process in defiance of the great power 
preferences. The undertaking of this more activist leadership role was made possible 
by the strong backing and cooperation provided by the NGOs.
In doing so Canada and Norway not only found new ways to reassert their 
identity as “good world citizens”. They also expected some short-, mid-, and long-
term dividends from taking up the risks and costs of leadership.37 The short-term 
dividends consist mainly in the ability of the leading states to steer the negotiations in 
their preferred direction and have greater influence of their final outcome. The mid-
term dividends include the ability to translate the newly gained political capital and 
prestige into leverage in other issue areas. Finally, the long-term dividends that accrue 
to states come from their enhanced international status and their ability to redraw 
further the international agenda toward including issues in which middle power states 
have a comparative advantage and on which they have already asserted their 
leadership ambitions. Thus, the promotion of the “human security” agenda 
internationally by Canada, Norway and a number of other middle powers could be 
                                                
37 In additional to the financial costs associated with organizing international conferences on the issues 
of landmines and cluster munitions and expending resources on lobbying other states or contributing the 
lion’s share of funding to clearance operations in order to match their rhetorical and financial supports, 
the leading states also take the risk of loss of prestige in the case of failure of their initiative, and the 
risk of punishment by the great power for going against its interests. 
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seen as an attempt to solidify their authority and legitimize their greater role in 
international politics (Chapnik, 2000).
The swing in US policy toward more pronounced unilateralism with the 
coming to power of the George W. Bush administration and its subsequent emphasis 
on the preventive use of force and global war against terrorism have constrained to 
some extent the freedom of action of middle powers, but have also provided a clear 
foil against which they could distinguish and distance themselves from the great 
power. Both of these trends probably tempered the willingness of middle powers to 
launch high-profile initiatives antagonizing the US.38 Thus, in the lack of strong NGO 
campaigning on cluster munitions and serious state leadership to address the issue, 
states have sought to deal with it in the consensus-based forum of the CCW and tried 
to engage the military powers in the process for more than five years. As NGO 
advocacy grew and spurred more national support for their cause, the risks of 
assuming leadership were lowered enough to convince Norway to head an alternative 
process toward restricting cluster munitions despite objections from a range of 
influential countries, including the US, Russia, the UK and France. 
Thus, the constraining effects of the international system appear to have had 
less importance for the state decisions to assume high-profile leadership positions than 
the existence of mobilized NGO campaigning on the studied issues. 
D/ NGO leadership dividends
Finally, leadership dividends accrue not only to the states and specific policy-
makers involved in norm promotion but also to the NGOs that begin the respective 
campaigns. By getting engaged in campaigning NGOs increase their visibility in the 
                                                
38 Instead vocal opposition to US plans to attack Iraq, for example, has come from states such as France 
and Germany that are usually not considered middle powers but rather second-tier great powers.
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media and among potential donors. A successful campaign is a sign of NGO 
effectiveness in bringing about change and a good indicator in the eyes of both 
foundations and individual donors that support them. In the overcrowded and 
competitive NGO sector such visibility provides palpable benefits to leading 
campaigners. By achieving an international treaty with provisions on clearance 
operations and humanitarian assistance, NGOs (especially in the service providing 
sector) are going to further benefit from an increased, and possibly, stable source of 
financing. Finally, in the process of campaigning and building partnerships with 
officials and administrations in like-minded countries, NGOs improve their positions 
and create networks that could pay off in their future activities and campaigns.
NGO brokerage and the fostering of common identity: An integral part of this process 
has been the NGO brokerage between different states and the creation of a common 
identity of like-mindedness or a “pro-ban identity” (NGO member quoted in Mathews, 
1997b). NGOs not only tried to stimulate individual states to play leadership roles, but 
also functioned as brokers that brought together in a series of meetings different states 
and nourished the development of their distinct identity as vanguard norm promoters. 
As most processes of identity development, this one also entailed the juxtaposition 
with the “other” – with the backward norm opponents. In the case of the landmine 
campaign this involved the publication of the list of “the good, the bad and the ugly” 
states, and on cluster munitions, the issue of updates on the 2006 CCW Review 
Conference that focused on state positions and counted the numbers of supporters for 
an international instrument regulating those weapons. 
This process of contrasting the “good” and the “bad” states, combined with the 
inconsistent or openly adversarial position of the US, resulted in painting the latter as 
the retrograde force supporting the use of inhumane weapons. That the US became the 
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“rogue state” on landmines despite its early leadership and much more progressive 
policies compared to other ban opponents, such as China and Russia, was the result of 
at least two factors. The US was a suitable target for NGO criticism because of its 
initial support for a mine ban and general embrace of humanitarian and human rights 
norms. It was also a good target because of the need of the like-minded countries to 
build an identity distinct from that of the US and play a leadership role.39 Had the US 
joined the same camp of like-mindedness, leadership would have naturally gone to it 
and the NGO campaign would have lost some of its vigor and its rebellious 
character.40  
Macro processes of norm emergence
In contrast to the “boomerang” and “spiral” models, the processes I explore are not of 
norm socialization but are the initial stages of norm creation and exhibit the opposite 
dynamic of that postulated in the above two models. The process starts at the 
international level with a couple of NGOs (or the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and several states in the 1970s) advocating a new international norm against the 
use of inhumane weapons. They try to spur international negotiations on weapons 
                                                
39 The like-minded countries, including predominantly Canada and West-European states in good 
international standing could draw very few dividends from contrasting their leadership role to the 
backward positions of countries known for their weak support of international norms, such as China for 
example. In addition, it has been argued that identity formation is a process primarily of drawing 
dividing lines and distinguishing oneself from those who are similar rather than from those who are 
apparently different and thus pose no threat of diluting or blurring the sense of identity that might exist 
(Bering, 1998). An additional factor is that the US, in contrast to other opposing countries, tried to 
engage in some sort of dialog with the landmine campaigners and eventually sought to join the ban 
treaty through an attempt to change its terms, which in turn produced a barrage of NGO criticisms
40 Indeed, according to some commentators, the success of the Ottawa Process was due to the initial 
lack of support for it among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This fact enhanced 
the credibility of the landmine campaign among states from the South and thus increased their support 
for it (Maslen, 2004: fn. 214). 
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prohibitions, by working on the domestic, regional, and international levels, with 
certain NGOs exercising more leverage domestically, and the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Human Rights Watch (HRW) focusing on 
the other two levels. However, when obstacles are encountered on the international 
level, the mobilization of support for the incipient norm at the national levels becomes 
a key prerequisite for launching the process of norm development internationally. 
Thus, at the macro level, the processes involve scale shifts from the 
international level where consensus-decision making becomes an obstacle to adopting 
new prohibitory norms, to the domestic arena of different countries where national 
support for the new norms is easier to achieve, and back to the international level 
where national mobilizations stimulate leadership among a few countries and propel a 
new negotiating process out of the consensus-based forum. I depict this process in the 
“chain reaction” model in Figure 1 to emphasize the linkages between processes at 
different levels and especially the dynamic of leadership competition that is triggered 
by the consecutive adoption of more progressive positions by a series of early-norm-
supporter countries.
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NGOs
International Level
  Regional Level
   Domestic Level
S2 S1
Where S1, S2, S3, etc. are the early states supporters
Figure 1 “Chain reaction” model of the dynamics of early norm creation
S3
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The framework of international negotiations on weapons restrictions within the 
CCW roughly approximates the conditions hypothesized as conducive to social 
learning through persuasion. Yet, within CCW the scope for creating strong new 
norms that would place restrictions on weapons use and have positive humanitarian 
impact has been limited. Overall, the CCW environment is non-political and until 
2000 it had been closed to NGO participation, thus providing a degree of insulation to 
negotiators.41 The ICRC, in particular, has followed a low-profile negotiation style 
aimed at persuasion and incremental progress toward improvement of the laws 
regulating weapons restrictions within this forum. In addition, during the CCW 
negotiations states felt that there was a humanitarian landmine crisis and at least a very 
serious humanitarian problem with cluster munitions, which should have facilitated 
the acceptance of new ideas and adoption of measures to deal with those critical 
situations. However, those conditions, combined with the shared diplomatic culture 
and embrace of general IHL norms were not enough to generate a process of norm 
creation through persuasion. States started with positions that were far apart, and even 
if one could assume that all participants were prepared to change their own beliefs or 
interests in the process of arguing (Risse, 2000), that would have required a very long 
time of negotiation. Thus, persuasion in such settings might work but would require a 
prohibitively long period of time to have an effect if one assumes that participants are 
really committed to finding a good and quick humanitarian solution. Alternatively, the 
setting allows for marginal compromises and a lowest-common-denominator outcome 
achieved through rational, means-ends bargaining. In that sense, “normative suasion” 
behind closed-doors  (Checkel, 2005) offers one way of normative evolution, but one 
which is slow and incremental at best.
                                                
41 Since 2000 NGOs can participate in the plenary sessions of the CCW meetings.
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Thus, when at the international level consensual-decision making procedures 
impede progress toward a new and clear norm against use of weapons with severe 
humanitarian effects, NGOs focus on mobilizing support at the national level, as well 
as obtaining the endorsement of their cause from as many regional organizations as 
possible. This support then is channeled back to the international level. Whereas most 
previous work has described how opposing states become the targets of pressure 
coming from international NGOs, international organizations, and foreign states, this 
study focuses on the processes that generate initial support and prompt states to 
assume leadership in creating and promoting a new norm.42 That is, I am interested in 
the first stage of norm creation (Figure 2) before the tipping point is reached and a 
cascade of states joining the flow ensues (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896). Thus, I 
focus on what happens between point A in Figure 3 when a practice is commonly 
accepted by states and point B when a number of countries (in my cases around 30) 
come to deem this same practice as reprehensible and in need of prohibition and start 
working actively to win the support for prohibition from other states, thus triggering a 
“norm cascade.”43
         Norm Emergence                   “Norm Cascade”           Internalization 
        
     Stage 1       Tipping        Stage 2       Stage 3
        Point
Figure 2 Norm life cycle in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998
                                                
42 The boomerang effect comes into work against recalcitrant states as the process of norm development 
moves forward, but this phase will not receive particular attention as the dynamics have already been 
studied in detail. 
43 The way I define the tipping point is slightly different from Finnemore and Sikkink’s since it is a 
point where states decide to back an emerging norm and work actively to produce the “norm cascade”. 
In Finnemore and Sikkink it is a point that comes later in time when approximately 1/3 of the existing 
states embrace the new norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 900-1).
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A
B (Tipping point)
Number of states
0> Short-term benefit of norm acceptance >0
             0< Risk of adopting the new norm <0
          0< Long-term leadership dividends <0
Figure 3 Norm emergence stage
43
I argue that the success of norm creation depends, first on the initial framing of 
the problem by NGOs, and second, on their ability to foster among states a dynamic 
that I call “leadership competition” through a combination of domestic and 
international approaches. 
Leadership competition is the result of a chain-reaction dynamic among states 
started and fueled by NGOs. By playing upon the ambitions for leadership of states, be 
they small, middle or great powers, NGOs were able to generate support for banning 
landmines and cluster munitions. By appealing to the humanitarian traditions and 
national identities as “good world citizens,” especially of small and medium states, 
NGOs were further successful in setting in motion a process of leadership competition, 
even though the roles different states played were largely dictated by their diplomatic 
cultures and traditions. On landmines, the process started with the US leading the way 
domestically. Next, France was willing to show international leadership (at a moment 
when the US could not) by calling for a review conference of CCW to deal with 
landmines. Then Belgium unilaterally banned landmines with the first national law of 
this kind. Sweden called for an international ban at the CCW. Norway, eyeing its 
neighbor went further, adopted the second national legislation on landmines and 
became a driving force for an international ban. The Netherlands, Germany and 
Denmark followed with national bans. As progress at the CCW stalled, Austria quietly 
started drafting a treaty for a total landmine ban. At this point Canada realized there 
was a leadership opportunity not to be missed and it seized it fearing someone else 
would otherwise steal it. Then the group of leading countries worked as a team to 
trigger a norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The NGOs were there every 
step of the way to work with states on the treaty provisions in the negotiating halls, but 
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also to cheer and applaud them and – if one of them appeared to go astray – to boo it 
back into the pack.
Even though the process on cluster munitions is still evolving, it has reached a 
point where NGOs have been able to stimulate leadership among states, and it does 
confirm the importance of the domestic pathway to norm creation. Once it became 
clear that international negotiations on explosive remnants of war and cluster 
munitions within the traditional CCW forum could only yield partial and weak 
regulations, NGOs focused their efforts on pushing through parliaments domestic laws 
banning or placing a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions. They have secured 
the first national ban in Belgium, a moratorium in Norway and are energetically 
working on stimulating similar measures in several other countries including Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland.44 As national 
initiatives proliferated, a new war in the summer of 2006 between Israel and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon revealed once again the dangers cluster munitions use poses to 
civilians. This unfortunate occasion was seized by NGOs, the ICRC and supportive 
UN agencies as an opportunity to launch a renewed campaign against those weapons. 
At the CCW Review Conference that came in the fall, Sweden and Austria pushed for 
negotiations within the CCW on a legally-binding instrument addressing the 
humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions and drew the support of 30 
countries in the 10 days of the Conference. However, opposition from other countries, 
including the US, Russia and China, blocked the process at this forum. Perceiving the 
growing state support and momentum of the campaign against cluster munitions, 
Norway decided to seize the moment and launch an alternative negotiating process 
outside of the CCW modeled on the Ottawa Process.
                                                
44 In an attempt to spread the legislative process across Europe, the Senator who introduced the first law 
proposal in Belgium plans to organize a conference for fellow MPs from other European countries to 
discuss the issue and share experience in drafting appropriate legislation. This could also be seen as a 
sign of a trend toward reinvigoration of parliamentarian life in Europe (e.g. Costa et al. eds, 2004). 
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This pathway of norm creation through concerted efforts at the national levels 
of countries that are aimed at producing an international effect has been neglected in 
the recent literature on norm development and socialization. In a sense, this is an old 
pathway of diffusion of domestic norms internationally. The latter however, has been 
associated with the promotion of norms by hegemonic states unilaterally and mostly at 
the international level or in bilateral contacts.45 In contrast, this process starts with an 
international effort from non-state actors that gets refocused on domestic action, when 
obstacles at the international stage are met, and then feeds back on the international 
level. Whereas it could be seen as a case of regional norm formation to the extent that 
a key phase of the mobilization around the new norms takes place in Europe, it is not 
limited to it. The initial formulation of the problems of landmines and cluster 
munitions actually originates with American NGOs and the US is first in recognizing 
the issues and responding to them in some limited ways. The ultimate success of the 
process rests on the support of a large number of countries especially in Africa and 
South America.46
The role of NGOs is key at several stages of the processes of generating 
leadership and norm development. First, NGOs are the main agenda setters – they 
highlight the issue in need of action, its problematic aspects, and the appropriate ways 
in which they should be addressed, and move the issue higher on the international 
agenda. At these stages, issue framing is of utmost importance since the created 
perception of the problem, its urgency, and possible solutions in large part define 
subsequent state reactions. Second, when their efforts toward norm creation are 
blocked at the international level, they turn to the domestic level, publicize the issues, 
                                                
45 Britain’s fight against slavery, in particular, was a case of internationalizing a norm originating in 
British society (e.g. Kaufmann and Pape 1999; Nadelmann 1990).
46 The development of new norms first in the individual domestic contexts of different countries and 
then at the international level is characteristic of the women’s rights movement (e.g. Berkovitch, 1999; 
Dubois, 1994 cited in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893).
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and thus “create” specific opportunities for willing parliamentarians or government 
officials to play more visible roles in their respective domains. Thus, by stirring 
domestic debate in a number of countries and achieving the adoption of national bans 
or measures against the weapons, NGOs provide the grounds from which states 
willing to play a leadership role internationally could launch their initiative. That is, by 
domestic and international mobilization NGOs manage to change the risk calculations 
of assuming leadership by making the issue more prominent in the media and 
obtaining the endorsement of their goals from a number of states. Once that point is 
reached states with leadership ambitions could count on the support of a number of 
like-minded states and expect that others would follow. Without the NGO work this 
tipping point could not be reached easily. 
Third, NGOs not only enable but also legitimize the role played by leading 
states. Without NGO involvement, the state willing to lead the way would have to 
shoulder the difficult task of convincing other countries to back its proposal – a 
process that would likely make the issue more politicized and incur a price if more 
powerful opponents decide to check the initiative. In addition, by asserting its 
leadership early, that state would deprive other countries from the possibility to play 
leading roles as well, and thus, diminish the incentives for their joining in the effort of 
norm creation. In contrast, by working within different countries and bringing 
supportive state representatives together in meetings to discuss the problems and 
strategize about the best ways to address them, NGOs foster among states a distinct 
identity of belonging to a team of leaders that can make a difference. NGOs also focus 
the attention of the media on the problems. By highlighting their humanitarian aspect, 
NGOs leave little space for politics and thus facilitate the role of their state partners as 
disinterested actors that try to address the humanitarian crises in the name of the 
common good. In this sense, NGOs are not only agenda setters, but also indispensable 
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allies for the likeminded countries in the joint effort to generate support for the new 
norms. Accordingly, funding from those countries has been very important for the 
activities of the ICBL (Short, 1999: 484, 491), and similarly, financing from 
sympathetic governments has allowed NGOs in the CMC to develop a range of 
activities, including the creation of a website, field missions to investigate the effects 
of the use of cluster munitions and prepare reports on them.
Finally, having helped create the conditions for state leadership in norm 
creation, defined the role those states should play and the goals they should pursue, 
NGOs also “police” state behavior and make sure that their partners would not deviate 
from the set up goal and would live up to their commitments to negotiate a strong 
treaty and create an unambiguous international norm.
Thus, in these cases we witness scale shifts of mobilization both downward 
and upward again, as well as a diffusion of a set of parliamentary initiatives among 
countries, and parliamentarians in one country copying the legislative proposals that 
had gained success in another. However, NGO work with MPs from different 
countries does not ensure the success of their efforts. Party configurations, role of the 
military establishment, and to some extent domestic structures do impose limits on 
their ability to achieve domestic policy change through this channel. Nevertheless, the 
NGOs contribute to the invigoration of parliamentarian initiatives and debate on the 
issue, which is a necessary precondition for further steps to be made nationally 
whether by the legislative or executive branch of government.
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Hypotheses, case selection and methodology
Hypotheses
Two strands of realist theory furnish two contradictory explanations of the emergence 
and role of norms. On the one hand, hegemonic stability theories provide for the role 
of norms when a hegemonic power promotes them and accepts the costs of 
maintaining multilateral institutions and a normative order from which it profits most. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that hegemonic states are only constrained by 
multilateral arrangements, which suit best the interests of lesser, militarily weak states 
(Kagan, 2002, 2003). Applied to the case of weapon restrictions several hypotheses 
are derived:
Military necessity: Since realist theories of IR assert that states are concerned 
above all else with their security or power maximization, what would account for the 
different positions regarding weapons restrictions is the level of threat states face or 
their defensive or offensive intentions.  
“Lilliputians try to pin down the giant”: An extension of the military necessity 
logic and Kagan’s argument implies that weaker states would use international 
agreements as a way to restrict the military might of more powerful states such as the 
US. Thus, weaker states should try to impose bans on the most effective, as well as 
most expensive weapons in the arsenal of great powers. The hypothesis also implies
that such attempts at restraining militarily powerful states would fail unless a grand 
coalition of states is formed.  
Soft balancing: Similarly, a new version of balance of power theory claims that 
states perceiving a threat from the accumulation of American power would take 
“measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use 
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international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, 
frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies” (Pape, 2003, 2005; also Walt, 2005a,b). 
Whereas IR scholars have remained predominantly focused on the use of economic 
levers and coalition-making as instruments of soft-balancing (e.g. IS, Summer 2005), 
others have depicted European support for a host of international agreements including 
the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty as “balancing-on-the-sly” (Joffe, 2003; 2002), 
“international legal imperialism” (Anderson, 2000), or even “lawfare” aimed against 
the US (Dunlap, 2001; also Rivkin, and Casey, 2003). Thus the negotiation and 
adoption of international weapons restrictions could be seen as a result of smaller 
states’ desire to reign in American power. Opinions differ on whether this pattern of 
balancing is the result of weakness (Kagan, 2002, 2003) or newly acquired 
assertiveness of the balancers (Cox, 2005), but in contrast to the above hypothesis, in 
this case the prediction is that soft balancing might actually succeed.
“Power gives away junk or disarms the Lilliputians”: The only weapons that 
have ever been successfully banned are those with very limited military uses or those 
that have been superseded by new technological developments. That is, the great 
powers would agree only to restrictions on obsolete and unnecessary weapons. 
Another nuance to the above thesis actually sees the rich and powerful states armed 
with high-tech weaponry as pushing for restrictions on low-cost, equalizer weapons 
that can to some extent redress the asymmetry of power between them and the poor 
countries (Price, 1998b). 
From one constructivist point of view, the different approaches to the 
humanitarian problems of weapons may be attributable to the different social values 
embraced by different nations, i.e. the differences on these issues can reflect larger 
cultural differences among countries.
Both liberal and instrumental Marxist theories of IR look at the role of 
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domestic actors, and in the latter case, particularly at the role capital and big 
corporations play in defining state policies. Thus, it would be more difficult to restrict 
the use of profitable weapons in whose production large manufacturing companies 
have a considerable stake. States that do not have companies engaged in the 
production and export of landmines and cluster munitions, or states where the 
manufacturers have limited leverage over decision-making, would be more likely to 
support restrictions on these weapons.
The focus of this study will not be on testing which of the above hypotheses 
explains why new international norms against inhumane weapons are adopted. Rather, 
I will explore how such new norms come into being by proposing a model that 
combines insights from constructivism, liberal, and domestic structure theories. It 
highlights the interplay of national and international NGOs and domestic actors in the 
executive, the legislature, and the military establishment that unfolds within the 
particular domestic, international, or regional structures of different states and shapes 
state policies and practices. I show that state positions regarding weapons restrictions 
emerged out of a contest in coalition building and issue framing between the NGOs 
and the military establishments and I emphasize the decisive roles played by 
committed individuals in decision-making positions in furthering the process of norm 
development at the domestic and international level.
Country Case Selection
I will explore the processes of norm formation at the domestic and international levels 
within the context of five country case studies. The selected countries belong to the 
broad categories of “great powers” (the US), “second tier powers” (France), “middle 
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powers” (Canada and Norway) and “small powers” (Belgium), which allows the 
examination of the behavioral patterns and roles of states positioned differently in the 
international system and their impact on the development of international norms.
The countries have also been chosen as representative of the three broadly 
defined types of domestic structure – the “society-dominated” US, “state-dominated” 
France and Canada, and “corporatist” Belgium and Norway. Thus, the case selection 
allows testing the ability of the domestic structure model to predict the avenues most 
conducive to the translation of NGO influence into policy aimed at norm creation. 
I will show, however, that NGOs were not entirely dependent for their success 
on domestic structures. Instead, NGOs through their campaigning and partnership with 
parliamentarians and government officials managed to circumvent the obstacles posed 
by domestic institutional structures in some of the studied countries. Pressure from and 
interactions with NGOs helped redefine and enhance the role played by parliaments 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in different countries. For example, in the 
corporatist setting of Belgium where the parliament has traditionally played a minimal 
role in domestic policy making, and even less so in foreign policy, a coalition of 
NGOs and parliamentarians set the course not only of the country’s domestic but also 
foreign policy on landmines and cluster munitions. In a relation of mutual 
reinforcement, NGOs and parliamentarians broadened the scope of their opportunities 
for action and heightened their profile in the media and public opinion. Similarly, the 
alliance between NGOs and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed the 
latter to increase its freedom of operation and funding resources in a highly centralized 
political system that concentrated the policy-making power in the hands of the prime 
minister. 
Changes in the institutional roles of legislative or government bodies have 
largely been the result of the combined energies of NGOs and committed individuals 
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within the respective organizations. In either case, the partnership between NGOs and 
parliamentarians or foreign affairs officials has enhanced the leverage of both sides. In 
this sense, individuals, their personalities, beliefs and ambitions are key at many stages 
of both the landmine and cluster munition campaigns. They operated within their 
domestic and international structures but they also managed to go beyond them. There 
can be no leadership without leaders willing to take risks and step outside of their 
institutional limits. Yet this step might be easier to make in certain environments 
rather than others. In particular, support for a new norm is easier to garner where there 
is a foreign policy tradition that ranks high human rights promotion and development 
aid. Similarly, diplomatic initiative and leadership are practiced and better accepted in 
some Foreign Ministries than others. Middle powers such as Canada and Norway (in 
contrast to Belgium) had both the resources to engage in high-profile initiatives and 
occasionally the diplomats to carry them through. 
In addition, the “resonance” of promoted norms with domestic culture matter 
(Checkel, 1997b; Cortell and Davis, 2000; Risse, 2002: 265; Price, 2003: 596). In 
cases, such as France, the US, and to some extent Norway, NGO efforts were 
channeled along the ways predicted by the domestic structure framework. But the 
model per se does not explain why certain national positions on landmines or cluster 
munitions were adopted. The actual results of NGO campaigning could be attributed 
to the choice of tactics and arguments NGOs made, which in turn were influenced by 
the broader political culture of the societies within which they were embedded. 
53
Substantive cases and interdependence
The two selected cases are tightly linked since the development of the cluster 
munitions campaign was in many respects dependent upon the prior campaign against 
landmines, which both opened up new opportunities for NGO mobilization and 
created some obstacles for the new campaign. In particular, the landmine campaign 
could be viewed as a point of departure of two path-dependent trajectories that set the 
states that had opposed the landmine treaty on a different road compared to the one 
upon which certain landmine treaty supporters embarked.47 On the one hand, the US 
military drew the lesson that they should oppose new weapons restrictions at their 
inception and prevent the launching of a negotiating process out of their control. On 
the other hand, the NGOs and some of their partners among the like-minded countries 
tried to emulate the steps of the landmine campaign in the case of cluster munitions. In 
both cases for example, NGOs worked together with Belgian senators to achieve the 
first national bans on the two types of weapons. Similarly, Norway was the second 
country to advance domestically a ban on mines and a moratorium on cluster 
munitions. Whereas the mine ban opponents learned the lesson that next time they 
should be more active in their efforts to thwart campaigns for weapons restrictions, 
ban supporters learned that it was possible to overcome the hurdles in their path and 
repeat success.
NGO assets from the landmine campaign
The success of the landmine campaign, the adoption of the Ottawa Convention, and in 
particular, the award of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to the coordinator of the 
                                                
47 Whereas one could discern certain similarities and path-dependencies in the way the two campaigns 
evolved internationally and in certain countries domestically, this is not implied for every single country 
participating in the two processes.
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ICBL campaign Jody Williams and the ICBL became an important asset for the NGOs 
that had been working for the ban. Not only did little-known NGOs such as Handicap 
International, for example, become well-respected co-recipients of the Nobel Prize in 
their countries, but new umbrella NGOs such as Mines Action Canada, Landmine 
Action, UK, and the German Landmine Actiongroup were brought into existence for 
the purposes of the landmine campaign and continued working on mines and new 
issues such as cluster munitions thereafter. Thus the creation of the new norm against 
landmines constituted new actors with enhanced prestige and more clout in domestic 
politics and international negotiations in this issue area.48 The NGOs were admitted to 
participate in the sessions of the CCW and their position was institutionalized through 
the Ottawa Convention itself – the annual meetings of the states parties to the 
Convention and the meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of the 
Convention, the 2004 review conference, the creation of the Landmine Monitor 
organized by the NGOs to follow state compliance with the treaty, the establishment 
of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as well as numerous national commissions 
and parliamentarian committees devoted to mine action, provided new settings within 
which NGOs could exert influence or find new partners to further their agendas. The 
new norm itself provided legal grounds to expand its scope of applicability to other 
classes of weapons with similar effects, such anti-tank mines with anti-handling 
devices and unexploded cluster munitions. Finally, enhancing the visibility of the mine 
issue on the international agenda and the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty contributed to 
                                                
48 Whereas the NGOs had gained a more institutionalized role in the area of mine action and the forums 
that dealt with the problem of landmines and inhumane weapons, with the coming to power of the new 
Bush administration in the US there was a backlash against the participation and enlarged role of NGOs 
in other international negotiations. This was most evident at the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, where then-Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security, John Bolton bluntly stated that the US didn’t “support the promotion 
of international advocacy activity by international or non-governmental organizations, particularly 
when those political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the views of all member states” 
and argued for restricting NGO activities at the Conference (US Department of State, 2001).
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an increase in the funding of mine clearance, victim assistance and mine education 
programs that to a large degree were channeled through the NGOs which were active 
in the campaign, thus providing a steady source of funding for them as well as for their 
cause.49
Liabilities of the landmine campaign
Paradoxically, the main liability for the NGOs was the success of the landmine 
campaign itself. It was displayed in a couple of different ways. 
First, initially the NGOs framed the problem of cluster munitions as a subset of 
the larger problem of unexploded ordnance and emphasized the fact that due to their 
failure rates, cluster submunitions often functioned as de facto landmines, thus 
obscuring the negative impact of the weapons during the time of their use. The 
drawing of close parallels to landmines resulted in a decision by governments to 
concentrate within the CCW on the post-conflict effects of unexploded munitions 
(including clusters). This decision then steered discussions away from the issue of 
cluster munitions and led to a weak protocol on clearing explosive remnants of war. 
Only after a renewed NGO mobilization domestically and internationally that focused 
on the problems of cluster munitions during and after conflict did the issue come back 
on the international agenda. 
Second, NGOs found it more difficult to energize government support for a 
treaty prohibiting cluster munitions since diplomats were somewhat awed with the 
prior success of the landmine campaign and feared that if a similar process were 
launched on cluster munitions, even if it produced satisfactory results in dealing with 
                                                
49 Increased funding resulted, on the one hand, from the need that states that had taken on the leadership 
roles follow on their words with real deeds of financial support, and on the other, from the desire of 
state that had been left out of the process – most prominently the US – to compensate for their loss of 
prestige and prove their humanitarian credentials by augmenting their contribution to mine clearance 
and assistance.
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the humanitarian problems of the weapons, it would still be viewed as a failure 
compared to the Ottawa Process.
Finally, having learned their lessons from the landmine campaign, the military 
opposition in most countries would be better prepared to meet the NGO challenge 
early on. Similarly, the US would act more shrewdly, get involved in discussion on 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) and agree to the adoption of the legally binding 
ERW Protocol in order to keep the process within the CCW and prevent it from taking 
a turn toward alternative fast-track negotiations. However, such tactical concessions to 
NGOs and the states supporting their demands could only temporarily slow down the 
NGO projects. If NGO mobilization persists and garners increasing support among a 
number of states, the tactical concessions either have to turn into a real norm-making 
process or else end and thus give rise to an alternative process when a number of like-
minded states deem the moment propitious to launch it – as manifested in the Ottawa 
Process and the recent Norwegian initiative to negotiate a cluster munition ban. 
Research methods and variable controls
Given the non-independence of the two cases, the “before and after comparison” 
research design, combined with within-case comparisons, and process tracing is the 
most suitable technique to uncover the factors contributing to the success of NGOs on 
different stages of campaigning and early norm development (George and Bennett, 
2005: 166-7; 204-32). 
The success or failure of NGO campaigning would be defined in each country 
case depending on the match between the demands NGOs make and the measures 
governments take as a response. According to this narrow definition of norm 
acceptance, regarding landmines the country cases that can be coded as success are 
Belgium, Canada, France and Norway, and failure – the US. In the cluster munition 
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case, we have success in Belgium and Norway, failure in Canada and France, and a 
mixed situation in the US. Since I am interested in the early stage of norm emergence, 
at the international level a campaign would be considered successful if it generates 
state leadership initiatives in promoting the adoption of international agreements 
addressing the problems of weapons along the lines of NGO demands. The final 
success of creating a new norm would be measured not only by the adoption of an 
international treaty prohibiting the weapons but also by the degree to which their use 
is stigmatized and the norm accepted even by states that refuse to become parties to 
the treaty.50
Examining two cases within the same issue area of conventional weapon 
restrictions allows me to concentrate on the same range of actors involved in the 
negotiations on both landmines and cluster munitions and thus control the effect on the 
outcome of the particular types of organizations. On the other hand, landmines and 
cluster bombs are considerably different in terms of military utility, uses and 
profitability. This allows me to evaluate competing arguments focused on these issue-
specific factors. 
Studying two campaigns (even though similar) within the same country also 
offers a possibility to evaluate the importance of NGO strategies and strength of the 
campaign, given that the values of the domestic institutional variables will be 
relatively stable over the period separating the two campaigns, discounting the 
opportunities for NGO advocacy on cluster munitions created by the first landmine 
campaign. On the other hand, focusing on the same country and two interrelated 
campaigns helps assess the influence of the first campaign on the second, when the 
adoption of the Ottawa Treaty is defined as the break-off point in the “before and 
                                                
50 For example, even though the US is under no legal obligation to do so, it refrains from using, 
producing, and exporting landmines and there is evidence that people in the military consider them an 
illegal weapon.
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after” configuration. Again, the effect of the creation of the first norm on the chances 
of success of the second can only be discerned by controlling for the changes that may 
have occurred in the same period in other relevant variables in the domestic or 
international environment. 
Finally, studying two cases each in the state-dominated and corporatist types of 
domestic structure also provides opportunity to assess the influence of national culture 
or individual factors, given that the institutional environment is approximately, even if 
not exactly, the same. 
Whereas the case selection provides for variation in some of the factors whose 
influence has to be controlled for in order to prove or disprove the alternative 
hypotheses, I rely on process tracing, in-depth case studies, and interviews to uncover 
the causal relations between different factors and the dynamics through which 
weapons restrictions get adopted both at the domestic and international levels.51 In this 
sense, the bias toward selecting countries that have been instrumental in providing 
initial support for the norms (despite their divergent paths and final positions) is 
warranted by the goal of discovering how the process of norm creation is generated. 
The lack of independence among the two cases also is not an insurmountable problem, 
since I am interested in the general process of developing new norms in the area of 
weapons restrictions and the connections among the cases and examined factors could 
help delineate the causal chain that leads to norm creation. Thus, the current study 
does not systematically test existing theories of norm development.  Rather, it 
identifies significant gaps in their coverage, especially at the early stage of norm 
creation, and discovers important processes that they have neglected.  Future 
theoretical development will benefit from taking account of the processes of 
                                                
51 Process tracing is defined as “the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated 
into outcomes,” (George and McKeown, 1985 quoted in Checkel, 2001: 565). The process involves 
tracing backwards the causal mechanism connecting the outcome to its cause  (Van Evera, 1997: 70).
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leadership competition and chain reaction if we are to understand how new norms 
emerge. 
A potential problem in the research design is selection on the dependent 
variable. Even though in the two cases of landmines and cluster munitions, I examine 
stages of failure and success of NGO efforts to obtain their demands, both processes 
reach a tipping point when a state decides to take the lead and call for an alternative 
negotiating process out of the traditional consensus-based fora. This point could be 
defined as success at this early stage of norm emergence on which I focus. The lack of 
variation in the dependent variable poses the danger that the factors, which I identify 
as causally important for success, may also be present in cases where norm emergence 
has not followed. To address this problem, in the final chapter I include a short 
overview of two cases of problematic use of weapons and methods of war – depleted 
uranium weapons and attacks on dual-use targets – that so far have not resulted in 
successful norm development.   
Organization 
The thesis will proceed as follows. In chapter 2, I will provide a historical study of the 
development of regulations on certain conventional weapons with deleterious effects 
during the Cold War and delineate the factors that prevented the adoption of more 
ambitious restrictions advocated by a number of countries. In chapter 3, I will outline 
the major points in the international level campaigns on landmines and cluster 
munitions, focusing on the role of the ICRC and the two international NGO coalitions 
– the ICBL and the Cluster Munition Coalition, and outline the factors facilitating or 
blocking the success of international negotiations. In the next three chapters I will 
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focus on the domestic campaigns that were key in generating support for the creation 
of the international norms (the US – chapter 4, France, Belgium, and Norway –
chapter 5, and Canada – chapter 6). Finally, chapter 7 will conclude with an overview 
of the study findings and their implications for further research.
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PART ONE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES OF NORM FORMATION
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CHAPTER TWO
Weapons Restrictions during the Cold War
Historical origins and development of International Humanitarian Law  
The origins of the principles that inform the laws regulating the conduct of warfare are 
millennia old and their formulation in a comprehensive doctrine dates back at least to 
the 4th century and the work of St. Augustine.52 Their codification in written law 
agreed by a community of states is much more recent, however. In 1864, the Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the 
Field was adopted and in 1868 several states signed the St. Petersburg Declaration that 
prohibited the use of a very specific weapon – a recently invented explosive bullet that 
could cause extremely severe wounds. The ways in which these two first international 
agreements were initiated were very different but both were animated by the desire to 
prevent and alleviate human suffering. 
The 1864 Geneva Convention resulted from the efforts of Henry Dunant, a 
Genevan businessman who had witnessed and tried to alleviate the suffering of 
wounded soldiers left on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859. He later wrote a book 
about his experience and ideas to create relief societies to provide care to soldiers 
wounded in battle. His book became a success and soon he was joined by several 
fellow citizens to form the first relief society in Geneva and then promote in European 
state capitals the idea of international rules that would regulate the conduct of war and 
stipulate the rights and duties of the relief societies (Bugnion, 2004). This was the 
                                                
52 For an extensive and insightful examination of the origins of just war principles and the laws of war, 
see for example, Johnson (1975, 1981).
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beginning of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international 
humanitarian law (IHL) – a remarkable achievement that started as the private 
initiative of Dunant and a number of Genevans, whose cause captured the interest of 
civil society and of the rulers of some countries and got translated in an international 
agreement.53
The St. Petersburg Declaration was also the result of the initiative of a single 
individual intent on limiting suffering on the battlefield, but the process through which 
it came about was the opposite. The Russian tsar Alexander II proposed the banning of 
a bullet invented by the Russian army in 1867 that exploded on impact with a soft 
substance and could be extremely deadly. The prohibition of the bullet in the Russian 
view was dictated by the customary rule according to which the use of arms, 
projectiles and materials of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering was prohibited. 
Thus the first codification of a general principle for the conduct of war was the 
prohibition of a concrete weapon.54 It was deemed necessary to translate a general 
principle into a ban of a rigorously defined weapon to avoid any misunderstandings or 
loopholes for state compliance. Similarly, the next round of codification of the rules of 
armed conflict came about with the 1899 Hague Peace Conference convened on the 
initiative of Tsar Nicholas II, “with the object of seeking the most effective means of 
ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace.” In addition to 
elaborating general principles, the Conference also adopted two Declarations banning 
the use of projectiles diffusing asphyxiating gases and expanding bullets (the so-called 
dum-dum bullets). The objective of the two Declarations was again to give concrete 
expression of existing customary principles against the use of materials causing 
                                                
53 Sixteen states agreed to the 1864 Geneva Convention that included provisions for the protection of 
wounded soldiers, the inviolability of medical personnel, the protective symbol of the Red Cross, and 
the establishment of voluntary relief societies.
54 The prohibited weapon was defined as “any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is 
either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances.”
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unnecessary suffering. 
In this sense, the early development of IHL has been tightly linked to weapons 
prohibitions as a way of clarifying the meaning of principles and ensuring proper 
compliance with them. The other notable features of the process of law development 
at the time were the humanitarian impulses driving the process (whether coming from 
civil society or the top of states) and the adoption of the regulations not with 
consensus but based on the agreement of the majority. This majoritarian principle did 
not prevent the adopted provisions from becoming customary law over time, even 
though the US, for example, never signed the above two declarations, and the major 
military power at the time, Britain, never accepted the declaration on expanding 
bullets and only joined the one on asphyxiating gases eight years after its adoption. 
The other milestone treaties of IHL – the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 
Additional Protocols were initiated again by the ICRC with the purpose of 
ameliorating the conditions of civilians in occupied territories and reaffirming and 
developing general principles of civilian protection during armed conflict, 
respectively. As with the prior IHL agreements, their negotiation was based on rules of 
procedure that provided for majority voting whenever consensus could not be 
achieved.55
The traditional majority-based treaty making in the area of IHL is both curious 
and intrinsically logical. It is curious when looked upon from the perspective of 
military interests and state security that can be significantly affected by rules limiting 
the use of military force and employment of weapons. It is also curious seen in the 
light of arms control and disarmament negotiations during the Cold War when security 
stakes were high and the bipolar system necessitated the agreement of the two bloc 
                                                
55 At the negotiations of the Additional Protocols, “[a]ll decisions on matters of substance taken by the 
plenary Assembly, and particularly the definitive adoption of articles, were subject to a two-thirds 
majority whenever there was no consensus. In the Committees only a simple majority was required” 
(Pictet, 1987b).
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leaders before a treaty could be adopted. On the other hand, from a humanitarian 
perspective, no significant progress (or only a very slow one) could ever be expected 
in the development of new societal norms, including those regarding warfare, if the 
consent of all interested parties were required. As has been argued, the process of 
norm formation has a “tipping point” and the support of a critical mass of states is a 
necessary condition for a norm to claim international status (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998).56
This chapter will examine the attempts by the ICRC and a number of neutral 
countries led by Sweden to achieve international restrictions on the use of certain 
weapons with severe humanitarian effects in the context of bipolarity during the Cold 
War. It will be argued that several factors combined in making possible modest 
progress toward restricting the use and negative effects of such conventional weapons. 
At a practical level, a number of conflicts in the period after WWII, and especially the 
Vietnam War, had demonstrated the inadequacies and the need for improvement of the 
laws of war regarding the conduct of hostilities. The ICRC, an organization with the 
mandate to monitor and work for the development of international humanitarian law 
(IHL), has persistently pointed out the need to enhance civilian protection and regulate 
the conduct of hostilities since the time when the Geneva branch of the laws of war 
dealing with the protection of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians 
was updated with the Geneva Conventions of 1949.57
                                                
56 Formal treaties are not indispensable for the creation of new norms, but they enable the process. To 
the extent that a new legal norm regulating warfare requires states’ approval, there is a great chance that 
it would never pass the “tipping point” and get institutionalized if the consent of all states involved is 
needed.
57 Traditionally, the laws of war have been divided into two branches – the Hague laws, codified in 
1899 and 1907 at the Hague Conferences that regulate the conduct of hostilities, and the Geneva laws 
dealing with the protection of victims of war (the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians) 
that were initiated by the International Red Cross and written into the 1864 Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, updated several times, and 
especially in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Since the 1970s the separation between the two branches is 
less clear-cut as the 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions comprise provisions both on 
the conduct of military operations and victim protection. Rather, there is a nuance in the usage of the 
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However, the ICRC appeals were only heeded after changes in the normative 
and security climate took place in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The normative change 
came with the institutionalization of human rights norms at the UN, whose influence 
then spilled over to the laws of war. The security change came with the easing of 
tensions between the two superpowers during the years of détente, which opened a 
window of opportunity for nonaligned and small neutral states to play a more assertive 
role in the international arena. In particular, using the UN General Assembly as a 
platform from which to voice their concerns, a number of active states led by Sweden 
sought to “humanize” the laws of war to ensure basic human rights on the battlefield 
and shield both civilians and combatants from the excessive cruelty and suffering 
caused by war and certain weapons. However, their efforts were faced with opposition 
from the USA and most NATO countries, which resented any restrictions on their 
military assets and strategies that some of the Swedish proposals entailed. The ICRC 
tried to find a middle ground between these opposing positions and come up with 
practical solutions that would improve civilian protection without losing sight of 
military requirements. It might be argued, however, that in the process of seeking 
compromise, a lot of the initial momentum was lost and the public stigmatization and 
legal prohibition of weapons such as napalm and cluster bombs sought by the 
proponents of restrictions was muffled down in technical discussions and long 
negotiations. Similarly, along the way, the emphasis put by the UN on the protection 
of the human rights of both civilians and combatants during armed conflict was 
replaced by a more limited focus on the protection of civilians against the pernicious 
effects of weapons that animated the ICRC initiative on IHL development as a whole.
                                                                                                                                            
terms “laws of war” or “laws of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law” – the latter 
generally preferred by NGOs and the former by military officers. The difference is based on the 
respective actors’ tendency to see the laws regulating the conduct of warfare as the product of either 
humanitarian impulses or codification of military practices (Evangelista, 2006; Dunlap, 2001). In fact, 
these two aspects of IHL treaty-making are not mutually exclusive but inseparable parts of the process 
of customary international law formation and will be used interchangeably in this work.  
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Whereas public concern over the Vietnam War and the crisis of legitimacy 
suffered by the US, coupled with détente allowed the neutral countries to place the 
issue of weapons restrictions on the international agenda, the decision-making 
procedure based on consensus ensured that the outcome of negotiations would be 
heavily influenced by the major military powers. The question remains, however, to 
what extent could the major powers be swayed by the arguments of the restriction 
proponents and make some concessions? Thus, this chapter will explore the factors 
that shaped the results of international negotiations on weapons and the degree to 
which human rights and humanitarian concerns played a role in the process of 
reaching them.
1950s: the troubled beginnings
The ICRC has been preoccupied with the problem of inhumane weapons that cause 
unnecessary suffering or can endanger the civilian population, including landmines, 
since the 1950s. Initially, its foremost preoccupation was with the looming danger of 
nuclear war. Thus in April 1950 it made an appeal to states parties to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions to prohibit nuclear weapons and indiscriminate weapons in general. In 
1956, in preparation of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross to be held 
in New Delhi in 1957, the ICRC published a draft of fairly specific rules of warfare 
under the title “Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian 
Population in Time of War” (Kalshoven, 1971: 69). 
The use of conventional weapons was not the focus of the Draft Rules but their 
chapter on “Weapons with uncontrollable effects” addressed some of their negative 
effects. It suggested, among other things that minefields be charted and upon the end 
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of hostilities information about their location be handed over to the authorities 
responsible for the safety of the civilian population. In addition, the text stipulated that 
“weapons capable of causing serious damage to the civilian population shall, so far as 
possible, be equipped with a safety device which renders them harmless when they 
escape from the control of those who employ them”  (ICRC, 1956; SIPRI, 1978: 221-
2).58
Thus, as far back as 1956 the ICRC had raised and sought to address some of 
the humanitarian problems caused by conventional weapons and the Draft Rules can 
be seen as the basis from which future discussions of incendiary weapons, landmines 
and other delayed-action weapons would start in the 1970s and eventually end with the 
adoption of restrictions on their use in the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW). However, at the time when they were presented to the attention of 
governments, the Draft Rules did not generate interest. Most states were unwilling to 
commit themselves to rules of civilian protection that would have prohibited the use of 
nuclear weapons and severely restricted area bombing at a time when conventional 
and counter city nuclear bombardment were key in the military strategies of major 
powers (Baxter, 1975: 3, 1977b: 178; Kalshoven, 1971). 
Obviously, in the 1950s the time still was not ripe for developing more 
comprehensive rules for the conduct of hostilities and use of weapons. This was a 
period when the Cold War was just starting, the Soviet Union had embarked upon 
producing nuclear weapons, and states from both the Western and the Eastern block 
were insecure and suspicious of the intentions of their adversaries. The issues of 
conduct of military operations and aerial bombardment had been avoided in the 
                                                
58 Article 14 of the Draft Rules stated that, “the use is prohibited of weapons whose harmful effects --
resulting in particular from the dissemination of incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or 
other agents -- could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the 
control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population. This prohibition also 
applies to delayed-action weapons, the dangerous effects of which are liable to be felt by the civilian 
population.”
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recently concluded Geneva Conventions and major powers such as the US were not 
ready to begin a new round of negotiations that would place restrictions on their 
preferred military strategies. In addition, no support was forthcoming from the UN, 
which at that time had no interest in developing laws for waging war, but aimed at 
outlawing war itself.
The 1960s: New wars, new human rights regimes, and a new role for the UN
The ICRC initiatives
The issue of indiscriminate weapons was brought up again by the ICRC in 1965 at the 
20th International Red Cross Conference that adopted a resolution, pointing out that 
“indiscriminate war constitutes a danger to the civilian population” (Sandoz, 1981, as 
reprinted in Maresca and Maslen: 92-3), although its wording lacked the specificity of 
the 1956 Draft Rules (Baxter, 1975). Following upon that in 1967, in a Memorandum 
to governments regarding the protection of civilians against the dangers of 
indiscriminate warfare, the ICRC posed the question “whether ‘such new weapons as 
napalm and high velocity rockets’ should not be regarded as ‘weapons inflicting 
unnecessary suffering’” (Kalshoven, 1989:255). Continuing with its efforts to upgrade 
the laws of war with a view to enhancing civilian protection, in February 1969 it 
convened a meeting of experts to get their opinions on its initiatives for IHL 
development, which included among other things, questions about the use of napalm, 
fléchettes (high speed barbed missiles) and fragmentation bombs.59
                                                
59 The expert views on whether the use of napalm was permissible were sharply divided and a number 
of experts cautioned the ICRC not to work toward the prohibition of specific weapons but rather remind 
governments of the general principles regulating their use (Kalshoven, 1989:255).
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The period since the 1950s had shown that nuclear deterrence might work but 
at the same it did not prevent conventional wars, and especially internal wars and 
guerrilla warfare that exposed the civilian population to more dangers than ever 
before. Thus, in 1969 ICRC issued a report with a broader scope, also reflected in its 
title – “Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts” (Kalshoven, 1971: 70). The issue of nuclear weapons remained a 
concern but it was toned down given the previous failures to get governments deal 
with it. Weapons regulations as a whole were not the focus of the report, but it 
nevertheless included a statement declaring that “belligerents should abstain from 
using weapons likely to cause unnecessary suffering; which because of their lack of 
precision or their effects, affect civilians and combatants without distinction; whose 
harmful effects were beyond the control, in time or space, of those employing them”
(Sandoz, 1981: 92-3). 
The UN initiatives on humanitarian law
Two developments in particular spurred interest in the development of the laws of 
armed conflict in this period and gave further impetus to the ICRC efforts as well – the 
institutionalization of human rights norms internationally and the Vietnam War. 
The 1960s saw the expansion of human rights norms worldwide and the active 
engagement of the UN in their development and promotion (Draper, 1989:4, 1988:82; 
Cerna, 1989:39; Meron, 2000). After the two major Covenants on civil and political, 
and economic and social rights were adopted in 1966, the UN Human Rights bodies 
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turned their attention to the problem of human rights in armed conflict.60 This 
expansion of interest toward warfare at the UN was occasioned not only by the 
institutionalization of human rights in the organization and the completion of its work 
on the two Covenants, but also by the realization that war had not been banished by 
the adoption of the UN Charter and kept taking an ever heavier toll on the civilian 
population due to the changed nature of armed conflicts and the development of new 
weapons technologies (International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 12 May 
1968, Resolution XXIII; Reed, 1977:18). 
During that period, the Vietnam War loomed large and prompted increasing 
concern about civilian protection and the use of weapons causing excessive injury and 
having indiscriminate effects (Gasser, 1989). The 1967 International War Crimes 
Tribunal initiated by Bertrand Russell to investigate war crimes during the Vietnam 
War generated attention to the use of inhumane weapons. It declared illegal the use of 
antipersonnel fragmentation (cluster) bombs, whose purpose, according to the 
evidence gathered at the Tribunal, was to injure the civilian population (SIPRI, 1978: 
222-3). Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have also 
protested the use of certain weapons in conflicts during that period (Salmon, 1980: 
85), but did not undertake a consistent campaign on the issue. In the US, public 
interest in the use of anti-personnel weapons was stirred by the American Friends 
Service Committee and grassroots anti-war organizations took up local campaigns 
against producers of anti-personnel cluster bombs but these activities remained 
focused mainly locally and did not generate a lot of public or media interest 
(Prokosch, 1995). Whereas these civil society initiatives may have brought some 
public attention to the issue of controversial weapons use in Vietnam, they remained 
                                                
60 In particular, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Third Committee, the Human Rights Division 
of the Secretariat, and the General Assembly were concerned with human rights in armed conflict 
(Baxter, 1973a, 1975).  
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within the context of the anti-war movement and did not aim to influence the 
development of new legal weapons restrictions. Thus, at that point in time NGO 
mobilization transnationally or at the international level did not exist and except for 
the UN no international organizations or negotiating fora existed that could serve as 
focal points of NGO efforts to outlaw the use of inhumane weapons.
The concerns over the effects of weapons use in Vietnam, nevertheless were 
taken up by a number of neutral and nonaligned countries, and found reflection in the 
work of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In 1968, the International Conference on 
Human Rights in Teheran adopted a resolution requesting the UNGA to invite the 
Secretary General to study steps which could be taken to secure the better application 
of existing humanitarian rules and “the need for new international conventions” to 
ensure the protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in war (Baxter, 1975:5), as 
well as “the need for additional humanitarian international conventions . . . to ensure 
the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare” 
(International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 12 May 1968, Resolution 
XXIII). Subsequently, in December 1968, the UNGA adopted a resolution on 
“Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts” that affirmed the principles laid out 
in the 1965 Conference of the Red Cross and charged the Secretary General to 
undertake the studies requested at the Teheran Conference in consultation with the 
ICRC (UNGA, Resolution 2444 (XXIII)). 
As a result, in 1969 and 1970 the Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat 
produced two reports on “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts” that 
identified the areas where the laws of war required further development or 
clarification.61 A section in the first report reviewed previous efforts at introducing 
                                                
61 A third report followed in 1971 but it largely summarized the work at the 1971 Conference of 
government experts convened by the ICRC (Baxter, 1973a: 101; Kalshoven, 1972:19).
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weapons restrictions and made a suggestion that a study examining the legality of the 
use of napalm be conducted – a suggestion repeated in the second report which saw 
such a study of napalm and other incendiary weapons as a first step that would 
“facilitate subsequent action by the United Nations with a view to curtailing or 
abolishing such uses of the weapons in question as might be established as inhumane” 
(quoted in Roach, 1984:7-8). 
Competition between the ICRC and the UN about IHL development
Thus, a sort of competition regarding the promotion of new IHL rules developed 
between the ICRC and the UNGA that was stoked by countries such as Sweden and 
Mexico active on these issues. The interest at the UN contributed to the work of the 
ICRC, and indeed, it has been argued, motivated it to keep the pace, concerned that if 
it failed to produce results, the UNGA might get more actively involved and take the 
lead in the field of special ICRC expertise (Baxter, 1973a, 1975, 1977a,b). This 
concern was felt particularly strongly in the area of weapons restrictions where the 
ICRC was hesitant to push hard for concrete weapon prohibitions, despite its 
inclination to do so, since it was aware that due to their sensitive character, such 
proposals would face strong opposition from the majority of states and might slow 
down the progress of the upcoming diplomatic conference on humanitarian law. On 
the other hand, the ICRC was reluctant to let those issues be dealt with at the UN 
where they would have inevitably got tangled in politicized discussions (Kalshoven, 
1989:256).62
                                                
62 On the different approaches of the ICRC and the UNGA to developing IHL, see also, Forsythe (1975) 
focusing, in particular, on the issue of recognition of national liberation wars as international conflicts 
and the conflicting perspectives of the Western states and Third World and Socialist Countries.
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In its neutral, legal approach to these issues, the ICRC was supported by most 
Western states that dominated the legalistic discourse (Forsythe, 1975). Delegates 
from the USA, for example, appreciated the “beneficial aegis” of the ICRC and its 
ability to steer the process of developing the humanitarian law in an expert and non-
political way (Aldrich, 1984:135). On the other hand, the Third World countries and a 
couple of neutral states such as Sweden sought more public participation in the 
discussions of the laws of war and tried to promote their humanitarian, and in certain 
respects, political agenda at the UN General Assembly. Possibly, the prospect of more 
UNGA involvement with the concomitant politicization of the problems and influence 
of new, developing states in this forum, might have also motivated some countries to 
make concessions that would allow progress at the diplomatic conferences and thus 
preserve the development of humanitarian laws within the ambit of the impartial and 
non-politicized ICRC (Baxter, 1973a: 111). The ICRC for its part tried to isolate the 
valid humanitarian arguments from the influence of short-term political motivations 
and work for the adoption of balanced rules that would provide a degree of protection 
to the civilian population even if not completely shielding it from the dangers of war.
1970s: Détente and a window of opportunity for non-aligned and neutral states 
The period of détente roughly coincided with the time when the initiatives to reaffirm 
and develop international humanitarian law (IHL) were undertaken. As already 
mentioned, several factors combined in allowing for and catalyzing these 
developments – an impetus coming from the human rights community in the UN and 
the persistent interest on the part of the ICRC. The Vietnam War was also a driving 
force in two respects. First, the war together with several other armed conflicts in 
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Africa and the Middle East demonstrated the inadequacy or incompleteness of existing 
rules of IHL, their frequent violation, and the terrible effects of new methods and 
means of warfare on combatants, civilians, and the environment. Second, in the eyes 
of many the justification for and the conduct of the Vietnam War undermined the 
authority of the US as a world power and its legitimacy as a force promoting 
democracy, liberty, and human rights. 
It is not clear, however, if those developments by themselves would have been 
enough to trigger and sustain the process that led to the adoption of two cornerstone 
treaties in IHL – the 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions and the 
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It will be argued that détente was 
also a necessary condition for the conclusion of these international agreements. By 
easing the tension between the two superpowers and lowering the security threats in 
the international environment, détente opened a window of opportunity for smaller, 
neutral and non-aligned states to have their voices heard on the international arena. 
In addition, at that point the developing countries were gaining in strength and 
numbers at the UN and sought an opportunity to assert their role in world politics as 
well. This made possible the formation of a coalition of non-aligned and West 
European neutral countries led by Sweden. The latter countries seized the occasion to 
emerge from the shadow of the Cold War and enhance their image as forces for good 
in international politics – “civil” powers in contrast to the two military blocks in which 
the world was divided. This humanitarian zeal motivated the active Swedish policies 
in developing IHL, but it also overlapped with the military interests of developing 
countries (as well as its own interests as a weak military state), especially regarding 
weapons restrictions. 
However, at the same time that détente opened a window of opportunity for 
non-aligned states to raise their demands and achieve some of them with the help of 
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the socialist countries despite opposition from the Western states, it also made possible 
closer relations between the Cold War rivals and cooperation between the major 
Western and Eastern military powers (Aldrich, 1977, 1984) in defending their mutual 
interests in the case of weapons restrictions. Thus, Sweden, together with a couple of 
other countries, among which Austria, Mexico, and Egypt, forged a coalition of like-
minded states and used the propitious conjuncture of circumstances to raise the issue 
of the need for prohibitions or restrictions on weapons that might cause unnecessary 
suffering or have indiscriminate effects. But even though this group of countries 
managed to bring up and keep the issue alive at the UN and the Diplomatic 
Conference on IHL for almost ten years, after the initial breakthrough their initiatives 
met with only varying degrees of success, as will be shown in the following sections.
1971 Conference of Government Experts on Reaffirmation and Development of IHL
Amidst the growing concern about the need of better regulation of warfare among 
certain states and at the UN, after consultation with the UN Secretary General, the 
ICRC decided to convene a conference of government experts to discuss proposals for 
the development and reaffirmation of IHL. Following a preparatory meeting in March 
1971, the conference took place from 24 May to 12 June 1971 in Geneva. The ICRC 
prepared for discussion eight documents that contained measures regarding protection 
of the civilian population against the dangers of hostilities, rules on the conduct of 
combatants, rules applicable in guerrilla warfare, and on protection of the sick and 
wounded, among others (Kalshoven, 1971).63
                                                
63 The 1969 and 1970 reports of the UN Secretary General on “Respect for Human Rights in Armed 
Conflicts” were also tabled for discussion.
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The ICRC did not include a separate document on possible weapons 
restrictions – a sensitive issue, which it feared might stall progress in other areas – but 
in the chapter dealing with guerrilla warfare it raised the question of “whether 
weapons such as ‘fragmentation bombs’, ‘certain ultra rapid darts,’ certain new types 
of rifle ammunition, ‘mines filled with glass splinters or rusted nails’ and indeed the 
entire range of so called ‘anti-personnel’ weapons should not be made the subject of a 
critical examination” (Kalshoven, 1989: 255). However, a group of experts from 
several countries led by the Swedes were of the opinion that the Conference should 
undertake a study of all weapons that were not discussed at other fora at the time. 
Elaborating upon the ICRC’s initial proposals, this group of experts64 suggested that 
delayed action weapons with indiscriminate effects likely to cause suffering to the 
civilian population, the use of incendiary weapons “in circumstances where they may 
affect the civilian population,” and “bombs which for their effect depend upon 
fragmentation into great numbers of small calibrated pieces or the release of great 
numbers of small calibrated pellets” should be banned (quoted in Kalshoven, 1975: 
80).
A second session of the conference of government experts was scheduled for 
1972 to expand and systematize the work begun on new humanitarian rules and 
provide for better state representation after critiques that only a small number of 
experts from Third World countries participated in the first session.65
In the meantime, the UNGA was watching closely the ICRC initiatives and at 
its 1971 session expressed hope that the second conference of government experts 
would produce recommendations for subsequent action by governments66 and 
                                                
64 The experts were from Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
65 In the first session participated experts from about 40 countries, whereas the ICRC invited all states 
parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the second session (Baxter, 1973a: 101).
66 Resolution 2853(XXVI), introduced by the USA and sponsored by Japan and New Zealand 
(Kalshoven, 1972: 19).
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requested again the Secretary General to present a report on the use of napalm and 
other incendiary weapons.67 The latter report was finally submitted to the 27th session 
of the UNGA in October 1972 and recommended controls on the use of incendiary 
weapons. These recommendations were supported by 22 countries,68 although their 
views regarding the appropriate body to develop such controls varied from the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Diplomatic Conference on 
Humanitarian Law, to the ICRC (Roach, 1984: 9-10). 
1972 Conference of Government Experts on Reaffirmation and Development of IHL
In preparation for the second conference of government experts, the ICRC conducted 
numerous consultations with officials, experts and various organizations and 
distributed two Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on international 
and non-international armed conflicts. The second session of the Conference of 
Government Experts took place from 3 May to 2 June 1972 and was attended by 
delegations from 76 states – almost twice the number of states present at its first 
session.
However, despite the encouragement received from government experts at the 
first session, the ICRC had not included any specific weapons prohibitions in the 
drafted protocols. Instead, it had chosen to reaffirm the principles laid down in the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations that belligerents do not have unlimited rights in the 
                                                
67 This Resolution 2852 (XXVI) also stressed the need “to evolve norms designed to increase the 
protection of persons struggling against colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation and racist 
regimes” and disseminate the “principles of respect for human rights applicable to armed conflicts” and 
was sponsored by 12 states: Austria, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, 
Norway, Peru, Sweden, and Yugoslavia (Kalshoven, 1972: 19).
68 The countries were Australia, Barbados, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, Guatemala, India, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Syria, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada.
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choice of weapons and weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering are 
prohibited. Thus the ICRC hoped to regulate the use of weapons through general rules 
of IHL that would provide for the protection of the civilian population and 
combatants. It argued that if specific weapons bans were to be enacted, that task was 
within the purview of other fora such as the UN or the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament.69
This view was shared by most NATO countries, which were of the opinion that 
if the issue had to be addressed, the most appropriate forum to do so was the 
Conference on Disarmament. Other states, however, thought that the ICRC proposals 
were not sufficient in dealing with the problem of inhumane weapons and sought to 
broaden their scope. A number of neutral and socialist countries suggested the general 
prohibition of “means and methods which affect military objectives and protected 
persons or civilian objects indiscriminately.”70 Several neutral and non-aligned 
countries led by Sweden and Mexico favored more comprehensive weapons 
prohibitions and tabled a proposal for a ban of delayed-action, incendiary weapons 
containing napalm or phosphorous, and fragmentation bombs (Kalshoven, 1972:29-30,
1975:80; Mathews, 2001; Mathews and McCormack, 1999).71 In contrast to their 
proposal at the first session of the conference, this time the ban was not limited to the 
use of incendiaries “in circumstances where they may affect the civilian population,” 
but aimed at a wholesale prohibition.72 The latter countries also argued that the 
prohibition of cruel weapons was entirely within the mandate of the diplomatic 
                                                
69 If no other body would take up the weapons issue, the ICRC declared that it “would then be prepared 
to consider how it could contribute to the studies to be carried out” (quoted in Kalshoven, 1975:81).
70 This proposal was supported by Poland, GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Egypt, Finland, 
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Jordan and Spain. Another proposal envisioning 
the express prohibition of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons was made by Romania and 
Jordan (Kalshoven, 1972:29).
71 The proposal was made by Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.
72 Due to this change in the proposal, the Netherlands withdrew its support for it because its air force 
possessed napalm weapons and it was feared that a total ban might affect NATO tactics (Kalshoven, 
1975: 82). 
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conference on the development and reaffirmation of humanitarian law and should not 
be left to disarmament talks where strategic arguments prevailed. Finally, Sweden 
together with experts from 18 other governments73 asked the ICRC to gather further 
information on weapons and convene a meeting of experts in preparation for the 
Diplomatic Conference to examine “the question of express prohibitions or limitations 
of use of such conventional weapons as may cause unnecessary suffering or may be 
indiscriminate in their effect” (quoted in Kalshoven, 1972: 30; Maresca and Maslen, 
2000: 19). 
Not entirely satisfied by the pace of progress being made by the ICRC on 
weapons, the Swedish government also brought up the issue at the UNGA, and after 
some lobbying on its part, in December 1972, the UNGA adopted Resolution 3032 
(XXVII), which expressed concern, inter alia, over the lack of agreement among 
government experts on the prohibition of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or 
have indiscriminate effects, and requested the Secretary General to prepare a “survey 
of the existing rules of international law concerning the prohibition or restriction of 
use of specific weapons” (Baxter, 1973b: 44).74 Thus, the UNGA interest in the 
weapons issue was demonstrated once again after a resolution from November, which 
made clear that the General Assembly “deplored the use of napalm and other 
incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts” and stressed the need for new rules 
prohibiting the use of certain weapons, and if possible, their elimination through 
disarmament measures (Res. 2932A (XXVII); Kalshoven, 1974:5).
                                                
73 The experts were from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, FR Germany, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and 
Yugoslavia (Kalshoven, 1975: 82).
74 The latter survey was prepared by the Secretariat based on work by R.R. Baxter of the US and Igor 
Blishchenko of the USSR and was submitted to the UNGA in November 1973 (Kalshoven, 1975, 
fn.28). The report of the existing international rules on weapons concluded that “[t]he law was, to put 
the matter bluntly, an ineffective instrument for establishing some control on the use of weapons, even 
if a good-faith effort were made to apply it” (Baxter, 1977a: 47).  
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1973 ICRC Expert Meetings: a limited victory for Sweden and the non-aligned 
countries  
In carrying out the request to organize an expert meeting on weapons, the ICRC 
convened two sessions (26 February – 2 March and 12-15 June 1973), which focused 
on providing a general overview of the technical characteristics and military uses of 
several types of weapons, including mines and fragmentation cluster bombs, without 
analyzing, however, these issues in relation to IHL rules (Maresca and Maslen, 20-1). 
The meetings paid a lot of attention to the antipersonnel effects of weapons liable to 
cause severe injuries and unnecessary suffering to combatants, as well as, to weapons 
that by nature could not be directed at specific targets (Kalshoven, 1974:19). 
Landmines did not draw particular attention and the report from the meeting 
noted that, “casualties from mines [among both combatants and noncombatants] 
…have normally been quite low in proportion to casualties from other weapons” 
(ICRC Report on the work of experts, 1973, reprinted in Maresca and Maslen, 41). 
Moreover, in its conclusion the report suggested that state review and action might be 
appropriate regarding incendiaries, high-velocity small arms ammunition, and certain 
fragmentation weapons, but did not mention landmines (Maresca and Maslen, 43). 
However, a problem of the expert meeting, whose influence would be felt later 
in the process of negotiating weapons restrictions, was that experts from states 
favoring prohibitions were over-represented, while military experts from the major 
powers and most Western states did not contribute to its discussions.75 Sweden was 
                                                
75 The same had been a problem with the study group on incendiaries convened by the UN Secretary 
General to which only Sweden from the Western countries sent an expert (Kalshoven, 1975:83). The 
other experts came from Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Peru, Nigeria, Romania and the USSR (Blix, 
1973:156; Kalshoven, 1974, fn.5). 
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particularly engaged in the problem of weapon prohibitions76 and its representative 
Hans Blix influenced the conclusions of the report that the gathered information 
provided good reasons for “restrictions upon [the] operational use or even prohibition” 
of the above weapons. The ICRC, concerned that such statements were too rash, 
cautioned in the introduction of the report that it was “purely documentary in 
character” and offered to continue the inquiries and convene another conference with a 
view to promoting IHL with regard to weapons use (quoted in Kalshoven, 1975:83, 
1974:19-20). 
Despite the ICRC’s caution and opposition from most Western states and the 
US, which till that moment had refused to participate in the expert meetings on 
weapons, Sweden and a number of non-aligned countries kept pushing for a study of 
possible weapons prohibitions both at the UN and within the Red Cross Movement. 
Whereas Sweden was seeking prohibitions on certain weapons not only because of 
their adverse impact on the civilian population but also because of their cruel 
antipersonnel effects on combatants, the US and most NATO countries77 were only 
willing to discuss the use of weapons in connection to their impact on civilians but not 
the use of certain weapons as a whole. 
                                                
76 Shortly after the Secretary General study on napalm was prepared, in 1972 the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) came up with an Interim Report on Napalm and other 
Incendiary Weapons: Legal and Humanitarian Aspects. In 1973 after convening a study group of 
military and medical experts, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published another report entitled 
“Conventional weapons, their deployment and effects from a humanitarian aspect” that recommended 
prohibitions and restrictions on the use of small-calibre high velocity projectiles, fragmentation 
warheads, fléchette warheads, landmines, booby traps, and incendiary weapons (Prokosch, 1995:148; 
Roach, 1984: 11). That report included very detailed weapons descriptions and recommendations. For 
example, regarding fragmentation weapons, the rules, aimed at limiting wounding effects and suffering, 
prohibited the employment of substances that had serious toxic effects and fragments non-detectable by 
X-ray. In addition, they included instructions about weapon construction that would ensure that “only a 
limited percentage of the persons affected by the explosion will be hit by four or more segments with a 
certain energy.” To limit the indiscriminateness of cluster bombs, additional rules were stipulated: “use 
only against well-localized military targets within an area of no more than one square kilometer; no 
dropping of certain clusterbombs from airplanes or helicopters nor launching of such weapons by 
missiles or unguided heavy rockets; prohibition of the use of clusterbombs which eject a great number 
of small fragments” (Kalshoven, 1974:20).
77 Norway made an exception in the NATO camp, favoring instead the position of Sweden and the non-
aligned countries.
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The two groups of countries also placed different weight on strategic military 
considerations and humanitarian concerns in formulating their arguments, and 
respectively, favored different forums for discussion – the non-aligned wanted the 
Diplomatic Conference on humanitarian law to deal with the weapons issue and were 
trying to get more public involvement on those questions, whereas the Western states 
preferred the route of quiet diplomacy within an arms control forum such as the 
Conference on Disarmament (Kalshoven, 1975:84-5; Blix, 1973: 149, 155; Cassese, 
1979b: 476). The position of the socialist countries fell somewhere in between –
whereas publicly they supported far-reaching restrictions on conventional weapons 
and the demands of the Third World countries, they preferred that the Conference on 
Disarmament tackle those issues (Fenrick, 1981:239; Cassese, 1975, fn.57).78
Eventually, the non-aligned group managed to get through its proposal for a 
weapons study after negotiations between the representatives of the two major 
positions – George Aldrich of the US and Hans Blix of Sweden. The agreement was 
reached at the 22nd International Conference of Red Cross, which passed a resolution 
inviting the upcoming Diplomatic Conference to “to begin consideration at its 1974 
session of the question of prohibition or restriction of the use of conventional weapons 
which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects” and requesting 
                                                
78 In the course of discussions at the First and Sixth Committees of the UNGA in 1973, the USSR 
declared that “it was necessary to prohibit certain particularly cruel methods of warfare, and the USSR 
had always supported the United Nations efforts to that end. However, the question of deciding which 
types of weapons should be prohibited on the grounds that they caused unnecessary suffering… should 
be resolved within the framework of the question of arms limitations and disarmament” (quoted in 
Cassese, 1975: 33, fn. 56). Despite such public pronouncements in favor of weapons prohibitions, most 
commentators doubt their sincerity and see the Soviet Union and most socialist states as sharing the 
same interests with the western countries and thus their positions as equally obstructionist or simply a 
subterfuge to blame the lack of progress on the more outspoken Western countries. See for, example, 
Cassese, 1979a: 184, 1979b: 476; Condorelli, 1979:395-6, Ciobanu, 1979:400, 422-27; Baxter, 1977a: 
51-3; the views expressed by Cassese and Obradovic in Cassese (ed.) (1980), p. 77 and p.82-3. 
Romania took a different position from the rest of the Warsaw Pac countries, favoring the study by the 
Diplomatic Conference not only of the effects of “conventional weapons, but also all weapons which 
might cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, including nuclear weapons” (quoted 
in Ciobanu, 423, emphasis in original). 
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the ICRC to convene a conference of government experts to study in depth the same 
question (Kalshoven, 1974:23). Simultaneously, the UNGA adopted a resolution to 
the same effect, but with a slightly stronger message – it asked the Diplomatic 
Conference not only to consider these questions, but also “to seek agreement on rules 
prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons” (Kalshoven, 1974:24, emphasis 
added; Res. 3076 (XXVIII)).
After more negotiations between the representatives of Sweden, the USA and 
Canada, the mandate of the ICRC meeting of government experts on conventional 
weapons was agreed and it was scheduled for the fall of 1974 (Kalshoven, 1975:84). 
In addition, although a separate committee on weapons was not envisioned for the 
Diplomatic Conference, at the insistence of the Swedish group, it was decided that the 
Conference would also discuss weapons issues and an Ad Hoc Committee on 
Conventional Weapons was established to consider the question of prohibiting or 
restricting the use of certain weapons, including antipersonnel landmines and 
fragmentation (cluster) bombs (Kalshoven, 1974:29; Mathews, 2001; Maresca and 
Maslen, 19-89).
One of the reasons why the USA finally relented to the idea of a study of 
conventional weapons appears to have been the result of a change in tactics. 
Previously, the USA had opposed the discussions of weapons issues and refused to 
participate in the 1973 expert meetings.79 However, this boycott did not prevent the 
                                                
79 The US saw the weapons issue through the lens of strategic considerations – states that relied 
predominantly on manpower would favor restrictions on weapons possessed by technologically 
developed states such as the US. In addition, it held that any weapon can be used indiscriminately and 
even WMD could be used discriminately. Thus, efforts to impose prohibitions on specific weapons 
based on the criterion that they caused unnecessary suffering or were indiscriminate were in the US 
view misconceived and could hardly produce but an “embarrassingly brief” list of prohibited weapons. 
A better approach in this view was the institution of legal reviews of newly developed weapons (e.g. 
Aldrich, 1973: 148). Understandably, the US opposition to specific weapon bans flowed also from the 
fact that most of the weapons, which were being targeted for prohibitions, were employed by it in the 
Vietnam War and their eventual prohibition would have meant that the US had used (and was still using 
at the time of the talks) illegal and inhumane weapons. Due to the same considerations, the US was 
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meeting from taking place. Instead, the result was that representatives of states 
supporting comprehensive weapons restrictions dominated it and the issue didn’t go 
away but was kept by the non-aligned states in the focus of the UNGA and within the 
Red Cross. Thus, the US change of mind seems to have come from a realization that it 
was better to participate in and influence the course of the talks instead of remaining 
aloof and letting the weapons issue gather more momentum.80 Indeed, there were 
grounds for concern that if the issue was not addressed under the aegis of the ICRC 
and within the framework of the Diplomatic Conference, the UN General Assembly 
might proceed on its own and only politicize the issue further. In addition, the fallout 
from the Vietnam War had already undermined the prestige of the US and its military 
and the US use of controversial weapons, and particularly napalm, was very much in 
the focus of public opinion. Thus it has been argued that the US was motivated to 
participate in the talks for IHL development not only to see its parts dealing with POW 
protection and the status of protecting powers strengthened (since in Vietnam US 
soldiers had suffered from non-observation of these rules) (Reed, 1978: 9), but also to 
clear the tarnished image of its military by demonstrating that they had acted in 
Vietnam in accordance with the laws of war and had even followed restrictions not 
required by international law (Aldrich, 1984:132).
1974 Lucerne Conference: the US and the Western states turn the tables
When the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional 
                                                                                                                                            
careful to point out that provisions discussed for inclusion in the 1980 CCW did not codify customary 
law but were contractual agreements (e.g., Matheson, 1979:158).
80 Similarly, Roach (1984:4) states that even though in the 1970s the US was “not particularly desirous 
of concluding a weapons agreement,” “ultimately participated fully in the weapons negotiations with a 
view to shaping the results” and entered the CCW negotiations as a “holding action.”
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Weapons convened in Lucerne (28 September – 18 October 1974),81 the participation 
of Western experts shifted the balance between states favoring and opposing weapons 
restrictions and changed the terms of the debate. The Conference had two major tasks: 
to clarify the criteria that determine the legality or illegality of weapons, and examine 
several weapon categories from military and medical perspectives with a view to 
assessing their compliance with the general legal principles and the desirability of 
introducing specific weapon prohibitions or restrictions.82
Regarding general legal principles, differences of opinion existed between the 
Swedish and the Western groups of states. In clarifying the meaning of the concept of 
“unnecessary suffering,” the Swedish representative defended a limited understanding 
of the military necessity that does not render suffering unnecessary, whereas the US 
and a number of Western states argued that the suffering caused by military force 
would be justified by a much larger set of factors.83 Similarly, there was a division 
regarding the concept of indiscriminateness. The western experts claimed that there 
were no conventional weapons that by their nature were indiscriminate. Instead, the 
effects of weapons depended on their mode of employment, and thus, rules should be 
elaborated with a view to placing restrictions on methods of use and not on categories 
of weapons as a whole. In contrast, the group of experts led by Sweden argued that 
intrinsically indiscriminate weapons existed and both these and weapons “whose 
normal or typical use would be one which had indiscriminate effects” should be 
banned (quoted in Kalshoven, 1975:91). 
                                                
81 The Conference was attended by some 150 experts from 49 countries (Kalshoven, 1975: 89).
82 The weapons under consideration were incendiary weapons, small-calibre projectiles, blast and 
fragmentation weapons, delayed action and treacherous weapons, future weapons (Kalshoven, 1975: 
94).
83 For details on the US position on military necessity, see Kalshoven (1989:261), Robblee (1976:118-
19), Aldrich (1973: 148), Prugh (1974:266), Paust (1974: 230). On the Swedish position, see Blix 
(1988:138). For a general treatment of the concept of unnecessary suffering, see Dienstein (2004:59), 
for its interpretation and application to weapons restrictions, Cassese (1975), and Clark (1998) for a 
more recent examination of the principle in connection with the debates during the drafting of the ICC 
statute.
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Despite these different points of departure, the discussion of specific weapons 
might have yielded some results if the basic information about their functioning and 
effects was agreed. In fact, the states favoring restrictions expected that the 
Conference would proceed based on the data contained in the study of napalm and 
other incendiary weapons by the UN Secretary General, the 1973 report of the ICRC 
expert meeting, and a Swedish working paper submitted to the Diplomatic Conference 
in February 1974. These reports, however, had been written without input from 
Western states, which at that point took the occasion to challenge their factual findings 
and accuracy. Thus the talks on specific weapons degenerated into highly technical 
disputes about the type of wounds small-calibre projectiles cause and the factors that 
determine their effects on the human body, the precision of incendiary weapons, and 
the precision, area coverage and wounding effects of cluster munitions. The merits of 
the arguments US and other western experts put forward regarding the functioning and 
effects of weapons were difficult to assess, since for the most part these weapons were 
stocked and used only by the same Western states. Whereas some of the factual 
information in the 1973 ICRC report regarding small-calibre weapons might have 
been exaggerated or based on insufficient testing, the claims of western experts 
regarding cluster munitions, for example, aimed at discrediting data provided by the 
Swedish experts that were actually accurate.84
Regarding fragmentation weapons, the Swedish experts were of the view that 
antipersonnel cluster bombs and fléchette weapons, which caused unnecessary 
suffering and had indiscriminate effects, should be prohibited, and together with a 
                                                
84 The US experts claimed that cluster bomblets were not that deadly and their footprints were not as 
large as claimed by the Swedish experts (approximately, 300 by 900 meters), which in fact was less 
than their real area coverage. Similarly, the UK experts asserted that the footprint of the newly 
developed BL755 cluster bomb had area coverage of less than 100 by 100 meters, whereas more recent 
data showed that it actually was 100 times larger (Wiebe, 2000, p.152 -55; Prokosch, 1995: 151-2). 
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number of countries tabled a proposal to discuss the issue.85 However, the Western 
representatives sought to debunk by all means the accuracy of the assertions 
underlying the Swedish ban proposal. 
In the case of landmines, proposals were made regarding the marking and 
clearance of minefields after the end of hostilities. Scatterable mines, in particular, 
were perceived as posing a more serious danger to both friendly forces and civilians 
and some experts called for their prohibition, whereas others proposed that they be 
fitted with self-destruct mechanisms (Maresca and Maslen, 54-60). 
Thus at the Lucerne Conference, partly as a result of the influence of Western 
states, more attention shifted toward the mine problem and its impact on civilians, and 
arguments about weapons restrictions as a whole began emphasizing the protection of 
civilians against the dangerous effects of weapons at the expense of limiting the 
suffering inflicted upon combatants.86
1976 Lugano Conference: change in focus from unnecessary suffering to civilian 
protection
In contrast to the general discussions at Lucerne, the task before the second session of 
the Conference was to identify a list on weapons, which might become the subject of 
prohibitions or restrictions on their use and formulate the substantive form, which such 
prohibitions could possibly take. However, at this important stage when actual 
restrictions had to be worked out, the attendance of the conference was lower 
                                                
85 The proposal to address the issue of submunitions initially came from Sweden supported by Egypt, 
Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, later to be joined by Algeria, Austria, Lebanon, 
Mali, Mauritania, and Venezuela (Herby and Nuiten, 2001).
86 In fact, in the debate about mines at Lucerne, the principle of unnecessary suffering was not even 
brought up. Instead arguments focused on the perfidy and indiscriminateness of mines (Kalshoven, 
1984:384).
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compared to that at Lucerne and representatives from only about 10 Third World 
countries participated.87 On the other hand, this time the Western countries not only 
participated, but also put forward written proposals for discussion. Their proposals 
featured much more limited restrictions compared with the Swedish working paper 
that had been the basis for deliberations at the previous session and thus the referent 
points in the debate in Lugano changed. For example, the Swedish group aimed at a 
comprehensive ban on the use of incendiary weapons (except for anti-materiel 
munitions combining incendiary and penetration or fragmentation effects), whereas 
the Western proposal sought only to limit the use of incendiaries in areas of civilian 
concentrations, which was still allowed against military targets in such areas as long as 
“all feasible precautions” were taken to confine their effects to the military objective 
and avoid incidental civilian damage (Kalshoven, 1976:199-200).88
The question of landmines emerged as a major issue for the first time at 
Lugano. The interest in landmines and other delayed action weapons resulted in large 
measure from two factors – on the one hand, booby traps and time bombs were widely 
used by terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s and were a problem in the Vietnam War, in 
particular, and on the other, the development of remotely delivered mines during the 
same period led to concerns that they could be used indiscriminately as an offensive 
weapon (Carnahan, 1984: 75). 
The most watered-down proposal came from the Western camp and envisioned 
                                                
87 Experts from 40 as against 49 states at Lucerne participated. However, representatives from the 
World Health Organizations and SIPRI also attended and took active part in the work of the Conference  
(Kalshoven, 1976:198).
88 Other proposals at the Conference included a wholesale prohibition of incendiaries by Mexico, a 
prohibition of the use of incendiaries against personnel targets, but not against military objects by 
Norway, and a proposal from the Netherlands, cosponsored by Denmark and Australia, which sought to 
reconcile the Swedish and Western positions by suggesting that “it is prohibited to make any city, town, 
or other area containing a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of any incendiary 
munition” (quoted in Baxter, 1977a: 54). However, the Dutch proposal did not go farther than the 
general prohibition against attacks of civilian objects and thus did not succeed in bridging the two 
opposite views, even though it gathered more support at the 1976 session of the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Diplomatic Conference (Kalshoven, 1976: 200).
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some weak restrictions on the use of landmines in civilian areas or technical measures 
to make remotely delivered mines detectable and self-destructing after a set period of 
time. 82).89 On the other hand, Sweden and 12 other countries90 suggested that the 
delivery of anti-personnel landmines by aircraft be banned altogether (Maresca and 
Maslen, 86-7).
Thus, the difference between the Western and the Swedish approaches became 
manifest with regard to this problem as well.91 The Western states proposed only 
limited restrictions on the use of landmines with a view to enhancing civilian 
protection to the extent allowable by military requirements. In contrast, Sweden aimed 
at more comprehensive prohibitions that would ban a whole class of new, militarily 
important mines, thus enhancing the protection of both civilians and combatants from 
their negative effects at the expense of military interests, especially those of the major, 
technologically developed powers that possessed those weapons.
With regard to cluster bombs, Sweden and another 12 countries92 made a 
proposal to ban the use of antipersonnel (as against anti-materiel and combined 
effects) bombs93 because they “tend to have both indiscriminate effects and to cause 
unnecessary suffering” (quoted in Mennonite Central Committee, 2001) and their use 
                                                
89 The proposal was made by the UK, the Netherlands, and France, and suggested that if mines were 
used in population areas where combat was not taking place, they should be “placed on or in the close 
vicinity of a military objective; or due precautions are taken to protect civilians from their effects” 
(Maresca and Maslen, 85). The proposal also (somewhat unrealistically) envisaged that it “would be 
possible to mark the location of remotely delivered mines through the use of markers such as flags or 
pyrotechnic flares, delivered simultaneously with the mines;” alternatively such mines could 
incorporate a self-destruct or neutralization mechanism (Maresca and Maslen, 82).
90 The countries were Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, 
Switzerland, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
91 The Western and the Swedish groups of states were the only actively engaged in the weapons 
discussions at this point.
92 The proposal was made by Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, 
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, as a part of a comprehensive document 
submitted to the conference (Wiebe, 2000: fn.313).
93 The definition of the cluster bombs prohibited for use was “Anti-personnel cluster warheads or other 
devices with many bomblets which act through the ejection of a great number of small-calibred 
fragments or pellets” (quoted in Baxter, 1977a: 58).
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aroused “public concern” (Wiebe, 2000:154).94 However, delegates opposed to a 
prohibition of fragmentation cluster bombs not only disputed the figures about their 
area coverage, but also argued that these weapons “represented an improvement from 
the humanitarian point of view over weapons with random fragmentation,” and were 
particularly useful in defensive situations (Wiebe, 2000:155). 
Thus, what transpired at Lugano in the end, was that the widest gap between 
the positions of the two groups existed regarding weapons with the highest military 
value and unclear status regarding either the principle of indiscriminateness or 
unnecessary suffering. Given the positions of the Western countries, it became clear 
that the greatest chances of adopting restrictions existed for weapons with limited 
military utility and the most severe impact on civilians. Thus, even though Sweden 
was intent on placing restrictions on the use of small calibre projectiles, their high 
military value, precision and questionable degree of inhumane wounding effects, made 
them an easy target for the counterarguments of Western states. Similar was the 
situation with fuel air explosives and fragmentation cluster bombs, whose employment 
was much more problematic on account of both their indiscriminateness and the 
suffering they caused, but their real effects were surrounded by even more uncertainty 
and lack of information than those of small calibre projectiles. Where the effects of 
militarily valuable weapons such as incendiaries were both graphic, better documented 
and strongly opposed by public opinion, there was at least some common ground on 
                                                
94 The supporters of the cluster bomb ban elaborated further: “At detonation a vast number of small 
fragments or pellets are dispersed evenly covering a large area with a high degree of probability of 
hitting any person in the area. The effect of such a detonation on unprotected persons - military or 
civilian - in the comparatively large target area is almost certain to be severe with multiple injuries 
caused by many tiny fragments. Multiple injuries considerably raise the level of pain and suffering. 
They often call for prolonged and difficult medical treatment and the cumulative effect of the many 
injuries increases the mortality risk. . . . It has been suggested that cluster bomb units may have 
indiscriminate effects not because of their construction but rather because of their operational use. 
However, when the normal weapon effect is so extensive as to cover areas of several square kilometers 
in an attack by a single aircraft, these weapons are hardly capable of use anywhere without hitting 
civilians incidentally” (quoted in Wiebe, 2000:155).
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restricting their use in areas where civilians could be injured. In view of the more 
limited military utility of landmines, some restrictions on their use were achievable 
even without pressure from public opinion. At that point, a proposal from Sweden and 
Switzerland for a ban on the use of weapons dispersing fragments that could not be 
detected in the human body by the usual medical methods stood to garner most wide-
ranging support (Kalshoven, 1976:23) given the very low military utility and the 
superfluous injuries such weapons were bound to cause.95
1974-1977 Sessions of the Diplomatic Conference and provisions on means and 
methods of warfare
Most of the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on conventional weapons, as well 
as those in the other Committees dealing with the general principles applicable to 
means of warfare (unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate attacks), followed closely 
the debates that had unfolded in the two conferences of government experts in Lucerne 
and Lugano.96 The sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee were often occupied by lengthy 
statements by the Swedish representative, Hans Blix, which did not, however, provoke 
reactions from most of the other delegates (Kalshoven, 1989:266; Baxter: 1977a: 51). 
Thus, after four sessions, the Committee had not adopted any specific texts. 
Nevertheless, it was noted that there was “agreement” about a prohibition of non-
detectable fragments, “a wide area of agreement” with regard to land-mines and 
booby-traps, and need to further narrow down the divergent views existing about the 
                                                
95 Although at the time of the proposal it was believed that US forces had used such weapons in 
Vietnam, in fact they had not been either employed or produced (Cassese, 1986: 269; Burke, 1981: 
fn.4).
96 For a summary of the debates in Committee III (rules on the conduct of warfare) and provisions on 
means and methods of warfare in Additional Protocol I, see Kalshoven (1978:146-53) and Pictet 
(1987a: 387-410, 421-28).
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desirability of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons. It was 
further mentioned that the effects of small calibre projectiles and certain blast and 
fragmentation weapons had been examined and considerations had begun on the 
possibility of prohibiting or restricting the use of those weapons (Kalshoven, 
1978:153-4). 
More controversy arose over the possibility of instituting an international 
review mechanism for the legality of newly developed weapons. Committee III of the 
Conference had settled down on Article 36 of Protocol I, which stipulated that the 
development of weapons should be examined by the respective national authorities to 
make sure that new weapons don’t violate any applicable rules of international law.97
However, at the second session of the Diplomatic Conference, some states, among 
which, Pakistan and Sweden, argued that national legal reviews “should be 
supplemented by international machinery” (Kalshoven, 1978:156-7, emphasis in 
original).98 Then in April 1977 when the text of Protocol I had already been worked 
out, Mexico tabled a proposal in Committee I for a new Article 86bis, which provided 
for the establishment of a Committee of States Parties, which would “consider and 
adopt recommendations regarding any proposal that one or more States Parties may 
submit concerning the prohibition or restriction of the use of conventional weapons 
that may cause superfluous injuries or have indiscriminate effects” (Kalshoven, 
1978:158). The Western group was strongly opposed to the proposal, attacked it on a 
couple of procedural grounds and finally countered it by a proposal of its own – to 
delete the proposed article and instead include a recommendation that a conference be 
                                                
97 Protocol I, Article 36: “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or 
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.”
98 A number of other proposals circulated both at the Lugano Conference and in the 1976 Session of the 
Ad Hoc Committee that envisioned setting up a mechanism for review conferences on conventional 
weapons by a clause in the Additional Protocol or the creation of a separate institute which would 
gather information about weapon effects (Kalshoven, 1978:157).
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convened to search for agreements on restrictions or prohibitions on the use of specific 
weapons. Whereas the original proposal made its way into the plenary meeting, there 
it failed to muster the required support of two-thirds of the votes (Kalshoven, 
1978:160; Pictet, 1987a: 422). 
Nevertheless, some compromise was reached, as reflected in the adoption of 
Resolution 22, “Follow-up regarding prohibition or restriction of use of certain 
conventional weapons,” which recommended that a Conference of Governments 
should be convened no later than 1979 “with a view to reaching agreements on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons” and 
“agreement on a mechanism for the review of any such agreements and for the 
consideration of proposals for further such agreements” (Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva, Resolution 22; Kalshoven, 1978:154; Sandoz, 1981: 94; SIPRI, 1978: 254-5). 
Thus, even though neither weapons restrictions nor the article setting up an 
international committee to develop such restrictions in the future were included in 
Protocol I, the issue was not transferred to the Conference on Disarmament or just left 
to die. The UNGA supported the establishment of a separate UN Conference on 
Conventional Weapons that not only was tasked with reaching agreement on concrete 
restrictions, but also with creating a mechanism through which future problems arising 
from the use of certain weapons could be discussed and addressed.
1978-1980 Negotiations of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Two preparatory sessions for the UN Conference on conventional weapons took place 
in September 1978 and March-April 1979, but delegates failed to agree on any 
substantive issues and devoted most of their time to procedural questions – the major 
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among those the adoption of a voting procedure. Resolution 22 urged that in its work 
the Conference “should, in each case, seek the broadest possible agreement.” In the 
opinion of the Western states that meant that all decisions should be made by 
consensus, if the achieved agreements were to have any real importance. In contrast, 
the states seeking more comprehensive restrictions argued that consensus voting 
would be “tantamount to bowing to the will of an erring minority” (Kalshoven, 
1978:155). The two groups did not agree on the decision-making rules, and as a result, 
no votes were taken at the Preparatory Conference and the main Conference that 
followed it. Instead, “decisions were reached on the basis of an unofficial, and 
undefined, consensus,” which in practice favored the Western position and allowed a 
small group or even single states to block consensus on issues supported by the 
majority (Fenrick, 1981:238-9; Szasz, 1980:212).
As in the preceding conferences of government expert and the preparatory 
sessions of the Conference, wide disagreement existed on a series of issues between 
the Western states and the group of countries supporting the Swedish positions. Apart 
from the prohibition of non-detectable fragments, some overlap between the positions 
of the two groups existed only regarding restrictions on landmines. After dropping its 
proposal to ban antipersonnel cluster bombs, Sweden concentrated its efforts on 
securing prohibitions on the use of incendiary weapons and small-calibre, high-
velocity projectiles. With respect to incendiaries, however, the Western states were 
only willing to accept restrictions on their use in civilian areas and the USA was 
objecting even to that point till very late in the negotiations. In the face of the adamant 
Western opposition and unclear stance of the socialist countries, the proponents of 
restrictions persisted in calling for more negotiations, which lasted as long as they did 
mainly due to the perseverance of the Swedes, who according to Fenrick (1981:240), 
“expected to gain more concessions by prolonging the agony.” Indeed, the US 
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concession on the provision prohibiting the use of incendiary weapons in populated 
areas came in only in the last week of the second session of the Conference, 
immediately followed by consent from the Soviet Union as well (Kalshoven, 1989: 
268; Roach, 1984:39).
In the course of the Conference it was not even possible to achieve an 
agreement on whether the adopted restrictions on non-detectable fragments, 
landmines, and incendiaries were accepted because these weapons “may be deemed to 
be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,” as the title of the 
Convention, adopted after long debates, suggests. The US argued against this 
proposition and maintained that the Convention was just a contractual agreement 
whose provisions did not codify customary law, as the opposite view would have 
implied that in the past states had used illegal weapons or employed them in an illegal 
manner (Fenrick, 1981:240; Roach, 1984:16-17).
The final issues over which the positions of the nonaligned, the Western 
countries, and in this case, also of the Socialist states, clashed were the procedures for 
review and amendment, and for the entry into force of the Convention. Given the 
limited progress achieved on their major proposals, the nonaligned states were 
vigorously promoting the establishment of a review mechanism that would allow the 
reopening of discussions in the near future with a view to taking up the unresolved 
issues of restrictions on the antipersonnel use of incendiaries and small-calibre 
projectiles. To achieve this goal, the Swedish group was opposed to having the 
Committee on Disarmament deal with the problem of conventional weapons. It was 
also trying to set the requirement for the entry into force of the Convention at a small 
number of ratifications in order to ensure that a review conference would take place as 
soon as possible. In contrast, the Western states and the USA preferred to settle the 
question of conventional weapons once and for all, and short of that, push any new 
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considerations far in the future, and retain control over their outcomes.99 Both the 
Socialist and Western countries wanted to transfer the matter of future discussions to 
the Committee on Disarmament where they could exert most leverage and argued for 
procedures that would delay the entry into force of the Convention and hold off the 
time of a future review conference.100
The compromise decision was a mixed bag. Whereas it was agreed that 
amendments and new protocols would be considered by review conferences within the 
same framework as the original Convention, instead of the Conference on 
Disarmament, consensus would be required for their adoption (Roach: 40), which gave 
states opposed to new developments the power to block them. The interests of the 
major powers were also served by the provisions regarding entry into force: it was 
agreed that the Convention would enter into force six months after the 20th ratification 
and a review conference to consider amendments or new protocols “could not meet 
unless and until requested by a majority of the States parties, including at least 18 
States.” If ten years after the Convention’s entry into force no review conference had 
been convened, it could be called on the request of any party (Roach: 53-54).
Despite these provisions pushed through by the Western states to ensure that 
no changes or additions to the Convention could be made in the nearby future – and as 
it was believed at the time, not before the mid-1990s at the earliest (Roach: 40) – it has 
been argued that the establishment of the review mechanism was one of the most 
significant results of the CCW (Fenrick, 1981:155). In view of the role this 
                                                
99 For example, the US delegation report from the Conference states that  “Since the incendiaries and 
other weapons protocols were deemed to be significant, the review and amendment procedures were 
designed to be difficult to activate in the near future and unlikely to produce any significant changes” 
(quoted in Roach, 39-40). 
100 The Western states also aimed at a high number of ratifications for the entry into force, the 
agreement of the majority of states parties to a review conference, and the passing of considerable time 
before it could be convened. The socialist countries even had a proposal that the ratification of all 
permanent members of the Security Council be required for the entry into force of the Convention 
(Roach, 1984: 39-43, 53-55).
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meachanism played as a catalyzer for the ban on antipersonnel landmines and blinding 
lasers in the 1990s and the continous work of the Conference regarding explosive 
remnants of war and anti-vehicle mines, it could be said that the accuracy of Fenrick’s 
assessment has been born out by the time, especially against the background of the 
otherwise modest influence of the Convention in restricting the use of landmines, 
incendiaries or other weapons that “may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to 
have indiscriminate effects.”101
Summary: obstacles to achieving weapons regulations in the 1970s 
The proponents of strengthening IHL who had argued for more encompassing 
weapons regulations deemed the adopted protocols very weak, upholding military 
interests at the expense of humanitarian considerations and leaving the military ample 
opportunity for evasion of even the partial limitations that were agreed (Mathews, 
2001: 994-6). Sweden and its group of supporters had sought prohibitions on the use 
of incendiary weapons, air-delivered mines, small calibre projectiles, and 
fragmentation cluster bombs but only got some restrictions on the first two categories 
of weapons. Even so, the problem with antipersonnel landmines was not adequately 
dealt with and was only aggravated following the 1970s as new production methods 
and trade made landmines smaller, cheaper and readily available, while new delivery 
platforms scattered them in greater numbers and made them harder to detect 
(Mathews, R. 2001: fn.18). All of this was coupled by higher demand for mines in 
numerous conflicts stoked by the great powers during this period of the Cold War. The 
issue of restrictions on small calibre projectiles was entirely sidelined and instead of 
                                                
101 For comments on the three CCW Protocols, see, Roach (1984), Carnahan (1984) and Levie (1994).
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finding place in the Convention, in September 1979 states only adopted a non-binding 
resolution highlighting the issue.102 Finally, the consideration of fragmentation 
weapons was limited to those producing undetectable fragments, thus leaving aside the 
real problems resulting from the use of cluster munitions.
Apart from the opposition from the USA and the Western states, one of the 
reasons why attempts to attract attention to the problem of cluster bombs and regulate 
it by international agreement was that the use of cluster bombs in Vietnam was 
shrouded in secrecy and didn’t generate widespread public discussion, despite 
occasional press reports of cluster bomb attacks in civilian areas in Vietnam and Laos 
(Prokosch, 1995: 98-9). Nonetheless, grassroots anti-war organizations built up local 
campaigns against producers of anti-personnel cluster bombs. In particular, the 
Honeywell Project organization protested for years the production of military fuzes 
and cluster bombs by the Honeywell Corporation based in Minnesota, but its activities 
remained focused locally and largely unnoticeable.103
Thus the attempts both nationally and internationally to restrict the use of 
cluster bombs in the 1970s failed for a number of reasons. On the whole, NGOs and 
peace organizations lacked sufficient information on the use of cluster bombs in 
Indochina, had no skills and resources to engage in nation-wide, transnational, or 
international campaigning against cluster bombs, and focused their efforts instead on 
local producers. In addition, the protests that existed against the production of cluster 
munitions and napalm bombs were closely linked with the Vietnam anti-war 
movement, and as the Vietnam War ended so did these initiatives without being 
                                                
102 The Resolution invited “Governments to carry out further research, jointly or individually on the 
wounding effects of small-calibre weapon systems” and appealed to “all Governments to exercise the 
utmost care in the development of small-calibre weapon systems, so as to avoid an unnecessary 
escalation of the injurious effects of such systems” (UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979; also Granat, 1993: 156-7).
103 For the grassroots protests in the US against the production and use of cluster munitions during the 
Vietnam War, see Prokosch (1995:138-45).
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carried on into efforts to improve the laws of war.104
States such as Sweden that would have liked to use public sentiment against 
the use of napalm and cluster bombs were not able to do so. There were no NGOs that 
could be their allies in the effort at weapons prohibitions. Sweden pushed the ICRC to 
become more active on the issue, but the organization remained faithful to its 
principles of impartiality and neutrality that prevented it from taking a more activist 
stance on weapons. The only forum where Sweden and the non-aligned states could 
focus attention on the issue was the UN General Assembly but as the weapons 
problems were taken up at the ICRC meetings of government experts and the Ad Hoc 
Committee set up by the Diplomatic Conference, the involvement of the UNGA 
gradually diminished. The regulation of weapons through the consensus-based CCW 
proved difficult as the countries possessing the weapons, the best information about 
their use and effects, and the veto power in the negotiations were not willing to accept 
any meaningful restrictions.
1980s: the window of opportunity shuts down
As a whole, the position of Western governments and a certain overlap of interests 
between the major powers the US and the USSR in preventing the adoption of 
comprehensive weapons restrictions limited the scope and importance of the CCW. 
Thus, whereas the climate of détente made possible the negotiations on IHL in the first 
place, it also allowed for collaboration between the great powers, which in the case of 
weapons restrictions blocked the progress sought by small and medium-sized states.  
                                                
104 Certainly, improving the laws of war had never been on the mind of the protesters even if they were 
to continue with their opposition to weapons production.
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In the contest between the military weak and neutral “have-nots” led by Sweden and 
Mexico, the military strong “haves” managed to avoid any serious limitations on the 
use of important weapons, and by extension, on their military strategies.105 Even the 
weak provisions of the Convention, which were consensually agreed and in large part 
shaped by the Western states, were not accepted by them. Nevertheless, the 
Convention entered into force in December 1983, six months after its 20th ratification 
(Mathews, R. 2001: 996) with the support of the Swedish group of states that had 
pushed for weapons prohibitions and most of the socialist countries.106 However, the 
support for it was so weak when it was concluded that it was doubted that a significant 
number of countries would ever ratify it (Cassese, 1986:269). Indeed, by 1992 only 
thirty countries had ratified the Convention and it was only at that point that it was 
brought back into the focus of state attention when the NGO campaign against 
landmines pushed for a review conference.
Despite the greater importance of the Additional Protocol I in developing IHL 
and hopes for its wide acceptance and impact on the conduct of war, its fate in the 
1980s was not very different from that of the CCW – by the end of 1983, more than 
six years after its adoption, only 36 states had ratified it, among which none of the 
major military powers.107
As the years of détente gave way to a new round of Cold War rivalry, in the 
                                                
105 Most authors see the opposing sides on the issue of weapon restrictions in those terms – e.g., Cassese 
(1979a,b), Aldrich (1973:148), Baxter (1997a: 51-2; 1977b: 181), Ciobanu (1979:426-7).
106 The first 20 ratifications were of Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the USSR (CCW ratifications 
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=500&ps=P and Roach, fn. 127)
107 An exceptional early ratification by a major military power was that of China. Importantly, none of 
the Warsaw Pact states ratified Protocol I and only two NATO states – Denmark and Norway did so. 
The states that ratified the Protocol by the end of 1983 are: Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Botswana, China, Congo, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Korea, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Libya, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Norway, St. Lucia, St. Vincent Grenadines, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam (data at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P).
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US the new humanitarian treaties faced tough opposition. The US had actively 
participated in the drafting of Additional Protocol I and the CCW and at the time they 
were deemed largely uncontroversial and reflecting US interests and influence 
(Aldrich, 1981, 1986, 1991; Baxter, 1977b; Reed, 1978; Burke, 1981).108 Thus, it was 
expected that the ratification of the Additional Protocols would be readily forthcoming 
in the very near future.109 However, the US perspective sharply shifted with the 
coming to power of the Reagan Administration, which was also accompanied by 
personnel changes among the people who had negotiated the two treaties and who 
could have influenced the positions of the Administration and the prospects for 
ratification of the Protocols and the Convention by the US Senate (Aldrich, 1997). 
The main considerations behind the Reagan’s rejection of the Additional 
Protocols were political and not military, even though the given arguments were 
couched in military terms. In the words of the main US negotiator in the 1970s, “[the] 
administration clearly welcomed the opportunity to assert its toughness and to contrast 
itself with the alleged weakness of its predecessors by denouncing the Protocol” 
(Aldrich, 1991:4). Nevertheless, the position of the Administration found support in 
the Department of Defense, where junior officers from the Vietnam War that had 
“chafed at the political restrictions imposed upon them there” had risen to rank 
(Aldrich, 1997: fn.4) and opposed the adoption by the US of new international 
agreements limiting their freedom of action.110
                                                
108 At the closure of the Diplomatic Conference, the US head of delegation George Aldrich stated that, 
“[t]he United States welcomes the adoption of Protocol I. We are satisfied that this Protocol represents a 
major advance in international humanitarian law, an advance of which this Conference can be proud.” 
Moreover, this statement did not represent only the view of negotiators from the State Department but 
was backed by the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff as well (Aldrich, 1991:2).
109 In the words of one of the members of the US negotiating team: “the Protocols will now have to be 
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent prior to ratification. This procedure will probably 
move quickly and before long the two new Protocols will be in force for the US” (Baxter, 1977b: 182).
110 Among the arguments the Administration gave for its rejection of Protocol I were:
“the Protocol grants guerrillas a legal status that often is superior to that accorded to regular forces; [i]t 
also unreasonably restricts attacks against certain objects [unidentified] that traditionally have been 
considered legitimate military targets; [i]t fails to improve substantially the compliance and verification 
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The end of détente and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan with its massive use 
of conventional weapons of the types discussed and even restricted by the CCW 
(which the USSR had ratified in 1982) only added to the skepticism in the US that the 
Convention would work and states would comply with its terms (Roach, 1984:5). 
Finally, Ronald Reagan’s decision to escalate the arms race with the Soviet Union also 
ran counter to the spirit and aims of the Weapons Convention.
Opposition to the Additional Protocols gradually toned down in the late 1980s 
as relations between the West and the East and between Israel and the Arab countries 
improved (Kosirnik, 1997).111 Military interventions in the 1990s proved that the 
Protocol provisions did not hamper military operations and even countries such as the 
US, which had not ratified it, declared their adherence to its provisions. Interest in the 
CCW, on the other hand, resurfaced in the early 1990s as a result of an ICRC initiative 
to prohibit the use of blinding lasers, and in particular, from the efforts of a group of 
NGOs to ban antipersonnel landmines.
Conclusion
Two factors worked to make the adoption of new IHL agreements possible – the 
Vietnam War that revealed the need to regulate a number of questionable war 
practices and the détente years, which eased perceptions of security threats among the 
                                                                                                                                            
mechanisms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; eliminates an important sanction against violations of 
those Conventions; and is too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical guide for military 
operations” (Secretary of State’s letter of submittal, attached to President Reagan’s letter of transmittal, 
quoted in Aldrich, 1991:11). See also, Reagan (1987). For arguments against ratification in the 1980s, 
see for example, Roberts, 1985; Feith, 1985; Sofaer, 1986; for recent criticisms against the Protocol, 
see, Rabkin, 2003.
111 From the beginning of 1984 till the end of 1989, 54 countries became parties to Protocol I, among 
which NATO members Belgium, Italy, Iceland, Greece, Netherlands, Spain, and the socialist states 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the USSR, followed by Romania and Ukraine in 1990.
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non-aligned countries and provided some space for international negotiations.
This opportunity was used by neutral and non-aligned states led by Sweden to 
place the question of weapons restrictions on the table of international negotiations. 
The committed work of the Swedish negotiator Hans Blix was also critical for keeping 
the issue on the international agenda. However, state leadership and individual 
activism on the issue helped move the issue of weapons restrictions only up to a point. 
When the US perceived a threat that momentum was gathering behind proposals for 
bans on weapons in its arsenal, it began participating in the discussions and challenged 
the factual grounds for weapons prohibitions, thus making impossible to establish 
clear evidence about the negative weapons effects on which ban proponents were 
basing their arguments. The lack of solid proof of cause-and-effect relationships, 
combined with the excessive technicality of the debates took away a lot of the 
momentum that Sweden and its allies had been able to generate prior to the US joining 
the talks. 
From that point on the major point of contention became the forum where 
weapons issues would be discussed and the procedure of decision-making. In a way 
presaging the debates surrounding the landmine campaign, Sweden wanted to keep the 
issue within the ambit of humanitarian law, whereas the US and the USSR preferred to 
move it into the area of arms control and the Conference on Disarmament; Sweden 
argued for making decisions by majority voting, the US insisted on consensus. Even 
though Sweden managed to keep discussions within the IHL framework, the US and 
its NATO allies prevailed on consensus-based decision-making. In the context of the 
Cold War and with no support forthcoming from the ICRC or any major NGOs,
Sweden and its non-aligned partners tried to achieve the best they could within the 
consensus-based negotiating forum but this amounted only to weak and 
inconsequential restrictions on landmines and incendiary weapons. The major 
105
achievement, as it turned out, was the establishment of the CCW as an institution 
where discussions on weapons with serious humanitarian effects could be reopened 
and where interested parties could focus their efforts at further development of IHL. 
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CHAPTER THREE
The End of the Cold War, New Demands and Opportunities for IHL 
Development
The ICRC and landmines: from quiet diplomacy to public advocacy 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the ICRC had been closely involved in the 
regulation of weapons, including landmines since the 1950s. Its approach throughout 
the period of the Cold War was cautious, trying to avoid politicization of the issue at 
the UN General Assembly and find a compromise solution that would bridge the 
divide between strong supporters and opponents of weapons restrictions. The result 
was the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol 
II on landmines that included provisions prohibiting the use of the weapons against 
civilians and restricting their use in areas of civilian concentration.112 However, a 
limited number of countries ratified the protocol and its provisions were often 
unknown or ignored by belligerents in the subsequent years (Maslen, 1998: 84; 
Mathews, R., 2001: 997).
The end of the Cold War and the increase of humanitarian NGOs
The end of the Cold War changed the environment in which the ICRC operated in a 
                                                
112 The Protocol also established criteria for the use of remotely delivered mines in terms of marking the 
area where they were used or including a self-destruct or neutralization mechanism.
107
couple of important ways. On the one hand, since the 1970s, but especially since the 
end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of NGOs actively engaged not only 
in humanitarian relief, but also on IHL issues.113 These organizations that were 
“aggressive, vocal, and highly competitive” (including for funding) (Moorehead, 
1999: 693) resented, questioned, and challenged the previously unrivaled position the 
ICRC held in those fields (Forsythe, 2005: 264). It was depicted by newcomers as 
secretive, uncooperative, and receiving most of the funding for humanitarian action. 
The ICRC was not oblivious to those trends and in 1993 it commissioned a survey of 
perceptions of the organization within the Red Cross movement, among the 
humanitarian community and donors to help it devise an “effective communications 
strategy” (Moorehead, 1999: 693-4). The ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga was 
particularly attuned to the problem of the need to improve the ICRC relations with 
international organizations, NGOs, and the media and in 1995 argued that, 
“humanitarian action must be in parallel with political action” (Berry, 1997: 31). On 
the other hand, the end of the Cold War also lifted a number of constraints on ICRC 
action. Whereas during the Cold War years ICRC activism or promotion of a wider 
range of human rights would have been seen as taking sides, there was no such (or 
less) danger in the 1990s. Thus, these years saw a certain “coming out” of the ICRC 
that included a more public approach and better relations with the media,114
cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs, and “willingness to broaden its activities to 
help enable populations and victims not just to meet their immediate relief needs but 
                                                
113 This NGO growth was also linked to the increase in development programs established to help 
reconstruction efforts in the wake of several conflicts that petered out together with end of the Cold 
War.
114 In comparison to the period 1946-1987 when the ICRC made 74 public appeals, only between 1989 
and 1996 it made 104. In addition, public announcements in the past were made “without fanfare and 
attracted little interest” in sharp contrast to Sommaruga’s public statements that were made forcefully 
and commanded attention. The shift in approach under Sommaruga is also reflected in the expansion of 
the ICRC information department that received generous funding and produced numerous new 
publications (including a large number on landmines). An ICRC website was also created with the goal 
to make ICRC work as transparent as possible (Moorehead, 1999: 699-700).
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also to prepare themselves to recover their productive lives” (Cornelio Sommaruga 
preface to the ICRC Report, quoted in Berry, 1997: 116).115 This was the context 
within which the landmine issue came to the fore and out of which came a change in
the ICRC approach to IHL development from low-key and compromise-seeking 
diplomacy to public and unwavering advocacy of a total ban on landmines.
The end of the Cold War also helped reveal the scale of the problem of 
antipersonnel landmines. After peace agreements in a number of developing countries 
were brokered by the UN and peacekeeping forces entered, they found millions of 
landmines (Cameron, 1998: 431). The ICRC was again the organization to witness 
their destructive impact and struggle to alleviate the civilian suffering caused by them. 
The early ICRC approach:  information provision and expert consultations as usual 
In the late 1980s surgeons working for the ICRC were faced with the large number of 
amputations and serious medical challenges posed by them as a result of mine 
proliferation. In the early 1990s the ICRC started collecting data about the injuries 
suffered by the people treated in its hospitals and it soon became clear that the large 
majority were victims of landmines (Maslen, 2004:17-18). The ICRC tried to bring 
attention to the problem first by publishing Mines: A Perverse Use of Technology, 
which detailed the horrible reality of the “mine epidemic” (Maslen, 1998: 84).116
In response to prompting from its newly created Medical Division, in 1992 the 
                                                
115 Sommaruga also wrote, “The 1990s have marked the “coming out” of the organization in many 
senses: […] in its willingness to cooperate with other humanitarian players in the interest of the victims 
[…]; to collaborate more closely with human rights and other specialist lawyers as the relevance to 
them of international humanitarian law grows; to be more public about its concern – whether regarding 
the security of civilian populations or, for example, on the health effects of weapons such as anti-
personnel landmines” (1995 ICRC Report, Challenges of the Nineties, quoted in Berry, 1997: 115). 
116 This was followed by another publication in 1993, The Worldwide Epidemic of Landmine Injuries: 
The ICRC’s Health Oriented Approach.
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ICRC began consultations with military commanders, diplomats, legal and medical 
experts in order to develop a view of what could be done about the problem of 
landmines on the legal level (Sommaruga, 1996). Thus it decided to convene a 
symposium on the issue in Montreux in April 1993 that brought together legal and 
military experts, deminers, surgeons, and campaigners (Dormann and Maresca, 2004). 
At the symposium, the ICRC was still following its traditionally cautious approach 
and only called for the incorporation of self-destruct mechanisms in APLs, even 
though the ICBL had already issued its call for a total ban in October 1992. Other 
participants thought that the ICBL goal was unrealistic and achievable only if the 
states’ militaries would agree to it. There was common agreement, however, that 
existing IHL rules on landmines were inadequate and had to be strengthened (Maslen, 
1998: 85) and the meeting was successful in spurring new research on the topic, 
including a study on the economic impact of mines by VVAF and research by HRW 
of the global production and trade in landmines (Maslen, 2004: 19). The symposium 
also “recognized the crucial importance of alerting public opinion in order to increase 
awareness among the military and governments” – a conclusion that influenced the 
future thinking of the ICRC on the subject (ICRC, 1994).
Individual entrepreneurship: Sommaruga and the ICRC’s new public approach
As a follow-up of the Montreux Symposium, in January 1994 the ICRC organized a 
meeting of military experts to sound out their opinions on the military utility of APLs. 
Even though views were divided again, the predominant feeling was that the military 
utility of antipersonnel mines warranted their continued use until alternatives were 
made available (ICRC, 1994; Maslen, 2004: 19; Maresca and Maslen, 257-63; ICBL, 
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1995a:102). Nevertheless, ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga who was personally 
in favor of a ban and complaining about “the excessive discussion, consultation, and 
slowness in ICRC policy making” (Forsythe, 2005: 217),117 decided to use the 
opportunity of a press conference ahead of the start of the preparatory meetings for the 
CCW Review conference to announce on 24 February 1994 that, “‘from a 
humanitarian point of view,’ a ‘worldwide ban on anti-personnel landmines’ was ‘the 
only truly effective solution’” (Maslen, 2004:20).118  He did so despite the fact that the 
ICRC Assembly had not met to discuss the decision, the Directorate had not finalized 
its position, and the Legal Department cautioned against abandoning the ICRC policy 
of not expressing views on issues that do not concern the Geneva Conventions and 
questioned the feasibility of a landmine ban. Only people at the Medical Department 
were supporting Sommariga’s decision enthusiastically (Forsythe, 2005: 217; Lorenzi, 
1998: 96; interview 41 NGO).
This was an unusual move for an ICRC President to make, but one that was 
pivotal in charting the course of the organization on landmines.119 In his words, after 
describing the gruesome picture of the humanitarian disaster caused by mines, 
Sommaruga could not simply say that, “the international society should seriously deal 
with that matter;” he wanted to open a relatively new niche for the ICRC to get 
engaged in weapons-related issues and have it stake a public position in favor of a 
landmine ban (Lorenzi, 1998: 95-6). His active personal engagement with the cause of 
banning landmines was not only important in prompting the ICRC to take a bolder 
                                                
117 In Sommaruga’s opinion, many people at the ICRC were intellectuals with ideas who loved to 
debate and discuss things at length, whereas he preferred to act, especially when victims in the field 
required rapid responses. He particularly disliked the fact that even after a decision was made, the ICRC 
continued to deliberate on it (Lorenzi, 1998: 88, 94). 
118 It was believed that the ICRC president was personally in favor of a ban already at the time of the 
Montreux symposium (Maslen, 2004: fn.99). In its presentation at the London NGO Conference in May 
1993, the ICRC also mentioned the possibility of working toward a total landmine ban (ICRC, 1993).
119 Sommaruga then contacted the Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien with a request that Canada raise 
the issue of landmines at the 1994 G-7 meeting in Naples, which was received favorably.
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position on the issue but also greatly contributed to the success of the whole process 
that led to the Ottawa Convention.
The ICRC reiterated its support for a total ban on APLs in its 1994 report 
prepared for the CCW Review Conference and actively participated in the four 
preparatory meetings for the Conference in 1994-1995. In contrast to the NGOs which 
were banned from attending the CCW meetings due to opposition from China, in 
particular, the ICRC had an observer status and was closely involved in the 
negotiations on the landmine protocol amendment in the fall of 1995 and the two 
sessions of the CCW Review Conference in January and April-May 1996 (Maresca 
and Maslen, 2000). 
This time, however, the ICRC did not confine its activities to the conference 
hall and low-key contacts with diplomats. Faced with the lack of progress in the CCW 
negotiations that failed to achieve agreement on any substantive measures (the only 
decision made was to reconvene next year to continue talks), in November 1995, for 
the first time in its history the ICRC decided to launch a public and media campaign in 
support of a call for a total ban on landmines.120 The idea behind the campaign was 
that “[a]nti-personnel mines must not only be outlawed, but their use must also be 
stigmatized, so that whatever their understanding of the law combatants will choose 
not to use them because they are considered abhorrent to the societies in which they 
operate” (Sommaruga, 1996). The campaign message was “Landmines Must be 
Stopped” and combined a number of advertising tools such as TV spots and print 
announcements placed free of charge in national and international media throughout 
                                                
120 Another instance when the ICRC got publicly involved in advocacy, though on a far smaller scale, 
was in the case of poisonous gas in 1918 when it issued an appeal against its use. The appeal has been 
credited as one of the motivations for the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of 
chemical weapons (ICRC, 1918; ICRC, 1997, Durand, 1984: 90-6). In February 1938, the ICRC also 
launched an appeal to belligerents against aerial bombardment, followed by a second one in March after 
Japanese bombing caused large-scale destruction. In view of the intensification of the aerial war, ICRC 
launched multiple appeals, among which the one of 12 March 1940, in which it underlined the necessity 
of distinguishing between military objectives and civilian populations (Harouel, 1999: 71, 79).
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the world, videos, and numerous publications for specialists and the general public on 
the humanitarian, legal, military, and medical aspects of the landmine problem
(Dormann and Maresca, 2004). 
When in May 1996 the Amended Protocol II of the CCW was finalized, the 
ICRC called its restrictions on the use of landmines “woefully inadequate” and 
pointed out that the Protocol itself was “unlikely to significantly reduce the level of 
landmine casualties” (Maslen, 2004: 22; 1998:87). From that point on the ICRC 
became a key player together with the ICBL and the core group of governments in 
what would become the Ottawa Process and its 1997 campaign, specifically focused 
on promoting the Ottawa Treaty, was a major contributor to its success. 
The second element in the ICRC campaign was to provide a sound study of the 
military utility of landmines and work to get the support of the military for a ban. To 
that end it commissioned a retired brigadier, Patrick Blagden, assisted by a military 
historian, to study the military use and effectiveness of APLs in 26 conflicts starting 
with WWII. In February 1996, the ICRC convened a meeting with senior military 
experts from 8 countries to discuss the Blagden study. The experts unanimously 
concluded that,  “[t]he limited military utility of AP mines is far outweighed by the 
appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts. On this basis 
their prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by 
governments and the entire international community” (ICRC, 1996) – a conclusion 
that has subsequently been endorsed by 55 senior military commanders from 19 
countries in their personal capacity. The ICRC widened its efforts to engage the 
military in a dialogue on the problem of landmines by organizing two more meetings 
of military experts. In April 1997 in Harare, Zimbabwe, it sponsored a meeting of 
defense and foreign ministry officials from the 12 countries of the Southern African 
Development Community, followed by a meeting organized in July 1997 in Manila 
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together with the Philippines government that brought together Asian military and 
strategic experts from 14 countries. Importantly, at these meetings the military value 
of APLs was considered in “the context of [their] long-term human, social, and 
economic costs” (Maslen, 1998:89), instead of limiting attention to the military 
aspects of their use, which would have shifted the debate away from its primary focus.
The final element of the ICRC strategy on landmines was to encourage 
national and regional steps toward banning them. Already in 1995, recognizing the 
fact that the African continent was most severely affected by landmines, the ICRC 
together with the Organization for African Unity organized four regional seminars on 
the subject.121 These were followed in April 1997 by the above-mentioned meeting of 
military experts in Harare, and the First Continental Conference of African Experts on 
Landmines, organized by the Organization for African Unity. Within the context of 
the Conference, the ICRC organized a meeting of 12 national societies to discuss their 
role in moving the region toward a landmine ban, which issued a declaration “calling 
upon their governments to support the Ottawa Process, to prohibit anti-personnel 
mines at national level, and to work together to establish an anti-personnel mine-free 
zone in the region” (Maslen, 2004:32). This consolidation of African support for the 
Ottawa Treaty under the leadership of South Africa, in particular, would be crucial 
during the final negotiating conference in Oslo in the fall of 1997 when the US lobbied 
hard to have the treaty provisions changed.122
The ICRC actively participated during the Ottawa Process conferences that 
started with the Ottawa meeting in October 1996. At this meeting the ICRC President 
                                                
121 There were two seminars in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and one each in Harare, Zimbabwe and 
Yaounde, Cameroon.
122 The ICRC also focused attention on landmines in another mine-infested region and hosted with the 
cooperation of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry a regional seminar in Managua in May 1996. The 
meeting was attended by officials from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Panama and concluded with the idea of creating a mine-free area in Central America, 
which was endorsed by the Organization of American States a month later (Maslen, 1998: 90).
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Sommaruga was one of the very few people informed about the Canadian decision to 
launch a challenge for a fast-track negotiation of a total ban and the one to give a 
congratulatory speech right after the announcement.123 Over the course of 1997 the 
Ottawa Process proceeded with a series of conferences focusing on the treaty text and 
provisions in Vienna (February), Bonn (April), Brussels (June) and the final 
negotiations in Oslo in September. The ICRC took part in all of them and advocated 
several core provisions for inclusion in the treaty – a better definition of landmines 
that would remove the word “primarily” from the CCW definition; a comprehensive 
and immediate ban on production, transfer and use of APLs, accompanied by a phased 
destruction of stockpiles and clearance of existing mines with a clearly specified 
deadline; as strong as possible verification measures but without allowing this issue to 
block progress toward establishing the humanitarian norm; and finally, an important 
goal for the ICRC was the universality of the treaty. As a result of efforts by the ICRC 
and the ICBL, the definition of landmines was strengthened and the principles the 
ICRC supported were reflected in the final treaty text (Maslen, 1998: 91-93). ICRC 
support for the treaty was also important in the final negotiating hours of the Oslo 
Conference when the US was exerting pressure on many states to accommodate its 
demands and “lobbied the ICRC directly to back off from its commitment to a total 
ban.” However, President Sommaruga’s firm support on the issue was key in keeping 
the ICRC firmly behind the integrity of the treaty and its ultimate success (Forsythe, 
2005: 265).    
Thus, the ICRC carried out an unprecedented public campaign on landmines to 
which it harnessed its financial resources, international prestige and presence, legal 
expertise and connections with the military services of countries around the world. It 
was an invaluable ally to both core governments in the Ottawa Process, such as 
                                                
123 The other speech of support came from Jody Williams of the ICBL (Maslen, 2004: 26).
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Canada that was money strapped in the wake of deep budget cuts (English, 2000: 31) 
and NGOs, most of which didn’t have the same level of legal expertise or access to 
military circles (Maslen and Herby, 1998). The ICRC public campaign was the first of 
this kind for the organization and initially there were concerns that it would 
compromise its principles of neutrality and impartiality. These concerns were 
overcome, however, since in practice, the campaign was waged in favor of the victims 
of landmines without the ICRC taking a position vis-à-vis parties in a conflict and 
without openly criticizing any government not joining the landmine ban – a job that 
was reserved for the ICBL (Maslen, 1998; Forsythe, 2005: 265).124 Nevertheless, the 
landmine campaign repositioned the ICRC toward the public domain. The step was 
made as a result of internal advocacy from the ICRC medical personnel who were 
confronted with the landmine disaster first-hand and the backing of ICRC president 
Cornelio Sommaruga. The strong personality and dynamism of the latter were very 
important in shaping ICRC policy and moving the landmine campaign to a successful 
end. During his years at the helm of the ICRC, Sommaruga often engaged in personal 
diplomacy and raised the visibility of the ICRC and its causes on the international 
scene and in diplomatic circles (Forsythe, 2005: 217-18). His initiatives, however, 
have to be seen as a response to the new situation in which the ICRC found itself after 
the end of the Cold War created new opportunities and demands for action on the 
organization, as well as challenges to its unique status the field of humanitarian relief 
and IHL development. 
                                                
124 Despite this fact, the ICRC has been criticized by opponents of the ban for its spending on the 
campaign and using money coming from US contributions against American interests (e.g. Center for 
Security Policy, 1997a; Gaffney, 1997).
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The ICBL: from the streets to the negotiating halls and in between
The end of the Cold War, the landmine problem, and a few good people with a good 
idea
The end of the Cold War was the permissive factor that opened up opportunities for 
increased humanitarian action and shifting the focus from the Cold War security 
concerns and nuclear weapons issues to new kinds of threats to individuals, or the so-
called “human security”.125 In Jody Williams’ words: “[w]ith the end of the Cold War 
and the accompanying perception of decreased nuclear threat, there has been growing 
attention to other weapons which have, in fact, inflicted far more casualties in the wars 
of the past few decades than nuclear and chemical weapons combined” (quoted in 
Larrinaga and Sjolander, 1998: 372). The mitigated threat perceptions and the toning 
down of the all-encompassing security preoccupations characteristic of the Cold War 
years also allowed a discursive change in the depiction of landmines as an essential 
and legitimate part of state defense to an enemy of innocent civilians and soldiers alike 
– a change that was effected as a result of the hard work, reporting and campaigning of 
non-governmental organizations. The end of the Cold War also relieved some of the 
                                                
125 “Human security” represents a conceptual shift from traditional military issues to a focus on the 
security and well being of the individual, initially brought up by the UN and advocated by Canada, in 
particular. The human security agenda includes a whole range of issues from job security and 
unemployment, to health, and family violence (e.g. UN Human Development Report, quoted in Hay, 
1999: 228) but its core comprises the issues of landmines, the International Criminal Court, small arms, 
women and children in conflict, child soldiers, human rights.  In Canada itself the concept started with a 
focus on sustainable development and later was refocused on the above mentioned core issues. In 1998 
Canada and Norway signed an agreement for cooperation on the promotion and implementation of the 
human security agenda, which in 1999 was extended to include other interested countries, and was 
named the “Human Security Network” (Axworthy and Vollebaek, 1998; Hampson et al., 1999:19; 
Hillmer and Chapnick, 2001:81; Small, 2001). For the development of the concept in Canada, see, Hay 
(1999); Hillmer and Chapnick (2001); for other works focusing on the issue, see, for example, McRae 
and Hubert (2001), Matthew et al. (2004). 
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constraints imposed on states as a result of the two-block rivalry, which allowed the 
formation of new coalitions of like-minded states and cooperation between them and 
members of the NGO community (Larrinaga and Sjolander, 1998: 372; Lawson, 1997; 
Axworthy, 1998: 451-52; Price, 1998b: 340-41; Mathews, J., 1997a; Gwozdecky and 
Sinclair, 2001:30). Finally, with the end of the Cold War conflicts in regions of 
previous East-West rivalry petered out at the same time that new fires of internal strife 
broke out. As the UN and Western governments funded new development programs 
and peacekeeping operations, an increasing number of NGOs moved in these regions 
and discovered the reality of life and death in mine-infested lands (Cameron, 
1998:431; Dolan and Hunt, 1998: 400). 
The beginnings of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) are to 
be found in this encounter of NGOs with the dangers of landmines in their 
humanitarian work in places such as Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, 
and Somalia. Not only were landmines killing about 20,000 people a year but they 
were severely impeding the work of NGOs on the ground and post-war economic and 
social development. 
In September 1991 Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Physicians for Human 
Rights (PHR) published the first report on the landmine crisis in Cambodia, 
Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War and were among the first to call for a 
ban. The same year, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) opened a 
prosthetics clinic in Cambodia and in November contacted Medico International, 
Germany with the idea of organizing an international campaign to ban antipersonnel 
landmines (Wareham, 1998:212-3). In 1992 Handicap International (HI), France 
decided for the first time to move beyond its traditional mandate to help victims of 
armed conflict and engage in a public campaign against the indiscriminate effects of 
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landmines. HI worked together with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), UK in Cambodia 
and translated of The Coward’s War report in French. In May 1992 at a conference in 
Paris to present the French version of the report, the two organizations along with 
PHR also came to the idea of an international campaign and launched a signature call 
in support of a landmine ban (Chabasse, 1998: 60). Finally, in October 1992, six 
organizations – HI, HRW, PHR, MAG, Medico International, and VVAF – came 
together and issued a “Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines.” These 
organizations laid the foundations of the ICBL, which was formally launched in May 
1993 in London at a conference attended by approximately 70 representatives from 40 
NGOs (Williams and Goose, 1998: 28). Jody Williams, hired by VVAF in 1991 to 
work on building the landmine campaign, became the coordinator of the ICBL, and 
her exceptional determination and character greatly contributed to its success. 
The call for a landmine ban: a simple and effective solution
Whereas these NGOs had an interest in creating public attention to the landmine crisis 
and securing more funding for demining, victim assistance programs and humanitarian 
aid, they saw a total ban on the export, production and use of landmines as the only 
solution to the problem. The call for a ban had the advantage of sending a simple, 
strong message to governments and the ability to unite around it a diverse group of 
humanitarian service NGOs, demining NGOs, human rights and advocacy NGOs, as 
well as a wide range of development, women’s and religious groups.126
The initial NGO approach to the problem of landmines focused on raising 
                                                
126 There was no absolute unanimity on the issue, however. Some demining organizations, such as 
HALO Trust, for example, argued that advocating a ban would only divert resources from the real task 
of clearing mines on the ground and contribute nothing to solving the problem of landmines (interview 
8 NGO; Jefferson, 1997a,b; Flynn, 2004).
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awareness and providing data about its scale. HRW was the organization that 
contributed most to this effort. After publishing together with PHR The Coward’s War
in September 1991, in October 1992 Rae McGrath of MAG wrote for it another report 
on the landmine situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, Hidden Death, followed by reports on 
Angola in 1993 and Mozambique in 1994, as well as by another publication together 
with PHR on the global landmine crisis in 1993, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy. Other 
reports were issued by PHR, Hidden Enemies (1992), MAG and African Rights,
Violent Deeds Live On (1993), and VVAF, After the Guns Fall Silent (1995). All the 
publications portrayed stories of horrific suffering of innocent victims (most often 
women and children)127 and impediments to reconstruction efforts in war-torn 
societies inflicted by landmines. Thus the human and humanitarian consequences of 
landmines were highlighted at the expense of their military utility. 
As the NGO advocated a simple solution to the problem – a total ban, they also 
had to play down the complexities and different proximate causes of the landmine 
crisis by limiting their focus on the weapon itself as the major culprit – landmines 
were the hidden killers and enemies that had to be stopped once and for all (Larrinaga 
and Sjolander, 1998, see also Rappert, 2006: 170-185 on issue simplification). Only 
after the NGOs had managed to define the discourse in those terms (at least at the 
international level and in the leading states on the issue), did they direct their critiques 
to manufacturers of landmines,128 and tried to show that not only were there 
humanitarian reasons to ban landmines, but these also outweighed the limited military 
utility of the weapons by far – arguments aimed at audiences in the countries which 
                                                
127 Even though the estimates were that women and children comprised about 30, maximum 40% of the 
landmine victims, the NGOs always placed the emphasis on them and occasionally claimed that they 
made 90% of the victims (Larrinaga and Sjolander, 1998: 376-7). 
128 See, for example HRW (1997a) report on US producers of landmines and Handicap International 
(1997) on French producers, Le Complexe Français de Production des Mines et Systemes Associes. The 
delay in targeting the industry has to do with the fact that many countries had already stopped 
producing landmines anyways. In contrast, in Italy where Valsella Meccanotecnica was a major mine-
producer, the Italian campaign focus was largely on it.
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persisted in their belief that landmines could be used responsibly and discriminately. 
The USA and initial boost for the landmine campaign
One, sometimes forgotten, factor that gave impetus to the early NGO efforts to build 
their landmine campaign was the concern shown for the problem in the US Congress 
and government. In October 1992 the US Senate passed a bill placing a one-year 
moratorium on the export of landmines “that galvanized the imagination of the 
international community” and made activists believe that progress toward elimination 
of these weapons was possible (Williams and Goose, 1998:26; also Axworthy, 2003: 
128; Muller, 1998). This was followed in August 1993 by an influential report by the 
US State Department, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Un-cleared Mines, 
which called landmines “weapons of mass destruction into slow motion,” and the 
introduction of a resolution on the problem by Senator Leahy at the UN General 
Assembly in November 1993, which urged states to agree to and implement a 
moratorium on export (Hubert, 2000). In September 1994 in a speech to the UN 
General Assembly President Clinton declared the goal of the “eventual elimination” of 
anti-personnel mines and the need for international efforts toward achieving it,129 and 
in December 1995, the USA proposed again a UN Assembly resolution calling for 
“further immediate international efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by 
anti-personnel landmines, with a view to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel 
landmines” (quoted in Maslen, 2004: 30).
In the spring of 1996 there were still high expectations among NGOs and states 
                                                
129 The “eventual elimination” for which Clinton called for, was premised on the development of 
“viable and humane alternatives” (Wareham, 1998:221) but this detail may have not registered with 
most countries. 
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that the landmine policy review undertaken by the Administration would result in bold 
measures in support of a total ban. In March 1996 their hopes seemed to have been 
confirmed – in a statement published in the New York Times, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, indicated that he was “inclined to 
eliminate all antipersonnel land-mines.” This announcement then prompted the 
Netherlands, Austria and Germany to declare national bans on landmine use in 
“anticipation of a bold new policy from the US,” even though the latter never 
materialized (ICBL, 1996a).
The US momentum gradually ground to a halt in the second half of 1996 as the 
military mobilized against the perceived threat to be denied a weapon they argued they 
were using responsibly without causing any civilian suffering. Nonetheless, even after 
the Ottawa meeting in October 1996, which launched fast-track negotiations for a total 
APL ban in an ad-hoc process outside of the traditional UN channels, the US position 
remained unclear. Whereas the US insisted that the Conference on Disarmament, 
known for its slow, consensus-based decision-making, was the appropriate forum for 
negotiations on a comprehensive ban, in November 1996 it introduced a resolution in 
the UNGA calling on states to “pursue vigorously” an international agreement to ban 
use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines “with a view to 
completing the negotiations as soon as possible,” which many countries interpreted as 
tacit support for the Ottawa Process (Dolan and Hunt, 1998: 403-04).   
These actions made the USA appear early on as a strong proponent of 
landmine restrictions and a leader to whose actions NGOs could point when urging 
other governments to adopt similar measures. This initial active stance and, I would 
argue, the later ambiguous US positions on landmines and a commonly shared belief 
that President Clinton supported the landmine cause, served, first, as a catalyst of the 
NGO campaign, and second, as a permissive factor that allowed support for a ban to 
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grow among other countries and let negotiations of the Ottawa Treaty itself be 
completed without strong American opposition.130
Reinforcement from international organizations
Parallel to the NGO campaign, and certainly reinforcing it, concern about the issue of 
landmines grew in the UN, and in particular the UNICEF. In October 1992 the UN 
Departments of Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-Keeping Operations hosted the first 
in a series of meetings with UN agencies and NGOs to share information on mine 
clearance and legal controls over the use of mines. In September 1993 UNICEF, 
Geneva decided to give priority attention to the issue of land mines and asked the 
National Committees to seriously consider advocacy for the cessation of production of 
landmines. In January 1994, it followed up with a consultative meeting on the problem 
of landmines. In December 1993 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, 
introduced by the US, calling for a moratorium on the export of landmines (ICBL, 
2004). In March 1994 the Executive Director of UNICEF, Jim Grant, called for a 
landmine ban and in May 1994 UNCEF gave its support to and co-hosted the second 
NGO landmine conference in Geneva. Some 110 representatives from 74 NGOs 
gathered in Geneva and in his opening remarks sent to the Conference, the Secretary 
General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali called for a worldwide ban on landmines 
(ICBL, 1994a: 11). The same month UNICEF and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees called for a total landmine ban at the second preparatory session for the 
                                                
130 For example, after the Vienna CCW conference in Sept 1995 the USA had not yet emerged on the 
list of “obstructionist” states compiled by the ICBL (Landmine Update #12, Dec 1995). Regarding later 
US policies on landmines, a senior governmental official argued, that the low-profile approach toward 
presenting US views on the Ottawa Process and the Leahy initiatives “‘helped to create an impression 
overseas that the United States was going to ban mines very soon’ when, in fact, the reality was quite 
the opposite” (quoted in Wareham, 1998:235).
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CCW review conference. Further, on the initiative of the UN Secretary General, a UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance was established in November 1994 and the 
next month the UNGA passed a resolution, which called for more states to enact 
export moratoria and for the eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines.
This institutional support greatly enhanced the credibility, and arguably, 
popularity of the international campaign at this early stage (Williams and Goose, 
1998: 28) in a dynamic of mutual reinforcement of initiatives undertaken by the ICBL 
and the UN. Even after Canada moved the negotiating process on landmines away 
from the UN auspices, it had the backing of the Secretary General Bouros Boutros-
Ghali, who was informed of the Canadian decision to launch the fast-track process and 
sent in his congratulations and expressed full support of the initiative (ICBL, 1996c: 
57).  
Similarly, NGOs received support for their efforts from the European 
Parliament (EP). After in November 1992 Handicap International and Mines Advisory 
Group distributed to the members of the EP the Coward’s War report on the landmine 
situation in Cambodia, accompanied by a letter of support from the EP President 
Simone Veil, the Parliament responded to the NGO concerns immediately. In 
December 1992, it passed a resolution calling on member states to declare a five-year 
moratorium on the export of landmines, as well as to ratify the 1980 CCW and 
allocate more funding for mine clearance (HI, 1997: 48; ICBL, 1995a). In February 
1995, the EP passed another resolution asking the EU to “instantly enact a law to 
prohibit the production and trade of antipersonnel landmines”. In March, on the 
initiative of the EP President Bernard Kouchner (who had close links to French NGOs, 
being the founder of Médecins sans Frontières and later Médecins du Monde) the 
Parliament organized an unprecedented two-day public hearing on APLs to which 
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several NGOs were invited to present their views.131 Following the hearings, in June 
1995 the EP adopted two resolutions asking for a total ban on APLs and calling on all 
Member States to unilaterally ban the production and use of APLs and destroy existing 
stocks (HI, 1997: 49). By its initiatives, the European Parliament contributed to the 
transnational anti-landmine campaign because it acted as a venue for NGO 
campaigners to voice their views and as an amplifier for the anti-landmine position. Its 
resolutions also stirred discussions of the common EU position on landmines and 
helped create a climate of European opinion against landmines, even though they were 
not enough to set the common EU position on the issue, for which a consensual 
decision was needed (Long, 2002: 440-41).
Thus, NGOs were able to muster support for their campaign in international 
and regional institutions where their voices could make an impact without being held 
hostage to consensus decision-making. This symbolic political support could then be 
used as an additional tool in their domestic and international campaigns against 
landmines. 
International fora as focal points of mobilization 
The international NGO campaign became more focused, and importantly, gained 
significant media attention during the Review Conference of the CCW in the fall of 
1995, that was convened as a result of the successful lobbying of the French 
government by Handicap International. Ahead of the Conference, the ICBL sent a 
team of organizers to prepare the NGO campaign in Vienna, which eventually brought 
                                                
131 Representatives from Medico International, Germany, Mines Advisory Group, UK, VVAF, and 
Handicap International France and Belgium participated in the hearings. 
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together 350 organizations from 23 countries (ICBL, 1995a:18). Even though the 
working sessions of the Review Conference were closed to NGOs, the ICBL 
employed a wide range of tactics to influence the course of the negotiations – from 
insider lobbying, information distribution, to public advocacy. NGO members lobbied 
delegates of the state negotiating teams, provided them with information on different 
aspects of the landmine problem, made statements at a CCW plenary session, and 
invited delegates from different countries to present their views at several NGO 
briefings. In a demonstration of global support for the issue, they presented the 
President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Johan Molander of Sweden, 1.7 
million signatures from 53 countries under the call for a ban. The ICBL also 
coordinated an extensive media campaign132 – it published twice a week and made 
available to the media and state delegates a newsletter, CCW News, providing 
information on the landmine crisis and on state positions at the Conference.133
Whereas the NGO pressure did not produce any significant progress in the 
Review Conference, their criticism of the negotiation and its weak results produced a 
deadlock and led to the decision to prolong the conference with two additional 
sessions in January and April-May 1996 in Geneva. Still, the conference was 
important because it attracted a large number of NGOs that pledged support to the 
cause of banning landmines and brought the ICBL in the spotlight of media attention.  
In the course of the conference the NGOs also learned more about different state 
positions, which allowed them to better direct their lobbying and public activities. The 
upcoming conference in Geneva provided another opportunity for NGO involvement 
and helped them better plan their activities and draft a common set of future demands 
                                                
132 For the first time the ICBL hired a media consultant to organize the media campaign during the 
Vienna Review Conference (interview 8 NGO).
133 The public advocacy activities included among others, showing a film, “Silent Sentinels: Cowards’ 
War,” creating a 6-ton shoe pyramid in front of the Austrian Parliament, emplacing a simulated 
minefield in a busy walkway in the center of Vienna, and setting up a photo exhibit (ICBL, 1995a).
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and tactics – a matter that so far had been left to the discretion of individual 
organizations.134
As the issue gained in prominence, more and more organizations came to 
support it and 450 of them gathered in Geneva for the second round of negotiations of 
the CCW Review Conference (ICBL, 1996b: 145). This conference, and especially its 
failure, turned out to be the turning point in relations between NGOs and governments 
and the one that showed the way ahead to get out of the CCW deadlock. In the words 
of Ambassador Molander, the President of the Review Conference, “the cumbersome 
diplomatic process, based on universality and consensus, set in motion a chain 
reaction that was difficult to foresee,” the contrast between “the haggling over 
seemingly unimportant details and procedure in comfortable Geneva” and “the 
nameless suffering of children, women, and men torn to pieces in the rice paddies of 
Cambodia, the valleys of Afghanistan or the fields of Angola” was so stark and brutal 
that it could not be ignored by governments willing to do something about this human 
tragedy (Molander, 2000).
NGO brokerage and the formation of a vanguard team of state supporters 
The CCW conferences also served as a focal point of contact between NGOs and like-
minded countries and helped forge connections between the two (Williams and Goose, 
1998: 31-2). 
As NGOs watched states “haggle” over details and procedure in Geneva, they 
realized that no agreement reached by consensus at the CCW would satisfy their 
                                                
134 While it was still up to the individual NGOs to choose their tactics and demands, now they were 
presented with a more structured range of activities both for the Geneva Conference and for the future 
(ICBL, 1995a: 4-8).
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demands for a total ban and started thinking about other possible ways to advance 
their cause. Several states, pushed by national legislative action and domestic NGO 
campaigning, had already mentioned the need for a total ban on landmines in their 
CCW statements and in August 1994 Sweden had officially proposed an amendment 
to prohibit the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APLs.135
Encouraged by these positive developments, during the January 1996 session of the 
CCW, the coordinator of the Dutch campaign suggested that the NGOs invite those 
countries to a meeting to discuss what could be done to keep the issue alive and going. 
The idea was not only to talk about possible further steps toward international 
measures on landmines, but also to bring together and create among government 
officials from different countries a common “pro-ban identity” (NGO member quoted 
in Mathews, 1997b). The result was a first NGO-government meeting with the 
participation of officials from seven invited states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland) and the unexpected showing up of a 
member from the Canadian delegation, Bob Lawson, who had heard of the meeting 
even though Canada was not among the invited because it had not voiced support for a 
total ban. As it turned out, Canada was to play the key role in the events that followed. 
A second NGO-government meeting was organized at the April CCW session and 
observing NGO mobilization and the growing state support for a total ban,136 after the 
CCW failed to adopt anything significant, the Canadians decided to host a follow up 
                                                
135 Among those states were Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, and Norway (Dolan and 
Hunt, 1998: 401).
136 By May 1996 at the closing session of the CCW conference, 40 states had publicly expressed 
support for a total international ban on APLs, 25 states had renounced the use of APLs by their own 
forces, and 11 were already destroying their stockpiles. In addition, Werner Ehrlich of the Austrian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had drafted the text for a treaty banning APLs in April 1996. The scale of 
support for a ban was significant, given that in the CCW meeting participated 33 States Parties and 33 
states non-parties to the Convention. The problem was, however, that CCW decisions had to be 
consensual. It has been argued that this level of support for a total ban was mostly responsible for the 
Canadian decision to step in and lead on the issue (Maslen, 2004: 23-24; fn. 127). 
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meeting on the problem to strategize with other supportive countries about ways to 
achieve a comprehensive prohibition of landmines.
At the end of the strategy meeting in October 1996, Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy evaluated the degree of support among states, as well as the 
willingness of the most active among them to assume the leadership role if Canada 
was slow to take it, and decided to take the chance and launch an unprecedented 
challenge to the states gathered in Ottawa – to come back and sign a treaty by 
December 1997 (Axworthy, 1997). Thus NGOs were quite successful not only in 
stimulating among different countries leadership ambitions to lead the way on 
landmines. They were also successful as brokers between those countries (Tarrow, 
2005) – NGOs brought together state representatives to think about common goals and 
welded them in a team to work toward their achievement. Despite some bitterness that 
Canada had snatched the leadership position in Ottawa, the core group of states 
remained united and during the months that followed, the created sense of belonging 
to a like-minded group was so strong among government officials that some of them 
admitted that they felt more loyal to its goals than to the interests of their own states 
(interview 38 NGO).
The fast-track Ottawa Process: “bandwagon” or “left behind” effects
This was the beginning of the so-called Ottawa Process that proceeded with a 
whirlwind of conferences – three conferences in Europe to negotiate the treaty text, a 
final negotiating conference in Oslo in September 1997, and several regional 
conferences aimed at generating support for the treaty in Africa, Asia, the Baltic 
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region, and the Middle East that were organized by the ICBL and the ICRC.137 The 
whole process was based on self-selection – only countries that endorsed the goal of a 
total ban were invited to the first meeting in Ottawa and thereafter, only those states 
which associated themselves with the final declarations of the subsequent conferences 
would be allowed to participate in the next round. Thus, from the very beginning 
consensus was not sought and the rules ensured that only countries that were generally 
in tune with the idea of a comprehensive ban on landmines could join and have a say 
in shaping the treaty text. 
The other distinctive feature of the Ottawa Process was the active participation 
of NGOs not only by stimulating support for it through public campaigning, letter 
writing, reporting on the problem and organizing conferences, but also in the actual 
negotiation of the treaty. The NGOs closely cooperated with the governments of the 
core group of states (usually identified as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland) (Lawson et 
al., 1998: 167), were allowed to attend the plenary sessions of the negotiating 
conferences, and had open access to the closed sessions through the numerous NGO 
representatives sitting on official state delegations.138 Thus NGO participation in the 
negotiations was almost on an equal footing with that of state delegations; the ICBL 
had its own draft proposal and made sure that most of its provisions were reflected in 
the final treaty (Maslen, 2004: 29).
                                                
137 In addition to the European conferences in Vienna (February), Bonn (April), Brussels (June) and 
Oslo (September), over the course of 1997, meetings to help build political will for the treaty were 
organized either by the ICBL and the ICRC or co-sponsored by governments in Maputo, Harare, 
Kempton Park, Manila, Tokyo, Stockholm, Sydney, New Delhi, Ashgabat, Senegal, and Sanaa (see, 
Williams and Goose, 1998: 36-42).
138 States that included NGO representatives on their delegations included, for example, Austria, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. In addition, the ICRC and 
the UN were also invited to participate in the closed conference meetings, so NGOs did not lack 
information about any of the discussions taking place.
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The partnership forged between NGOs and sympathetic governments came to 
be known as a “new diplomacy”139 and was highly effective in the context of the 
landmine campaign. As NGOs and diplomats from the core group of countries circled 
around the world to promote the treaty, they triggered a real “snowballing” effect in 
state support for it. The number of countries that attended and signed on the 
declarations of the treaty conferences steadily grew from 74 attending the 1996 
meeting and 50 of them supporting its declaration, to 111 attending the Vienna 
meeting in February, 121 participating in Bonn in April, to 156 attending the Brussels 
conference in June with 97 of them pledging support to its declaration. After a slight 
drop in attendance of the final treaty negotiation conference in Oslo to 120 states, in 
December, 122 states signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa (Lawson et al., 1998; 
Maslen, 2004).
Despite this close engagement in the negotiation of the treaty, and their 
becoming part of the official teams of more than a couple of countries, NGOs were not 
co-opted by states nor did they lose sight of their ultimate goal of a strong treaty with 
“no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes.” As soon as they saw a threat to their 
objectives, the NGOs were back in the streets, protesting with full vigor. Their actions 
were crucial for preserving the integrity of the treaty, when after rejecting the Ottawa 
Process, the US decided to join it for the final conference in Oslo, determined to make 
other states accommodate its demands. Benefiting from insider information about state 
discussions of the US proposals and witnessing signs of yielding to American 
pressure, the NGOs went public with their protest against any weakening of the treaty 
which both propped up the position of their governmental allies and constrained the 
                                                
139 The term “new diplomacy,” or more broadly, “new multilateralism” has been used to denote the 
diplomatic processes or international relations characterized by openness and transparency, public 
engagement and larger role for civil society actors, the creation of new partnerships among small and 
medium-sized states and NGOs that take place out of the traditional diplomatic forums and often pursue 
principled goals. See, for example, Axworthy and Vollebaek (1998), Axworthy (1998), Dolan and Hunt 
(1998), McRae and Hubert (2001), Cooper et al. (2002).
131
freedom of action of those among them who were contemplating compromises in 
order to bring the US on board. At that phase of the negotiations there was no room 
for accommodations, and arguably it would have been difficult for the US to change 
some core principles regarding the definition of APLs even if it had joined the process 
earlier. The US was left behind, while most states jumped on the bandwagon and 
accepted the strong treaty. In December 1997, 122 states gathered in Ottawa and 
signed the Mine Ban Treaty or the Ottawa Convention, as it has become generally 
known.
The Campaign against Cluster Munitions
After the 1970s the problem of cluster munitions had been raised again in the context 
of the negotiations on landmines.140 In May-June 1994, the ICRC convened an expert 
meeting regarding certain weapons systems and implementation mechanisms in 
international law, at which the Australian representative submitted a Non-Paper141
recommending that the CCW be amended by including a requirement for a self-
destruction mechanism in all cluster bomblets (Herby and Nuiten, 2001; ICRC, 2000a: 
9). Even though the proposal was discussed at the meeting and some NGO 
representatives were interested in it,142 on the whole, states were not prepared to 
                                                
140 The question of submunitions and explosive remnants of war was also raised in December 1983 in a 
UN General Assembly Resolution, which endorsed the recommendations of a report to the UN 
Environment Program on explosive remnants of conventional war. The report called for cooperation 
between States in the area of collection, classification, dissemination of information on ERW and for 
the promotion of technical assistance and cooperation in clearing. In addition, the report recommended 
that ‘“[h]igh explosives should be designed to have built-in mechanisms that render the munitions 
harmless in due course” and that “[t]he important issues of responsibility for damage and compensation 
should not be minimised or neglected.”’ (quoted in Herby and Nuiten, 2001).
141 an off-the-record and/or unofficial presentation of policy
142 Following the proposal by the Australian representative, a non-governmental expert elaborated on 
further proposals, including banning fragmentation cluster munitions, attacks with multiple cluster 
munitions where area coverage is above a certain limit; requiring self-destruct or self-neutralizing 
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address the problem, while the NGO community preferred to focus its efforts on the 
more urgent and widespread problem of landmines. In 1995 the ICBL rejected the idea 
to include cluster bombs in the call for a ban on antipersonnel landmines, even though 
the Mennonite Central Committee was arguing for it and some people both in the 
NGO community and the military thought that unexploded submunitions might be 
captured by the effect-based definition of APLs (Wiebe, 2000: 158).143 The NGOs 
preferred to concentrate their efforts where the perceived humanitarian problems were 
most severe and there were chances that they be adequately addressed. Thus the 
suggestion to demand a ban on cluster munitions (and anti-vehicle mines) fell by the 
wayside and was not incorporated in the talks of the First Review Conference of the 
CCW in 1995-96 or in the following campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines.
The Kosovo intervention as a window of opportunity
In 1999, however, the problems of cluster munitions and their deadly impact on 
civilians were highlighted again during the NATO bombing campaign against the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The NATO use of force in this case was proclaimed 
as a “humanitarian intervention” to save the lives of Kosovars persecuted by Serb 
forces. A central point of the intervention was the utmost care NATO forces were 
                                                                                                                                            
mechanisms on bomblets; setting a maximum permitted delay time for time delay fuzes on bomblets; 
and banning cluster munitions attacks where there is a high likelihood of civilian casualties (Wiebe, 
2000: 158)
143 The APL definition in the Ottawa Treaty, “ a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons,” was not 
intended to cover cluster munitions. The major difference with the definition in CCW Amended 
Protocol II is the lack of the work “primarily” before “designed”. This omission worried US military 
officials who stated in July 1997 that, “Ninety-five percent of that problem [in Laos] is unexploded 
ordnance dropped there during the '60's and '70's. These were old cluster bomb type units. And under 
some circumstances, if you took the existing land mine ban definition, without that primarily in there it 
could be, in fact, stretched to include this high unexploded ordnance rate” (quoted in Mennonite Central 
Committee, 1999).
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taking to minimize civilian casualties. Yet, as the bombing continued, civilian 
casualties mounted and a large number of those were attributed to the use of cluster 
bombs. This unfortunate result, however, opened a window of opportunity for NGOs 
to bring attention to the problems of cluster munitions and demand a moratorium on 
their use. Moreover, as the bombing ended and UN peacekeepers and humanitarian 
organizations went back in the Kosovo province they discovered that the numbers of 
victims of cluster bombs kept rising, this time as a result of explosions of unexploded 
submunitions lying on the ground and in the woods where NATO planes had dropped 
them during the bombing campaign. 
Thus, there was a serious humanitarian problem caused by the NATO military, 
especially the US, British, and Dutch air forces, which opened them to NGO criticism 
for not living up to their pledges to do everything possible to save civilian lives, and 
indeed, that they had traded civilian lives for greater security of their own forces 
bombing from a safe distance, which exacerbated the problems of cluster munitions in 
terms of increased failure rates and greater imprecision and area coverage (Amnesty 
International, 2000, HRW, 2000). In addition, after the conflict ended the NGOs, and 
HRW in particular, were able to do field research and meticulously gather data about 
civilian casualties and their causes – credible information that was key to convincing 
military and governmental officials that there was a pressing problem that had to be 
addressed. 
The ICRC and the CCW negotiations on explosive remnants of war (ERW)
Compared to the landmine case, the ICRC response to the problem of cluster 
munitions was more subdued and in tune with its traditional role in IHL development. 
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Nevertheless, in September 2000, the ICRC called for suspension of the use of cluster 
munitions “until an international agreement on their use and clearance has been 
achieved” and its appeal registered with the media as well (ICBL, 2000; Kaban, 2000; 
Doole, 2000). The ICRC started by compiling statistics about the victims of 
unexploded cluster munitions and landmines in Kosovo and gathering evidence about 
the humanitarian problems of cluster munitions. Then it issued two reports based on 
the data and expert research, and in September 2000, organized a meeting of 
governmental and military experts and NGO representatives to discuss their findings 
and recommendations in Nyon, Switzerland, very much the way it proceeded initially 
with the Montreux symposium on landmines in 1993.144 The idea of the Nyon meeting 
was to sound out opinion about the inclusion of a new protocol on explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) in the CCW. 
The ICRC proposal in this regard was informed by its reading of IHL and 
based, in particular, on already existing provisions in CCW protocols regulating the 
use of incendiary weapons and landmine clearance. The ICRC recommended: that the 
use of submunitions against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians 
be prohibited; that in order to reduce the risk to civilians in future conflicts, cluster 
bomblets and other submunitions be fitted with mechanisms which will ensure their 
self-destruction immediately after the device fails to explode upon impact as designed; 
that responsibility for the clearance of all unexploded ordnance be assigned to those 
who have used them; warnings of the threat posed by explosive “remnants of war” be 
provided to the civilian population immediately after their use in a given area; and 
finally, that all necessary technical information concerning the location, dangers, 
                                                
144 The first report, which had not been widely circulated, was Explosive Remnants of War: A Study of 
Submunitions and other Unexploded Ordnance, written by Colin King, the editor for Jane’s Mines and 
Mine Clearance and consultant on explosive ordnance disposal for the British Ministry of Defense and 
DoD. The second was written by Stuart Maslen (Beach, 2001).
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detection and destruction of cluster bombs and other munitions be made available to 
the United Nations and demining bodies immediately after the end of hostilities 
(ICRC, 2000a: 37). 
The proposal was fully supported by representatives of Human Rights Watch 
and Landmine Action, UK (LMA), the latter calling in addition for “compensation to 
civilian victims for death, injury, and economic disadvantage for the inability to use 
land” (Wiebe, 2000: 164). State responses were split, however. Whereas everyone 
present agreed that there was a humanitarian problem caused by cluster munitions and 
ERW, opinions were divided as to what needed to be done and how. The ICRC and 
the NGO community together with government experts from several countries 
envisioned the possibility of rapid process eventually leading to a new protocol of the 
CCW on ERW.145 Others thought that it would not be possible to address the issue 
adequately before the CCW review conference in 2006, whereas US experts did not 
even think that a legally binding instrument was the only possible solution when states 
could take measures to address the problem individually (interview 12 GOV).
Based on the outcome of the meeting, the ICRC went on and formally 
presented its proposal on ERW at the first preparatory meeting of the Second Review 
Conference of the CCW in December 2000 (interview 5 NGO; Kaye and Solomon: 
2002). The Netherlands, motivated by the criticism against its use of cluster munitions 
in Kosovo, called together with 23 other countries for discussions of ERW during the 
preparatory meetings for the 2001 Review Conference and its proposal was 
unanimously adopted (interview 30 GOV). Thus, the issue of ERW was inserted into 
the CCW agenda, as the ICRC and several NGOs had requested. The choice of the 
CCW as the forum to discuss the issue was warranted by the desire to have the major 
                                                
145 Experts from Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland favored the speedy 
negotiation of a new protocol (interview 5 NGO). 
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users of cluster munitions such as the USA and Russia subscribe to any future 
negotiated instrument. On the other hand, if consensus on a meaningful protocol that 
would really address the humanitarian problems of the weapons could not be reached 
at the CCW, this could provide a springboard for the NGO campaign the way it had 
happened after its failure on landmines in 1996.
Whereas NGO participation at the CCW meetings was limited and 
contributions minimal except for statements and briefings from HRW, Landmine 
Action, UK and Mines Action Canada,146 the ICRC was actively involved in the 
discussions on ERW, but the focus of its recommendations shifted from cluster 
munitions to ERW more generally, due to the fact that the latter issue had gained some 
traction in discussions during 2001. Except for the insistence on a prohibition on the 
use of cluster munitions in civilian areas, the rest of the ICRC proposals were dealing 
with the aftereffects of unexploded munitions and envisioned less categorical 
obligations for states than its earlier recommendations.147 Even though the ICRC 
remained committed to its earlier call for a moratorium on cluster munition use until 
an agreement on use and clearance had been achieved, it did not promote publicly this 
position, nor did it push the issue during the CCW negotiations on ERW, preferring 
instead to leave room for discussions on the topic and await their results (interview 41 
                                                
146 The Mennonite Central Committee had been working for years on the problem of cluster munitions 
and was active at the CCW sessions initially, issued several studies on cluster munitions (e.g. MCC, 
1994, 1999a,b, 2000) but stopped attending the CCW meetings in 2003.
147 In December 2001, ICRC stated that the ERW protocol would: “[1] establish a responsibility for 
those who use explosive munitions to clear those which remain following the end of hostilities or 
providing the technical and material assistance needed to ensure such clearance. This responsibility 
could be supported by a variety of technical measures including, for example, a requirement that 
munitions (including submunitions) be equipped with self-destruction mechanisms and a requirement 
that they be made detectable; [2] require the rapid provision of technical information to the UN and 
demining bodies to facilitate swift clearance and minimize risk to clearance personnel; [3] require those 
who use munitions likely to have long term effects to provide information to organizations conducting 
mine/UXO awareness and provide effective advance warning to the civilian population about the 
delivery of such munitions; [4] prohibit the use of submunitions against any military objective located 
within a concentration of civilians” (ICRC, 2001). The ICRC did not push for measures on munition 
reliability since at the time Switzerland had a formal proposal to stipulate a 98% reliability rate for 
submunitions, which the ICRC supported (interview 41 NGO).
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NGO).148
At the Second Review Conference in December 2001 states decided to 
establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with a broad mandate to discuss 
both preventive and post-conflict measures to alleviate the problem of ERW (Maresca, 
2002a,b).149 At that point the only basis for discussions at the CCW was the ICRC 
proposal from December 2001. However, discussions throughout 2002 made clear that 
no consensus could be reached at this point regarding the inclusion of provisions on 
technical improvements for cluster submunitions or more stringent rules on their 
use.150 Instead of prolonging the talks indefinitely in search for consensus on a broader 
range of issues, the coordinator of the GGE on ERW, Ambassador Chris Sanders of 
the Netherlands, decided to form two tracks for discussion – the first focused on post-
conflict measures, for which in December 2002 a negotiating mandate was adopted, 
whereas the second one envisioned only talks on other means to lessen the impact of 
ERW (interviews 34 and 5 NGO).151   
                                                
148 However, the call for a moratorium had disappeared not only from the ICRC statements and papers 
for the CCW, but also from the only ICRC publication on ERW since 2000, which aimed at increasing 
public awareness of ERW and popularizing the newly adopted Protocol. The brochure in fact distanced 
the ICRC from NGO calls for a moratorium: “the ICRC has called for a prohibition on the use of 
submunitions against military objects located in or near populated areas. Some non-governmental 
organizations have also called for a moratorium on the use of these weapons until stricter international 
regulations are in place.” (ICRC, 2004: 18).
149 The draft mandate included for consideration the types of munitions that cause civilian casualties 
after a conflict; possible technical improvements to reduce the risk of munitions becoming ERW; 
adequacy of existing IHL in minimizing post-conflict risks of ERW; warnings to the civilian population 
in or close to ERW affected areas, clearance of ERW, rapid provision of information to facilitate early 
and safe clearance of ERW; and whether a legally binding instrument would be appropriate to regulate 
the issue (CCW, 2001)
150 Switzerland, for example, had proposed that the technical changes should be implemented so as to 
guarantee that the dud rate would be no more than 2 % (Matheson, 2001). VVAF (2001) had also made 
a detailed proposal on the need to increase munition reliability. Even though the USA and the EU were 
generally favorable to such proposals, other countries (among which Russia and China were most 
active), opposed them due to the increase in cost of munitions they would entail. See, for example 
(Russia and China, 2002). 
151 The adopted mandate for the GGE on ERW advise it to: 1) ”negotiate an instrument on post-conflict 
remedial measures of a generic nature, which would reduce the risk of ERW,” including questions of 
“responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of information to facilitate clearance and risk 
education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance and cooperation” and 2) explore whether these 
negotiations could successfully address preventive generic measures for improving the reliability of 
munitions “through voluntary best practices concerning the management of manufacturing, quality 
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After initial negotiations in March, a Draft Proposal for an Instrument on ERW 
was produced in May 2003. The ICRC studied the proposal and promptly distributed 
to the states parties, as well as to ICRC delegations in the respective states, its 
comments on the draft together with proposals for changes in its text.152 The ICRC 
argued for a substantial strengthening of the protocol provisions, especially regarding 
cooperation of users of explosive ordnance in the clearance of ERW in territory not 
under their control, and recording and transmission of information about the used 
explosive ordnance – two points on which it succeeded in improving the relevant texts 
(ICRC, 2003a,c). However, attempts by the ICRC to strengthen the provisions in the 
protocol by substituting clear obligations, reflected in terms such as “states shall,” for 
more vague language such as “states are encouraged,” “as far as possible,” or “where 
feasible” were less successful. The ICRC also strongly insisted on the need for a 
legally binding ERW protocol and argued against the US position, favoring a political, 
non-binding agreement (ICRC, 2002, 2003b). Given that most states shared the ICRC 
position on this point, the US decided not to block consensus and CCW Protocol V on 
Explosive Remnants of War was adopted in November 2003.153
After the adoption of the Protocol, the ICRC prepared a ratification kit to 
enable early ratification of the Protocol by states and kept working in the context of 
discussions about the implementation and adequacy of IHL in relation to munitions 
use. It prepared together with several countries a questionnaire aiming to identify state 
                                                                                                                                            
control, handling and storage of munitions.” Separate from the negotiations the states parties agreed to 
“continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of international humanitarian law and to 
further study, on an open-ended basis, possible preventive measures aimed at improving design of 
certain specific types of munitions, including submunitions, with a view to minimise the humanitarian 
risk of these munitions becoming ERW” (CCW, 2002).
152 Representatives of the ICRC delegations had to meet with state officials to discuss the draft, convey 
the ICRC’s position and eventually garner their support for it at the upcoming session of GGE. The 
ICRC followed the same tactics again after the revised draft proposal for an instrument was distributed 
in September before the November 2003 meeting of states parties (Interview 21 Apr 2004).
153 The Protocol entered into force in November 2006 after the required number of 20 ratifications was 
finally reached in May 2006.
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understandings of IHL principles applicable to the use of munitions that may become 
ERW and the way they are being implemented.154 The ICRC had emphasized that in 
view of the divergence in state interpretations and implementation of IHL principles, 
new rules specifically designed to regulate the use of cluster munitions were 
necessary. 
Thus after the very public campaign on landmines, the ICRC reverted back to 
its primary advisory role in IHL negotiations. Even though the two studies it 
commissioned on cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war in 2000 and the 
Nyon meeting that followed them were of key importance for launching the ERW 
initiative and including the issue on the CCW agenda, the ICRC did not publish or 
distribute a lot of additional studies on the problem, except for a short brochure on 
ERW printed in 2003 and 2004 and a film on ERW and the adopted Protocol V issued 
in 2005. Since 2000 and after the adoption of the ERW Protocol, the ICRC has kept 
calling for a prohibition on the use of cluster munitions, irrespective of their precision 
or reliability rate in civilian populated areas. More recently it has also argued that no 
transfer of unreliable and imprecise cluster munitions should be allowed and that these 
munitions should be destroyed (interview 40 NGO). It also kept consulting with 
NGOs and attending the meetings organized by them aimed at discussing possible 
avenues for action on cluster munitions with a forming group of like-minded 
government officials. 
However, the call from a total ban on cluster munitions from Handicap 
International and the adoption of a legislative ban on those weapons in Belgium in 
                                                
154 Observing the lack of consensus regarding the relevant IHL principles and rules to be considered 
during the planning, targeting, weapons selection and weapons use phases of military operations, the 
GGE coordinator steered the work of the Group in a three-step approach that sought, first, to identify 
relevant IHL principles, second, to establish the status of their implementation by the various States 
Parties, and third, examine the adequacy of the implementation mechanisms as required by IHL. The 
questionnaire prepared by several states in consultation with the ICRC was an attempt to facilitate work 
on this three-step approach and stimulate some progress in this direction.
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early 2006 spurred further discussions within the ICRC about the position it should 
take on the issue. Then in the summer of 2006, the conflict between Israel and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon revealed once again the dangers of cluster munitions. Israel 
used a large number of cluster munitions with devastating consequences for civilians 
in Lebanon and reports surfaced that Hezbollah had also employed such weapons. The 
war became a rallying point for NGO mobilization, provoked sharp criticism of the 
Israeli weapons use from the UN, and resulted in constant reports on cluster munition 
problems from the UN mine action teams in Lebanon, all of which stirred enormous 
media interest in the issue. 
Finally, the war and its consequences prompted a redefinition of the ICRC’s 
position on cluster munitions as well. On 6 November 2006, just ahead of the opening 
of the CCW Review Conference, the ICRC went public with its call for “for strong 
international action to end the predicable pattern of human tragedy associated with 
cluster munitions.” The call emphasized as previously the need to take national steps 
to “immediately end the use of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions; to prohibit 
the targeting of cluster munitions against any military objective located in a populated 
area; [and] to eliminate stocks of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions and […] 
not to transfer such weapons.” However, it also underscored the need for “a new 
international humanitarian law agreement which will effectively address the problem 
of cluster munitions” and announced the ICRC’s intention to hold an expert meeting to 
identify the elements of such an agreement in early 2007 (ICRC, 2006). Even though 
the substance of the ICRC demands was not very different from what it had insisted 
upon before and it stopped short of calling for a ban on cluster munitions, what 
mattered was the public nature of its announcement at a press conference that 
translated into press articles that actually trumpeted “Red Cross Urges Ban on Cluster 
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Bombs” (New York Times, 2006; Washington Post, 2006; also International Herald 
Tribune, 2006). 
Thus for several years the ICRC had maintained a low-key approach to cluster 
munitions. It was generally satisfied with the work at the CCW and the outcome of 
negotiations on ERW. Even though it thought the provisions of Protocol V could have 
been stronger (interview 5 NGO), it welcomed its adoption as “an important addition 
to the fabric of international humanitarian law” and “recognition that States are 
responsible for eliminating this serious threat to civilians in the aftermath of war” 
(ICRC, 2003d,e).155 After the Protocol adoption, the organization continued working 
within the CCW framework for further clarification and development of IHL 
principles applicable to the use of explosive munitions, including clusters. However, 
other NGOs, such as Handicap International, characterized Protocol V as “privileging 
the military interests at the expense of humanitarian consequences” (HI, 2003b) and 
later decided to push for a total ban and seek solutions to address the problem out of 
the CCW. Their position reshaped the tactics of other organizations that prior to the 
Belgian legislation had dragged their feet and been reluctant to go for a total ban. 
States such as Norway also became more actively engaged in the issue and gave 
support to NGO activities. Finally, the Israel-Hezbollah war gave strong impetus to 
NGO reporting and criticism. The ensuing NGO mobilization and media attention to 
the problem pushed the ICRC to make another step forward and stake public support 
for stronger measures on cluster munitions even though it remained cautious not to 
call for a total ban. Thus, as in the landmine campaign before it, NGO advocacy on 
cluster munitions prompted the ICRC to upgrade its position to keep pace with the 
more activist organizations and add to the momentum of their mobilization. 
                                                
155 For a balanced and detailed overview and commentary on Protocol V, see Maresca (2004).
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NGO responses to the problems of cluster munitions
As already pointed out, the Kosovo bombing campaign opened a window of 
opportunity for NGOs to gather reliable data on the problems of cluster munitions and 
bring them to the attention of the media in the context of general concerns about 
civilian casualties caused by NATO’s “humanitarian intervention.” HRW’s press 
releases and reports on NATO’s use of cluster bombs were especially instrumental in 
stirring media interest in the problem (e.g. HRW, 1999a,b,c,d) and soon critiques of 
the weapons use were also voiced by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Mary Robinson and former US President Jimmy Carter (BBC, 1999; Carter, 1999).
Finally, HRW, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), and Landmine Action, UK 
issued calls for a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions until their humanitarian 
problems were resolved. 
Even after the bombing ended the issue did not disappear since NGOs started 
issuing “after action reports” scrutinizing the conduct of the NATO intervention for 
violations of IHL and “unlawful” civilian deaths (HRW, 2000a; Amnesty 
International, 2000). In its report on the bombing campaign, questioning the legality of 
certain NATO practices, means and methods of attack, Amnesty International 
concluded, for example, that, “NATO failed to meet its obligations to take necessary 
precautions by using cluster weapons in the vicinity of civilian concentrations, thereby 
violating the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks,” and thus, “may have contributed to 
causing unlawful deaths” (Amnesty International, 2000). Not only NGOs were 
questioning the legality of the use of cluster munitions. A draft report of NATO’s 
Civilian Affairs Committee recognized that “one of the most controversial aspects of 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was the use of certain types of weapons, in particular 
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cluster bombs.” Acknowledging the arguments made by HRW before, the report went 
further to state that, “cluster bombs may represent a breach of IHL because … of 
[their] high ‘dud rate’ or ratio of unexploded ordnance,” claiming, “it is possible that 
cluster bombs would fall under the definition of anti-personnel mines in their effects. 
In any case, even if cluster bombs cannot be considered mines, Articles 35, 51 and 57 
of Protocol I would protect civilians from their effects, which could be judged as 
unable to discriminate between civilian and military objects” (Kroening, 1999). 
Campaign foci and issue framing: what are the problems, what is to be done?  
The controversy over the use of cluster munitions in the Kosovo campaign focused 
both on the immediate dangers to civilians caused by the imprecision and wide area 
coverage of the weapons, as well as by the high percentage of unexploded cluster 
munitions that were left in the wake of strikes and claimed civilian lives days and 
months after the bombs were dropped. However, in the aftermath of the bombing, the 
problem of unexploded cluster submunitions (or duds) became the dominant theme in 
NGO reports and concerns about the weapons that emphasized that cluster duds were 
de facto landmines. 
The shift in NGO focus is explicable by obvious circumstances – the end of 
hostilities opened the Kosovo province to relief organizations that were faced with the 
dud problem in the field.156 Moreover, many NGOs were involved in demining 
operations and unexploded submunitions presented for them the same or even greater 
                                                
156 The devastating consequences of the use of cluster munitions could be identified in the aftermath of 
hostilities and the cause of casualties ascertained in contrast to the case of immediate attacks and 
collateral damage in the context of indiscriminate attacks during combat when information is more 
difficult to obtain and causes of the casualties attributed to particular weapons (interview 31 NGO).
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problems than landmines. Another factor was the legacy of the successful landmine 
campaign and the fact that most of the organizations that got involved in the cluster 
issue were very active in the ICBL; some of them were even specifically created to 
work on campaigns to put an end to the landmine threat. The mandates of many 
organizations included working for the elimination not only of landmines, but also of 
victim-activated weapons that functioned as landmines. Thus, to a large degree, NGOs 
took up the issue of cluster munitions because it could be argued that unexploded 
submunitions fell under their mandates (e.g. Mines Action Canada, 2001; interview 32 
NGO).157 Whereas NGOs were aware of the other problems cluster munitions posed in 
terms of indiscriminateness at the time of attack, the high dud rates of cluster 
submunitions became the natural focus of their work. 
Thus, in their campaigning NGOs referred to cluster bombs as “de facto 
mines” both because of the effects of unexploded duds and because this provided a 
clear link to the successful landmine campaign and a host of arguments that could be 
applied by analogy to cluster munitions. In the early phase of their work during 2000-
2002, NGOs did not have a clear idea of what their goals should be and those that took 
on the initiative to create an NGO network on the problem of cluster munitions (Mines 
Action Canada and Landmine Action, UK) tended to address it within the wider 
context of explosive remnants of war. For example, in 2002 the goals of Mines Action 
Canada (MAC) included:
[1] Obtain a moratorium on production, sale, transfer and use of cluster 
munitions until the humanitarian concerns associated with their use is addressed 
either by new international humanitarian law (IHL) or through effective 
application of existing IHL; [2] Encourage Canada and other states to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to ERW by making it clear that AV mines with 
antihandling devices or sensitive fuses, directional fragmentation (Claymore-
type) mines and cluster munitions are part of much broader problem with 
                                                
157 The ICBL itself decided not to get involved in the issue of cluster munitions and keep its focus on 
landmines even though it called for a moratorium on the use of cluster bombs (ICBL, 2001).
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unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. [3] Advocate for new IHL 
to minimise the effects of cluster munitions and other ERW on civilian 
populations and places the responsibility on the users of explosive munitions, 
including cluster submunitions, to ensure clearance of unexploded ordnance, or 
provision of financial assistance to ensure its clearance, without delay; allocation 
of more resources to clear ordnance & explosive remnants of war and to help 
survivors (Tuttle, 2002, emphasis added).
There was no clear sense of whether the problem of cluster munitions could be 
solved by IHL implementation or whether it was actually the result of gaps in existing 
IHL provisions.158 And as the second point in the above objectives indicates, MAC 
was seeing and trying to present the problem of cluster munitions as part of the larger 
problem of explosive remnants of war. Many NGO statements from the time and up 
until recent writings in 2006 (including the Cluster Munition Coalition call)159 refer to 
“cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war” that inevitably led to mixing 
the two issues and obscuring the other problematic aspects of cluster munitions, such 
as indiscriminateness during use, which NGOs have been trying to highlight in their 
more recent work. 
In 2000-2003 the NGOs active on cluster munitions directed their attention 
almost entirely to the international level,160 but they did not share a set of clear, 
common objectives. The MCC had called for an immediate moratorium on cluster 
munitions, while insisting that they should be banned; HRW had focused on cluster 
munitions as a whole and called for restrictions on their use in populated areas, as well 
                                                
158 Similarly, even though Handicap International was defending a more radical approach to the 
problem of cluster munitions, in 2004 it still called for suspension of their use, production and transfer 
“until their humanitarian problems have been resolved,” without specifying how this should be done 
(HI, 2004b). Landmine Action UK, on the other hand, after an initial focus on cluster munitions in 
2000, campaigned primarily about ERW and in 2002 called for “[a] legally binding obligation on the 
users of explosive weapons to clear unexploded ordnance, or fund its clearance, and to provide 
warnings to civilians; [and a] moratorium on the manufacture and use of cluster bombs until this new 
international humanitarian law is in place (Landmine Action, 2002).
159 Point 2 of the three-point CMC call demands, “Increased resources to communities and individuals 
affected by unexploded cluster munitions and all other explosive remnants of war” (CMC, 2003).
160 An exception is the “Clear Up! Campaign” in the United Kingdom launched by Landmine Action 
and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund in February 2003 (Cave, 2006; LMA, 2003a).
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as, preventive measures to improve reliability rates and post-conflict measures to 
reduce the threats to civilians from unexploded munitions. MAC and Landmine 
Action, UK (LMA) on the other hand, had split their attention between cluster 
munitions and ERW with a heavier emphasis on the latter. 
Since in 2000 states agreed to discuss, and at the end of 2002, to negotiate an 
instrument dealing with ERW at the CCW, this further moved the focus away from 
cluster munitions and LMA, MAC, and the German Actiongroup Landmine worked to 
develop global surveys of explosive remnants of war, which contributed to 
understanding the problems and informed the discussions at the CCW (LMA, 2003b; 
LMA et al., 2005). 
However, cluster munitions were also kept on the radar screens of NGOs and 
the media as a result of the US-led wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, 
when cluster munitions were used again. A lot of new valuable information about the 
problems of these weapons was acquired thanks to HRW’s fact-finding missions and 
field research on the impact of the use of cluster munitions in these two military 
campaigns. In particular, the need for change in focus and greater mobilization of 
NGO efforts became apparent after the Iraq War in 2003, when the use of ground-
launched cluster munitions by the US and British forces in and near populated centers 
revealed the gravity of the immediate effects of the weapons.161 At the same time, 
talks at the CCW indicated that these problems of indiscriminate use would not be 
tackled by the new protocol discussed in Geneva. Developments at the CCW also 
made clear that it was not enough to try to negotiate an international agreement and 
                                                
161 The cases of cluster munition use, investigated by NGOs up until the 2003 war in Iraq, consisted 
primarily of air-dropped cluster bombs and the dangers posed by use of ground-launched munitions in 
populated areas became well-understood only at that point. Thus, the initial NGO focus on unexploded 
submunition was in large part a result of their field experience and the lack of sufficient, well-
documented evidence about the other humanitarian problems of their use (interviews 29, 31, 34 NGO). 
As information accumulated, the NGOs were able to make stronger arguments about the need of more 
comprehensive restrictions on the use of cluster munitions or even of their prohibition.
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expect that it would answer the humanitarian concerns of NGOs if there were no 
concomitant domestic pressure on recalcitrant governments to engage in serious 
negotiations and not enough domestic or NGO support for sympathetic government 
officials to strengthen their position internationally. 
Thus, the first step NGOs made toward a more focused and sustained action on 
cluster munitions was to form a coalition working on the problem. Feeding on 
dissatisfaction with the limited scope and progress of discussions at the CCW, a 
number of NGOs supported by several governments advocating a stronger position on 
ERW met in the spring of 2003. In April 2003 Pax Christi Ireland and the Department 
of Foreign Affairs of Ireland organized an International Conference on Explosive 
Remnants of War and Development in Dublin that provided a forum for governments, 
international organizations, NGOs, researchers, representatives of the media and other 
experts to exchange views on the subject.162 After the conference, a core group of 
NGOs decided to coordinate their efforts in a joint campaign on cluster munitions.163
After the CCW negotiations in June 2003 when it became clear that a consensus on 
restrictions on use of cluster munitions would not be reached, it was decided to launch 
the campaign in November before the meeting of CCW States Parties (Hollestelle, 
2003). 
The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) was launched on 13 November 2003 in 
The Hague by issuing a call, endorsed by 85 NGOs for: 
1) No use, production or trade of cluster munitions until their humanitarian 
problems have been resolved;
2) Increased resources for assistance to communities and individuals affected 
                                                
162 The conference was funded by the Irish Government in conjunction with the Governments of 
Austria, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Irish Parliament, 2003).
163 Among these NGOs were the Austrian Aid For Mine Victims, Handicap International Belgium, 
Handicap International France, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action UK, Landmine Struggle Unit 
(Egypt), Mine Action Canada, Mennonite Central Committee, Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines, Pax 
Christi Ireland, Pax Christi Netherlands, IPPNW Russia/Russian Campaign to Ban Landmines.
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by unexploded cluster munitions and all other explosive remnants of war; 
3) Users of cluster munitions and other munitions that become ERW to accept 
special responsibility for clearance, warnings, risk education, provision of 
information and victim assistance.
The call was a compromise formula on which all the NGOs could agree and it 
obviously lacked the simplicity and power of the landmine call for a total ban. Even 
though the name of the NGO coalition is a “Cluster Munition Coalition,” and it was 
arguably created to push forward the issue of regulating the use of cluster munitions, 
the call itself continued to mix this problem with ERW, because of continuing 
disagreements among NGOs about where the focus of their activities should lie (Cave, 
2006: 66).164 Opinions on the value and efficacy of IHL to address the problem also 
diverged (interview 23 NGO), which prevented the adoption of a stronger call. 
   Lacking a single and clear common objective and bedeviled by want of 
sufficient funding, for several years the CMC had not been able to play a role similar 
to that of the ICBL on landmines even though in many respects it was fashioned after 
it.165 A CMC coordinator was finally appointed toward the end of 2004 but in the 
summer of 2005 it still wasn’t clear exactly what functions NGOs expected the CMC 
to perform, what the role of its coordinator should be, and whether changes in the 
CMC call were necessary. NGOs remained divided over the desirability of calling for 
a ban and unclear about where their efforts should be directed (Rappert, 2005b). 
HRW, in particular, did not think that a ban was justifiable under IHL, even though 
the detailed restrictions it was calling for in terms of use and technical characteristics 
of submunitions could be seen as amounting to a ban in practice. Other organizations 
also preferred a moratorium call because they didn’t think a ban was achievable and 
                                                
164 Mines Action Canada and Landmine Action UK were the two organizations that insisted that the 
ERW problem remain central to the CMC call, because of the mandate of the organizations to work on 
it (interview 34 NGO).
165 For example, it took one and a half years after it was created before the CMC managed to even set 
up a functioning website in June 2005.    
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were careful about the legal soundness and credibility of the claims they were making. 
Handicap International, on the other hand, had decided in 2004 to strengthen its call 
and since February 2005 to call for a total ban on cluster munitions in order to be able 
to mobilize public opinion and avoid being drawn into discussions of potential 
technical solutions. It undertook a campaign in support of its allies in the Belgian 
Senate who had introduced a law proposal for a total ban on cluster munitions. During 
debates in the Senate, opponents of the comprehensive ban proposal actually used the 
CMC call to argue that even the CMC and civil society were not asking for a total 
prohibition (Rappert, 2005a,b). 
Thus, the CMC call had not been particularly helpful to the campaigning 
efforts of its members. It either was not used by the organizations most active on 
cluster munitions that had their own specific demands, or even hampered their 
activities. The utility of the Coalition had also been confined mostly to providing 
information and some direction to NGOs that were short on resources and didn’t 
campaign domestically, and lending additional weight and credibility to domestic 
campaigners who could argue that there was an international movement active on the 
issue.166  
“The train starts moving:” domestic mobilization and the repercussions of war 
However, two key developments changed the course of NGO campaigning on cluster 
munitions in 2006. First, as already mentioned, the success of the Belgian campaign in 
passing a national law banning cluster munitions in early 2006 helped energize the 
work of certain NGOs domestically167 and internationally in hopes that it could serve 
                                                
166 The lack of common purpose and direction among the NGOs making up the CMC also prompted 
Pax Christi Netherlands to commission a study of possible campaigning strategies in 2005.
167 For example, Landmine Action UK has decided to switch from a call for a moratorium to a ban and 
became more active in domestic campaigning by working with parliamentarians and developing an ad 
campaign against cluster munitions (interviews 23 NGO, 30 GOV). It also published in November 2005 
two reports on the problem of old cluster submunitions in Lebanon and a detailed analysis on the 
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as a catalyst of other national and international measures against cluster munitions in 
the same way the first Belgian law prohibiting landmines had worked in the 1990s. 
Even though differences at the CMC level still persisted, unofficially there has been an 
move toward agreeing on a ban of all old, unreliable and imprecise cluster munitions, 
or alternatively, a call for a total ban on cluster munitions, from which more advanced 
systems with fewer humanitarian effects could be excluded in the process of working 
out the details of concrete national or international actions. Handicap International’s 
success in Belgium contributed most to this trend, since it changed the playing field 
and made it more difficult for NGOs to call for anything less than what has already 
been banned by a country (interview 17). 
Meetings between NGOs, the ICRC, UN agencies, and a small number of 
countries interested in the issue (and eventually in working on an international 
agreement on cluster munitions) also intensified and Norway displayed its willingness 
to assume a leadership position internationally.168 Prior to that, the Netherlands had 
been the leading state on the ERW issue and since 2002 it had been gathering people 
from NGOs, the ICRC, and state officials in their personal capacity at annual meetings 
in Garderen, Netherlands to discuss the issue ahead of the CCW spring meetings 
(interviews 27 and 41 NGO). During that period, HRW, MAC, and LMA had also 
                                                                                                                                            
position of the UK government on cluster munitions and its lack of effort to gather information on the 
effects of cluster munitions on civilians as well as their military effectiveness. The two reports were part 
of a two-prong approach that tries to shift the burden of justifying the use of cluster munitions and 
proving that it is in compliance with international law to the military and governments using them. The 
two reports try to show that government positions are unsustainable in view of the lack of any efforts to 
gather the necessary information that could help determine whether the military advantages gained from 
the use of cluster munitions are proportionate to the civilian damage caused, and the fact that since the 
problems of cluster munitions had been highlighted in the 1970s, nothing has been done to resolve them 
for more than 30 years and people still suffer from the effects of cluster bombs used in Lebanon in the 
1980s (Rappert, 2005b, LMA, 2005a,b).
168 There were two NGO-government meetings in March 2006 organized by the Geneva Forum and 
LMA in Geneva and London, respectively, to discuss the exact nature of the problem of cluster 
munitions and possible ways to address it at the international level. Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden participated in the first meeting in Geneva, whereas representatives from Belgium, Ireland, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland were present at the London meeting 
(interviews 17, 40 NGO).
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been organizing meetings with government officials at the margins of the CCW and 
the Mine Ban Treaty sessions but no clear vision on how to proceed with the question 
of cluster munitions had emerged from them.169 Many differences persisted among the 
NGOs, as well as, among states about the possible avenues for action and the 
likelihood of their success. The only point on which everyone agreed until the summer 
of 2006 was that much stronger domestic campaigns and pressure form the legislatures 
were needed before sympathetic government officials could effectively argue for the 
need of more radical action that could take place out of the CCW framework. 
As NGOs worked to stimulate new legislative initiatives in several European 
countries, including Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, a new war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in July 
2006. After issuing appeals that the warring parties not use cluster munitions, several
NGOs, among which HRW, HI, and LMA rushed to the region to monitor compliance 
with IHL during the operations and watch for the signs of cluster munitions use.170
HRW first sounded the alarm that Israel had used cluster munitions in July (HRW, 
2006d), but it was just three days ahead of the ceasefire when Israel unleashed 
numerous cluster attacks that carpeted with submunitions large civilian areas in 
Lebanon. Outcry came not only from the NGOs working on cluster munitions but also 
from the UN as well as Amnesty International, which had not been particularly 
engaged on the issue of cluster munitions before (Amnesty International, 2006a,b). 
Finally, the US State Department opened an inquiry whether the use of US-made 
cluster munitions by Israel violated an agreement dating back to the 1970s that posed 
                                                
169 Austria, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were regularly 
participating in those meetings, with Belgium and Ireland showing interest, but to a lesser degree (Cave, 
2006: 59, fn.36)
170 The NGO reaction was indeed remarkably prompt (probably because they already had some 
personnel in the combat area), whereas in previous armed conflicts NGO field researchers usually went 
on their missions after the end of major operations.
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limitations on the employment of US-sold cluster munitions.171
At the August meeting of the CCW, the CMC called states to introduce 
individually national measures “to prohibit or place a moratorium on the use of cluster 
munitions” and launch new negotiations on “a prohibition on cluster munitions, whose 
inaccuracy and unreliability make them unacceptable weapons” at the November 
CCW Review Conference for which everyone was preparing (CMC, 2006d). 
Just ahead of the Conference, Landmine Action, UK issued a report on the 
cluster munition situation in Lebanon and Handicap International (HI) a global survey 
of cluster munition use and casualties, both of which made possible by support from 
the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that was preparing to lead a process for international 
prohibitions (LMA, 2006b; HI, 2006j).172 The HI report in particular provided solid 
grounds for advocating a ban on cluster munitions and countering the arguments of 
opponents that they were no different than any other type of employed munitions –
according to its preliminary findings 98% of the victims of cluster munitions were 
civilians and the total number of confirmed casualties amounted to over 11,000. The 
other line of NGO arguments focused on the threat of proliferation of cluster 
munitions through their potential use by states stockpiling large quantities of them and 
their actual use by non-state actors such as Hezbollah. In this way NGOs sought to 
create a sense of urgency to address the problem before the “looming disaster” or 
“humanitarian crisis in waiting” materializes  (HRW, 2006g; also LMA, 2006c).
As the Review Conference opened in November, CMC members also devoted 
some efforts to public campaigning – they greeted the CCW delegates in front of the 
UN building in T-shirts saying “Stop Cluster Munitions. Start a New Treaty” and set 
                                                
171 The same agreement had been the focus of controversy for its violation by Israel already in the 
1980s. For details, see for example, Mohr (1982), Smith (1982), Gwertzman (1982), Cloud (2006), 
Kessler (2006).
172 Another report, Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The Humanitarian and Socio-Economic 
Impact was issued in September 2006 by UNIDIR.
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up at the UN an exhibition on cluster munitions entitled “Civilian harm from Laos to 
Lebanon” (CMC, 2006e). CMC campaigners also placed an emphasis on bringing 
activists from affected countries and victims of cluster munitions to bear witness at the 
Conference of the difficulties people in their countries experience in their daily lives 
as a result of cluster munitions contamination or injuries and call on delegates to take 
action to put an end to the use of those weapons (HI, 2006l). 
Thus, on a smaller scale, the CMC campaigners tried for the first time to recreate 
some aspects of the public campaigning the ICBL had undertaken at the CCW 
conferences in 1995 and 1996. What they did not try to recreate was the slogan of the 
ICBL for a total ban “with no exceptions.” Recognizing the complexity of the cluster 
munition problem, differences among NGOs on what the right solution should be, and 
the limits to which supportive states were willing go in their advocacy for a new 
treaty, the CMC chose instead to campaign just for a treaty and the establishment of a 
CCW negotiating mandate to prepare it, and if the CCW failed to do so, for an 
alternative fast-track negotiating process. If anything, it was admitted that that would 
be a treaty “with exceptions” – exceptions for those weapons that did not pose a threat 
to civilians either during or after their use. Nevertheless, Handicap International 
continued to call for a prohibition of cluster munitions – a position that came to be 
shared by LMA as well (HI, 2006k; LMA, 2006c).
After in September six states (Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, 
and Sweden) had proposed a CCW negotiating mandate for “a legally-binding 
instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions” 
(CCW, 2006), on 7 November when the Review Conference opened, the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan called for a freeze on the use of cluster munitions. In just a few 
days, the number of states that supported the proposal for a negotiating mandate rose 
to 18 and HRW proclaimed “We have reached a tipping point on cluster munitions 
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[…] It’s no longer a small group of isolated states calling for a new treaty. Many 
countries – realizing that negotiations not only should happen, but will happen – want 
to be on board from the start” (HRW, 2006h). Soon the number of supporters became 
24, and on the final day of the Review Conference reached thirty.173
Sweden was portrayed in the press as the leading state behind the initiative to 
ban cluster munitions.174 Even though Norway was actually the state most intent on 
seeing international negotiations on cluster munitions start, it did not believe the CCW 
was the forum where meaningful negotiations could take place. Thus, it stayed in the 
wings and only joined the group supporting the negotiating mandate on the last day of 
the Conference. It was just biding its time and as the negotiating mandate failed to 
garner support at the CCW due to opposition from a number of countries (including 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Britain, and the United States),175
Norway announced its decision to launch an alternative negotiating process to ban 
cluster munitions “that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences” (CMC, 2006f; 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Thus events unfolded similar to the 
developments in the landmine campaign back in 1996. When the number of countries 
supporting a treaty prohibiting the respective weapons reached about 30, a leading 
state took up the initiative and decided to launch an alternative process toward 
formulating a new norm out of the CCW where consensus decision-making prevented 
progress.176
                                                
173 The countries supporting the negotiating mandate were Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
174 E.g. Whitaker (2006a,b), Reuters (2006). In fact, the formal submission of the proposal for a 
negotiating mandate was made by Austria. 
175 Those countries were not staunch opponents on any talks on cluster munitions. Instead, they 
supported a mandate proposed by the UK that envisioned discussions on “explosive remnants of war, 
with a particular focus on cluster munitions” (CMC, 2006f).
176 In addition, there is a large overlap between the countries that first supported a treaty on cluster 
munitions and those that pledged support for a mine ban in 1996 (11 of the early 15 supporters of a 
cluster treaty were also present among the early mine-ban supporters).
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Support from international and regional institutions
The United Nations
The UN, in particular, has shown interest in the problem of cluster munitions since the 
UN humanitarian and demining agencies shared many of the NGO concerns with 
these weapons. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been closely involved in 
the negotiations on ERW at the CCW and based on its field experience in Kosovo it 
argued that, “[t]o simply include cluster bombs as part of a generic UXO [unexploded 
ordnance] threat was not sufficient, given the threat that they posed” (UNMAS, 2002). 
In 2003 UNICEF urged the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee coordinating UN 
humanitarian assistance to pay attention to the issue of cluster munitions and at the 
CCW meeting in November 2003, the Committee threw its support behind the 
demands of NGOs and the ICRC for a moratorium and called for “a freeze on the use 
of cluster munitions until effective legal instruments that resolve humanitarian 
concerns are in place” (Laurie, 2006) – a call, which was reiterated in July 2004 
(UNMAS, 2004).
In January 2005, the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Mine Action177
established a Working Group to consider developing a position on cluster munitions 
and in February it invited the CMC coordinator and representatives from HRW and 
                                                
177 The United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA) comprises 14 
UN departments and agencies involved in mine action including: UNMAS, UNICEF, the United 
Nations Development Program, the United Nations Office for Project Services, the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the United 
Nations High Commission for Human Rights, the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the World Health Organization, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Program, the World Bank, and the Office of the 
Special Adviser on Gender Issues.
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the ICRC for consultations on the issue (CALM Newsletter, 2005: 5).178 Thus, the UN 
agencies were not directly prompted to work on the issue by NGOs (and the other way 
around, have sought their advice), but were responding to the problems encountered in 
their field work and the need to develop a coherent position, possibly not to be 
overtaken by developments at a later stage. Whereas NGOs deemed a UN position in 
favor of cluster restrictions an added asset for their campaign, they had neither looked 
nor pushed for it (interview 34 NGO).  
The two options considered for a UN position were a call for international and 
national legal regulations restricting the design and use of cluster munitions, or a call 
for a complete ban on these weapons, but no consensus could be reached on either and 
it was decided that further research on the problems and impact of cluster munitions 
was needed. The UN Institute for Disarmament (UNIDIR) was commissioned to carry 
out such a study. 
In the meantime, at the CCW meeting in March 2005, UNMAS, UNICEF and 
the UN Development Program (UNDP) declared in a joint statement that, “UN 
agencies are concerned with the hazards that cluster munitions pose as ERW, but also 
with the immediate threat posed to the lives of civilians during cluster munitions 
strikes.” They also reiterated their previous call for a freeze on the use of cluster 
munitions and asserted that addressing the problems of cluster munitions would 
require “strengthening of the international humanitarian law that currently governs 
their use” and  “[a]n additional legal instrument within the CCW framework could 
achieve this aim” (UNMAS, 2005). In the same presentation UNMAS provided a 
working definition of cluster munitions, which was a first step toward defining what a 
                                                
178 In March 2005, the UN Executive Committee for Peace and Security also initiated a series of 
discussions on cluster munitions led by the Department of Disarmament Affairs but it was decided that 
the Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Mine Action should play the leading role in the process 
(Laurie, 2006).
157
cluster munition is for the purpose of regulating the weapon.179
The commissioned UNIDIR report was ready in October 2005 and even 
though it concluded that, “it could be argued that cluster munitions are prone to 
indiscriminate effect” and “the poorest sectors of society suffer the greatest 
humanitarian impact from cluster munitions and bear the heaviest socio-economic 
burden in post-conflict development terms,” it could not reach a definitive conclusion 
as to whether regulations or a complete prohibition of the weapons were needed 
(Laurie, 2006). Thus, the UN agencies apparently ran into the same difficulty as 
NGOs in the CMC that were struggling with the question, “to ban or not to ban?”. 
In a further effort to clarify the extent of the cluster munition problem, the UN 
Working Group on cluster munitions distributed a questionnaire to the UN national 
mine action programs asking that data on submunitions be separated from other UXO 
and that positions on the issue be developed. Nevertheless, at the CCW meeting in 
November 2005, 11 of the members of the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group for 
Mine Action, except for the Department of Disarmament Affairs, agreed on the 
position that, “[r]educing failure rates through more stringent technical specifications 
can reduce the danger posed by cluster munitions, but will not resolve the problem,” 
and called for the inclusion of the question of cluster munitions in the 2006 agenda of 
the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (Laurie, 2006) – a call the UN Secretary 
General repeated in his statement to the CCW in November 2005 (UN Department of 
Public Information, 2005).
The breakthrough in the UN position on cluster munitions came with the 
Israel-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006. It was primarily the UN Mine Action 
Coordination Center in Lebanon (UNMACC) that had to deal with the consequences 
                                                
179 The UNMAS definition of cluster munitions proved useful for national legislative action in Belgium 
in July 2005.
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of the Israeli use of cluster munitions in Lebanon. UNMACC South Lebanon and its 
coordinator Chris Clark became one of the most vocal critics of the munitions use and 
generated a large number of media articles on the issue by gathering daily information 
about the number of cluster munition strike locations, the number of submuntions 
discovered and destroyed, the failure rates, as well as the number of victims of those 
weapons (e.g. UNMACC South Lebanon, 2006; Boustany, 2006; Shadid, 2006; 
Russell, 2006, Yahmour, 2006).
The Israeli use of cluster munitions also prompted a strong reaction from the 
UN Undersecretary of for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator 
Jan Egeland (an erstwhile leader on the mine-ban as Norway’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister in the 1990s) who called it “shocking and completely immoral” since 90% of 
the strikes occurred in the last 72 hours of the conflict when it was known that there 
would be a ceasefire (McCarthy, 2006). Furthermore, as the CCW Review Conference
opened in November, Egeland called for an immediate freeze on the use of cluster 
munitions, reasoning that “[a]s long as there is no effective ban, these weapons will 
continue to disproportionately affect civilians, maiming and killing women, children, 
and other vulnerable groups” (quoted in Associated Press, 2006). A similar (even 
though less categorical) message was also delivered to the CCW Conference by UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, who called on delegates to “devise effective norms that 
will reduce and ultimately eliminate the horrendous humanitarian and development 
impact of these weapons.”180 Finally, following the end of the CCW Review 
Conference, a UN Panel investigating the conduct of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict 
placed special emphasis on the issue of cluster munitions and concluded that their use 
                                                
180 Specifically, the Secretary General called on delegates “to freeze the use of cluster munitions against 
military assets located in or near populated areas […] to freeze the transfer of those cluster munitions 
that are known to be inaccurate and unreliable, and to dispose of them [and…] to establish technical 
requirements for new weapons systems so that the risk they pose to civilian populations can be 
reduced” (UN Department of Public Information, 2006).
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by Israel was “excessive” and “amounted to a de facto scattering of anti-personnel 
mines across wide tracts of Lebanese lands” (quoted in O’Neil and Myre, 2006).
The European Parliament 
Another institution, which provided the NGOs with support on the issue of cluster 
munitions, is the European Parliament (EP). Different NGOs have taken the lead in 
raising awareness among and lobbying members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
on the problem of cluster munitions, in addition to national organizations contacting 
their own MEPs. Landmine Action UK was among the first to bring the issue to the 
attention of MEPs in 2001 and 2002, with support from the ICRC (International 
Security Information Service, 2001, 2002; Wiebe, 2003: 102). This was followed by 
efforts from Pax Christi Netherlands and the German Actiongroup Landmine.de in 
2004, supported by briefings from Handicap International and the ICRC (interviews 
18, 27, 32 NGO).181
Whereas NGOs have been actively contributing to the discussions on the issue 
in the EP, the initiative for passing resolutions calling for a moratorium on the use, 
production and transfer of cluster munitions has often times come from the Parliament 
itself, and in particular, from the disarmament advisor of the Green Party Group, Ernst 
Guelcher (interview 18 NGO). Thus, the latter has served as a connection between 
NGOs and MEPs on weapons-related issues and worked together with them on finding 
compromise language that would be supported by the European party groups in order 
to pass the resolutions.182 The timing of the resolutions themselves has been aimed to 
                                                
181 Representatives from the ICRC have supported NGO and EP activities on the issue with expert 
presentations when invited to participate, but have not initiated them (interview 40 NGO).
182 The main obstacle to passing the resolutions on cluster munitions has been opposition from the 
group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats and British 
MEP, Geoffrey Van Orden (interview 24 PARL). Pax Christi’s lobbying of the Christian Democrats has 
been particularly helpful in overcoming their opposition to the 2004 resolution (interview 27 NGO).
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coincide with, and if possible, influence upcoming events such as the CCW meetings 
(interview 24 PARL). 
In that sense, the involvement of the European Parliament on landmines and 
cluster munitions has been similar to that of national parliaments in several European 
countries, where NGOs create the issues to be picked up by parliamentarians and 
pushed through with NGO help. The European Parliament has been responsive to 
NGO calls for resolutions asking for a European moratorium on “the use, stockpiling, 
production, transfer or export of cluster munitions, including air-dropped cluster 
munitions and submunitions… until an international agreement has been negotiated on 
the regulation, restriction or banning of these weapons” (EP, 2004, also, 2001, 
2003);183 for a ban on financial investment in companies producing landmines and 
cluster munitions (EP, 2005); as well as, support of the international movement to ban 
cluster munitions (EP, 2006). In fact, the Parliament has been quite open and willing 
to take up weapons and disarmament issues and sometimes has even tried to pass 
resolutions going beyond what NGOs were asking for.184 Thus, it could be said that 
the European Parliament and NGOs have promoted the issue of cluster munitions 
                                                
183 The wording of the three calls for a moratorium has been slightly different. In 2001 it was for “an 
immediate moratorium until an international agreement has been negotiated on the regulation, 
restriction or banning of the use, production, and transfer of cluster munitions under the CCW” and also 
urged “all states possessing and/or using cluster munitions to undertake other measures, such as 
improving the reliability of fusing mechanisms by way of dual-event fuses and incorporating self-
destruct or self-neutralising mechanisms into munitions” (EP, 2001). In 2003, the EP more broadly 
requested Member States “to immediately implement a moratorium on the further use of cluster 
ammunition and depleted uranium ammunition (and other uranium warheads), pending the conclusions 
of a comprehensive study of the requirements of international humanitarian law” (EP, 2003).
184 For example, in 2005, MEPs wanted to pass a resolution calling for a ban on anti-vehicle mines and 
sought help from NGOs to draft one, but the NGOs were reluctant to go that far. In a similar vein, the 
EP has been involved in the issue of depleted uranium and the health and environmental consequences 
of its use but could not get Greenpeace interested in the subject (interview 24 PARL). During the 
process of drafting the 2004 resolution calling for a moratorium on cluster munition use, there were 
proposals from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Group for “a total ban on 
cluster munitions,” whereas PXC lobbying on the subject only sought support for the CMC call and 
dissuaded more active MEPs from pushing for more ambitious language in the resolution, to make sure 
it would not be blocked by conservative MEPs (ALDE, 2004; interview 27 NGO). 
In addition, already in November 2001, the president of the EP, Nicole Fontaine, declared that she 
“personally believe[d], in all conscience, that the use of cluster bombs must be banned” and called on 
the US “to refrain from any further use of such weapons” (EuropaWorld, 2001).
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together, rather than see the process as a unilateral effort from NGOs to influence 
parliamentarians. The NGOs have benefited from the European Parliament support 
and used it as an additional argument strengthening the legitimacy of their campaign, 
even though its resolutions have had limited impact on EU common policy on the 
question outside of the area of funding for clearance of ERW.185
Thus, UN agencies dealing with development and demining share with NGOs 
the same interests in popularizing the problems of landmines and cluster munitions 
and attracting more funding for clearance. The NGOs make good use in their 
campaigns of the political support coming from UN agencies, as well as, resolutions 
from the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament that back their 
objectives. Whereas it has been argued that the UN and international organizations 
gave legitimacy to NGOs in international politics and facilitated their functioning 
(Tarrow, 2001, 2005; Jacobson, 2000: 155-56), the cases of landmines and especially 
cluster munitions suggest that this has been a process of mutual reinforcement in an 
area where both NGOs and UN agencies share interests and where NGOs have 
valuable expertise and may actually be a step ahead of the UN in their thinking about 
the problem of cluster munitions. In fact, from a different perspective, it has been 
suggested that the relationship between international NGOs and international 
organizations is one of “mutual legitimation,” providing each with “some veneer of 
democratic legitimacy,” despite the democratic deficit characterizing both (Anderson, 
2000). As I have tried to show, the relationship was really one of “mutual 
legitimation” and reinforcement but not so much because either side lacked 
democratic legitimacy, as because both faced the same problem and were trying to 
                                                
185 More recently, French NGOs have aimed at influencing EU decisions related to the problem of 
cluster munitions through a post card campaign organized by Handicap International France, Agir Ici, 
and Observatoire des Transfers d’Armements targeted at the President of the EU among others, and 
reporting on the production and trade of cluster munitions by EU industries with specific 
recommendations about comprehensive prohibitions (e.g. Observatoire des Transfers d’Armements, 
2005).   
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find a solution to it.186
Conclusion
The landmine campaign took place during the post-Cold War years when new 
opportunities opened for both smaller states and NGOs to become more active on 
security issues at the international level. Its story is probably unique in its dynamic of 
sustained competition among a number of states willing to push it forward for the 
dividends of leadership and international recognition that it could yield in addition to 
helping alleviate a real humanitarian crisis. And the objective of achieving an 
international ban on a weapon with limited military utility was much more 
manageable and cheaper than alleviating hunger and disease in the developing world, 
for example, or other humanitarian causes that might produce political dividends and 
strike public consciousness with similarly horrific images of human suffering. Thus, 
the success of the campaign was not so much the result of the substance of a problem, 
involving “bodily harm to vulnerable individuals” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), as of the 
ability to identify a concrete culprit – landmines – and concentrate on a simple 
solution – a ban on them. The landmine success came from this simplification of the 
issue and presenting it as the only possible point of reference, where many other 
                                                
186 If critiques about the EU’s democratic deficit abound, it is more difficult to level them against the 
European Parliament – its only directly elected institution. In addition, critiques of democratic deficit 
usually refer to the lack of participatory input or internal accountability of international organizations 
and NGOs – they are not elected organs and do not provide accounts of their activities to their 
principals or the citizenry. In fact, international organizations (IOs) are actually accountable to their 
member states, even though NGOs report back only to a limited number of members and funding 
bodies. In both cases, however, their legitimacy does not depend so much on their internal 
accountability, as on the effects of their policies and activities, and ability to address problems and 
represent the common good. In this sense, IO and NGO legitimacy rests upon their moral authority, 
impartiality and expert knowledge, as well as on the effectiveness of their work in solving problems 
(Risse, 2006: 188-92). 
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causes and solutions of the problem have and could have been brought up. 
At least in hindsight, and possibly a bit dazzled by the glow of its success, 
diplomats and NGOs alike refer today to the landmine issue in the 1990s as “sexy”. 
Once the issue was “packaged” and, one by one, states started showing interest in the 
“product,” other states got interested as well. What followed was a process 
approximating bidding for leadership, with the early bidders dropping out after 
realizing that they either did not have the resources to win or lacked the support of 
important elements at home. Even though this dynamic was at work from the
beginning, it actually took several years of work, incremental progress, and successes 
domestically before the issue was propelled into the limelight of international 
attention, first by a failure of consensus decision-making in an international forum and
then by the Canadian bid for leadership at a point when others hesitated about their 
next move. From that moment on, the energetic efforts of NGOs and diplomats from a 
group of like-minded states to promote the treaty all over the world brought about a 
bandwagon effect of countries joining the Ottawa Process.
The dynamic was started and maintained over the years by a handful of NGOs 
and determined individuals who gathered together in the early 1990s and decided to 
launch the ICBL with the single goal of banning landmines. Over the course of the 5 
years from the inception of the ICBL campaign to the adoption of the Ottawa 
Convention, the six founding members were joined in their cause by hundreds of 
NGOs as dividends accrued not only to the leading states but also to the non-
governmental organizations involved in the process. The relationship between NGOs 
and governments and international institutions was generally one of mutual 
reinforcement. Not only did the NGOs need state support to achieve their goals, but 
government officials equally needed NGO support to provide them with new ideas of 
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areas where they could leave their mark and persuasive arguments and data to use in 
the battles with opponents in their own governments. The fact that NGOs remained 
independent in this relationship allowed them to exercise another function, whether 
welcomed by their governmental partners or not – to monitor closely the negotiating 
process and thus prevent people in government from walking away from their publicly 
made commitments. Depending on the real commitment of their governmental allies, 
this NGO function reinforced the position of their governmental partners in times 
when they were under pressure from higher-ranking officials or foreign powers, or 
limited their freedom of maneuver.
In contrast to the landmine case, the campaign against cluster munitions first 
started with individual NGOs and the ICRC raising concerns about the weapons 
following the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Both NGOs and the ICRC were much 
more circumspect in their calls about what should be done to solve the problems of 
cluster munitions. NGOs did not form a coalition from the beginning and have 
remained divided in their objectives throughout the process. States, on the other hand, 
were responsive to some of their concerns, in particular the one NGOs highlighted 
most – the unexploded cluster submunitions – and undertook negotiations on 
explosive remnants of war within the CCW. Bringing up the issue of ERW and 
addressing it in the CCW Protocol V has proved a comparative success and a welcome 
addition in an area previously unregulated by an international legal instrument. The 
debates and international negotiations surrounding it have also left the door ajar for 
subsequent talks on cluster munitions (interview 40 NGO). However, as I have argued, 
the amalgamating of the problem of cluster munitions with ERW and depicting it in 
terms of submunition failure rates has also made it more difficult for NGOs to get out 
of this frame later. They had to switch their focus from arguments that submunitions 
were de facto landmines to the immediate dangers they posed to civilian lives and 
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demand more comprehensive regulations that would not only address the technical 
issues of reliability, but also deal with the area and saturation effects of the weapons. 
Thus to some extent, the difficulty NGOs faced in getting more comprehensive 
regulations on cluster munitions were a product of their own making, since states 
responded to criticisms about high failure rates (and NGO calls for improving them) 
by focusing on technical solutions (especially France, the UK, USA) and opposing the 
adoption of new international legal restrictions.
In 2004-2005 NGOs realized that they were lacking crucial elements in their 
campaign if it were to yield more comprehensive restrictions on the cluster munitions’ 
use and not only their aftereffects. Conventional diplomacy in the conference 
hallways, providing negotiators with information and ideas did not suffice to 
overcome opposition in a forum of consensual decision-making. Not even the most 
sympathetic government representatives who shared their convictions could go much 
further in their proposals when they didn’t have a consolidated domestic policy on the 
issue and no other states showed encouraging signs of supporting their ideas. To 
change this, NGOs had to revert back to basics, educate the public about the issue and 
work in their domestic contexts, form connections with legislators, and push for 
national measures against cluster munitions. The adoption of national bans would have 
the double effect of providing greater freedom of action to their diplomats and 
encouraging other states to follow suit. Whereas the passing of national laws is neither 
a necessary nor determining condition for the position of every single state, the 
adoption of national legislations and supportive national positions toward prohibitions 
in a number of states is a necessary condition for setting the international process in 
motion. Once domestic support in different states starts developing, it becomes easier 
to mobilize action internationally, especially if NGOs and their state and IO partners 
make the best out of the opportunities exogenous shocks, such as the Israel-Hezbollah 
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war, provide them.
The domestic developments that preceded and laid the conditions for the 
Ottawa Process are the often-neglected side of the landmine campaign and the one that 
is in the process of emerging for the cluster munition campaign. As will be shown in 
the following chapters, countries follow different paths when it comes to addressing 
the humanitarian problems of weapons that also have security implications. But these 
paths need to be traveled by a certain number of countries before they could march 
together toward an international agreement.
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PART TWO
DOMESTIC PROCESSES OF NORM EMERGENCE
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CHAPTER FOUR
The US: The Military Calls the Shots, Technology Will Save the Day
Domestic structure and politics
The US is regarded as an example of the “society-dominated” type of domestic 
structure. Its political institutions are usually characterized as fragmented and its 
foreign policy-making process as decentralized. The executive has the prerogative for 
formulating foreign and security policy but several agencies influence the actual 
process including the National Security Council, the State Department, and the 
Pentagon, the latter also taking into account the preferences of the armed services in 
formulating its position on issues of arms control and weapons restrictions. Finally, 
the Senate holds a veto power over treaty ratifications that can only be passed by a 
two-thirds majority. The political system is also open, providing multiple points of 
access at which societal actors can reach policy-makers and voice their concerns and 
interests. 
The openness of the system, combined with a relatively heterogeneous society 
and good organization of interest representation results in the exertion of pressure on 
the multiple policy-making bodies from various directions. Thus, while coalition-
making between social actors and political elites is relatively easy, there could be 
strong competition from opposing interests. Winning the support of just one decision-
maker, be it a key one, does not ensure the translation of the actors’ demands into 
policy and even when a policy is actually adopted, it could be short-lived and 
dismantled after the policy-makers that introduced it leave office (Risse-Kappen, 
1991, 1995a). 
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A third factor that should be taken into account when considering US foreign 
and security policy making is the strength and politicization of the military 
establishment. Not only is the Pentagon one of the policymaking bodies in the US 
system, but the military and the armed services have become increasingly politicized 
since the early 1990s and thus play an additional role as a concerted interest that can 
lobby Congress for its preferred policies. In particular, when there is a divergence of 
policy preferences between the executive and the legislature, the military is apt to play 
one side off the other and push for its own specific interest (Avant, 1994).
Thus, the expectations of the domestic structure model are that NGOs would 
be able to forge coalitions with political elites to advance their cause of banning 
landmines and restricting the use of cluster munitions, but the success of their efforts 
will not be assured, especially if the military opposes their goals. This prediction is 
largely borne out in the case of landmines. On the issue of cluster munitions, however, 
NGOs have not even attempted to form a coalition with policymakers. The latter 
outcome can be explained both by Human Rights Watch’s organizational culture –
that in practice has been the only actively engaged NGO on the issue – and the 
transformation of the US domestic political structure in the period 2003-06 from an 
open and fragmented one into a much more centralized one, with the concentration of 
executive and legislative power in the Republican Party. Nevertheless, the NGOs have 
been able to influence policy making and military practices regarding cluster 
munitions by highlighting their problems in the media early on after the Kosovo 
intervention, establishing some lines of communication with the Air Force that was the 
major user of the weapons until the 2003 military operations in Iraq, and finally, by 
placing the issue on the agenda of international negotiations at the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). 
Thus, the domestic structure concept could be applied only to a certain degree 
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and keeping in mind that it is not a constant over time. It will be argued that American 
political culture and the place military values occupy within it has been of particular 
importance for the inability of NGOs to translate their demands into policy regarding 
landmines. The self-identification of the military and its desire to project an image of a 
professional and responsible force that protects the nation, uses weapons 
discriminately, and takes care not to injure civilians has been used to deflect criticisms 
about its insistence on retaining certain types of landmines. As has been argued, the 
US military was not part of the problem – its landmines did not cause civilian 
casualties. The same arguments, however, could be turned against the military when 
its cluster bombs were killing civilians in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus military 
interests and culture have been at the same time a barrier to a total ban on landmines 
and an opening for efforts to reshape military policy and practice regarding cluster 
munitions. Thus, one can argue that the military has played a central role in defining 
US policies on landmines and cluster munitions but it has not been impermeable to 
humanitarian concerns raised by NGOs. Under two very different administrations, the 
military influence has produced similar policies on both types of weapons by 
promoting a technical solution to their problems. 
The Bush Administration has been portrayed as unabashedly unilateralist, determined 
to stay away from or even undermine international agreements such as the Kyoto
Protocol or the International Criminal Court. In contrast, the Clinton Administration 
came into office favoring a policy of “assertive multilateralism” and has even been 
dubbed by its opponents “the most Globalist” US administration in the 20th century 
(Bolton, 2000:212).
Yet, when one looks at the cases of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) and cluster 
munitions there are more similarities than differences between the approaches the two 
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administrations pursued. Whereas the US under Clinton was one of the first countries 
to focus on the problem of APLs and call for an international ban, in the end Clinton 
decided not to join the Ottawa Treaty and opted instead for the development of 
technological solutions to the problem of landmines and increase of the funds for 
demining programs. The Bush administration’s policy on APLs can be seen as an 
extension of this trend with some backsliding, especially with its renunciation of the 
goal to sign the Ottawa Treaty in 2006 if APL alternatives were developed, which was 
set up by the previous administration. Similarly, on the problem of cluster munitions, 
which was placed on the international agenda only in 2000, the Clinton Administration 
instituted a policy of technological improvement of submunition reliability that was 
continued under Bush. The US participated actively in the meetings of the states 
parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) regarding the 
problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and cluster munitions. Interestingly, 
even though it opposed the adoption of a legally binding agreement, under an 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, notorious for his 
distaste of international treaties, in the end, the US decided not to block consensus, 
accept the addition of Protocol V on ERW to the CCW, and even submit it for 
ratification to the Senate.
I would argue, many activists’ critiques notwithstanding, that in both cases US 
policies have responded to the humanitarian arguments of a host of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and have actually contributed to the emergence of the norm 
against landmines and the acknowledgment of the problem of cluster munitions. 
Whereas US policies have not exactly dovetailed with the demands of NGOs in either 
case, neither have they simply reflected military positions on the issues, as some have 
argued (Center for International Policy (CIP), 1999). Rather, I would argue that the 
US positions regarding landmines and cluster munitions under both Clinton and Bush, 
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were made up of a mixture of humanitarian and military considerations, which is 
typical of the development of IHL as a whole. Clinton’s personal position, receptive to 
the NGO arguments and favoring an international ban was tempered by military 
opposition, whereas the position of Bush, and notoriously, of his Undersecretary for 
Arms Control, John Bolton against any multilateral agreements and international 
norms that might limit US freedom of action, were balanced by humanitarian 
concerns. This is not to suggest that the two administrations exhibited exactly the 
same positions on these issues but to point out that the differences (as well as the 
similarities) of US policy pre- and post-Bush and 9/11 have been exaggerated. I 
propose to shift attention to the processes through which these positions regarding IHL 
have been shaped.  
I will also argue that the US position on these issues was to a large degree 
shaped by the domestic discourse initiated by the NGOs. In contrast to the public 
debate on landmines in other countries, the one that unfolded in the US after 1996 has 
highlighted the military arguments about operational requirements for landmines and 
their role in saving soldiers’ lives instead of focusing on the human tragedy caused by 
these weapons. This has been commonly attributed to the influence of the military on 
the US administration and the Congress and its ability to reframe the debate in the 
media. The interest to the military aspect of landmines restrictions is also 
understandable in view of the greater American security engagements. These factors 
obviously influenced the decision of the most actively involved US NGO in the 
landmine campaign, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) to follow 
a strategy of drawing support for their cause from military figures and trying to expose 
the flaws in the military arguments from a military point of view instead of 
approaching them above all from a humanitarian perspective. Thus, I would argue the 
VVAF’s choice of strategy had the unintended consequence of turning the debate to its 
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disadvantage. In addition, the focus of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) 
predominantly on domestic political games and legislative actions seems to have 
limited its efforts to highlight the scope and pace of the international campaign going 
on at the same time. As a result, it did not fully exploit this potentially useful lever to 
put pressure on the Clinton Administration – i.e. it didn’t bring the “boomerang” of 
international campaigning to bear on US decision-making. 
Similarly, the initial framing of cluster bombs as de facto landmines influenced 
the direction international negotiations and domestic initiatives would take. The 
argument focused on the high failure rates of submunitions that function in the same 
way as landmines and the larger category of explosive remnants of war that did not 
encompass the problems submunitions caused during war. Early on VVAF promoted 
the incorporation of self-destruct and self-neutralization features in the submunitions 
as a possible solution to the problem and this has been a central demand of Human 
Rights Watch and other NGOs as well. However, the emphasis on munition reliability 
displaced attention from the other NGO concerns about the indiscriminateness of the 
weapons and the danger inherent in their use near civilian areas. It took NGOs three 
years after the ERW Protocol was adopted in 2003 to put the focus back on the other 
problems of cluster munitions in their domestic campaigning in European countries, 
and the shock of indiscriminate employment of cluster munitions in the Israel-
Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006, to squarely place the problem on the 
international agenda. It remains to be seen if they would try and be able to do so also 
in the US domestic context.
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Landmines: from leadership to opposition on the ban
1991-1995: NGO-Congressional partnership leading the way
What gave an initial boost to the NGO efforts to ban landmines was the concern 
shown for the problem in the US Congress. After a visit to a field hospital on the 
Honduran border during the conflict in Nicaragua, in 1989 Senator Patrick Leahy 
established the War Victims Fund – a $5 million annual congressional appropriation to 
assist victims of landmines. Thus the Senator was a natural ally for the VVAF in its 
efforts to get a landmine ban campaign started and in December 1991 Jody Williams 
met with his aide Tim Rieser to probe the possibility of getting the Senator’s support. 
Rieser assured her that Leahy would be willing “to enter information about such a 
campaign into the Congressional Record.” In early 1992, closer relations between 
VVAF and Leahy’s Office developed with VVAF offering support for Leahy’s first 
legislative initiative – a one-year landmine export moratorium. The VVAF also gained 
the support of Congressman Lane Evans, a Vietnam veteran himself, to work for the 
landmine legislation in the House (Wareham, 1998: 213-4). 
The proposed moratorium was only the first among a series of actions in 
Congress initiated by Leahy that aimed, first at setting the course of US policy on 
landmines and providing an example for other countries to follow, and later, at getting 
the US to agree domestically on restrictions on landmines that would bring it closer to 
the international standards set up with the Ottawa Treaty. In July 1992 Leahy 
introduced the bill to impose a one-year moratorium on the sale, transfer or export of 
antipersonnel landmines (APL) abroad, which was referred to the Foreign Relations 
Committee but never enacted.187 However, the moratorium still passed after being 
                                                
187 The bill had 34 cosponsors, of which 30 democrats and 4 republicans (Chester, 1999:32).
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attached as an amendment to the 1993 Defense Authorization Bill and was signed into 
law by President Bush in October 1992.188 In 1993 the export moratorium was 
extended for another 3 years with a vote of 100 to 0 in the Senate (Wareham, 218).
Whereas VVAF had established good relations with Senator’s Leahy’s Office, 
the idea for the moratorium originated with the office itself and its successful passing 
was chiefly the result of skillful work within Congress and not NGO advocacy 
(Williams and Goose, 1998: 26; interview 15 NGO). Neither did the NGO envisage 
that the moratorium would “galvanize the imagination of the international 
community” and make politicians abroad believe that the US was willing to address 
the problem and that progress could be made toward the elimination of landmines 
(Williams and Goose, 1998:26). It also proved an excellent tool for activists who 
would pressure their own governments to follow the US lead and parliamentarians to 
enact similar landmine laws.  
In September 1993, the State Department produced a report to Congress, Hidden 
Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Mines that depicted the proportions of 
the landmine crisis worldwide. The State Department indicated that “landmines may 
be the most toxic and widespread pollution facing mankind”189 and Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher characterized them as “weapons of mass destruction in slow 
motion” – statements indicating the serious concern with the problem in the US State 
Department. The report itself and Warren Christopher’s words provided another boost 
for the NGO community. On the one hand, they made appear that the State 
Department shared not only the concerns, but also the goals of the NGOs, and thus 
                                                
188 Most probably, the moratorium passed because it was attached to the Defense Authorization Bill in 
the last minute by Rieser, something he was very good at. “The amendment also called on the US to 
‘seek verifiable international agreements prohibiting the sale, transfer, or export, and further limiting 
the use, production, possession, and deployment of antipersonnel landmines.’ Separate language in the 
Defense bill also called on the President to submit, within 180 days, a report on demining activities in 
certain nations. Senator Leahy also called the US government to ratify the 1980 Convention on 
Conventional Weapons” (Wareham, 1998: 214).
189 Quoted by Senator Leahy in a speech to the Senate (Congressional Record, February 28, 1994).
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served as an encouragement to other states to take up the issue. On the other, if that 
strong language would not be followed by equally strong actions toward elimination 
of the landmine threat, it also opened the State Department to critiques by the NGOs 
for not living up to the challenge of landmines and its own words. 
Senator Leahy directed his efforts to the UN as well where he had a personal 
friend in US Ambassador Madeleine Albright (Dobbs, 1999: 277) who together with 
her arms control deputy Karl (“Rick”) Inderfurth were considered ban advocates. In 
November 1993, Leahy’s collaboration with them led to his introducing at the UN 
General Assembly a resolution urging states to agree to and implement a moratorium 
on the export of “antipersonnel landmines that pose grave dangers to civilian 
populations” – a definition that in contrast to the moratorium passed by the US 
Congress could be construed as not covering self-destructing landmines (quoted in 
Wareham 1998: 220, her emphasis). As a follow up to the resolution, the Clinton 
Administration sent out letters to 44 mine-producing countries asking them to ban 
exports for three to five years. Finally, lobbying efforts by Sen. Leahy and his staff 
bore fruit, when in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1994 President 
Clinton called for international efforts to achieve the “eventual elimination” of anti-
personnel mines (Wareham, 220).190
Thus during this early period of landmine advocacy, Senator Leahy played the 
major role in the debate on landmines in the US and to a large extent was able to 
define the US position on the problem through Congress. He was tirelessly bringing 
up the issue in the Senate, emphasizing the indiscriminate nature of landmines, their 
enormous impact on civilians, and by drawing comparisons to the prohibition of 
chemical weapons, advocated that the only solution to the landmine humanitarian 
                                                
190 The “eventual elimination” for which Clinton called for, was premised on the development of 
“viable and humane alternatives” (Wareham, 1998:221) but this detail may have not registered with 
most countries. 
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crisis was a ban. Furthermore, he managed to spur action in the Clinton 
Administration, invigorate the UN debate on the issue, and indirectly give a boost to 
efforts to deal with the landmine problem in other countries. The debate at this point, 
both in the US and internationally, was predominantly shaped by humanitarian 
considerations and the military aspects of the problem were largely ignored. The 
military did not show concern for the issue partly because it had not yet generated a lot 
of public interest, partly because the idea of a total ban while in circulation was 
accompanied by different, more modest proposals about creating an international 
export regime or enacting other half-measures, and finally because the suggestion of a 
total prohibition on landmines prior to Clinton’s speech at the UN seemed to US 
military officers “so bizarre as not to merit detailed rebuttal” (CIP, 1999).
However, these early successes191 gradually drew the attention of the Pentagon. 
The unanimous passing of the export moratorium extension, pending legislation by 
Leahy in conjunction with the FY1995 Defense Authorization bill, and the upcoming 
CCW review conference in 1995 prompted the Department of Defense (DoD) to start 
thinking about formulating its own position on the issue, even though this remained of 
low priority for the Pentagon (interview 10).192 The Office of Special Operations and 
Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) was tasked to draft some guidelines for developing a 
DoD position, and in turn, it contracted the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to 
perform a quick response study of the military utility of landmines and the 
implications for arms control. The first part of the report was concluded in June 1994 
                                                
191However, even early on success was not easy to achieve – while the export moratorium was 
unanimously extended in 1993, a Landmine Moratorium Extension Act cosponsored by 57 Senators, 
among which 13 Republicans, which declared that “it should be the US policy to terminate 
manufacture, possession, and use of anti-personnel landmines” was referred to committee but never 
enacted (Chester, 1999:33). 
192 The reason why the issue was thrust upon the relatively small Office of Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) was precisely because it was a low-priority matter. In addition, it was “an 
orphan issue” that “no one wanted to touch” because it couldn’t be expected that one would progress in 
her/his career by working on it (interview 14 NGO). 
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(Biddle et al., 1994: 3)193 and it highlighted two important results: first, the military 
utility of landmines depended on whether the US was planning to use them in 
defensive or offensive operations;194 second, for antipersonnel landmines to have an 
effect, very stringent conditions have to obtain, and even under those conditions, the 
impact of antipersonnel landmines is significantly smaller than that of anti-tank 
mines.195 The overall conclusion IDA made was that “military utility in high intensity 
conflict need not preclude consideration of landmine arms control” and antipersonnel 
mines should be considered for such controls first (Biddle et al., 1994:68). 
Whereas the IDA report was perceived as very favorable to their cause by the 
NGOs196 and encouraged the civilian officials at SOLIC to work for a landmine ban 
within the military bureaucracy (interview 10), its actual impact on the DoD position 
is less clear. Even though among SOLIC’s chief civilian officials were two political 
appointees of the Clinton Administration who were in favor of a total landmine ban –
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, Patricia 
Irvin and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, 
Timothy Connolly – the ability of SOLIC to influence the DoD policy on the matter 
was limited. 
                                                
193 Prior to that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had drafted 
position papers on landmine control, respectively, on 4 February and 8 June 1994 (Biddle et al, 1994:5).
194 Whereas the military generally envisaged a Korean type scenario, or even relied on old Cold War 
plans of fighting a defensive war in Europe, combat of the offensive type waged in the 1991 Gulf War 
would be more probable. In addition, since pure defense without counterattack is rare, even in a 
defensive scenario, the net effect of removing landmines on US materiel and combatant losses would be 
less significant than the one under pure defense conditions; For example, if mines were altogether 
removed from a scenario featuring a US mechanized brigade in defense on desert terrain that includes a 
counterattack and use of scatterable AT mines by the US, there would be a 20% increase in US vehicle 
losses, in contrast to previous assertions in the arms control debate that giving up mines will double US 
losses (Biddle et al, 1994: 44).
195 “For AP mines to have a decisive effect, a number of important preconditions must be met, among 
these being: (1) that the attacker reach the close-in positions where US doctrine places most AP mines; 
(2) that the attacker’s infantry dismounts and conducts the assault on foot; and (3) that the attacker 
maneuvers this dismounted infantry and its accompanying armored vehicles independently” (Biddle et 
al, 1994: 70).
196 For example, NGOs organized briefings of the report to NGOs in the US and its leading author was 
even invited to give a presentation for Save the Children in Sweden (interview 10). 
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Thus by mid 1994 both the State Department and the Pentagon were becoming 
more closely involved in the policymaking process regarding landmines. When in 
June 1994 Sen. Leahy gathered the support of 50 Senators for a bill that would require 
a one-year moratorium on the production and procurement of antipersonnel landmines, 
for the first time his initiative provoked strong resistance from the Secretaries of State 
and Defense and he eventually dropped it, allegedly to “give the Administration time 
to develop its own landmine policy” (quoted in Wareham, 219).197   
The shape of the Administration’s policy became clear when a month after 
Clinton’s speech to the UNGA in September 1994, the State Department held a 
briefing for representatives of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines. The 
Administration plans included working for the reinforcement of the CCW Mine 
Protocol at the CCW Review Conference, reduced reliance on traditional, non-self-
destructing mine, and the establishment of an international export regime. Both at the 
meeting and in a subsequent letter to the President, the NGO community reacted 
negatively to the proposed policy and characterized it as “a giant step backwards in 
what has been until now a promising US leadership initiative” (quoted in Wareham, 
221).   
Nevertheless, the State Department did not make changes to its policy, which 
appeared in its 1994 report to Congress on landmines, released on 27 January 1995. 
The report fell far short of charting a policy course that would move the US toward a 
total ban in the near future, even though rhetorically it seemed to suggest as much by 
drawing a parallel to the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention: “[s]oon, a 
comprehensive body of law similar to that recently developed to regulate chemical 
weapons should narrow the lawful uses of landmines to a point where the future risk to 
                                                
197 More probably, the bill was dropped because it would not have gathered the necessary votes after 
opposition from the Administration undermined support in the Senate (interview 15 NGO).
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noncombatants will be substantially reduced” (US Department of State, 1994: 55). 
Instead, it defined the priorities of US policy at the upcoming CCW Review 
Conference as seeking an extension of the scope of the mine protocol to cover internal 
conflict; a prohibition of the use of non-self-destruct mines out of marked and 
monitored areas; and a ban on non-detectable mines, among others. It also promoted
the idea of a multilateral control regime on the production, stockpiling, and export of 
landmines as a way to curb their proliferation (US Department of State, 1994: 27-8). 
Whereas by that time the Pentagon had not come out with a specific policy on 
landmines, the one elaborated by the State Department was consonant with its 
interests. 
However, Senator Leahy and Congressman Evans kept up the pressure on the 
government to take a bolder position on landmines. On 15 June 1995 they introduced 
in the Senate a joint bill with 49 cosponsors that aimed at emplacing in three years a 
one-year moratorium on the use of antipersonnel landmines “except along 
internationally recognized or in demilitarized zones” in marked and monitored 
minefields (Wareham, 219). At this point, ban proponents spurred significant media 
interest in the issue and the American Red Cross, headed at the time by the wife of 
Senate majority leader Robert Dole, endorsed the bill (CIP, 1999).198 It passed in the 
Senate by a vote of 67-27 in August 1995 despite the fact that the 1994 elections had 
brought in a Republican majority and Jesse Helms had assumed the chairmanship of 
the Foreign Relations Committee. 
 It was this one-year moratorium on landmine use coming in force in 1999 and 
the need to comply with it that finally awakened the military to the seriousness of the 
issue and mobilized opposition among them (interview 14 NGO). On 12 September, 
                                                
198 For example, a statement from the Catholic Bishops in favor of a ban and 10 pro-ban newspaper 
articles from major national and local media (9 of which from July), were attached to Sen. Leahy’s June 
21 and July 21, 1995 statements (Congressional Record, 1995a,b).
181
prior to the bill passing in the House, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), Gen. Shalikashvili sent a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on 
National Security, Floyd Spence, requesting his support to defeat the proposed 
legislation since its banning of self-destruct mines that “do not pose a significant 
humanitarian problem” would “needlessly place [American] forces at risk.”199
However, it was too late to mobilize and stop the bill that had already passed the 
Senate, and it was signed into law by President Clinton on 12 February 1996. That 
was a lesson learned for the military that from that point on started preparing “a 
legislative game plan” (interview 14 NGO), would follow closely action in the 
Congress and take measures to influence its outcome. As Leahy was hoping, the bill 
also had the practical effect of spurring the Army to think about how it could comply 
with the use moratorium, and as a result, it ordered the procurement of Volcano mine 
systems that would incorporate only antitank mines instead of the standard mixed 
munitions (interview 14 NGO). 
1996: The military enters the stage… and steals the scene
While domestic legislation solidified opposition in the military, the CCW Review 
Conference that took place in Vienna in September-October 1995 and its follow up 
sessions in Geneva in January and April-May 1996 turned into a focal point for the 
international NGO campaign and helped it not only get media attention but also 
develop in terms of organizational coordination and strategy for action. As a result, the 
debate about landmines shifted from relative obscurity to the spotlight in the media, 
                                                
199 John M. Shalikashvili, letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on National Security, Floyd 
Spence, 12 September 1995, reprinted in Congressional Record (1995c).
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public support for a ban increased, as did the profile of the NGOs promoting it. 
Whereas that was particularly true of some European countries, the public campaign in 
the US gathered force as well and presented a more formidable opponent for the 
military. However, the battle in the US continued to take place on the domestic front, 
and particularly, in the field of legislative action, where the USCBL efforts were 
primarily directed – a choice of tactics that in the end, however, did not deliver the 
hoped for results. 
After Leahy’s 1995 use moratorium, it was Ambassador Madeleine Albright 
who spurred a whirl of activity and controversy on the landmine issue. After a visit to 
mine-infested Angola in January 1996, about which she commented, “I’ve never seen 
so many one-legged people as I have in Angola” (quoted in Sciolino, 1996), Ms. 
Albright took it upon herself to change US policy on landmines. She sent a personal 
letter to the President, the CJCS Gen. Shalikashvili, and the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, arguing that with the current US policy the elimination of landmines would 
not be achieved “within our lifetimes” and urged for a new policy (Wareham, 223). 
Arguably, it was this letter that prompted Gen. Shalikashvili to order a review of 
Pentagon’s policy on landmines that became public knowledge in March 1996.200
Apparently, Gen. Shalikashvili (who was on good terms with Ambassador 
Albright)201 had become “inclined to eliminate all anti-personnel landmines” – a 
                                                
200 According to Folkerts (1997) the policy review took place from February through May 1996. 
Albright’s letter and the Pentagon policy review became a public issue only after parts of her letter were 
leaked and appeared in a New York Times article by Raymond Bonner on 17 March 1996; see also 
Mintz (1996a). Further information from a meeting between Bobby Muller from the VVAF and 
Albright, which she insisted was off the record appeared in a Washington Post article by Mary McGrory 
on 21 April 1996. As a result Muller was “angrily denied access to her office” (Wareham, 223). 
McGrory’s article was obviously intended to warn of the solidification of the Pentagon’s position that 
was at odds with the President’s and “shame” the latter into assuming a tougher stance against the 
military.
201 The fact that both Albright and Shalikashvili were émigrés from East Central Europe created a kind 
of bond between them – for example, Albright referred to Shalikashvili as a “fellow Slav” (Albright, 
2003: 167). Also, Albright’s views on the use of military force were shared by Shalikashvili, who has 
been depicted as her “close ally” in the Administration (Sciolino, 1996).
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position which was made public in a NY Times article (Bonner, 1996; also Mintz, 
1996b)202 and spurred several European states among which Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria to change their policies and declare national bans on 
landmine use in “anticipation of a bold new policy from the US” (ICBL, 1996a).
Shalikashvili was willing to push the military bureaucracy on the issue and see how 
far they could go to accommodate the concerns expressed in Albright’s letter. Thus he 
gathered the major stakeholders on landmines within the Joint Staff and people from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss the issue. The options that were 
presented by the Joint Staff Head of Operations were basically three: “the US does not 
have mines anymore; the US will not have mines in 5 years, or we keep the same way. 
Option three is not tenable, figure out how to make option one and two happen.” Some 
progress was made during the discussions, technical fixes that would have allowed 
compliance with a landmine ban were proposed, and the Army considered giving up 
some systems (interview 14 NGO). 
During the same period VVAF activated its lobbying efforts and worked to 
solicit the support for a landmine ban from high ranking retired military officers. It 
managed to garner the support of 15 senior military figures, among whom, the 
Commander of Operation Desert Storm, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones, and former Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe, Gen. John R. Galvin.203 VVAF then paid for a one-page ad in 
                                                
202 Responding to a letter from the president of Dupuy Institute, Nick Krawciw, in which he was 
recommending that the US adopt a total landmine ban, Shalikashvili wrote “Concur in the conclusion 
that the US should support a total ban on APL” (letter reproduced in VVAF, 2000). Krawciw wrote to 
Shalikashvili in January 1997 to clarify the implications of a quick reaction study the Dupuy Institute 
had performed at the request of the JCS as part of the review process in April 1996 and offer that the 
Institute perform more analysis to substantiate the recommendation for a total ban at the time when the 
Administration was considering the choice between the Ottawa process and the CD.
203 Mark Perry and Bobby Muller of VVAF circulated an appeal to 38 retired generals who they 
believed might favor a ban, of whom, 15 signed (Priest, 1997c). Colin Powell, while in favor of a ban,
declined to sign the letter because he wanted to give Shalikashvili time to complete the internal 
Pentagon review (Wareham, 224). In addition to the three generals cited above, the rest included: 
General William G.T. Tuttle, Jr. (US Army, ret.), former Commander, US Army Materiel Command; 
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The New York Times to publish an open letter from these generals to President 
Clinton on 3 April 1996. The letter tried to provide Clinton with authoritative military 
backing and thus encourage him to resist pressure from within the military 
establishment and take a bold stance in favor of a total ban. It tackled all the 
arguments of the opponents of the landmine ban and assured the President that a total 
international ban was “not only humane, but also militarily responsible,” it would not 
affect antitank mines or “undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces,” 
nor would it turn into a “slippery slope” to ban other categories of weapons. The 
unprecedented character of this action made it an international news story (Wareham, 
1998: 224).204
As the Pentagon review progressed, hopes among the NGOs about its coming 
out in favor of a ban ran high. Already in March Timothy Connolly of SOLIC had 
come out publicly in favor of a total ban, including on self-destruct mines, with an 
exception only for Korea (Bonner, 1996). Information has also gotten out that the 
discussions at the Pentagon “even included time frames for a US ban on all mines 
from as early as 1999 to 2014;” there would only be a “‘muddy’ statement about 
                                                                                                                                            
General Volney F. Warner (US Army, ret.), former Commanding General, US Readiness Command; 
General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr. (US Army, ret.), former Commander-in-Chief, US Southern 
Command; Lieutenant General James Abrahamson (USAF, ret.), former Director, Strategic Defense 
Initiative Office; Lieutenant General Henry E. Emerson (US Army, ret.), former Commander, XVIII 
Airborne Corps; Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr.(US Army, ret.), former President, National 
Defense University President, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Lieutenant General James F. 
Hollingsworth (US Army, ret.) former I Corps (ROK/US Group); Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, 
Jr. (US Army, ret.), former Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division; Lieutenant General Dave R. 
Palmer (US Army, ret.), former Commandant, US Military Academy, West Point; Lieutenant General 
DeWitt C. Smith, Jr. (US Army, ret.), former Commandant, US Army War College; Vice Admiral Jack 
Shanahan (USN, ret.), former Commander, US Second Fleet; and Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard 
(US Army, ret.), former Chief of Military History, US Army (Congressional Record, House, May 15, 
1997, p.H2776-H2778). 
203 Another who publicly supported the ban was Brian Atwood, the administrator of the US Agency for 
International Development (see, Atwood, 1996). Patricia Irvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, who was also an advocate of the ban, also left the 
Administration in 1996.
204 In fact, the action – retired military officers expressing public views with the goal of influencing US 
policy – was not unprecedented (see, Kohn 2002). What was unprecedented was its defense of NGO 
goals.
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Korea involving a finite exception mandated by the President” (Wareham, 224). The 
VVAF felt it was close to convincing the Joint Chiefs to agree to a ban (Teague, 
2002:24). 
However, the information about a draft interagency proposal that became public 
in mid April did not meet the expectations of the NGOs and advocates in Congress. It 
envisaged that the US would stop using non-self destruct mines in 2001 and all 
antipersonnel landmines in 2010, but there would be exceptions for the Persian Gulf 
region and Korea, as well as for the use of APL in combat search and rescue 
operations and the extraction of Special Operations Forces. The proposal drew strong 
criticism from both NGOs that argued that such a proposal would place the US in the 
same position as China, and Sen. Leahy who declared he would oppose the proposal 
since the US had to ban landmines “flatly” and “almost immediately” (Lewis, 1996; 
Graham, 1996). Another bad news for the landmine campaign came at the same time –
one of the few people supporting a total landmine ban within the Administration, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Timothy 
Connolly,205 was dismissed, as the media speculated, in large part due to the conflict 
between the course he was pushing for on landmines (favorable to the NGO demands) 
and the policy preference of the Pentagon (McGrory, 1996; Diamond, 1996). 
In view of these discouraging news, the VVAF stepped up their lobbying efforts 
and on 30 April bought a table for $60,000 at a White House fundraising dinner for the 
Roosevelt Memorial just to give the opportunity to Bobby Muller and two of the 
signers of the NY Times letter, Gen. Robert Gard and Gen. David Jones, to advocate 
the cause of the ban personally with the President. However, while Clinton said that he 
wanted to negotiate a ban, “he couldn’t afford a rupture with the Joint Chiefs” and 
                                                
205 Another one who publicly supported the ban was Brian Atwood, the administrator of the US Agency 
for International Development (see, Atwood, 1996). Patricia Irvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, who was also an advocate of the ban, also left the 
Administration in 1996.
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asked Muller for help “to get them off [his] back” so that he could move toward a ban 
– something VVAF had already tried to do by publishing the letter (Mintz, 1996c; 
CIP, 1999). 
After these reactions from ban advocates, it appears that some changes were 
further discussed and days before the official landmine policy was announced, media 
reports indicated that exceptions for landmine use were narrowed to Korea and the 
deadlines for banning mines were set earlier – in 1999 or 2000 for non-self-destruct 
mines and 2006 or 2007 for self-destruct ones. Whereas some of the media coverage 
made it appear that the Administration and the military had reached consensus for a 
comprehensive landmine ban,206 the VVAF and Sen. Leahy reacted negatively to the 
exemptions, which in their view would make the achievement of an international ban 
impossible (Shenon, 1996). Despite being aware of the overall content of the policy 
review, till the very end the NGOs hoped that President Clinton would take some steps 
to change its direction. When on 10 May they learned details of the review 
conclusions that Gen. Shalikashvili had taken to the White House, they were bitterly 
disappointed and outraged. Obviously, the military had yielded regarding non-self-
destructing APL (which the policy banned immediately, except those needed for the 
defense of the demilitarized zone in Korea), whereas it had held fast for self-
destructing or self-neutralizing mines for whose use no deadline was set – they were to 
remain in the American arsenal until alternatives were developed or until an 
international agreement was reached. It also directed the Services “to begin 
                                                
206 For example, the Time Magazine from 13 May 1996 announces, “Can a superpower say no to the 
poor man's weapon? Clinton and the Pentagon agree it can” and goes on citing senior Pentagon policy 
makers declaring that, "We’ve all agreed we’re going to have to get rid of land mines…We have to 
lump them together with chemical and biological weapons. Even though we used them more carefully 
than other nations, we still agreed to scrap them too." Even an Army officer opposed to the ban is 
quoted as saying that though, “There’s no easy way to defend a perimeter without land mines… it’s just 
politically incorrect to support the use of land mines right now.” Not only does the article claim that 
“many in the Pentagon [were] already convinced by the antimine argument” but even among the 
Republicans, despite the reservations of many, “nobody’s willing to take the thing on” because of 
Elizabeth Dole’s backing of the ban (Fedarko, 1996). 
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development of tactics and Service doctrine eliminating the need to rely on self-
destructing APL in anticipation of prompt international agreement to ban all APL.”207
In these recommendations Sen. Leahy and the NGOs saw nothing but the old military 
position, lack of a concrete US commitment to an international ban, and “a failure of
US leadership.”
Angry about these results the campaigners from USCBL protested that they were 
not consulted during the policy review and urged the President to reject the advice of 
the JCS. To deflect criticism, the National Security Council (NSC) “hastily convened 
a late-night meeting with VVAF representatives” trying to convince them that it was 
not too late to have their input in the final decision. Ironically, at the same time, the 
NSC were informed that the President had just signed on the policy proposed by the 
JCS, which was officially announced on 16 May 1996 (Wareham, 224-5).
So what had happened? The VVAF had focused all of their efforts on convincing 
Clinton to assume leadership and basically announce a total US ban on landmines in 
order to make other countries follow suit. They knew the President was personally in 
favor of a ban – in the margin of Albright’s letter next to the sentence saying “we must 
get rid of these,” he had written, “I agree with you” (McGrory, 1996).208 However, his 
troubled relations with the military over avoiding the draft and the issue of gays and 
lesbians were widely known, as was his reluctance to get into more conflict with them 
just prior to the 1996 elections. Whereas the landmine ban had some public support 
(CIP, 1999) it was hardly of a magnitude to compensate for an eventual break with the 
military. Still, the Administration (and Albright and Shalikashvili, in particular) had 
set the bureaucratic policymaking process in motion and was pushing the military to 
                                                
207 The policy also directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report annually (beginning in 
1999) to the Secretary of Defense and the President his assessment as to whether a military requirement 
remains for the exceptions and envisaged the demilitarization of “dumb” mines not needed for the 
defense of Korea by 1999 (DoD, 1997).
208 Reportedly, the President also held an antipersonnel mine on his desk in the Oval office (Wareham, 
225).
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find ways to comply with a future landmine ban. The various accounts of the process 
describe it as “a state of war” (quoted in Wareham, 224) and “vigorous debate” on 
whether the military should swear off the use of mines (Mintz, 1996a). However, as 
reflected in the several policy drafts that appeared before the final decision was 
announced, the military was obviously receiving mixed signals from the civilian 
officials, and in practice, was able to set the actual policy.
The VVAF understood the weak position of the President vis-à-vis the military 
and his hesitancy to push them on landmines and came up with the Open letter as a 
way to neutralize military criticism and portray a decision in favor of a ban as both 
humanitarian and militarily sound. Certainly, the letter was a success but it also 
focused attention on the controversy and to an extent paved the way for a more public 
and politicized role for the military that opponents of the ban did not hesitate to push 
forward.209 Arguably, by addressing the military arguments against landmines, the 
letter also shifted the debate in the field of their opponents – from predominantly 
humanitarian concerns, where the NGOs held the upper hand, over to the military 
utility of landmines.210 If Clinton, had to make his decision based on military 
arguments, it was only natural that when it came to choosing between the opinion of a 
number of retired generals lobbied by NGOs and the uniformed military in charge of 
planning and fighting wars, he would side with the latter.
                                                
209 As will be shown next, the letter tactic was picked up by right-wing opponents of the ban (e.g. from 
the Center for Security Policy) and skillfully exploited during the debates on landmines in 1997. The 
tactic was used by retired generals on other issues as well, for example, regarding space control 
technologies (CSP, Press Release, “43 of the Nation's Most Eminent Military Leaders Insist that the 
U.S. Must Be Able -- And Allowed -- to Dominate Outer Space”, No. 98-P 07, 15 January 1998).
210 Military interests necessarily make part of a decision to ban weapons and NGOs need to address that 
aspect as well (e.g., just prior to the Open Letter, in early March 1996, the ICRC published a study, 
“Antipersonnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?” written and backed by military experts showing that the 
military effectiveness of landmines was limited and far outweighed by the civilian suffering they 
cause). However, whereas military utility was discussed during the international negotiations on 
landmines, it did not come into the spotlight of media coverage in other countries as it did in the US. Of 
course, the focus on the military effectiveness and need for landmines can easily be explained by the 
greater security concerns the US has compared to other, especially some of the leading pro-ban 
countries.
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Arguably, in the end what had stemmed the initial progress of the policy review 
was the opposition that came from regional commanders. The CJCS Gen. 
Shalikashvili was willing to deliver a deal that would work for the Administration, 
many other members of the JCS did not have strong opinions about landmines, and 
even the Army Chief of Staff did not want to take the lead in the fight against the ban. 
However, when the input from the regional commanders was requested, Gen. Gary 
Luck, commanding the US Forces in Korea, strongly opposed a ban, claiming that 
landmines were indispensable in his war planning and their removal would 
significantly increase US casualties (Snyder, 2004:9-10; Teague, 2002:16, 24). His 
position was endorsed by the Pacific Command, and subsequently, by Gen. Luck’s 
successor, Gen. John Tilelli. Drawing on this assessment of the Korean war-planning, 
the Army and Marine Corps leadership began resisting the landmine initiative and 
convinced the CJCS to support their view.211 Eventually, the Air Force Chief of Staff 
and the Chief of Naval Operations joined the emerging position even though they did 
not seem to have a large stake in the issue (Snyder, 2004:10).212
Following the policy announcement, the NGOs were not able to sustain media 
interest in the issue and publicize the international developments that were also taking 
place. After the CCW Review Conference adopted in May 1996 Amended Protocol II 
on landmines (which was viewed as especially weak and even a step back from the 
original protocol in its definition of antipersonnel landmines), the NGOs formed a 
collaborative relationship with several like-minded states favoring the rapid 
achievement of a total ban. To this end the Canadian government proposed to organize 
a working session for interested countries in Ottawa in the fall of 1996. 
However, even though the USCBL repeatedly asked the Administration to take 
                                                
211 On resistance from the Army and Marine Corps Chiefs of Staff, also Bonner, 1996.
212 This explanation is in line with Priest’s (2003) overall argument about the growing influence of the 
regional commanders in chief on US foreign policy.
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the upcoming Ottawa meeting seriously, it remained focused domestically and lobbied 
the government for three policy steps: “(1) turn its export moratorium into a 
permanent export moratorium; (2) at a minimum, adopt a moratorium on AP mine 
production; and (3) encourage greater transparency by taking the lead and establishing 
a global registry for AP mines” (Wareham, 226). These goals were hardly as bold as 
one could have expected after the controversy over the Administration review 
policy,213 but no progress on them was made by the end of the year, even though 
President Clinton remained rhetorically committed to the landmine cause and in his 
speech to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 1996 called for a 
worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines 
and promised to lead the international efforts toward that goal.
As the Ottawa strategy meeting scheduled for October was approaching, the 
US Administration dismissed it as a “pep rally” and “an exercise in symbolism” 
(Wareham, 226). Yet, from this “exercise” came the big international breakthrough, 
when in his closing statement at the meeting, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy announced that Canada was prepared to hold a treaty-signing conference for 
a total ban on landmines in December 1997 and challenged states to work toward that 
goal. While angered by the unexpected Canadian announcement, the Clinton 
Administration still seemed to share its stated goal. In November, Ambassador 
Albright introduced a UNGA resolution, originally drafted by Canada, that 
acknowledged the accomplishments and objective of the Ottawa meeting and called on 
states to vigorously pursue an international ban on the use, stockpiling, production and 
transfer of landmines. In December, the resolution passed unanimously with a vote of 
156-0 (Wareham, 227).
                                                
213 The goals were probably shaped by the Arms Transfer Working Group (a Washington coalition of 
organizations concerned with arms trade), which was a core member of the USCBL.
191
1997: Looking for a middle way and losing one’s way
Early on in January 1997, the Clinton Administration decided to pursue its goal for a 
total and a global ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) where the big 
producers and users of landmines were participants instead of supporting the 
negotiating process launched by the likeminded states in Ottawa. Given the lengthy 
discussions characteristic of the CD, where decisions could only be reached by 
consensus, Clinton’s choice in practice meant an indefinite delay of any landmine 
agreement and killing the momentum that had gathered force in Ottawa. To deflect 
criticism at home, the Administration introduced two modest policy changes – it made 
the Leahy export moratorium into a permanent ban and capped the landmine 
inventories at their current levels. In talks with the USCBL, Bob Bell from the NSC 
assured the NGOs that if discussions at the CD got stalemated, the Administration 
would shift its efforts to the Ottawa process (Wareham, 228). Pursuing this double 
approach, the Administration to some extent was also able to deflect public criticism 
and dampen grassroots mobilization among the NGOs. For example, activists found it 
very difficult to have to explain to their members the stakes involved in pursuing the 
issue in the two different fora and mobilize them to call the White House or 
representatives in Congress to ask that the US join the Ottawa process instead of CD.
As it turned out, the US was not able to place the issue of landmines on the CD 
agenda due to resistance from countries that thought that it should deal with nuclear 
disarmament and others that did not want to see attention diverted from the Ottawa 
process. In June 1997 the CD appointed a special coordinator on landmines to probe 
state opinions on whether the issue should be taken up by the Conference, who stated 
in mid August that until the outcome of the Ottawa Process in December was known 
no steps on landmines could be made at CD (Hubert, 2000: 19-20, Wareham, 228). 
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Whereas it was obvious that the CD was not working, the US Administration did not 
give much attention to the developments taking place in the Ottawa Process. US 
delegates attended the meetings but had no clear guidelines for the negotiations and 
what positions they should try to promote (interview 11 MIL). In practice, they did 
nothing more than observe what was going on without making an input in the process. 
At the Brussels meeting in June 1997, the US delegation was led by a mid-level 
official, while Ambassador McNamara “conducted aggressive bilateral discussions 
with country delegations in isolation from the conference at a downtown hotel” 
(Wareham, 228; ICBL, 1997a: 44).  
Given the Administration’s reluctance to expend efforts on working for a 
landmine ban either domestically or internationally, the NGOs and Leahy decided to 
try again and push the issue through Congress, hoping to succeed as previously in 
sidestepping the military and creating the conditions that would allow Clinton to join 
the ban treaty. After months of lobbying by the NGOs and their congressional allies, 
in June 1997 Sen. Leahy and Congressman Charles Hagel (R-NE) managed to gather 
the support of 59 senators and 190 representatives for a “Landmine Elimination Act” 
seeking to ban any new deployments of landmines beginning in January 2000.214 The 
same day 164 House members sent a letter to Clinton, urging him to support the 
Canadian initiative for an international ban (Priest, 1997a; Wareham, 229). Even 
though, in order to address the main military concern, the proposed legislation made 
an exception for Korea by permitting the President “to delay the application of the ban 
with respect to the Korean peninsula on a yearly basis” (Congressional record, June 
16, 1997), the bill met with very strong and well organized opposition from the 
military. Following the pattern set by the VVAF Generals’ letter, a barrage of letters to 
Congress and an open letter to the President from both active duty and retired generals 
                                                
214 The bill was introduced on 12 June 1997.
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followed, this time against the pending landmine ban legislation. The chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms spearheaded the opposition to the landmine 
bill within Congress, while the right-wing Center for Security Policy (CSP) and his 
president Frank Gaffney led the assault against it in the media and played a role in 
organizing the generals’ opposition (interview 14 NGO).
On 26 June 1997, the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, supported by Gen. 
Shalikashvili, wrote to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee that DoD 
strongly objected to the proposed landmine definition and argued that it should be 
narrowed to “those systems primarily designed as anti-personnel landmines” and 
should also exclude self-destructing landmines (quoted in CSP, 1997b, emphasis in 
original). On 27 June 1996, Jesse Helms followed with a letter attacking the Leahy-
Hagel bill, which was distributed to his colleagues in the Senate, the CJCS, the Chief 
of Staff of the Army, and the General Counsel of DoD. On 10 July 1997, all the 
members of the JCS and all of the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) sent a 
letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee opposing the Leahy-
Hagel bill that became known as the 64-star letter (signed by 16 4-star generals and 
admirals), finally, on 21 July, 24 retired generals sent an open letter to President 
Clinton to the same effect. 
A lot of the resistance to the ban legislation was stoked by Gaffney’s Center, in 
a series of decision briefs starting on 18 June 1997 (see, for example, CSP, 1997a, 
1997b, 1997c, 1997d). Soon the debate between opponents and proponents of the mine 
ban moved on to the newspapers’ pages as well.215 However, the arguments that were 
exchanged were centered on the military utility and need for mines. Even, the 
legislation’s sponsor Chuck Hagel emphasized above all his credentials as a Vietnam 
                                                
215 For some op-eds in the Washington newspapers in June-July (apart from media coverage), see, for 
example, pro-ban Hagel (1997), Gard (1997), Isenberg (1997a,b), however, the one that strongly makes 
the humanitarian case is MacPherson, 1997); for anti-ban Cronin and Sahlin (1997), Gaffney (1997), 
Day (1997).
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combat veteran and unwavering supporter of the US military in making the case that 
the use of mines did not benefit the military (Hagel, 1997).
The NGOs kept trying to win the debate over landmines on the ground of the 
military. Right after the policy review came out, in June 1996 campaigners lobbied the 
NSC to assess the role of landmines in Korea and have the war game model, used to 
justify the need for mines, rerun with more plausible assumptions. Failing to convince 
the NSC to question the military’s results, in August 1997 Demilitarization for 
Democracy published a study, Exploding the Landmine Myth in Korea that pointed out 
the flawed assumptions and misinterpreted results of the simulation model on which 
the military’s claims against the removal of APL in Korea were based.216 A month 
before that, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and VVAF published a similar study, In its 
Own Words: The U.S. Army and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars, that questioned the military reasoning behind the US insistence on exceptions 
for smart mines and Korea (HRW, 1997).
Despite the merits of engaging the military arguments, it seems that the 
unintended effect of this was that the debate was framed in military terms and its 
outcome hinged on counting the stars on the shoulders of the generals in support or 
against a landmine ban and on the ability to flaunt better military credentials. In such a 
debate, Clinton was obviously deprived of a say, as gradually were the landmine 
victims and humanitarian organizations as well. The Pentagon supplanted the image of 
“thousands of innocent amputees gathering to receive prosthetics and training” by the 
image of “a US soldier pinned down in a foxhole but protected by mines” (CIP, 1999), 
                                                
216 Publicly Clinton had claimed that if mines were removed from the demilitarized zone, North Korea 
would take Seoul. The study by Demilitarization for Democracy showed that a North Korean attack 
would be defeated before it reached Seoul “even with [the war game’s] extremely pessimistic 
assumptions (for example, weather that grounded allied aircraft but permitted a rare fording of rivers; 
allied refusal to attack North Korean forces during a week of obvious preparation for invasion; and 
rapid enemy advance despite allied control of the air and of the well-fortified mountainous terrain)” 
(CIP, 1999). 
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but as I would argue, not without the unintentional help from pro-ban advocates.217
That the debate was framed in this way was hardly due only to Clinton’s 
unfortunate woes with the military and Pentagon propaganda. It was also the result of 
a certain “militarization” of some aspects of American society that seems to place 
inordinate value on the status of the military and being tough at all costs (see for 
example, Sherry, 1995). Indeed, being part of that culture, the NGOs employed the 
same language and tactics that senior military officers have used before to influence 
US foreign policy.218 The most common critique the NGOs themselves were leveling 
against Clinton was that he was not living up to his duties as commander in chief, 
“ha[d] abdicated power” (e.g. Washington Post, 13 Oct 1997) and wouldn’t stand up 
to the military, despite their trying to stiffen his back. In short, he was not tough 
enough – the common right-wing accusation.219 And in the end, Clinton did try to 
behave tough, however, not by standing up to the generals, but by siding with them 
and joining their club.220
                                                
217 The CIP argument is that the Pentagon fought hard to substitute the argument of force protection for 
the humanitarian one first established by Leahy, but never managed to “truly reverse” his early success. 
218 See, Kohn (2002) on the politicization of the military and its public attempts to influence foreign 
policy decisions. For example, in 1995 soon after retirement a four-star general published an op-ed in 
the New York Times criticizing US policy on Bosnia, whereas Colin Powell as CJCS was “willing to 
put forward spin on a policy before the president has formally staked a position.” When the first Bush 
administration was wrestling with the question of whether to intervene in Bosnia, he “gave an 
impassioned interview... on the folly of intervention” to the New York Times (Keller, 2001). The 
VVAF Open Letter from the generals was just a further step down the same road that gave undue 
leverage to the military. The VVAF campaign was probably also shaped by the fact that a lot of the 
advocacy was carried out by former military people – e.g. VVAF’s Bobby Muller; Robert Gard, former 
president of the National Defense University and a combat veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars; 
James Hollingsworth, former US commander in Korea. 
219 Portrayals in the media went along the same lines – for example, Clinton and Gore “meekly yield to 
the wrongheaded opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (NY Times, 21 June 1997); or Clinton should 
“let the Pentagon and the world know who’s boss” (McGrory, 1996). In an advertisement VVAF ran in 
Washington papers opposing the recategorization of APLs in anti-tank systems as not being APLs, it 
called the redefinition “Bill Clinton’s landmine dodge” (Wareham, 1998: 238). Attacks from the right, 
on the other hand, portrayed him as a “flip-flop” on landmine policy for his last-minute decision to go 
to Oslo and his pressure on the military to revise their views (e.g., Gertz, 1997). By far the strongest 
characterizations of this kind came from Jody Williams who called Clinton “a coward,” “Billy”, and “a 
weenie,” whose legacy would be that he “did not have the courage to be the Commander in Chief of his 
military” (quoted in Goldberg, 1997). 
220 See, for example, Priest’s (2003: 41-51) description of Clinton’s farewell dinner with the 
commanders in chief at the White House, marking the improvement of his relations with the military: 
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After the strong military opposition to the Leahy-Hagel bill, its sponsors 
forwent the vote on it, obviously fearing an unfavorable result (interview 15 NGO), 
even though Leahy argued that they did so to give the administration time to 
participate in the Ottawa Process (Wareham, 229).  
Following this setback in Congress, the attention of the NGO and the media 
shifted to the upcoming negotiations in Oslo and the question of whether the US 
would participate in them. The USCBL sent a letter to the President urging him to 
“abandon the caveats which constrain your current policy in order to fully participate 
in ban treaty negotiations” in Oslo in September (Wareham, 230). Still, the NGOs 
remained wary of the Administration’s approach and preferred that “the US stay 
outside of the process rather than to contribute to the creation of a treaty full of 
loopholes, exceptions and reservations” (ICBL, 1997a: 44).  
Throughout the year, Sen. Leahy would continuously bring up the question of 
the Ottawa Process and urge the Administration to participate in it at every possible 
occasion. Even though the USCBL remained primarily focused on the domestic 
legislative battle, it did bring up the issue of the Ottawa Process and the international 
ban to the Administration on a number of occasions (Wareham, 217). The NGO 
“political and legislative campaign… spent roughly $ 2 million the first six months of 
1997, much of it to produce and air television spots in the Washington market aimed 
at the handful of decision-makers and members of Congress who mattered on the 
issue” (Priest, 1997b). For example, on 7 April 1997 the VVAF published an ad in the 
Washington Post, made to coincide with the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien, in which it announced its intention to intensify lobbying for the international 
ban scheduled for signature in December. It also began its efforts to seek the support 
                                                                                                                                            
“Genetically, we’re all 99% the same, the president told his CinCs; if he couldn’t fight them, which he 
tried to avoid, then he would try to join their formidable club” (p.43).
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for the Ottawa ban from House members that resulted in the open letter to Clinton 
signed by 164 representatives. In addition, campaigners sent thousands of postcards to 
the White House urging the President to ban antipersonnel mines and sign a treaty in 
December, and organized public rallies in May 1997 in Washington (Wareham, 217-
8).   
Nevertheless, the imminent success of the Ottawa treaty and the prospect that the 
US would be left behind in the same camp with China, Russia, and Pakistan dawned 
on the Administration only after the end of the Brussels Conference and the failure of 
the CD to take up the landmine issue in June.221 On 15 August Clinton met with the 
Secretaries of State and Defense and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to 
decide whether they should go to Oslo after the Interagency Working Group could not 
reach a consensus. Secretary Albright advocated joining the negotiations, whereas 
DoD opposed participation unless several key issues were changed in the Treaty. After 
being lobbied by UNICEF, Princess Diana and other ban advocates, Hillary Clinton 
was rumored to have influenced the President’s decision to participate in Oslo, which 
was announced on 18 August (Wareham, 230-31).222 The Administration then 
scrambled to reformulate its positions and tried once again to push the military toward 
accommodation. In the short period before the Oslo conference in September, very 
little could be done, however. 
The policy formulation process then changed from the bureaucratic interagency 
deliberations to a very closed and personalized process, in essence, an exchange 
among a very limited number of people – the President, Sandy Berger and Robert Bell 
from the NSC, the vice-chairman of the JCS Gen. Joseph Ralston (who was taking the 
                                                
221 One reason why the landmine issue did not receive enough attention prior to that is that the 
Administration’s chief arms negotiators, including Robert Bell of the NSC, were deeply involved in the 
fight over the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Senate up until late April 1997 
(Burkhalter, 1997).
222 Some have also speculated that Diana’s visit to Bosnia in August also influenced Clinton’s decision 
to go to Oslo (Jerry White of Landmine Survivor Network quoted in Monin and Gallimore, 20-1).
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lead on landmines at the JCS), and Jan Lodal, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (interview 14 NGO). While Berger and Bell were pressing for a 
ban (Snyder, 2004:14), and Gen. Ralston was probing the possibility of getting rid of 
the APLs in mixed systems, in the end, the position that emerged was not very 
different from what had already been agreed on in May 1996.223 The Korean exception 
and the use of mixed anti-tank systems, containing APL for protection, remained the 
two key issues and the main difference with the 1996 position was that the military 
dropped its insistence on the use of self-destruct APLs alone, but given the limited 
operational requirement for such a use, the concession did not amount to much. 
The debate in Congress and the media continued, this time with a new focus on 
the international negotiations. The death of Princess Diana in the end of August 
focused media attention on the issue and gave additional impetus to the international 
effort to successfully conclude an international landmine ban, which she had been 
championing. Arguably, it also contributed to the President’s desire to participate in 
the Oslo negotiations in good faith, and if possible, have the US sign the treaty. 
However, opponents of the ban fought back against the prevailing mood in favor 
of the ban and the Administration’s last minute effort to join the treaty. Jesse Helms 
sent an open letter to Clinton urging him to recall the US delegation from Oslo if the 
other delegations failed to accept the US “bottom line” positions (Lawson, 1998:93). 
On 11 September 1997, in an open letter to President Clinton, ten four-star retired 
generals added their voices to those of the 24 who had opposed a ban back in July. On 
13 September, as the US was launching a frantic campaign to persuade foreign 
governments to agree to its proposals at Oslo, Gen. Shelton, the proposed new CJCS, 
sent his response to a letter from the chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
                                                
223 The DoD was largely excluded from this process; the NCS would prod the JCS and Ralston would 
invest efforts in finding a compromise solution, but would not go over the “red lines” which had 
emerged back in 1996 (interview 14 NGO; Snyder, 2004:14).
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Committee’s Readiness Subcommittee, underlining the need for a Korean exception 
and continued use of mixed systems containing APLs (CSP, 1997e,f). 
The State Department and the NSC were unwilling to accept the political 
consequences of staying out of the Ottawa Treaty and pushed for joining the Oslo 
negotiations on the belief that the Ottawa core group “would go to extreme lengths to 
bring the US into the treaty” and they would be able to “steer the negotiations toward 
an outcome that they could live with” (Maslen, 2004: fn. 198, 210). Thus, trying to 
reconcile both the President’s commitment to a landmine ban and the concerns of the 
military, NSC senior director for defense policy and arms control, Robert Bell pushed 
military lawyers to find ways to comply with the treaty provisions. The result was a 
series of unsuccessful attempts to redefine the meaning of an “anti-personnel 
landmine” and “anti-handling device” in the treaty text, so as to allow the use of APLs 
in mixed systems – attempts that were ridiculed both by pro- and anti-ban activists.224
They provoked a strong response from the NGOs and their slogan, “When is an AP 
mine not an AP mine? – When it’s American,” was picked up by the media.225 When 
the initial American proposals of new definitions faced state resistance, the US 
                                                
224 See, for example, CSP (1997g) for the reaction of anti-ban activists who derided the desire to 
comply with the treaty and depicted it as bullying the military.
225 For example, the proposal of the US delegation from 8 September 1997 featured the following 
definitions:
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact 
of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be 
detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, as well as any anti-
handling devices associated with those mines, are not considered anti-personnel mines.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area 
and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device or submunition intended to protect a mine other than an anti-
personnel mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to, placed under, or deployed as a constituent 
element of a munition containing the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with 
the mine, provided that any submunition deployed as a constituent element of a munition containing the 
mine has self-destruction and self-deactivation features in compliance with paragraph 3( a) of the 
Technical Annex to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines. Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as Amended on 3 Mav 1996, whether or not such mines are remotely-delivered. 
(Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines, 
APL/CW.9/Rev.l, 8 September 1997, reproduced in ICBL report, Oslo Conference, p. 32, emphasis in 
original)
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delegates tried another one that would require only the addition of “or near” after 
“placed under” in the original definition of “anti-handling device” which read “a 
device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed 
under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine” (Lenarcic, 1998: 70). The ICBL response 
was “Near is Too Far” (Williams and Goose, 1998: 44). In the words of Jody 
Williams, “this one word would have had the same effect as putting another single 
word, the word ‘not,’ before the word ‘banned’ throughout the treaty” (CIP, 1999). As 
it turned out, state delegations opposed any such changes in the treaty text as well.
 The other core issue for the US was Korea and some states, to the consternation 
of the NGOs, were more willing to accommodate the American concerns about it. The 
US started by demanding an explicit and indefinite exception in the treaty for the use 
of landmines by the US forces in Korea (August 1997 letter to the negotiating states 
from Albright, reproduced in ICBL, 1997b: 20). After that was rejected as 
unacceptable by the other countries, the US proposed that a transition period of 9 years 
from the time when the treaty entered into force be allowed for Korea. Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien offered a counterproposal: “to allow up to a nine-year delay in 
carrying out the treaty for any signing country that declares it needs mines for an 
urgent defense need” (Sanger, 1997). The US accepted the offer that would have the 
extension period start upon signing of the treaty instead of its entry into force, even if 
that shortened the period by approximately 2 years (White House Press Briefing, 17 
Sept 1997).
Thus in the course of the negotiations, the US dropped its insistence on a specific 
exception for Korea, but demanded two additions that would have still allowed it to 
use landmines there: first, a clause “providing individual states an option of deferring 
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compliance with certain treaty provisions for nine years from signature,”226 and 
second, a modification of the original clause that does not allow withdrawal from the 
treaty in times of armed conflict, which would make clear that “this restriction would 
not apply if the withdrawing party or its ally is a victim of armed aggression in 
violation of the UN charter” (US proposal, 13 Sept 1997, reproduced in ICBL, 1997b: 
36).227 However, states were not willing to accept these US conditions and Canada did 
not manage to gather support even for its counterproposal. Nevertheless, on 15 
September, Clinton insisted on a 24-hour extension of the negotiations to make one 
more attempt to lobby state governments to agree to the exemptions and include them 
this time not in the text, but as an annex to the treaty (Priest, 1997b) and reportedly 
was close to joining the treaty.228
The NGO community saw in all these American attempts a desire to torpedo the 
treaty and launched a vigorous public campaign that attacked the US position and 
insisted on “no exceptions, no reservations, and no loopholes” (Hubert, 2000:25).229
They also vigorously lobbied state delegates to oppose the US demands (interview 38 
NGO). When the Canadians asked for a 24-hour extension of the negotiations in a last 
                                                
226 In practice that meant that the US would have 19 years for development of alternative technologies 
before it would be required to have cleared the mines in Korea.
227 Initially, the US had demanded that the clause that prohibited withdrawal be altogether deleted 
(White House Press Briefing, 17 Sept 1997).
228 It seemed that the US had decided to drop its insistence on APL in mixed systems and agreed to the 
Canadian offer to find a way to use anti-handling devices connected to the AVMs. At 11pm on the night 
when the 24-hour extension was running out, Sandy Berger called Axworthy saying, “[the US] would 
likely be in.” However, a couple of hours later a second call announced the final decision that due to 
opposition inside the Beltway, the US would not sign (Axworthy, 2003: 147).
229 Despite the hype around the US conduct at the Oslo conference, which the NGOs rightly saw as a 
threat to the integrity and strength of the treaty, it does seem that the motivation for the US move was to 
be found in Clinton’s desire to have the US join the treaty (while at the same time dealing with some of 
its security concerns) and not in an alleged attempt to “torpedo” the treaty. After it was signed, the 
administration didn’t try to subvert the treaty and acknowledged that it was “a very significant 
accomplishment” (Eric Newsom, head of the US Oslo delegation, quoted in Bonner, 1997), “a great 
accomplishment” in the words of Robert Bell (White House Press Briefing, 16 Sept 1997). Sen. Leahy 
also characterized the last 48 hours of the Oslo negotiations as “a genuine attempt to break the impasse” 
(Wareham, 235). Clinton also stated that “he had ‘a lot of sympathy’ for the countries that had agreed to 
move ahead with the treaty and that he wished ‘we could sign the Oslo agreement’” (Myers, 1997). 
Later with his 1998 presidential policy directive, he aimed at signing the treaty by 2006.
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effort to bring the US onboard, the ICBL sharply criticized this move and went out in 
the streets to protest against an eventual “sell-out” by some countries (Williams and 
Goose, 1998: 44; ICBL, 1997c). The result was that despite the ICBL fears, Canada 
and the rest of the states held up to their commitment and did not accept the American 
proposals. 
After this blow to the US international prestige and the bitter disappointment at 
being spurned by his European allies,230 the President turned to his domestic audience 
and surrounded by his senior military officers announced that he refused to sign the 
treaty because it would expose American soldiers to risk: “there is a line that I simply 
cannot cross, and that line is the safety and security of our men and women in 
uniform” (Bonner, 1997) – a decision that was warmly applauded by the military and 
right-wing Republicans.231 All of sudden the President earned the military’s respect, or 
at least for a while. Still, the President tried to keep up his commitment to eliminating 
landmines and win the support of the NGO community as well. Thus, parallel to 
announcing his refusal to join the Ottawa treaty, he promised to continue “to lead the 
world toward the elimination of anti-personnel land mines” and redouble efforts to 
reach a global ban through the Conference on Disarmament, and made public a new 
US landmine policy on landmines (Defense Issues, 1997). The policy increased 
funding for demining programs and directed the military to end the use of 
antipersonnel land mines by 2003 everywhere in the world except Korea, and be ready 
                                                
230 According to President Clinton, the Oslo conference was determined to pass “the strongest possible 
treaty… partly because some people at the conference just wanted to embarrass the United States or 
bully us into signing the treaty as it was.” He further wrote, “I hated not to be part of the international 
agreement because it undermined our leverage in trying to stop the manufacture and use of more land 
mines” (Clinton, 2004:765).
231 Jesse Helms, for example, praised the President for his “courageous act” (Priest and Trueheart, 
1997), Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, the vice chairman of the JCS chimed in, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel 
very, very happy about the president's decision…It was courageous” (Priest, 1997b); the right wing 
CSP commended him for doing the “right thing” and 12 retired generals sent an open letter to Clinton 
commending him for resisting pressure (CSP, 1997h). Major newspapers such as Washington Post,
Washington Times, and the San Diego Tribune also supported Clinton’s decision not to sign the treaty, 
whereas New York Times, USA Today and Los Angeles Times critiqued it (Wareham, 233).
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with alternatives for Korea by 2006. The NGOs welcomed the policy as “a step 
forward” in that it stipulated deadlines for ending the use of mines – something the 
NGOs had long been asking the Pentagon to do. However, as it turned out the policy 
actually excluded APLs in mixed mine systems – the key issue for the NGOs – since 
according to the new understanding of the Administration they were not APLs but 
“explosive devices” – a definition that drew NGO criticism and was denounced by 
Sen. Leahy in the Senate but got very little media attention (White House Press 
Briefing, 17 Sept 1997; Trueheart, 1997; Congressional Record, 1997).232 In a final 
gesture to the NGOs, Clinton appointed Gen. David Jones (a ban advocate and signer 
of the VVAF 1996 open letter) as special advisor to the President and the Secretary of 
Defense for issues related to landmine policy. 
However, the goal of the USCBL and Sen. Leahy remained the US signature on 
the treaty in December. Leahy pledged to work for passing legislation that would ban 
landmines (Priest and Trueheart, 1997). The NGOs decided to organize a “Ban Bus to 
Ottawa” that would travel from California to Ottawa along a route that took into 
account “key congressional districts, locations of landmine producers, and sources of 
grassroots support.” The ride started on 27 October and finished on 1 December in 
Ottawa, after having made over a hundred presentations in 75 cities along the way. In 
addition, in December the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines and Save the 
Children, USA delivered to the President over 25,000 postcards featuring artwork by 
Afghan children. Arguably, the major boost to the campaign that highlighted the work 
of the ICBL and the importance of the upcoming signing conference in Ottawa came 
on 10 October with the announcement of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Jody 
Williams and the ICBL (Wareham, 234). Whereas all of this did not change the 
                                                
232 VVAF ran advertisements in Washington Papers, calling the redefinition “Bill Clinton’s landmine 
dodge” (Wareham, 238). One article that focused on the problem in the media is Priest (1997d).
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American decision not to join the Ottawa Treaty in December, it did make clear to the 
Administration once again how badly they had dealt with the problem.233
1998: last efforts with no lasting effects
The Administration tried to do what it could to prove its serious commitment on the 
landmine problem. On 21 October 1997, Secretary Albright announced initiative 
“Demining 2010,” which aimed at generating financial support form private and 
public sources in order to increase funding for humanitarian demining five-fold, to $1 
billion per year. The position of US Special Representative for Global Humanitarian 
Demining was created as well and Karl Inderfurth was appointed to it (Wareham, 
239).
Opposition to the ban legislation in the Senate was revived in February 1998 
when the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms organized a 
hearing on the military implications of landmine restrictions and invited four retired 
generals opposed to a ban to testify (CSP, 1998a,b). But the military was strongly 
opposed not only to any new initiatives that might restrict the use of US landmines, 
but also to the one-year landmine use moratorium that was passed in 1995 and was 
                                                
233 Reportedly, upon learning of the Nobel Prize award to Jody Williams, Clinton had no idea who she 
was. The only ban activist he knew was Bobby Muller. He had not been advised that Jody Williams was 
nominated for the prize either (interview 15 NGO). If that was true, however, it shows not only the bad 
work of Clinton’s advisers, but more damningly, bad work by the NGO campaigners in the US and their 
too narrowly focused legislative campaign that failed to convey the picture of the larger movement, 
which might have made a difference in Clinton’s decision, had it been made clear to him in time. A 
sense of nonchalance about the US is conveyed also by Williams at the end of the Oslo conference, 
“We hope President Clinton will take his confused internal policy home and fix it. But that is not our 
problem.” (Priest and Trueheart, 1997). One reason for that is the strategy, which the ICBL followed to 
get on board the states with worst landmine problems on the ground. In Steve Goose’s words, “We want 
to bring [the US] in, of course,” “But I don’t think they are going to create a humanitarian disaster” 
(Bonner, 1997). Another possibility would be that NGOs hoped for an international boomerang effect in 
the US, but obviously did very little to make it happen. 
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due to enter into effect in February 1999. The Pentagon was pushing for its repeal at 
the same time that the Administration was working to reshape further its landmine 
policy. In February, it was leaked that the NSC had consulted with the JCS about a 
draft of a new presidential directive on landmine policy that aimed at creating the 
conditions for the US joining the Ottawa Treaty in the future (CSP, 1998c). 
The military and Republican representatives in the House have been fighting 
against the use moratorium since its passing.234 However, the opposition became more 
concerted as the moratorium’s entry-into-force date approached and the 
Administration considered a revision of its landmine policy. In March 1998, Gen. 
Tilelli, commander of US Forces Korea, testified before the Armed Services 
Committee and conveyed his concerns with the upcoming moratorium (Congressional 
Record, 1998a). In April, a Pentagon report to Congress examining the implications of 
the moratorium argued against it, due to the threat that non-use of AP mines would 
pose to Seoul and an estimate that allied casualties would rise by 40 percent under 
such a scenario (CIP, 1999). The report was followed by a letter from Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen and the CJCS Gen. Henry Shelton to the Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Strom Thurmond. In it they expressed their “grave 
and substantial concerns” that the moratorium “constitute[d] an unacceptable risk to 
our troops and threaten[ed] mission accomplishment” and asked for a provision in the 
defense authorization bill that would allow the Secretary of Defense to waive it. Since 
the moratorium actually permitted the use of AP mines along international borders and 
in demilitarized zones, this time military arguments focused on the need for AP mines 
in the case of an Iraqi attack against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia (Myers, 1998).
                                                
234 In the two years after it was signed into law, “Republican opponents of the moratorium in the House 
have introduced legislation to reverse it in the Defense Department's authorization bill.” Each time, 
however, “the Senate has refused to take it up” (Myers, 1998).
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Eventually, Sen. Leahy and Rep. Evans agreed to permit the waiver in exchange 
for a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) stating an intention to sign the Ottawa 
Treaty. The deal was struck by Leahy, Sandy Berger, and Gen. Ralston, largely 
without the participation of the military (interview 14 NGO; Congressional Record, 
1998a).235 The PDD was never made public but its core provisions were 
communicated in a 15 May letter from Sandy Berger to Patrick Leahy.236 There were 
three major steps forward from the September 1997 directive – the administration had 
dropped its insistence that APLs in mixed systems were not mines, and thus they were 
covered by the new policy; second, it pledged to search for alternatives not only of 
non-self destructing and self-destructing mines, but also of mixed systems; third, it 
had made a clear commitment to sign the Ottawa treaty, even though it was 
conditioned upon the finding of alternatives to mixed mines.237
In June 1998 the Senate agreed to a presidential waiver of the moratorium, with 
the addition of a Leahy amendment providing funding and a mandate for two studies 
on alternatives to mines, to be commissioned by the Pentagon to independent research 
institutes (Congressional Record, 1998a; CIP, 1999).238 Leahy also tried to include in 
his amendment language that would reaffirm the policy directed by PDD 64 that the 
                                                
235 According to CSP (1998d) Ralston had not even consulted with the rest of the Chiefs of Staff.
236 The PDD committed the US to: first, destroy by 1999 all of its non-self-destructing APLs, except 
those needed for Korea; second, stop the use of all, including self-destructing, APLs outside of Korea 
by 2003; third, aggressively pursue the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006, 
including those that self-destruct; and fourth, “search aggressively for alternatives to our mixed anti-
tank systems by (a) actively exploring the use of APL alternatives in place of the self-destructing anti-
personnel submunitions currently used in our mixed systems and (b) exploring the development of other 
techniques and/or operational concepts that result in alternatives that would enable us to eliminate our 
mixed systems entirely;” and finally, PDD 64 committed the United States to “sign the Ottawa 
Convention by 2006 if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our anti-personnel 
landmines and mixed anti-tank systems by then” (Samuel Berger’s letter, reprinted in Congressional 
Record, 2004a).
237 Importantly, the deadlines for stopping the use of non-self destructing and self-destructing mines, 
including in mixed systems, out of Korea did not depend on the finding of alternatives. The point has 
been acknowledged by right-wing opponents of the ban at the time when Berger’s letter became public 
(CSP, 1998d). That has also been Leahy’s argument, but in practice, the lack of available alternatives 
has been among the major arguments justifying the change in landmine policy under the Bush 
administration.
238 The institutes proposed by Leahy were the National Academy of Sciences and Rand.
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US would sign the Ottawa Treaty “as soon as practicable,” but his efforts were met 
with a campaign from retired military officers and some Republicans against any 
language that would imply a ban on landmines.239 On 16 June 1998 16 retired generals 
sent a letter to the Senate and its majority leader Trent Lott, expressing their concern 
about the presidential directive and urging against the adoption of any legislation that 
would ban the use of self-destructing mines and any mines in Korea.240  Leahy 
eventually decided to drop the language that referred to the US intention to sign the 
Ottawa Convention when Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) put forward an amendment that 
would have barred U.S. signature of the treaty without the written approvals of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders that “the signing of the 
Convention is consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the armed forces 
of the United States” (Congressional Record, 1998b).241
Thus, with PDD 65 President Clinton presumably set the course for the US to 
join the Ottawa Treaty in the not-too-distant future. The policy fell short of the 
ultimate goals the NGOs had set, but in light of the legitimate (even if sometimes 
exaggerated) US military concerns compared to that of other, especially some leading 
pro-ban countries, as Canada, Belgium and Austria, it did represent a major step 
forward and a good balance between humanitarian and military interests, as 
understood by the administration.242
                                                
239 The exact language in the amendment read: “It is the policy of the U.S Government to sign the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction as soon as practicable” (Congressional Record, 1998b).
240 After Sen. Leahy responded to this letter and challenged its assertions, follow up letters from three 
generals were sent (see, Congressional Record, 1998b and a series of decision briefs and press releases 
from CSP in June-July 1998).
241 The amendment required a written certification to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
House Committee on National Security.
242 In fact, some people personally in favor of a ban were sympathetic to the dilemma the US faced. See 
for example, statements by Michael Ignatieff and Adam Roberts in Monin and Gallimore (2002). There 
are a couple of points commonly questioning the extent to which military concerns were sincere and 
well grounded – first, arguments about military requirements were just a cover for opposition to the ban 
out of fear that it would set a precedent and invite more attempts at limiting a series of weapons such as 
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Whereas the NGOs certainly welcomed the US funding for demining, in the 
policy realm most saw Clinton’s commitment to the problem of landmines and the 
issue of PDD 64 in 1998 as little more than rhetoric and handing over the issue to next 
administrations for decision. Nevertheless, many were still hoping that he might make 
a bold step and sign the treaty just before leaving office and in the summer of 2000 
NGOs made a last-ditch effort to persuade him to do so and one hundred members of 
congress sent him a letter to the same effect (Friends Committee on National 
Legislation (FCNL), undated; HRW, 2000b,c). Again, NGOs, and VVAF in particular, 
were placing the emphasis on disproving military arguments and thus providing the 
military grounds on which President Clinton could make the decision to sign the 
treaty. Over the span of the spring and summer of 2000, VVAF commissioned and 
published four studies on the utility of mines in general, and in Korea in particular, as 
well as on the military consequences of landmine restrictions (Dupuy Institute, 
2000a,b,c; Rossiter, 2000). Apparently, the issue stayed with Clinton as well. On his 
last full day as President, he issued a statement on landmines emphasizing the US 
contributions to demining and efforts to find alternatives to landmines and “asked the 
new administration to continue our global demining effort for 10 more years” 
(Clinton, 2004: 949). Once again that fell far short of NGO’s expectations and was not 
enough to consolidate the landmine policies instituted under his presidency. As it 
turned out, with the coming to power of the Bush administration all the significant 
policies regarding the search for alternatives to APLs in mixed systems and eventually 
joining the Ottawa Treaty would be overturned. 
                                                                                                                                            
“artillery projectiles, mortar and tank rounds, grenades, bombs or submunitions that may fail to 
detonate, leaving in place unexploded ordnance” (for example, CSP, 1997a), and second, the defense of 
Korea, on which most of the security interest arguments focused, was not such a big concern (and one 
on which accommodation in the Ottawa treaty could have been reached), but retaining the mixed 
systems. 
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2001-2006: The usual NGO refrain that the government doesn’t bother to hear
During George W. Bush’s Presidency, the NGOs continued with their attempts to 
muster military support for their campaign to have the US accede to the Ottawa 
Convention. After Bush took office in 2001, 8 generals and admirals sent him a letter 
arguing that antipersonnel landmines “are outmoded weapons that have, time and 
again, proved to be a liability to our own troops…We believe that the military, 
diplomatic, and humanitarian advantages of speedy US accession [to the Mine Ban 
Treaty] far outweigh the minimal military utility of these weapons.” (USCBL, 2003). 
This letter was followed by a similar one from 500 war veterans from all US states.243
In November 2001, as information about the Pentagon recommendations for the 
Administration’s review of landmine policy became available, HRW also sounded the 
alarm and urged policy-makers to consider what was the real military utility of 
landmines (HRW, 2001a).244 Legislators mobilized as well and in December 2001, a 
letter from 124 members of the House of Representatives was sent to Bush urging him 
to “redirect the landmine policy review to reflect the need for the elimination of this 
outmoded, indiscriminate weapon from the U.S. arsenal,” and at a minimum, not to 
reverse existing U.S. policy on the issue (quoted in FCNL, undated).245 Finally, as it 
                                                
243 In March 2001, VVAF commissioned yet another study of the consequences of banning, this time, 
antitank mines that was ready in June. The study concluded that a total ban on all “dumb” mines 
(antipersonnel and anti-tank), including those in Korea, was a sensible option, but defended the 
usefulness of “smart” antitank mines (Dupuy, 2001).
244 As previously, the focus was almost entirely on the military arguments about landmine use. HRW 
brought to the attention of policy-makers questions such as, “Do Mines have a Role on the Modern 
Battlefield? How Much Time Do Antipersonnel Mines Buy? What is the benefit that antipersonnel 
mines provide in "protecting" antitank?,” that were then subdivided into numerous detailed technical 
and operational questions. The memorandum concluded by asserting that there is no such thing as a 
humanitarian mine and outlined the international position of the US on the issue (HRW, 2001b).
245 It is not clear whether that lobbying played a role in delaying the announcement of the new landmine 
policy Whereas the new policy was announced in early 2004, it was already formulated in 2001, but 
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became clear that the Administration’s review process was about to be completed, the 
USCBL made another attempt to influence Bush’s final decision and sent him a letter 
countering the military arguments for continued use of landmines and urging the 
President to join the Ottawa Convention (USCBL, 2003). 
However, calls from NGOs and legislators were left unheeded and in February 
2004, the Administration announced its new landmine policy that went back to the 
bottom-line positions of the military from the period before May 1996. It did away 
with all elements of Clinton’s policy (stop the use of persistent landmines outside of 
Korea by 2003, join the Ottawa Treaty by 2006, and find alternatives to all, including 
self-destruct mines in mixed systems). The policy focused instead on eliminating the 
threat of all persistent (non-self-destruct) mines, including anti-tank ones. Thus it 
pledged to stop the use of all persistent mines anywhere in the world after 2010 and 
use them outside of Korea before this deadline only with Presidential authorization. 
However, no restrictions were placed on the use of “smart” mines. In addition, the 
Administration asserted that the US would continue to develop self-destruct and self-
neutralizing mines and envisaged a 50% increase in the US Humanitarian Mine Action 
Program funding (US Department of State, 2004). 
In 2005, the Pentagon proceeded with plans to start the production of a new, 
advanced landmine system, “Spider”. The system was a part of Pentagon’s program to 
develop landmine alternatives and was made of a network of command-detonated 
munitions. However, it also included a battlefield-override feature that could switch 
the landmines to a victim-activated mode that would turn them into conventional 
landmines prohibited by the Ottawa Treaty.246 For years, NGOs had been alerting the 
                                                                                                                                            
DoD officials have claimed that the delay in the announcement was due to the low priority of the issue 
for the Administration (interview 13 GOV).
246 The “Spider” system is “a network of radio-controlled landmines which ‘[detect] intruders and 
[alert] the field operator, who may then engage a hostile target or warn off a noncombatant.’” The 
“man-in-the-loop” functionality requires human intervention before a mine can be detonated, but this 
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public and policy makers to the inherent indiscriminateness of the battlefield-override 
feature in the new mine alternatives. To their satisfaction, in December 2005 the 
Congress delayed the Pentagon’s plans by including a last-minute provision in the 
2006 Defense Appropriations Bill, which required the Secretary of the Army to 
conduct a review of all new landmine technologies and report to Congress on the 
possible indiscriminate effects of these new systems before their full-rate production 
started (USCBL, 2006a).
Even though the Pentagon had not provided the requested report to Congress, 
in 2006 information got out that it had awarded contracts to Alliant Techsystems and 
Textron Systems for the production of “Spider”. The USCBL responded with an 
action alert to its members urging them to write to congressmen and “require that new 
victim-activated mines, which injure soldiers and children with impunity, not be 
produced” (USCBL, 2006b). In August 2006, senators Leahy and Arlen Specter (R-
PA) proposed the Victim-Activated Landmine Abolition Act that aimed at prohibiting 
the procurement of landmines or other weapons designed to be victim-activated 
(Komp, 2006; HRW, 2006e).247 The corresponding bill was introduced in the House 
on 26 Sept 2006 by Rep. James McGovern (D-MA), co-sponsored by Rep. Phil 
English (R-PA). It still remains to be seen if the congressmen would be able to garner 
the bipartisan support needed for the passage of the bill in the Senate and the House. 
                                                                                                                                            
mode could be switched off and the mines could then be exploded by the presence of humans without a 
decision from a military operator (FCNL, 2006).
247 The Bill prohibits only the procurement of such weapons, but does not ban the use of already 
procured victim-activated mines or require the clearance of already emplaced ones.
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Lessons from the landmine saga 
First, an obvious conclusion from the landmine campaign in the US is that the case 
confirms arguments about the significant role the military and militaristic culture play 
in US policy-making and society at large (Sherry, 1995; Bacevich, 2005; Lutz, 2002). 
In this case, the military factor went hand in hand with another characteristic of 
American culture – the belief in the progress of science and technology and their 
ability to improve society and solve its moral dilemmas (Sherry, 1987). 
Cognizant of the force of the military and its arguments to define the US 
position on the subject, the NGOs tried to disprove their validity. In doing so, 
however, they bought into the dominant military frame of reference, instead of opting 
out of it and putting the emphasis on a different point of view that privileges the 
humanitarian over the military aspects of the problem. Thus, time and again they tried
to meet the military on its own ground, and time and again they obviously lost the 
battle. The generals’ open letter to Clinton was an innovative, and according to the 
NGOs, highly successful lobbying tactic (interview 38 NGO). Yet, as I have argued, it 
backfired against them both by reinforcing the tendency to frame the discourse on 
landmines in military terms and by opening the door to politicization of the issue and 
more active involvement of military opponents in the ensuing debate. 
The NGO campaign was too narrow in another way as well. It focused its 
campaigning primarily on Washington and lobbying senators, House representatives 
and government officials. It didn’t invest a lot of energy in mobilizing the public and 
grassroots followers even though public opinion would have been a strong factor in 
motivating Clinton’s decision. Finally, concentrating on the domestic front appears to 
have limited the NGOs’ ability to highlight the unprecedented international 
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mobilization on the issue and use it as an additional tool in lobbying policy-makers in 
the US. Thus, embedded in their domestic context, the NGOs failed to overcome the 
military opposition and sway Clinton to their side.
The pervasiveness of military considerations was exhibited in another way as 
well. As a commander in chief, Clinton could have tried to impose its preference for a 
total landmine ban over military opposition. However, he feared a rupture with the 
military, which could have cost him dearly in the 1996 elections and so he didn’t 
challenge their position in the landmine policy review conducted in the spring of 1996. 
This preoccupation about breaking up with the military was born out of a personal 
vulnerability of the president due to his avoidance of the draft during the Vietnam War 
and the repercussions he suffered after bringing up the issue of homosexuals in the 
army early on in his term. Nevertheless, Clinton’s “vulnerability” could only have 
mattered in the context of a political culture where military service was of great 
importance to voters. Personal idiosyncrasy cannot fully explain the prominence of 
relations with the military for Clinton. It has to be seen in the light of the perception of 
a weakness of the Democratic Party in matters military, irrespective of the military 
credentials of its leaders, which combined with the predominantly conservative values 
among military officers (which is hardly unique to the US, however) put it on the 
defensive when dealing with the uniformed corps.248
                                                
248 A 1998 poll showed that 64% of the uniformed military were Republican supporters – probably an 
underestimated figure due to the reluctance of officers to reveal their preferences out of concern for the 
outcry that the exact figure, that in reality may reach about 85-90%, would spur (Kohn, 2002: fn. 75). 
Understandably in light of the above data, draft avoidance and lack of military service among 
prominent Republicans have not become a problem in their dealings with the military. Thus one could 
argue that the problem was not so much about Clinton’s personal problems with the military, as about 
problems that exist between the military and the Democratic Party, and which allow the military to 
exert a constraining influence on Democratic policies more than it could on policy-making under a 
Republican president, even when the positions of Republican administrations and the military diverge. 
The problems between the Democratic Party and the military originate in the post-Vietnam War period 
when the Democratic Party distanced itself from the military and used anti-military rhetoric – a fact the 
Republican Party exploited (and manipulated ever after to its advantage) and on its own worked toward 
creating solid Republican support among military officers (Kohn, 2002; Bacevich, 2005).
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Whereas seen from this angle, the landmine case fits the argument about 
“militarization” of the American society (Sherry, 1995),249 the outcome of the NGO 
campaign was not preordained by culture. Indeed, “militarization” is only one of the 
forces that shape American society. On the other end of the spectrum one finds the 
belief in liberty, human rights, and anti-war sentiments (e.g. Lieven, 2004) that the 
NGOs represented in the landmine case. They did not lack public support at the 
beginning of the campaign and in 2004 polls showed that 80% of the Americans 
favored US support for the Ottawa Convention (USCBL, 2004). As already 
mentioned, the NGOs did not manage to mobilize this alternative force in American 
society to counter the influence of the military, but instead got enmeshed in the 
arguments spun by it. 
Finally, the cultural and idiosyncratic factors played out within a system of 
fragmented government that is characteristic of the USA and that put the last 
stumbling block before a pro-ban policy. Even if the NGOs had succeeded in 
convincing Clinton, there were institutional obstacles that would have hampered the 
implementation of his decision. A more confident president could have challenged the 
military on an issue he felt strongly about, and in this case signed the Ottawa 
Convention. However, his signature would have had little effect in a Senate where the 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee supported by the military vowed not to allow 
the discussion and ratification of the treaty, as Jesse Helms had. Thus, the society-
dominated domestic structure of the US ensured that various societal and institutional 
forces, including the military, would vie for shaping US foreign policy on the issue, 
and the making of the policy itself would be placed in the hands of several actors with 
conflicting interests. The military was able to play off the executive and legislative 
                                                
249 Following Sherry’s definition, “militarization” is understood as “the process by which war and 
national security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that 
shaped broad areas of national life” (Sherry, 1995: xi)
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branches of government against each other in order to achieve its goals (see, Avant, 
1994; Kohn, 2002; Bacevich, 2005: 30) and the Senate held the final veto power over 
the US decision to support the landmine ban even if it did not have to exercise it in 
this case.
Cluster munitions: the limits of US engagement and lessons learned from the 
landmine campaign 
The Kosovo bombing campaign reveals a problem 
In the case of cluster munitions the NGOs (Human Right Watch and Landmine 
Action, UK in particular) and the ICRC were the first to recognize the problem and 
bring it to the attention of governments. As with landmines before, the US was again 
the first to adopt some domestic measures aimed at minimizing the aftereffects of 
unexploded cluster submunitions that NGOs and the ICRC had highlighted as the 
major problem of the weapon. 
Even though the Mennonite Central Committee had been calling for a ban on 
cluster munitions for years, the issue surfaced in the media and in the work of Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) as a result of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign of Serbia 
during which the use of cluster bombs was identified as one of the major causes of 
civilian victims. The issue came into the spotlight of the media, especially after several 
cluster bombs went off course and fell in the center of the Serbian city of Nis killing 
many civilians and damaging a city hospital. 
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The Nis incident was the critical point that opened a window of opportunity for 
Human Rights Watch to create public awareness of the problem of cluster bombs and 
mobilize opposition to it. In fact, before the incident, several times in early April 
cluster bomb attacks were reported and shown at US DoD briefings without provoking 
any questions from reporters.250 The first questions about the use of cluster munitions 
were raised in reference to a statement made by Senator Leahy that US planes were 
dropping anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines, which was rebutted by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon, while emphasizing the difference between air-
dropped mines and cluster bombs (DoD, 1999c). Only after HRW issued in May 1999 
a press release and a background paper condemning the use of cluster bombs in 
Yugoslavia, followed by a letter to the NATO Secretary General, raising among other 
things, concerns about the employment of cluster bombs (HRW, 1999a,b,c), did 
reporters at the DoD briefings, in particular, start asking more pointed questions about 
the use of these weapons, referring, among other things, to the HRW statement (DoD, 
1999d,e; NATO, 1999). 
Human Rights Watch and its work on cluster munitions 
The problem of cluster munitions revealed in the Kosovo campaign left its mark on 
the Air Force and DoD. In contrast to the landmine campaign when they could argue 
that the US military was a responsible user of weapons that did not create 
humanitarian problems, now the US military and the Air Force, in particular, became 
the target of media questions and NGO attacks for causing civilian deaths with 
                                                
250 The reports mentioned attacks against a troop staging area, tanks, and British use of cluster bombs 
through clouds (DoD, 1999a,b). 
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weapons they called “de facto mines.” Given this framing of the problem, the most 
frequent reaction of DoD and NATO officials when pressed on the question of cluster 
bombs was to argue that the weapons were “well within the confines of international 
law” (DoD, 1999c), they were “not mines,” (DoD, 2000: 90) and their duds are “like 
any other unexploded ordnance any place in the world” (DoD, 1999e). The legality of 
cluster bombs was always emphasized – even if a question was only, “are you using 
cluster bombs?” it engendered an almost knee-jerk reaction – “yes, but they are not 
illegal.” A similar reaction came when a reporter asked a more pointed question about 
Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) – 87, the type most commonly used by the Air Force: Had 
military lawyers “vetoed occasionally the use of CBU-87s?” The answer was: “Never. 
It’s not illegal. It’s totally within the law of armed conflict, and it’s legal in the 
international community to use that weapon” (DoD, 1999e).
These statements testify to the effectiveness of the prior landmine campaign 
not only in stigmatizing landmines, as reflected in the acceptance of US military 
officers that mines were illegal weapons, irrespective of the fact that the US had not 
signed the Ottawa Convention and that it is questionable whether their use is banned 
under international customary law. It was also effective in opening up new 
opportunities for engaging the military on the use of other weapons. Whereas the 
much more extensive use of cluster bombs during the Gulf War in 1991 went almost 
unnoticed by NGOs and media alike, in the wake of the Kosovo campaign the military 
found itself on the defensive, having to justify their use, and eventually to suspend it 
after Clinton issued an order to that effect at the height of media and NGO criticism 
following the incident in Nis.251
                                                
251 Among the critics of the use of cluster bombs were also the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Mary Robinson and former US President Jimmy Carter (BBC, 1999; CNN, 1999; Carter, 1999). 
Days after the Nis incident Clinton issued an executive order to halt the use of cluster bombs (HRW, 
2000). The decision was made following two incidents of off-target impacts of cluster munitions and 
was verbally communicated to the US Commander in Chief, Europe during a teleconference. The use of 
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 The issue of cluster munitions didn’t fade away with the end of the bombing 
campaign either. HRW followed on the issue by publishing in June 1999 a report 
focusing specifically on the employment of cluster munitions by NATO (HRW, 
1999d), calling in December for a global moratorium on use until the humanitarian 
problems of the weapon were resolved (HRW, 1999e), and issuing in February 2000 a 
second report evaluating the whole campaign, again with considerable emphasis 
placed on the use and aftereffects of cluster munitions (HRW, 2000a). Indeed, the 
nature of cluster munitions ensured that a major part of their problems would be 
revealed only after the conflict ended and people returned to their homes and tried to 
pick up their normal lives again. Unfortunately, the areas where NATO cluster bombs 
fell were infested with unexploded duds that would explode and kill civilians when 
disturbed by the unsuspecting victims. As humanitarian NGOs, the ICRC and UN 
deminers flocked back into Kosovo, they also discovered first-hand the dangers of 
cluster submunitions that some of them had been warning about. As a result, the ICRC 
and Landmine Action, UK (LMA) also issued calls for a moratorium on the use of 
cluster munitions and published two reports focusing on their problems.252
Whereas HRW brought attention to the issue of cluster munitions both in the 
US and internationally, it didn’t follow up its efforts with an attempt to raise 
awareness of the problem among other NGOs and create a network of organizations 
                                                                                                                                            
cluster munitions resumed following a review of US procedures (MCC, 2000, citing a letter from Lt. 
Gen. C.W. Fulford Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Joint Staff to a question from Representative 
Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH), 7 March 2000), but no more incidents involving cluster munitions were 
identified after May 13th according to HRW. Arguably, the Nis incident was caused by malfunctioning 
of the fuze at an altitude higher than the one for which the bomb was designed, which contributed to the 
wide dispersal of cluster submunitions. Following the incident, US tactics for delivering cluster bombs 
were changed, instructing pilots to make sure that the trajectory path between the release point and the 
target did not pass over civilian areas, thus ensuring that if similar incidents happened, at least the 
submunitions would not hit the populated area (interview 3 MIL).
252 In September 2000, the ICRC called for a ban on the use of cluster munitions in populated areas and 
suspension of the use of cluster bombs until an international agreement on their use and clearance was 
reached. Landmine Action recommendations were slight more circumspect – the NGO called for a 
global moratorium on use, manufacture, sale and transfer while a review of the impact and legality of 
cluster munitions was carried out (ICRC, 2000a; LMA, 2000).
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campaigning on it. LMA and Mines Action Canada (MAC) took the initiative in this 
respect in a series of informal meetings with their NGO colleagues (interviews 29, 34 
NGO). Their focus, however, was not exclusively on the humanitarian costs of cluster 
munitions. Instead, they situated cluster munitions within the larger problem of 
various unexploded munitions left by military operations, or the so-called explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). Out of consultations between the ICRC and LMA came also 
the idea to try to put the issue of ERW on the agenda of the CCW (interview 5 NGO). 
The proposition held some promise given that several states had already showed 
interest in the matter.253 Thus the ICRC proceeded in its time-honored fashion by 
convening a meeting of governmental experts in their personal capacity to discuss the 
issues in September 2000 in Nyon, Switzerland. The problem of ERW garnered 
considerable interest from experts even though their responses were divided. On the 
one hand, some government experts thought that it would not be possible to address 
the issue adequately before the CCW Review Conference in 2006, on the other, some 
states, together with the ICRC and the NGO community, envisioned the possibility of 
a rapid process, eventually leading to a new protocol of the CCW on ERW (interview 
5 NGO; Kaye and Solomon, 2002). The result of the meeting and subsequent action 
during the preparatory meetings for the 2001 CCW Review Conference, however, was 
that the issue of cluster submunition use, that gave rise to the discussions in the first 
place, was limited to the aftereffects of cluster duds and got amalgamated in the 
category of ERW. 
After the issue of cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war was
included in the CCW agenda, HRW was among the few NGOs closely involved in the 
discussions. It also continued monitoring the use of cluster munitions by the US and 
                                                
253 At the December 1999 Annual Review of the Amended Protocol II of the CCW, Switzerland called 
for consideration of a cluster bomb protocol and other states, including Sweden, Norway, Canada, the 
Netherlands, and New Zealand showed interest in joining such an effort (Wiebe, 2000: 162-63).
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British forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, providing the most useful data on the effects of 
the weapons for NGOs campaigning on the subject and generating bouts of media 
interest in it when its reports were published (HRW, 2002a, 2003d). 
However, its approach to solving the problem remained policy-oriented and 
focused on discussions with government officials, and primarily, diplomats at the 
CCW meetings. It never tried to develop a domestic public campaign or mobilize 
grassroots support through a network of American NGOs that have shown interest in 
the issue. It didn’t even maintain contacts with the Mennonite Central Committee, 
which had been involved in the problem and campaigning on it at least since the 1980s 
(interview 16 NGO). Thus, HRW maintained a strictly professional approach and 
defended a moderate position, informed by interpretations of IHL. This has certainly 
solidified its image of “a professional NGO” almost on an equal footing with the 
ICRC among diplomats who often times prefer dealing and working with it rather than 
their national NGOs, which are seen as “less professional” and less knowledgeable 
(interviews 30, 37 GOV). Indeed, it has been stated by diplomats that their “military 
advisers would never question the substantive arguments of HRW and the ICRC,” but 
other NGOs would not be taken as seriously (interview 37 GOV). 
Unfortunately, HRW’s professional approach has not helped it find support for 
its ideas among officials in the Bush Administration. US diplomats and officials 
regularly engage in discussions with the NGOs and make sure they attend all the 
briefings organized by HRW at the CCW meetings (interview 36 GOV). The 
information provided by HRW’s field research is highly praised, the objectivity of its 
data is never questioned, but it has not been able to find common ground with US 
officials on its policy proposals (interview 12 GOV) and almost all of the interaction 
between HRW and US policy-makers, has been limited to the meetings of the CCW 
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and close to non-existent in the domestic context (interview 13 GOV). Another side 
effect of the this elite and international-level approach was that US officials did not 
feel any domestic pressure to negotiate the protocol on ERW or go forward on the 
issue of cluster munitions. Until the summer of 2005, they had not perceived any 
interest in the media (interview 13 GOV) and the pressure from Congress or letters 
received on the subject amounted to virtually “zero” (interview 12 GOV).
True to its approach, HRW has always been careful to underline that it is not 
calling for a ban on cluster munitions. In 2002, it stated, “We are not arguing for a ban 
on cluster bombs… What we want is better targeting and technology in order to 
reduce the humanitarian side effects” (e.g. HRW, 2002b) and it still holds that position 
even after NGOs in Europe, and Handicap International in particular, have been 
successfully campaigning for a total ban. Given that HRW is not involved in a public 
campaign and thus does not need to generate public support for its goals, it can easily 
maintain its more reasoned and moderate position. Its arguments, however, have 
prompted responses from the US government, military and Congress that have been 
limited to slow, piecemeal technical improvements of cluster munitions reliability and 
some changes in targeting by the US Air Force, as it had been the main receiver of 
criticisms until the war in Iraq.
In its writing on the topic HRW has always mentioned the need to avoid the 
use of cluster munitions in populated areas, and that governments “consider targeting 
as well as technology” problems, but at least until its 2003 report on Iraq its emphasis 
has been on the problem of unexploded munitions and their functioning as de facto 
landmines (e.g. HRW, 1999d, 2002b).254 Throughout, its call to the CCW has been 
                                                
254 For example, its 2002 report concluded with two recommendations that “Countries suspend the use 
of cluster bombs until the dud rate is reduced dramatically. By order of the Secretary of Defense, future 
U.S. submunitions must have a failure rate of at least less than 1 percent; Militaries consider the long-
term effect of CBUs when choosing targets regardless of what the dud rate is” Only as an afterthought it 
stated further that “While solutions discussed above hold promise, one must remember that cluster 
222
that solving the problem of cluster munitions should include “requirements to lower 
the initial failure rate of cluster munitions, and regulations on the circumstances in 
which cluster munitions are used, including a prohibition on use in or near populated 
areas” (HRW, 2003e, also HRW, 1999e, 2001c,d, 2002c). Nevertheless, its detailed 
recommendations on possible preventative measures regarding reduction of the failure 
rates often outweighed its suggestions on use practices.255
In 2004, HRW submitted to the CCW a draft proposal for a protocol on the use 
of cluster munitions intended to regulate and not ban the weapons, as it believed that 
“a blanket prohibition was not justified under existing international humanitarian law” 
(HRW, 2004c). In it HRW suggested a prohibition on the use of “submunitions with 
an initial failure rate of one percent or more,” whereas the indiscriminate and area 
effects of the weapons were regulated only by a proposed article that prohibited the 
use of “cluster munitions with non-precision guided submunitions on objectives in a 
city, town, village or other area containing similar concentration of civilians or civilian 
objects” (HRW, 2004b: 5, emphasis added, also 2004a,), thus even limiting the scope 
of its prior calls for no use of any cluster munitions. As it turned out, after reiterating 
the above demand in 2005 (HRW, 2005c,d), the organization went back to its previous 
call for a general restriction on the use of cluster munitions in civilian areas – a call 
that was also core to the ICRC approach to the issue. HRW also persisted with an 
effort to develop a list of “worst offenders” – munitions that pose dangers to civilians 
                                                                                                                                            
bomb strikes would still raise targeting issues even if their dud rate were eliminated” (HRW, 2002,b). 
Only HRW’s report on the civilian casualties caused by the NATO bombing campaign of Kosovo 
focuses on the dangers of using cluster bombs in populated areas and their tendency to have 
indiscriminate effects on civilians during use.
255 See for example, HRW (2003e). Some of the preventative measures included: “Require a reliability 
standard (i.e. 99% or greater) for weapon and components; Incorporate self-destruct fuzes in all future 
production; Retrofit existing stocks with self-destruct fuzes; Incorporate other technology to assist in 
clearance (luminescence, visible hazard indicators, warnings); Create international quality standards.” 
In another backgrounder, it outlined the steps undertaken by the US military toward improving the 
reliability rate under a title “A Better Future?” (HRW, 2003b).
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either because of their unreliability or inaccuracy (HRW, 2004c). 
In 2005, HRW focused its efforts for a while on the US domestic scene by 
demanding the destruction of old submunitions with a failure rate above 1% and 
urging Congress to adopt a requirement that allows the “military [to] use rocket 
launchers only with unitary warheads or submunitions with less than a 1 percent dud 
rate” (HRW, 2005c,d). Another new initiative was to launch its report on production 
and export of cluster munitions (HRW, 2005a,b) together with Handicap International 
and Netwerk Vlaanderen with a press briefing in Brussels that called for an end of 
investment in cluster munition producers. Even though the HRW report actually only 
asked for “national policies to curb the unrestricted production and export of these 
weapons” (HRW, 2005b), and the briefing itself was limited in its objectives, this was 
the event that launched the process, which led to a Belgian ban on cluster munitions 
less than a year later. Similarly, due to its worldwide reputation, HRW was a 
frequently invited speaker at events on cluster munitions organized by European 
NGOs in France and the European Parliament, for example. 
When the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict broke out in July 2006, HRW was again 
one of the first NGOs on the ground in Israel and Lebanon, monitoring the conduct of 
operations and gathering information about the use of cluster munitions. It was also 
the first organization to confirm the use of clusters (both by Israel and Hezbollah) and 
report on the civilian casualties it had caused. Nevertheless, it was cautious not to 
make statements on their legality that would go too far. Instead HRW limited itself to 
pointing out that it believed that “the use of cluster munitions in populated areas may
violate the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks” and that “cluster munitions should 
never be used, even away from civilians, unless their dud rate is less than 1 percent” 
(HRW, 2006d, emphasis added) – a statement that again fell short of its prior 
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insistence that no cluster munitions be used in civilian areas.256
Thus, it could be argued that thanks to its reputation in the human rights field 
and years of serious work on weapons issues since the creation of its Arms Division in 
1992, HRW has managed to position itself center-stage in the field of humanitarian 
law as well, next to the ICRC with its history of working in the field for more than a 
century. What helped it achieve this status was its active involvement in the landmine 
campaign (which, as in the case of cluster munitions, was mostly at the international 
level) and a series of important reports on landmines in the 1990s and several reports, 
based on research in the field, about the conduct of military operations in Iraq 1991, 
Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2002, and Iraq 2003. On the latter subject, in particular, 
HRW was basically the only NGO providing comprehensive information about the 
humanitarian impact of conflict, which was used extensively by other organizations in 
their work. 
A couple of factors have facilitated HRW’s work in this area. First, it had the 
resources to implement the studies and it did not hold a special position regarding 
relations with governments and the military in the field of the kind the ICRC had. 
Hence, it did not have to balance concerns about providing information to the public 
and the effect that would have on its activities in the field. Second, and importantly, 
HRW has been able to attract former military officers and analysts to its staff. Thus 
the people who conducted its research and battle assessments had the knowledge and 
skills to do so, some of them having done previously a similar job at the Pentagon.257
An additional asset were the connections those researchers had among the military 
                                                
256 HRW statement on the permissibility of cluster munitions use in populated areas changed again 3 
months later in its report on the use of the weapons by Hezbollah, when it declared that “[u]se of cluster 
munitions is never justified in civilian-populated areas because they are inaccurate and unreliable” 
(HRW, 2006f). Again, according to this statement, the prohibition on use in civilian areas seems to 
apply only to inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions.
257 Similarly, HRW’s main researcher on landmines dealt with the problem in the 1990s on the 
Pentagon side. 
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which helped them get the necessary information and stay abreast of developments in 
the military. HRW analysts’ connections in the military also helped them present their 
work to military planners and task forces set up to draw lessons from military 
operations. Thus, there was an additional direct channel of communication between 
the NGO and the military that allowed it to make its concerns about problematic 
aspects of the use of cluster munitions and other military practices heard by the people 
who would be planning future operations.258 Finally, given their background, the 
HRW representatives were able to speak the same language as their military 
counterparts (interview 2 NGO). Thus, it is hardly surprising that HRW’s approach to 
the issue of cluster munitions has been highly technical and oriented entirely to the 
policy level. 
In the spring of 2006 European NGOs were trying to engage the public and 
wondered whether the success they had achieved in Belgium would have an impact on 
HRW and change its mind regarding a call for a ban. HRW, however, didn’t redefine 
its position even though in practice the difference between it and what NGOs, such as 
Handicap International, were calling for was mostly a matter of semantics and not 
substance. And understandably so, where European NGOs needed a clear and strong 
message for their public campaigning, HRW needed to stay within the limits of the 
realistically achievable and not compromise its standing as a credible expert on IHL. 
Whereas it was willing to help in mobilizing the national campaigns of more activist 
NGOs, its official position remained unchanged. The side effect of this was that rather 
                                                
258 For example, in May 2002 HRW senior military analyst, William Arkin briefed Task Force 
Enduring Look established by the Air Force to draw lessons from the Afghan campaign about his 
findings about collateral damage and problematic practices (Task Force Enduring Look, 2002, 
https://www.tf-el.pentagon.af.mil/workshops.asp). A briefing was made also at Task Force Deep Blue, 
the Navy lesson-learning task force for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (interview 7 
NGO). HRW analysts and a number of military officials, some of whom in charge of the planning of 
military operation, have participated in the workshop series on the Means of Intervention organized by 
Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy where issues of collateral damage have been discussed 
extensively.  
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than generating a positive “radical flank effect” (McAdam et. al., 2001) and getting 
governments to agree to HRW’s more moderate propositions, the differences among 
NGOs created the impression that they didn’t speak with one voice (interviews 30, 37 
GOV) and thus were taken less seriously. Nevertheless, HRW remained actively 
engaged in the process of creating a group of like-minded countries supportive of the 
NGO goals and sent a stronger signal to CCW delegates in March 2006 stating that “If 
a mandate to negotiate cannot be agreed upon this year, other options should be 
considered by those states committed to the maximum protection of civilians during 
and after armed conflict” (HRW, 2006a).                                   
Finally, at the CCW Review Conference in November, when momentum was 
gathering behind the proposal for a new international instrument to deal with the 
problem of cluster munitions and NGOs were finally mobilizing in force, with the two 
most actively engaged European organizations – LMA and HI – asking for a ban, 
HRW still abstained from such a call and closely followed the position of the ICRC. It 
demanded measures to “minimize the harm cluster munitions cause to civilians,” 
including “prohibiting the use of cluster munitions in or near populated areas; 
prohibiting the use of cluster munitions with high dud rates; prohibiting transfers of 
unreliable and inaccurate submunitions; and, destroying stockpiles of unreliable and 
inaccurate submunitions” (HRW, 2006h). Even though, state delegates continued 
wondering exactly what prohibitions the NGOs making up the CMC were asking for, 
fortunately they all could agree on advocating the prompt start of negotiations on a 
new treaty dealing with the humanitarian problems of cluster munitions either within 
the CCW or out of it.
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The US response: there are problems -- there are technical solutions 
The gist of the US position on the issue of cluster munitions is that it recognizes that 
there are problems with certain cluster munitions in terms of their reliability and lack 
of precision, but these problems do not make the weapons illegal, because they serve 
indispensable military purposes and can even reduce civilian damage: “when properly 
employed, [cluster munitions] do not cause unnecessary suffering nor are they per se 
indiscriminate. Area attack munitions serve legitimate military purposes, and in many 
instances may cause less collateral damage than other munitions” (DoD, 2005: 11; US 
Delegation to the CCW, 2001). Thus, in some respects the US government and 
military have responded to the NGO concerns by looking for technological fixes that 
could alleviate the humanitarian threat of the weapons without compromising or even 
by increasing their military utility.
Voices from the Congress
Following the Kosovo intervention, individual members of the Congress occasionally 
showed interest in the problem of cluster munitions. Even though this interest was not 
sustained, it had some effect in spurring DoD thinking on the issue. First, congressman 
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) brought up the problem of cluster bomb use in the House by 
putting a question about the Nis incident to the DoD, and later in July 1999, proposing 
an amendment to the 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill that called for a complete 
cessation of funding for cluster bomb procurement, which however was not adopted. 
In August, Senator Leahy raised the issue in the Senate as well, and expressed concern 
over unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo (Congressional Record, 1999a,b,c). In 
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May 2000, Representative Kicinich brought up the issue of cluster bomb use again, 
this time requesting in an amendment to the 2001 Defense Appropriations Bill that a 
detailed report on the use of these weapons by US forces during operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo be submitted by DoD within a year (Congressional Record, 2000). 
With no targeted NGO campaign on the issue, congressmen who voiced 
concern about cluster munitions in connection with the Kosovo intervention were 
primarily relying on media coverage to substantiate their claims. The same pattern 
repeated during the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the 
bombing of Afghanistan, Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) raised the 
problem, resulting from the use of yellow-colored cluster munitions in the same areas 
where similarly appearing yellow-colored food packages were distributed, and called 
on the president to stop the use of cluster munitions (Congressional Record, 2001a,b). 
After HRW claimed that TV images showed evidence of cluster bomb use in Iraqi 
Freedom, Senator Leahy voiced again his concerns about the use of the weapons and 
underlined his prior calls on DoD to use only submunitions with reliable self-destruct 
fuzes and abstain from employing them in heavily populated areas (Congressional 
Record, 2003a). The Senator also expressed his concerns about the lack of progress in 
reducing US munition failure rates and the civilian consequences from their use in Iraq 
in a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the House, on the other hand, 
during discussions of the 2004 Defense Appropriations Bill, Representative Betty 
McCollum (D-MN) highlighted the need to fund the incorporation of secondary fuzes 
in legacy munitions to increase their reliability (Congressional Record, 2003b). 
Finally, in 2004 McCollum, supported by Representatives John Lewis (D-GA) and 
John Murtha (D-PA) managed to pass an amendment to the 2004 Defense 
Appropriations Bill that instructed the DoD to provide a report to Congress about the 
steps it was taking to improve the reliability rate of cluster munitions so that they 
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could meet the 1% requirement set up as DoD policy by Defense Secretary William 
Cohen in 2001 (see next section).259 In November 2004, DoD submitted the required 
report, which outlined its current stocks and planned acquisitions of new submunitions 
and asserted that, “the Department is keenly aware of interest in reducing our cluster 
munitions dud rates and improving the accuracy of the delivery methods to reduce the 
size of the residual hazardous areas and the total unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
produced” (DoD, 2004b: ii). It nonetheless underlined that whereas the desired 
functioning rate was 99% or higher, the submunition functioning rate during conflict 
might be lower due to various environmental and operational factors that in a sense 
emptied the policy of its major import. 
Following the outcry caused by the use of cluster munitions by the Israeli 
forces in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, in September senators Dianne Feinstein (D-
CA) and Leahy proposed an amendment to the 2007 Defense Appropriations Act that 
sought to prohibit the use of its funds “to acquire, utilize, sell, or transfer any cluster
munition unless the rules of engagement applicable to the cluster munition ensure that 
the cluster munition will not be used in or near any concentrated population of 
civilians” (Congressional Record, 2006a). The amendment aimed at protecting the 
civilian population against the effects of cluster munitions during and after military 
conflict and tried to repeat and expand upon an earlier measure adopted by the US in 
1976. In the 1970s the US had sold cluster munitions to the Israeli government on the 
condition that they would only be used in the case of major military operations 
                                                
259 The amendment required the following: “The Secretary of Defense shall provide a report to the 
congressional defense committees not later than October 15, 2004, that addresses how the Department 
of Defense (DOD) is improving the dud rate of cluster munitions to meet existing DOD policies. This 
report shall address: (1) the types and quantities of munitions systems that employ cluster munitions 
presently in DOD's inventory that do and do not meet the 1-percent dud rate policy; (2) DOD efforts to 
ensure the development of cluster munitions that meet the 1-percent dud rate policy, including a list of 
programs funded in fiscal year 2005; and (3) a schedule describing the DOD cluster munitions 
inventory profile from the present until the time this inventory will meet the 1-percent dud rate policy” 
(Congressional Record, 2004c, 2004b).
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“against organized Arab armies and clearly defined military targets under conditions 
similar to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973” (Cloud, 2006). When a 1982 
Congressional investigation showed that the U.S. munitions were used against civilian 
areas, the Administration banned further transfers.260 The recently reported use of US-
produced cluster munitions by Israel gave rise to a State Department investigation in 
the matter (Cloud, 2006; Kessler, 2006). The Feinstein-Leahy proposal sought to 
impose a similar prohibition not only on sales and transfers of cluster munitions, but 
also on their use by US military forces. Thus, it agreed with one of the main demands 
of HRW – to ban the use of the weapons in civilian areas. However, it was applicable 
only to the use of funds appropriated in the 2007 budget bill. Despite this limited 
scope, the amendment could not garner even the support of the senators from the 
Democratic Party and was rejected by a 70-to-30 vote (Congressional Record, 2006b). 
The official DoD policy on cluster munitions
Early on, the US was certainly not a laggard in responding to the problem of cluster 
munitions either domestically or internationally. Given that the problem NGOs were 
highlighting most at the time was the failure rates of cluster submunitions, which left a 
good percentage of them functioning as landmines by effect, the US predictably 
responded by measures aimed at reducing the failure rates and facilitating post-conflict 
clearance.261  Thus, it was the first country to announce a national policy regarding 
submunition reliability rates. Having concluded that the employment of cluster 
munitions in Kosovo revealed a “significant unexploded ordnance concern,” in 
January 2001 Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a new policy requiring that 
                                                
260 The ban was lifted in 1988. For details, see , Mohr (1982), Smith (1982), and Gwertzman (1982).
261 VVAF for example, saw the solution to the ERW problem in reducing the failure rate to 1in 1,000 
munitions and proposed an ERW protocol to the CCW to that effect (VVAF, 2001).
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future submunitions procured for the US armed forces meet a standard of 99% or 
higher reliability rate.262 By setting this standard, the policy also gave impetus to the 
development of new self-destruct and deactivation mechanisms and efforts to upgrade 
existing fuzes and incorporate new self-destruct fuzes in legacy submunitions 
(Strickland, 2003; Defense Daily International, 2001).
 Military use and lessons learned
Whereas prior to the Kosovo operation, the US Air Force has been primarily 
concerned with increasing the precision of its cluster bombs (interview 3 MIL), 
following the attention HRW and the media brought to the issue, it also came to 
acknowledge the importance of the failure rate problem. In August 2001, the US Judge 
Advocate General stated that cluster bombs “must pass [the] proportionality test,” the 
dud rate must be part of the proportionality determination because unexploded 
bomblets are “reasonably foreseeable,” and importantly, that there are “[c]learly some 
areas where CBUs normally couldn’t be used (e.g., populated city centers).”263 In an 
effort to reduce their dud rate, the US Air Force modified the BLU-97 submunitions in 
CBU-87.264
                                                
262 The new policy calls for a 99% or higher functioning rate for all types of submunitions. It applies to 
all future submunitions that will reach Milestone III of their acquisition process in FY 2005 or beyond, 
but allows the services to keep and use existing submunitions that fall short of the new standard until 
they are “employed or superseded by replacement systems.” Milestone III represents approval to enter 
Phase III of the DoD weapon acquisition process - “production, fielding/deployments and operational 
support,” i.e. all weapons that enter full rate production in or after 2005 should meet the new policy 
standards (DoD, 2001).
263 An informal Bullet Background Paper on International Legal Aspects Concerning the Use of Cluster 
Munitions prepared by the Office of the Air Force Judge Advocate General, August 30, 2001 (quoted in 
HRW, 2002a). 
264 “The newer version has a cap, or spider, that comes off more easily and a slightly different 
parachute. These modifications could decrease the chance of a bomblet malfunctioning, but there is no 
technical proof that this is the case” (HRW, 2002a). 
Similarly, the Kosovo intervention proved a threshold in the thinking about cluster munitions of the US 
Navy: “Obviously, in recent times, we have become sensitized to the unexploded ordnance issue… 
Events … in particular out of Kosovo, is really what has caused us to sit back and readdress what we 
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Being in the crosshairs of NGO monitoring of their practices, especially 
concerning the use of cluster bombs, both in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the US Air 
Force also appeared to have learned some lessons and made changes in its operational 
use of the weapons. In the war against Iraq in 2003, it used slightly fewer cluster 
munitions as a percentage of its overall weapons, a greater number of targeted cluster 
bombs equipped with the Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser compared to the 
campaign in Afghanistan, and avoided their employment in civilian areas (HRW, 
2003d). The result was that only a few civilian casualties have been attributed to air-
dropped cluster bombs (HRW, 2003d).
Unfortunately, the Iraq war witnessed the large-scale use of ground-launched 
cluster munitions, including in densely populated areas, which together with their high 
failure rates created a significant humanitarian problem during attacks, as well as in 
the aftermath of the major combat operations. The US Army had not taken part in the 
bombing campaigns over Kovoso and Afghanistan and thus its conduct of military 
operations had not been scrutinized by NGOs. Whereas prior to the beginning of the 
war, HRW had been warning against the use of ground-launched cluster munitions, 
especially in civilian areas because of their indiscriminateness and high failure rates 
(HRW, 2003a,b,c), the actual combat really revealed for the first time the scale of the 
problems these weapons posed to civilians not only after the end of hostilities but also 
during attacks (interviews 29, 31 NGO).265
Even though the US ground forces applied a vetting process aimed at limiting 
civilian casualties that avoided attacks near sensitive civilian objects, in the case of 
                                                                                                                                            
want to do here” (Navy Capt. Robert Wirt, program manager for conventional strike weapons, quoted in 
Wall, 2000).
265 Prior to the Iraq War NGOs were aware of the area and saturation effects of the weapons and were 
obviously trying to prevent their use, but the war itself provided the real and irrefutable evidence of the 
problems of immediate effect on civilians.
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counter-battery fire,266 they considered radar acquisition sufficient. This meant that 
civilian presence in the areas from which Iraqi fire was coming, was not taken in 
consideration when US forces fired back. This practice, coupled with the fact that 
often cluster munitions were the only available option for US long-range fire and 
Iraqi’s illegal tactics of engaging the US forces from civilian areas, led to high 
numbers of civilian casualties. 
After it became clear that the use of ATACMS and MLRS cluster munitions267
caused “heavy civilian casualties,” the Third Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divisions 
tried to change the practice and when possible use air support instead.268 In the 
aftermath of the Iraqi operations, the assessment of the employment of DPICM 
submunitions269 led to the conclusion that they were among the “losers” of the war and 
“a Cold War relic” that not only endangered civilian lives and hampered post-war 
reconstruction, but also impeded military operations during the conflict (HRW, 2003d: 
110, 114). The NGO criticisms spurred the ongoing Army effort to procure new 
                                                
266 The U.S. forces screened ground cluster strikes through a computer to make sure that no sensitive 
civilian facilities such as schools, mosques, hospitals, and historic sites were fired at. For example, the 
Third Infantry Division’s artillery batteries were programmed with a no-strike list comprising the 
coordinates of 12,700 such sites that could not be fired upon without manual override. Officers from the 
Division strove to keep strikes at least 500 meters away from such sensitive targets, and in general, they 
also required visual confirmation of a target before firing (HRW, 2003d: 92-4).
267 ATACMS denotes Army Tactical Missile System and MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System.
268 In Najaf and Karbala, for example, the Third Infantry Division called in close air support, which 
engaged with precision artillery and surface-to-surface missiles inside the cities with little damage to 
surrounding buildings. The Second Brigade of 3rd Infantry Division preferred JDAMs (Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions) and A10 aircraft with tank-killing close air support to firing MLRS. In Baghdad, it 
used high explosive artillery airbursts over highway clover leafs to reduce damage to the roads (Third 
Infantry Division, 2003:134; HRW, 2003d: 92-4). Similarly, after the combat of Najaf, the 101 
Airborne Division had a meeting at which it was decided not to use DPICMs any longer because it was 
realized that there were leaving a lot of duds that posed a danger to civilians (interview 9 MIL).
269 DPICM denotes Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
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precision weapons270 and launch programs aimed at reducing the rate of unexploded 
ordnance of new and legacy munitions.271
DoD certainly acknowledged the threats unexploded duds posed to “friendly 
forces and noncombatants alike” (DoD, 2004a) and the weakness in its approach 
toward solving it. The military had come under attack from NGOs for not conducting 
post-battle assessments of the real functioning rates of cluster munitions and relying 
instead on figures of manufacturer tests carried out under the best conditions so as to 
show a high reliability rate, which afterwards is never achieved in actual employment. 
Congress has also expressed concern over failure rates and civilian casualties from 
unexploded cluster munitions in Iraq. These considerations prompted the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to request in 
April 2004 the formation of a Defense Science Board Task Force to evaluate the 
current DoD efforts and additional steps that could be made toward reducing the 
amount of unexploded ordnance from munition failures.272 The report was issued in 
                                                
270 DoD affirmed “the Army is developing munitions with unitary payloads for the MLRS Family of 
Rockets. The ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) variant is being procured in small quantities, 
and a unitary variant of the GMLRS is under development. These variants are being developed to 
provide warfighters with alternatives to submunitions that produce a smaller UXO hazard area for use 
when operational maneuver concerns would constrain MLRS submunition fires” (DoD, 2004b: 8).
271 “As a result of a new policy decision in 2001, weapons with submunitions produced after 2005 are 
required to be 99 percent reliable. A contract was awarded in February 2003 to manufacture 500,000 
self-destruct fuzes for M915 105mm DPICM artillery projectiles. Funds to remanufacture and retrofit 
24,345 M864 155mm DPICM projectiles with self-destruct fuzes were requested in the fiscal year 
2004-2005 ammunition procurement budget request. Plans to produce a new generation of MLRS 
rockets with self-destruct fuzes for submunitions are also being developed” (HRW, 2003b). Under 
current Army programs, new and recapitalized M77 submunitions for the Guided-MLRS rocket and 
recapitalized M42 and M46 grenades for the M864 DPICM munition should be provided with self-
destruct and self-neutralization mechanisms (Hiebel and Glickman, 2004). The cost to retrofit the 5,000 
existing M864 155mm DPICM projectiles with self-destruct submunitions will be $10.1 million (HRW, 
2006c). 
272 The tasks before the board were to: “1. Conduct a methodologically sound assessment of the failure 
rates of U.S. munitions in actual combat use - a key subset of this effort should focus on submunitions 
system reliability. To the extent feasible, results of this assessment should be unclassified so they can be 
used to confirm or refute claims made about U.S. systems containing submunitions. 2. Review ongoing 
efforts to reduce the amount of unexploded ordnance resulting from munitions system failures, and 
evaluate whether there are ways to improve or accelerate these efforts. 3. Identify other feasible 
measures the U.S. can take to reduce the threat that failed munitions pose to friendly forces and 
noncombatants. These measures can include: (1) further efforts to improve munitions fuze system 
reliability (e.g., secondary pyrotechnic fuzing or self-neutralization), (2) changes in employment 
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September 2005 and concluded that there was lack of focus in DoD policies in this 
area and a “growing international concern over the impact of UXO on civilians.” 
Unless DoD addressed the challenge of munition reliability urgently, “a critical aspect 
of our warfighting capability will be jeopardized and held to even higher levels of 
scrutiny” (DoD, 2005).273
Thus it is readily apparent that the pressure from NGOs, members of Congress 
and the media played a significant role in prompting DoD actions to deal with the 
problem of cluster munitions reliability. The recommended steps included, among 
other things, measures that have been advocated by HRW for quite some time (e.g. 
HRW, 2003e) – expansion of the testing of new and legacy munitions in a broad range 
of operationally relevant environments that may cause degradation; funding of new 
research and development of inexpensive, ultra-reliable fuzes; establishment of a 
munition database that would contain information about the type, quantity, and 
location of expended munitions, which would be shared and used to facilitate both 
combat maneuvering and post-conflict clean-up; development of radio frequency tags 
for munitions beyond logistics tracking to facilitate UXO remediation for new systems 
(DoD: 2005: 4-5). In short, the message of the report was, find technical solutions to 
the problem and urgently coordinate DoD activities to that end. 
                                                                                                                                            
practices and/or procedures (including training) to minimize failures, and (3) technical modifications to 
munitions to facilitate the location and safe disposal of unexploded ordnance items. In considering these 
additional measures, the Task Force should take into account the efforts of other countries to mitigate 
the effects of munitions failures” (DoD, 2004a).
273 The report conclusions were quite strong and echoed some of the NGO criticisms of DoD policies. 
The briefings of former HRW researcher and military analyst, Bill Arkin, who had been voicing similar 
critiques for a long time, and Sarah Sewall and Matthew McKinzie of the Harvard Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy have probably also contributed to the findings of the report: “The Task Force 
could identify no comprehensive approach—empirical observation or otherwise—to determine and 
document operational combat failure rates of US munitions. The available data is inconsistent, largely 
anecdotal, and often from questionable sources… Funding for munitions research and development is 
chronically inadequate, and there is no program in place to develop a new generation of area attack 
munitions that are affordable and highly reliable… A fragmented organizational approach hinders 
DoD’s post-conflict efforts to mitigate the impact of UXO” (DoD, 2005).
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Weapons manufacturers also felt the impact of the NGO and media concerns 
about cluster bombs. Even though it is hard to argue that development of new weapons 
systems was undertaken as a result of NGO campaigning, there was certainly a change 
in the public representations of weapons (conceived for other reasons) as solving the 
problems of the old cluster munitions. This was particularly obvious in the efforts by 
Textron Systems to redefine its sensor-fuzed munition274 as a “smart,” “civilian 
friendly” weapon that leaves a “clean battlefield” and has nothing to do with the old 
type of munitions (interview 6 industry; Woods, 2003; Kerber, 2003; Textron 
Systems, 2002). In fact, even HRW people recognized the positive humanitarian 
consequences if this weapon were used instead of the legacy bombs,275 which was 
certainly consonant with the approach of HRW to the problem.
The US international position
Initially, the US was not trying to stall progress at the international level either. It 
participated in the Nyon meeting organized by the ICRC. Whereas the NGOs at Nyon 
were urging the prompt negotiation of a protocol on ERW and cluster munitions 
within a year, most states, even those favorable to the initiative, were cautious about 
                                                
274 The Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) consists of 10 BLU-108 submunitions that are released from a 
tactical munitions dispenser. Each submunition carries 4 skeet anti-armor warheads, for a total of 40 
skeets per SFW. Each skeet independently scans the ground as it descends using an infrared sensor. 
When it detects a heat source such as a tank engine, the skeet fires an explosively formed penetrator 
slug downward through the top of the target vehicle, thus immobilizing vehicles within the range of its 
15-acre footprint (Goodman, 1997). A Preplanned Product Improvement program, aimed at three major 
improvements – performance against countermeasures; performance against softer targets; and 
increased area coverage. To achieve these purposes, the enhanced SFW, adds active laser profiling to 
the original infrared sensor for improved aim point; incorporates 16 outer fragments to the central 
explosively formed penetrator for lethality against soft targets and light armor; and operates at a higher 
altitudes, permitting a 100% increase in area coverage from 15 to 30 acres. The laser sensor enhances 
precision by searching for the leading edges of a vehicle, making sure that the SFW is not triggered by 
hot spots other than the engine of a vehicle (Wall and Fulghum, 2000; Textron Systems, 2002).
275 See, for example, Mark Hiznay of HRW quoted in Kerber (2003) 
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the prospect of doing so before 2006. The US itself agreed that there was a 
humanitarian problem that had to be addressed but didn’t think that the way to do so 
was necessarily an international agreement (interview 12 GOV). 
Nevertheless, at the December 2000 CCW meeting, it co-sponsored a proposal 
by the Netherlands, which basically reformulated the ICRC recommendations and 
called for discussions during the preparatory meetings for the 2nd Review Conference 
of CCW in 2001 of “the humanitarian impact of various unexploded remnants of 
war.”276 The US also actively participated in the negotiation of the new Protocol V on 
ERW, even though it preferred more flexibility and resisted language that implied, for 
example, mandatory requirements for cooperation or “a right” to assistance in post-
conflict clearance of affected countries (US Delegation to the CCW, 2003b,c).277
Whereas the US had strong objections to a legally binding instrument and wanted to 
link progress in the negotiations on ERW to that on anti-vehicle mines (US Delegation 
to the CCW, 2003a; interview 7 NGO), many states, including those in the EU, and 
the NGO community favored the adoption of a legal instrument. Eventually, “in 
responding to the wishes of other CCW Parties, including many allies and friends,” the 
US decided not to block consensus, as it was the only country to oppose it (US 
Delegation to the CCW, 2003d; interview 12 GOV). The main reason why the US 
agreed to the legally binding protocol was probably the fact that the protocol 
provisions actually reflected existing US practice in the area and thus it had nothing to 
lose by accepting the protocol (interview 13 GOV). Possibly, the change in the US 
position was also motivated by its desire to keep the process on ERW and cluster 
munitions under control. Given the preference for stricter restrictions on the use of 
                                                
276 The Dutch proposal was co-sponsored by another 22 states in addition to the US: Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cambodia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom 
(Wiebe, 2000: 163-4, fn 353).
277 The US Delegation also found the recording requirements too burdensome to soldiers in the field and 
opposed any suggestions that the protocol be made retroactive and applicable to past conflicts.
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cluster bombs among the NGOs and several European states (HRW, 2004c), by 
blocking the adoption of the Protocol, the USA would have risked pushing the whole 
process out of the CCW framework and producing a stronger document the way it 
happened with the landmine campaign (interview 7 NGO).
Initially the Administration preferred to have first a new protocol on anti-
vehicle mines (AVM) and then submit both the ERW and the future AVM Protocol to 
the Senate for ratification (interview 13 GOV). Even though the US together with 
Russia were portrayed as hold-out states regarding the ratification of the ERW 
Protocol (Agence France-Presse, 2006), in fact, by May 2006 the Protocol had already 
been cleared in the interdepartmental review process and in June the Administration 
submitted it for ratification to the Senate (interview 36 GOV; US Department of State, 
2006).
Thus the first legal agreement in the field of disarmament after the Ottawa 
Treaty was negotiated with the active participation of the US and in a surprising 
gesture, the Bush Administration even recommended it for ratification by the Senate 
after its persistent opposition to international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Landmine Convention, and the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court to 
name a few. Granted, the ERW Protocol is not of the same importance as the above-
mentioned agreements and contains a lot of loopholes that would make it difficult to 
hold countries accountable for non-compliance. Thus, the obvious reason for US 
support is that the Protocol does not impose on the US any heavy new obligations. It 
does, nevertheless, fill a gap in existing humanitarian law regarding post-conflict 
clearance measures. States such as the Netherlands are working on linking the 
Protocol to the Ottawa Convention in order to streamline the process of allocating 
clearance funding for both landmines and ERW and that would produce some 
practical results on the ground. It also requires parties “to the maximum extent 
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possible and as far as practicable [to] record and retain information on the use of 
explosive ordnance,” as well as provide this information to the parties in control of the 
areas affected by the ERW (Art. 4, Protocol V of the CCW) – both areas (but 
especially the recoding of information about strike locations) have been a very weak 
point for the US military as it itself has acknowledged. Despite the fact, that the 
protocol provisions are framed in such a way that it would always be possible for a 
non-complying state to argue that it has done everything “practicable” to fulfil its 
obligations, the Protocol is an incentive for governments to strive to observe it, 
especially when monitored by an active NGO community. Certainly, it cannot be 
argued that the US had to give up some important military asset in order to meet a 
humanitarian requirement. What made possible its active participation in the 
negotiating process was the fact that it was consensus-based and there were more 
states holding far less progressive positions than the US than there were states pushing 
for something more. 
However, when in November 2006 some more costly restrictions on cluster 
munitions use came to be envisioned by a number of states requiring the adoption of a 
CCW mandate for negotiations of a legally binding instrument addressing the various 
humanitarian problems of those weapons, the US was again left behind in the 
opponent camp. Instead of keeping its course of engagement on the issue and agreeing 
to such negotiations within the CCW, which would have allowed it a maximum degree 
of leverage over their outcome, the US decided to oppose them and call the bluff of 
Norway, which was advancing the idea of alternative negotiations. As it turned out, it 
was not just a bluff and once again the US (together with several other countries) 
allowed the process of negotiating weapons restrictions to get out of the CCW and into 
the hands of those states willing to accept more comprehensive regulations.
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Conclusion: domestic culture and gaps in NGO mobilization
The US positions on landmines and cluster munitions have been rather similar in their 
emphasis on finding technological solutions to the humanitarian problems of the 
weapons. In either case, initially the US has been leading domestically by adopting the 
Leahy export moratorium on landmines in 1992 and William Cohen’s policy on 
munition reliability in 2000. Both measures have been followed by similar steps by the 
legislative bodies and governments of different countries. On both issues, the US has 
been engaged in negotiating international instruments within consensus-based fora, 
where it had maximum leverage to shape their agenda and outcomes. However, it 
opposed the international processes that aimed at stronger weapons restrictions going 
beyond technical improvements in self-destruction or self-neutralization of landmines 
and cluster munitions. 
Two main factors combine to explain the inability of the US to play a 
leadership role on those issues and its resistance to stronger prohibitions. First, 
military considerations and opposition have defined the limits of US policies 
irrespective of the preferences of the civilian leadership. The attention paid to the 
voices of the military and its arguments has been rooted in turn in a certain part of US 
domestic culture emphasizing military values of toughness and manliness and 
portraying the US as a great military power whose armed forces not only protect the 
country but also provide the security of allies and order around the world. From that 
perspective the interests of the military become foremost for society (or there is no 
difference between the two) and demand a special status for the US under international 
law corresponding to the special roles it plays. Certainly, this “militarization” of 
domestic culture has never been total and it is usually counterbalanced by other 
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American values cherishing human rights and the free expression of individuality, as 
well as multilateralism in US foreign policy and international law (e.g. Lieven, 2004, 
Finnemore, 2005:188-90). However, this context has made it more difficult for ban 
proponents to advance their agendas in the US and has and even placed constraints 
upon Clinton’s ability to assert his leadership on the issue of landmines. Similarly, 
NGOs have not been able to overcome the limitations posed by the military bias in US 
domestic culture. In the landmine case they tried to address the military arguments 
head on in order to debunk them, but as I have argued, this tactics had the unexpected 
result of shifting the whole debate on military grounds and thus disadvantaging the 
proponents of the ban who could not compensate for their lack of ability to speak 
authoritatively on military issues. In the case of cluster munitions, on the other hand, 
HRW’s circumscribed approach demanding measures that would improve the 
precision and reliability of munitions, or impose limitations on their tactical use in 
civilian areas, has led to responses from the military that focused on technical 
improvements or some procedural changes in the employment of cluster munitions by 
the US Air Force – partial and piecemeal measures that did not solve the humanitarian 
problem of the weapons.
Second, the NGOs have not been fully successful in changing US positions on 
those issues because their campaigning in both cases has been truncated on either the 
domestic or international side. Senator Leahy has been the main leader on the issues of 
landmines and cluster munitions in the US. Compared to President Clinton, he has 
been less constrained by the military bias in US domestic culture. He could promote 
strong legislative action on landmines due to two factors – the senators’ long term of 
office and the fact that Leahy was elected from Vermont – a liberal state with a 
constituency likely to support his initiatives. However, the main obstacles to 
advancing those issues have been the Republican majority in the Senate for most part 
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of the period since 1996, and on cluster munitions, the lack of a domestic NGO 
campaign to raise the public profile of the issue and lend support in advocating 
restrictions among members of the Democratic Party, congressmen, and government 
officials.
Given the importance of military interests in the US and the influence of the 
military establishment especially on weapons issues, to have a chance of success in 
changing US policy in this area the NGOs had to be able to bring the effect of both 
domestic and international campaigning to bear on the government, and if possible 
combine public mobilization and private, persuasion-oriented approaches to policy-
makers. However, in the landmine case the US NGOs focused their energies almost 
entirely on the domestic and elite level, without utilizing the “boomerang” effect of 
the strong international campaign or American public opinion. In the case of cluster 
munitions in contrast, a domestic campaign did not exist at all. The leading NGO on 
the issue, HRW, did not establish connections with grassroots and activist 
organizations such as the Mennonite Central Committee, for example, which were also 
interested in the problem. Instead, it focused its attention almost entirely on the 
international level where it dealt more often with members of other governments than 
with US delegates. Thus, whereas in the landmine case the power of international 
campaigning was underutilized domestically, on cluster munitions the domestic arm of 
NGO campaigning was almost entirely lacking. Thus given the strong military 
opposition on both cases, the inadequate utilization of international and domestic 
forces both from the top and from below diminished further the NGO chances of 
success.
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CHAPTER FIVE
European Countries and New Weapons Restrictions: Motors of Change?
Introduction
Three European countries – France, Belgium, and Norway – that have played different 
roles in spurring the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions will be studied in 
this chapter. The countries also belong to different categories regarding their size and 
influence in world politics. France is a second-tier state with a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council; Belgium is a small European country; and despite its small size 
and population, Norway is often characterized as a “middle power” because of its 
active international role, to which has been willing to devote energy and resources. 
The differences in the ways in which those states defined their positions on the two 
issues and the motivations behind them show that there is no unified “European” 
approach to the humanitarian problems of weapons, and by extension, to the purposes 
and uses of force. 
France: Leading or Falling behind – Party Differences on Humanitarian Issues
Domestic structure 
France is an example of the “state-dominated” domestic structure characterized by a 
centralized political system, policymaking power concentrated in the hands of the 
executive and a strong civil service that enhances the decision making power of the 
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executive. Whereas the President plays a predominant role in the field of foreign 
affairs, when there is a period of cohabitation, foreign policy making is divided 
between the president and the prime minister. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is in 
direct contact with both the President and the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs conducts French foreign policy on a day-to-day basis and ensures its 
continuity under all regimes (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 66, 71). The parliament (the 
Senate and the National Assembly) plays a negligible role in the foreign and security 
policy domain (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 488-89; Houben, 2005: 146; Abélès, 2000; 
Bourbao-Guiziou, 2004: 190-91; Boyer et al., 2003: 294-6). 
Policymaking authority on defense and security issues is vested in the Ministry 
of Defense and the Chief of Defense (le chef d’état-major d’armées), who is the direct 
military advisor of the president and operational commander of the French armed 
forces (Houben, 2005: 146; Martin, 1996:132). During the Cold War France tended to 
develop an independent security policy and defense industry, and after its end got 
actively involved in peacekeeping operations. In addition, as a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council and a core member of the European Union, France has 
always had the ambition “to remain capable of intervening, whenever and wherever 
required in the world” (Faupin, 2002: 46). Thus, the military had a potentially 
important role to play on policy issues falling within its domain of competence, 
especially after the end of the Cold War removed the emphasis on nuclear strategy. 
However, since the 1960s civilian control over the military in France has been quite 
strong. Indeed, it has been argued that the president reigns supreme in the foreign 
policy realm and has “unfettered” authority over decisions regarding the use of force 
that does not leave much leeway for military opinion or dissention (Boyer et al., 2003: 
289-90). Even though periods of cohabitation open opportunities for the exertion of 
greater military influence over policy-makers, the military has not tried to exploit 
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them.278 In addition, due to the “norm of partisan neutrality,” few retired service 
members become active in politics (Boëne and Danet, 2000: 248-49).279 Thus, 
whereas the opinion of the military is important in the formulation of policies with 
defense implications, it does not resort to political lobbying to make sure that its 
preferences will prevail over those of the civilian leadership.280
In contrast, to the centralized state structure, French society is often described 
as fragmented along ideological, class, and religious lines and lacking in strong social 
organizations that would cumulate and represent social interests. Polarization of 
French society is also high – “differences of opinion often tend to be enlarged rather 
than reconciled, widening the gap between conflicting views and interests instead of 
closing it” (Houben, 2005: 142).
Thus, the predictions of the domestic structure model about the ability of 
NGOs to promote their demands for prohibiting the use of landmines and cluster 
munitions are that NGOs will face difficulty in accessing key policymakers that could 
advance their cause, but if they succeed and manage to have their demands 
institutionalized in policy, there is a chance that it would be lasting. The latter 
expectation follows, in particular, from the important role the non-political civil 
service plays in formulating and implementing policy. 
                                                
278 A one-time statement from the Army chief of staff in 1997 that appealed to the President to 
guarantee the implementation of the 1996 programming law in the face of budget cutbacks announced 
by the socialist-led cabinet have been defined right away by political commentators as an attempt to 
“drive a wedge” between the president and the PM (Boëne and Danet, 2000: fn. 17).
279 Even though no clear data exist, indirect surveys indicate that political sympathies among the 
military service members “are not sharply at variance with the center of gravity of public opinion” 
(Boëne and Danet, 2000: 251; Boëne, 2000: 82).
280 Whereas the military has played a very limited role since 1960s and its prestige in the eyes of the 
French public has been low, since 2000 its prestige increased as well as its political involvement. The 
military spoke out in the media and the gendarmerie even protested in the streets the deplorable 
condition of their material force and the lowering of the standard of living of its members relative to 
other sectors of society (see, Boëne, 2006). These protests were highly political and visible, but they did 
not regard state foreign policies and were limited to bargaining over the economic situation of the 
armed forces. The upsurge of military political involvement has been the result of prior neglect of the 
military concerns and interests by policy-makers (Boëne, 2006, 2000). 
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The expectations of the model are largely borne out in the French case with 
two caveats – NGO success in promoting a landmine ban crucially depended on their 
links with key governmental officials (and initially with President Mitterrand) and the 
party affiliation of the government in power (with left governments being more 
supportive of their agenda). NGO attempts to push through national legislation 
banning mines failed under the center-right parliamentarian majority, even though law 
proposals to that effect were repeatedly introduced by the oppositional left parties. 
Similarly, in the cluster munition case, NGOs have concentrated their efforts on 
lobbying parliamentarians for the adoption of a French ban on cluster munitions but 
despite the support they have received from oppositional members of parliament 
(MP), attempts to secure such legislation have been unsuccessful. Given the lack of 
key government officials supporting their ideas, the NGOs have focused their strategy 
on winning support for their demands among MPs from the governing coalition and 
thus securing cross-party support for a ban law. Even though certain senators from the 
ruling center-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire have shown interest in the 
problem, so far the necessary support from senators or members of the National 
Assembly has not been generated. 
France’s early leadership on landmines that suddenly slipped away: military or party 
limitations?   
Handicap International (HI) launched its campaign against landmines in France in 
May 1992 with the introduction of the French translation of the report on the landmine 
problem in Cambodia by Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, The 
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Coward’s War. The report was targeted at the media, and especially, at the members 
of the French Parliament, to all of whom it was presented with the help of House 
Representative Michel Noir (HI, 1997: 58-9). The parliament was a focal point for 
NGO efforts at this point of the campaign and in June 1993 HI and Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG) with the support of MP Claude Malhuret presented to the MPs the 
French version of another report regarding the mine situation in Iraqi Kurdistan.
HI was the leading NGO in the French campaign281 and its initial efforts were 
concentrated on lobbying parliamentarians, as well as on generating public interest in 
the issue through the media and the endorsement of the campaign goals by high-
profile personalities.282 Thus, the public campaign and HI’s expert capacity in the field 
of demining were used to legitimize and reinforce HI’s efforts to convince not only 
MPs but also members of the French government that urgent action was needed to 
tackle the problem of landmines (interview 19 NGO).  
In December 1992 HI established its first contacts with the French government 
regarding the organization of a symposium on the issue of landmines together with the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas initial contacts were made easily and the 
Foreign Ministry was cooperative, some three weeks ahead of the planned symposium 
contacts with HI were cut and the Ministry would no longer answer its calls (interview 
                                                
281 The French landmine campaign was started by HI supported by France Libertés Foundation. By 
1994 Médecins sans Frontières, Terre des Hommes France, the Catholic Association for the Abolition 
of Torture, Greenpeace, Unicef France had joined in (HI France, 1994). 
282 HI drew the support of Elie Wiesel, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Simone Veil, Jean-François Deniau, 
Bernard Kouchner and Barbara Hendricks for its June 1992 manifest to the UN and all governments 
that denounced the proliferation of landmines and the lack of awareness of the problem. The public 
opinion campaign concentrated on creating regular contacts with the media and providing them with a 
flow of information on the landmine problem together with the gathering of signatures in support of a 
ban. The results of the campaign included press coverage in the major French dailies Liberation, Le 
Monde, Le Quotidien de Paris, La Croix; the medical dailies and paramedical journals; some of the 
major periodicals: Le Nouvel Observateur, L'Evenement du Jeudi, La Vie, Paris Match, Le Monde 
Diplomatique.  Major TV broadcasts on landmines were aired as well - in November 1992 France 2’s 
television program broadcast a documentary on the landmine consequences in Cambodia and following 
it in just a few days HI gathered 25,000 signatures supporting the ban of landmines (HI, 1997: 58). 
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19 NGO). At this point two letters from one of the invited symposium participants, 
Senator Patrick Leahy, provided an unexpected boost to the French campaign. In his 
first letter from 26 January 1993, he encouraged HI to try to convince the French 
government to call for a review conference of the CCW, and in a second letter a 
couple of days later, the senator explained that due to the “embarrassing position of 
not having ratified” the landmine Protocol II of the CCW, the US could not call for a 
review conference, but as a signatory would actively participate, if one were convened 
(Leahy letter, 28 Jan 1993, reprinted in HI, 1997). He further suggested that as a state 
that had ratified the protocol, France should call for a review conference. 
Right after HI forwarded that letter to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the 
communication flow with it reopened, suggesting that the Leahy letter played a role in 
motivating the French authorities to play a more active part on the issue of landmines 
(interview 19 NGO). HI prepared another letter for President Mitterrand that was 
directly handed to him by his wife, president of the France Libertés Foundation, 
together with the first 22,000 signatures gathered in support of a ban. During an 
official visit to Cambodia in February 1993, Mitterrand announced an indefinite 
French ban on APL export and called for a review conference of the CCW.283 Thus, 
the French decision resulted from strong lobbying by HI and was clearly motivated by 
“fear of American leadership on the landmine issue” (Chabasse, 1998:62). 
In 1993-95 the NGO public campaign in France gained force284 and NGO 
                                                
283 Even though the export ban was announced by Mitterrand on 11 February 1993, the official position 
of the French military equipment licensing body was only published in September 1993 (HI France, 
1994).
284 In November 1993, France 3 with the help of HI presented a program dealing with the landmine 
problem in Kurdistan and the issue of landmine trade, in whose wake some 50,000 signatures 
supporting the mine ban were gathered. This was followed in March 1994 by a documentary on 
Kurdistan made by MAG broadcast by France 2. The petition campaign was unfolding in parallel with 
the media one bringing the signatures in support of a total landmine ban to over 120,000 by the end of 
1993 (HI France, 1994; HI, 1997: 59-60). In June 1994, HI launched a public campaign “No to 
Antipersonnel Landmines” that included the display of 4,000 4-by-3-meters posters, the acceptance of 
posters by 350 city councils, a TV clip and a radio spot featuring Catherine Deneuve’s voice broadcast 
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members lobbied parliamentarians and worked together with them on the text of the 
first draft of a law banning APLs presented before the National Assembly in March 
1995.285 However, these efforts had no appreciable effect either in the parliament or on 
the government’s position. In May 1995, the socialist and communist groups in the 
National Assembly introduced law proposals for a total ban on landmines that were 
not adopted by the Assembly where the center-right parties had gained the upper hand 
in the 1993 elections.286
After a center-right government replaced the socialists in mid 1993, the 
approach to the problem of landmines changed. Initially a human rights issue, now it 
began to be addressed as a matter of disarmament. With the adoption of the 
disarmament approach to the problem of landmines, relations between NGOs and the 
government worsened, and at the expert meetings preceding the CCW review 
conference, France tried to accommodate the Chinese demand that no NGOs 
participate in the meetings. Even though the French delegation played an active part in 
the preparatory meetings for the CCW conference, its position was cautious and called 
only for a ban of mines non-detectable by electromagnetic equipment and of remotely 
delivered mines with no self-neutralizing or self-destructing mechanisms (HI France, 
1994). 
The NGOs’ connections in the government and their ability to exert influence 
                                                                                                                                            
on TV channels, radios and movie theaters, and a CD with interviews of opinion leaders and messages 
on landmines distributed to 500 local radio stations (HI, 1997).
Part of the HI’s activities in 1995 focused on the presidential election campaign. It tried to make the 
question of a landmine ban an election issue and get the presidential candidates’ responses on it.  Lionel 
Jospin declared that he “would defend without hesitation [HI’s] proposal for a total ban on 
antipersonnel mines and fight to have France stop the production of these weapons on the occasion of 
the conference in Vienna in September 1995” (Jospin, 1995; my translation). Jacques Chirac in his turn 
responded that he fully supported “all the efforts that would be made at the international level to ban the 
use of these mines as soon as possible” (Chirac, 1995).
285 HI worked with House Representative of Guyana, Mrs. Taubira-Delanon on a law proposal for the 
prohibition of trade, production, and use of landmines that was introduced in Parliament on 27 March 
1995 (interview 19 NGO; HI, 1997: 61).
286 In August 1995 the Socialist Party put forward a fourth law proposal in favor of France’s 
renunciation of landmines (HI, 1997:62).
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on its policies significantly improved after Xavier Emmanuelli, a prominent NGO 
activist for more than 15 years and a friend to several NGO leaders, was appointed 
Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs in 1995 (Chabasse, 1998:63-4). During his 
term in office, communication between the government and NGOs was constant and 
resulted in some changes in policy as well. 
HI and the rest of the core NGOs campaigning in France also kept bringing up 
the question of landmines to the attention of the newly elected president Jacques 
Chirac. On 18 September they sent him a letter asking that France support a total ban 
at the Vienna CCW Review Conference and that debate based on the law proposals 
introduced in the National Assembly and the Senate be held. Following a letter from 
the President on the following day, which reaffirmed his will that “France plays a 
leading role within international negotiations,” HI addressed one more open letter to
him together with 180,000 signatures supporting an international landmine ban and the 
adoption of French ban legislation regardless of the outcome of international 
negotiations (HI, 1997:62-3). 
The role of President Chirac during this period is interesting. According to 
NGO members, by that time he was personally convinced that landmines were 
weapons of the past that should be banned and his opinion was probably influenced by 
Emmanuelli who had developed a good relationship with Chirac since his time as a
mayor of Paris (interview 19 NGO).  But if the NGOs had read correctly the signs 
coming from the President in support of a mine ban, there should have been no 
obstacles to active French support for a total ban in 1995-97 under a President, 
government, and parliament from the same party and concentration of foreign 
decision-making power in the hands of the president. However, obviously Chirac’s 
support on the landmine issue was limited and he paid attention to the opposition of 
the military (whatever his personal views might have been). Thus, Chirac was 
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committed to “a leading role within international negotiations” on landmines, but not 
necessarily to a total ban as the objective of such negotiations.
HI did not restrict its efforts to lobbying the President and people in 
government. A major part of its strategy was also to mobilize public opinion and bring 
its influence to bear of decision-making.287 On the eve of the opening of the Vienna 
Conference, HI launched a public campaign together with the French Red Cross under 
the motto of “a victim = a shoe to say NO.” The idea was to build in four French cities 
– Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg, and Marseille – shoe pyramids (or mountains) symbolizing 
the numerous victims of landmines. Even though the happening was planned mostly as 
a “photo event” for the media, it turned into a true popular event that not only 
generated media interest but also brought together numerous supporters of the 
landmine ban (interview 19 NGO). The big success of the shoe pyramids made them a 
focal point of HI’s landmines campaign each year after 1995; they had also been used 
in other countries, and since 2004 have become the key event in HI’s campaign 
against cluster munitions in France and other European countries.288
These NGO efforts finally bore some fruit – at the CCW review conference in 
September 1995 in Vienna, France announced its decision to stop the production of 
APLs and start destroying its stockpiles – a decision Xavier Emmanuelli defined as a 
“courageous move” prompted by the need for “someone to lead the way” and one that 
                                                
287 The contacts with government officials and the public campaign were linked together. Contacts with 
sympathetic insiders provided HI with information about upcoming important meetings where the 
landmine issue would be discussed and thus helped HI optimize the planning of its public events, so as 
to create maximum media attention and have impact on the decisions to be taken at the meetings that 
followed or coincided with the NGO mobilization events (interview 19 NGO).
288 The shoe pyramids have been a very successful tool for generating media interest. They provided 
journalists with a spectacular and yet interesting and serious topic that allowed them to include different 
political, developmental, humanitarian, local and foreign policy aspects in their coverage. The 
regularity of the event also helped them develop expertise in the issue and follow it over time (interview 
19 NGO). The success of the idea is reflected not only in the fact that it had been adopted by NGO 
working on the same issue in different countries but also by its appropriation by other campaigns, e.g. a 
shoe pyramid was organized by the Campaign to End AIDS in front of the White House in May 2005 
(Free Speech Radio, 2005)
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was highly praised by the NGOs (CCW News, 1995). The decision was a cause of 
pride and enthusiasm especially for HI and the French NGOs, which realized for the 
first time that their efforts had an appreciable impact on French policies (interview 19 
NGO). 
Despite strong NGO mobilization and Emmanuelli’s active support for a total 
ban on antipersonnel mines, it was difficult to secure unwavering endorsement of this 
goal and prompt measures to achieve it from the French government as a whole. The 
military opposed the ban and insisted on their right to use landmines. Still, the 
cooperation among government and NGO members reached a high point when 
Emmanuelli invited an NGO representative on the official French delegation to the 
1996 Ottawa conference (interview 19 NGO). At the conference, France made another 
step toward embracing the total ban of APLs by declaring its decision to stop the use 
of mines, except “in the case of absolute necessity to protect its forces” even if this 
announcement fell short of the NGO objective (Chabasse, 1998:65). 
Although France was actually criticized for this statement by Jody Williams at 
the conference (Tomlin, 1998:201), it was nonetheless indicative of French progress 
on the issue and support for the Ottawa goals. However, by the time the French 
decision came about, the bar had been raised by other countries such as Belgium, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Canada that had adopted domestic 
legislation banning the production and use of APLs and were rapidly pushing the 
international process forward.289
The military were very influential in deciding how far French policy could go 
toward limiting the use of landmines and at that point they made it clear that they 
needed more time before they could totally relinquish the use of these weapons 
                                                
289 Even though France attended the Ottawa meeting as a full participant and made a step toward a total 
ban, it did not belong to the group of like-minded countries and did not did not take part in the meetings 
organized by the ICBL during the CCW sessions aimed at creating a like-minded coalition (Landmine 
Monitor, 1999).
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(interview 19 NGO). Due to the need to reconcile its humanitarian drive with its 
military interests, France, as the US before it, was overtaken by lesser powers eager to 
reassert their leadership on humanitarian issues, and landmines in particular.290 The 
Canadian proposal at the end of the Ottawa conference in October 1996 to start a fast-
track negotiating process and have the countries reconvene in Ottawa to sign a 
landmine ban treaty before the end of 1997 was a shock to all governments but was 
particularly bitterly resented by the French who saw it as “a political scoop” by the 
Canadian government (Chabasse, 1998:66; interview 8 NGO). Leadership 
competition, stoked by the NGOs had grown too strong for France. It opted instead to 
pursue the landmine talks at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) within which it 
could still exert influence and claim to be leading with its more progressive positions 
compared to those of many other CD participants.  
After the Ottawa meeting, the French military continued its opposition to any 
further steps toward a total landmine ban, whereas officials in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs viewed the whole process launched by Axworthy as a WASP movement that 
was not really serious. As the process gathered force in the early 1997 and more states 
joined it, French diplomats started realizing its importance and novelty – a process that 
was not promoted, as usually until then, only by major powers, by the Scandinavians, 
or by Southern countries, but that had generated wide-ranging and cross-cutting 
support.  However, they were not able to join it due to the veto power exercised by the 
military (interview 19 NGO) and kept insisting on landmine negotiations in the CD.
However, France changed its course and threw its support behind the Ottawa 
Process when a socialist government came to power in June 1997. The change in 
policy came with the appointment as Prime Minister of Lionel Jospin, who supported 
                                                
290 For the role of middle powers during the Cold War in advocating “humane internationalism” and 
issues such as poverty reduction and developmental aid, see for example, Stokke ed. (1989), Pratt ed. 
(1989, 1990).
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the total ban and appointed other long-time supporters to posts within the Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry for Cooperation and for Development (Chabasse, 1998: 66). 
The new landmine policy could also be seen as a part of a general reassessment and 
reorientation of French commitments to international law undertaken by Jospin that 
sought to incorporate a human rights perspective in French international relations 
(interview 21 GOV). This turn in French foreign policy undertaken by the socialist 
government later resulted in the ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions and support for the creation of the International Criminal Court.
In practical terms, the new French policy on landmines was brought about by 
personality changes in the administration, especially among the political appointees in 
the Ministry of Defense. In particular, Christian Lechervy (who had previously 
worked in the NGO sector) became the foreign affairs adviser of the new Minister of 
Defense, Alain Richard (interview 19 NGO). His first task at the Ministry of Defense 
was to undertake an inquiry about the last use of antipersonnel landmines by the 
French forces. As it turned out, landmines were used for the last time in 1982 to 
protect French soldiers in Beirut. During rescue operations and guerrilla type of 
combat in Congo and the Central African Republic, major military operations in Iraq 
and peacekeeping in Bosnia, French commanders had refrained from employing those 
weapons because of the danger they posed not only to civilians but also to the French 
soldiers. Thus, it became clear that if during the last 15 years landmines were not used 
in the types of conflicts in which French forces could be expected to engage in the 
future, their elimination was desirable not only on humanitarian but also on security 
grounds (interview 21 GOV). The inquiry proved that there was no operational 
necessity for landmines and their ban would not put soldiers’ lives in danger. On this 
basis, Defense Minister Richard gave his support to the landmine ban. After calling a 
consultation meeting with the Foreign Minister Huber Vedrin and the Defense 
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Minister, Jospin took the decision that France would join the Ottawa Process 
(interviews 19 NGO, 21 GOV).
Thus, an energetic political official in the Ministry of Defense was able to 
change the military position on the issue by providing sound analysis and evidence 
that French forces did not need landmines and had already forgone their use. Thus, 
initial military opposition could be attributed to bureaucratic inertia and the lack of 
information that made people believe that someone, some day might need to use 
landmines for force protection (interview 21 GOV). Alternatively, it could be argued 
that the military opposed the landmine ban in principle because of their interest in 
preserving their autonomy and reluctance to let politicians, and even less so, NGOs 
meddle with their work. From this perspective, Lechervy managed to influence the 
position of the Defense Ministry because he acted quickly and had the backing of the 
prime minister who was in favor of the ban. 
Thus, after it consolidated its position just days ahead of the Brussels 
Conference in June 1997, France pledged its support for the international mine ban 
and became (again) an active player in the process toward its achievement (Bourgois, 
1997). Arguably, its joining the Ottawa Process helped create a bandwagon effect for 
other countries following suit and was particularly important in preserving unwavering 
support for the treaty among African countries during the tense hours of the Oslo 
conference when the US was exerting heavy pressure on all countries to accommodate 
its demands and modify the treaty text (interview 19 NGO).291  
The Ottawa Convention was ratified unanimously by the French Parliament on 
25 June 1998. Reflecting the new attitude of the military and a renewed sense of 
                                                
291 The head of the French delegation in Oslo, Joëlle Bourgois was convinced that no exceptions were 
acceptable and played an active part in preserving the treaty intact (interview 19 NGO). Her 
determination might have stemmed also from her realization that the old French position that landmines 
were necessary in extreme cases, which she had been defending for years, was wrong and untenable 
(interview 21 GOV). 
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French leadership on landmines among the great military powers, the Minister of 
Defense declared: 
This law authorizing ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty will make France the 
first permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to adhere to these 
standards. It indicates our determined willingness to arrive at a total and 
universal ban on antipersonnel mines. This same determination to see a total 
mine ban recently led France to declare before the Atlantic Alliance that it 
would unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the 
planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation 
whatsoever by its military personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree 
to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of 
antipersonnel mines (quoted in Landmine Monitor, 1999).
The persistent NGO campaigning and their demands for information and 
action on the issue of landmines by the French government brought about cooperation 
from government officials and an unprecedented degree of openness in the area of 
disarmament that had previously been restricted to the public. The newly gained role 
for NGOs and their improved relations with government ministries and 
parliamentarians were finally reflected in the establishment of a National Committee 
For the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines with the participation of government 
representatives, two Representatives and two Senators, members of humanitarian 
organizations, and representatives of corporate management and organized labor. The 
National Committee has to ensure monitoring and enforcement of the French law, as 
well as of French actions in support of victim assistance and humanitarian demining 
internationally. The Committee marked the first time ever that the French government 
has officially allowed NGOs to take part in the monitoring of its political process 
(Landmine Monitor, 1999). 
Thus even under unfavorable conditions from the point of view of the domestic 
structure model, NGOs were able to find allies in government to promote their cause, 
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and as a result of their successful campaigning, secured an opening for their future 
activities in the otherwise closed French political system. The domestic structure 
model points to the channels through which NGO influence is more likely to find its 
way into French policy making (i.e. through the executive and not the parliament), but 
it is less successful in explaining the NGO success. To do so, the model has to be 
supplemented by attention to the role of individuals, supportive of NGO demands and 
well positioned not only in the government hierarchy but also within a government 
that shares their ideas and creates a propitious ideational climate. Secretary of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli was in favor of NGO demands, but could 
not overcome the military opposition within a center-right government even with 
NGO backing. NGOs made real advances in influencing the French position, but fell 
short of winning its support for a total and unconditional ban in the lack of strong 
commitment to this cause on the part of the president. On the other hand, when the 
socialist government came to power in 1997, the prime minister was able to overcome 
military resistance to the mine ban and push the preferences of the socialist 
government over any hesitations that the president might have had on the issue in view 
of his prior record of half-hearted support for the ban. Thus even in the French 
political system unanimously seen as one of the best examples of state-dominated 
domestic structure, centralization is not absolute.
Cluster munitions: strong national campaign, few policy results
Whereas Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, UK and the ICRC had been 
actively focusing on the problems of cluster munitions since the NATO bombing 
campaign in Kosovo in 1999, Handicap International (HI) didn’t pick up the issue 
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until 2003 when in the wake of the Iraqi war it decided to broaden its campaign from 
antipersonnel mines to cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war. The 
campaign started with a focus on the Iraqi situation, numerous press conferences, and 
the release in August 2003 of a report on cluster munitions systems (Landmine 
Monitor, 2004; HI, 2003a). In November 2003, HI was among the NGOs that founded 
the Cluster Munition Coalition in The Hague but still was lagging behind in terms of 
coming up with a specific position.
Whereas HI was slow in embracing the issue of cluster munitions, it quickly 
became the most active NGO working on this problem with a particularly strong 
public campaign in France that was launched in July 2004. The campaign represented 
a break with traditional humanitarian campaigns HI had engaged in before. It relied on 
the use of the Internet and the creation of a site on cluster munitions 
(www.sousmunitions.org) with all the necessary information on the issue, current 
events, news, and an on-line petition in support of the elimination of cluster munitions. 
The idea was to combine the new medium with a strong message and graphic 
illustration of the problem that would appeal not only to HI’s traditional base of 
supporters, but also to younger people. The campaign also included the distribution of 
posters, and short films for the TV and cinema (HI, 2004a).292 Its high point was the 
organization of the traditional shoe pyramids in 35 French cities, accompanied by 
numerous concerts, exhibitions and demining demonstrations, this time in support of 
ending the use of cluster munitions. The motto of the shoe pyramids was “To say NO 
to cluster bombs,” variously described as “the coward’s weapons” (“armes des 
lâches”) and “antipersonnel landmines by another name” (“des mines antipersonnel 
                                                
292 The campaign included 3,000 posters of 4 x 3 m distributed nationally; 8,000 posters of 120 x 176 
cm placed on the Abribus buses; 15,000 40 x 60 cm posters; a 30-second film played in about 200 
movie theaters in France; one 25-second TV film distributed over the national and regional channels 
and cable TV stations; and web ads on the Internet. In addition, about 400 municipalities supported this 
campaign by the placing of posters and the insertion of announces in the municipality bulletins between 
August 2004 and March 2005 (HI, 2004a, my translation). 
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qui ne disent pas leur nom”) (Le Monde, 2004).
In the wake of this mobilization, François Rochebloine, deputy from the UDF 
(Union pour la Démocratie Française, a center-right party that holds 29 seats in the 
National Assembly and is linked to the ruling Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), 
together with another 27 parliamentarians, introduced in the National Assembly, a law 
proposal envisioning the extension of the landmine definition in the French landmine 
legislation to cover cluster munitions as well. Even though the law proposal was 
inspired by HI’s campaigning on the issue, it was not the result of direct HI lobbying 
or consulations between Rochebloine and the NGO. In fact, the expanded definition of 
landmines, proposed in the text was too vague and resented by HI.293 Even though at 
that point HI was talking about ending the use of cluster munitions, it had not decided 
to call for a total ban and was still demanding only “the prohibition of the use, 
production or transfer of cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have 
been resolved” (HI, 2004b). HI also regretted the law proposal because it was hoping 
to garner cross-party support for a better thought-out proposal that would have better 
chances of approval (interview 20 NGO).
When the international talks at the CCW about explosive remnants of war, 
adequacy of international humanitarian law for regulating the use of cluster munitions, 
and preventive measures to limit their humanitarian impact stalled in 2004, HI decided 
to call for a ban of these weapons. Its decision was prompted by its field experience of 
demining and assisting victims of war that highlighted the gravity of the problem and 
                                                
293 “Le terme « mine antipersonnel » s’applique également à toute arme qui met hors de combat, blesse 
ou tue une ou plusieurs personnes et dont l'action de destruction est déclenchée par la présence 
involontaire d'une personne à proximité de cette arme ou d'un dispositif annexe lié à cette arme, ou 
indépendant ou partie intégrante de cette arme.” (Proposition de loi visant à compléter le dispositif 
d'interdiction
des mines antipersonnel, No. 1821, Assemblée Nationale) (The term “antipersonnel landmine” is 
equally applicable to all weapons that put hors de combat, wound, or kill one or more persons and 
whose destructive act is triggered by a person’s involuntary presence in the proximity of this weapon or 
that of an attached device linked to this weapon, independent, or making an integral part of this 
weapon;” my translation) 
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the urgency of resolving it. In addition, only a clear and powerful message could 
mobilize the public behind HI’s campaign (interview 18 NGO) and this made it 
necessary to leave aside the technical and legal details that warranted a more nuanced 
and less ambitious approach preferred by other organizations. Thus in 2005 HI issued 
a petition calling for “a ban on the production, use and transfer of cluster bombs, a 
French position in favor of an international agreement on this issue, and destruction of 
existing stocks” (HI, 2005a). It launched a continuation of its cluster munition 
campaign that tried to enlarge its scope and generate more public interest through the 
engagement of celebrities such as Catherine Deneuve, Juliette Binoche, Antoine de 
Caunes, and Cédric Pioline.294
Parallel to the public campaign, HI was heavily engaged in lobbying members 
of parliament and ministers. In July, it sent letters to all members of parliament, and 
the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, calling their attention to the humanitarian 
problems of cluster munitions and asking them about the measures France was taking 
to alleviate them. Following the passage of the law prohibiting cluster munitions by 
the Belgian Senate in July 2005, HI targeted its efforts in particular on the French 
Senate where it organized on 6 October 2005 a public education event on the 
humanitarian problems of cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war with the 
participation of NGOs from the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the ICRC, 
government officials from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, 
representatives from UNICEF, French parliamentarians, and journalists. The idea was 
to stir interest in the issue and repeat the success of the Belgian Senate in adopting a 
                                                
294 This time the campaign included 4,600 posters of 4 x 3 m distributed nationally; 18,200 posters of 
120 x 176 cm placed on the Abribus buses; 20,000 40 x 60 cm posters; a 20-second film played in about 
200 movie theaters in France; one general 20-second film and one 25-second film on the pyramids 
distributed over the national and regional TV channels and cable TV stations (the TV and cinema films 
used Catherine Deneuve’s voice); and web ads on the Internet. In addition, about 500 municipalities 
supported this campaign by the placing of posters and the insertion of announces in the municipality 
bulletins between 15 July and 15 October 2005 (HI, 2005b, my translation).
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law prohibiting all cluster munitions. To this end the Belgian senator who had initiated 
the Belgian legislative action, Philippe Mahoux, was invited to speak at the event 
(CMC, 2005d).
 The Senate event was followed by a show of public mobilization with the 
organization of the show pyramids in 36 French cities on 8 October. In only one day, 
HI gathered over 65,000 signatures in support of a ban on cluster munitions – an 
absolute record in the 11-year history of the pyramids (HI, 2005c). The Internet 
petition signing also gathered force and reached some 200,000 signatures in favor of a 
ban.
The public mobilization and interest in the issue didn’t go unnoticed by the 
French parliamentarians. As a result about 40 members of parliament picked up the 
issue and directed to the government over a hundred questions on cluster munitions 
(interview 20 NGO). In addition to Rochebloine’s 2004 law proposal, Georges Hage 
of the Socialist Party (PS) and another 22 deputies introduced a similar law proposal 
on cluster munitions in the National Assembly in November 2005, followed by a law 
proposal along the lines of the Belgian legislation put forward in the French Senate by 
Hélène Luc (PS) and 22 Senators in March 2006 (Proposition de Loi 2640, Assemblée 
Nationale; Proposition de Loi, 253, Sénat). Finally, following a hearing of HI 
representatives, the members of the bureau of the Commission on Foreign Affairs and 
on Defense in the Senate decided to create an information mission on cluster 
munitions that would gather information on the issue and prepare a report and 
recommendations to the government (HI, 2006a). 
Prompting Senate action on cluster munitions remained a priority for HI 
lobbying efforts in 2006. In a rare case of close collaboration between NGOs and 
Senators, HI is hoping to create a cross-party coalition behind a new proposal for the 
prohibition of cluster munitions with the help of Joëlle Garriaud Maylam of the ruling 
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Union pour un Mouvement Populaire  (who is also leading the information mission on 
cluster munitions) and Jean-Pierre Plancade of the Socialist Party (interview 20 NGO).
Despite the considerable concern shown over the problem of cluster munitions 
in the National Assembly and the Senate, the law proposals introduced in them could 
not garner the necessary support for adoption. Nor did NGO campaigning and 
parliamentarian letters influence the position of the French government regarding the 
need for stronger actions domestically and internationally. Both the Foreign Ministry 
and the Ministry of Defense defended the legality of cluster munitions and neither was 
ready to go farther than reaffirming their support for CCW Protocol V on explosive 
remnants of war (ERW)295 and working further within the CCW framework on 
preventive measures that would minimize the occurrence of ERW as a result of the use 
of cluster munitions (Douste-Blazy, 2005; Alliot-Marie, 2005; Scellos, 2005).296
The Ministry of Defense asserted that its armed forces considered “especially 
necessary to continue to be equipped with certain weapons with submunitions. These 
weapons are particularly suited to neutralizing ground targets (vehicles, artillery 
batteries, logistic systems, etc.) and they remain unrivaled in this way of employment. 
To decide to do without them would mean to accept an important reduction of the 
national defense capabilities of states, and of France, in particular” (Scellos, 2005).297
Thus the French military insisted on the military effectiveness of cluster 
                                                
295 France supported the establishment of a Governmental Group of Experts to study the issue of 
explosive remnants of war, which resulted in agreement on a new CCW protocol in November 2003 
and considered that problem to be a priority issue (France, 2001a,b, 2003; Landmine Monitor, 2004).
296 For a number of responses to the same effect from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to 
parliamentarian questions, see for example, 
http://www.senat.fr/basile/visio.do?id=qSEQ050718908&idtable=q168544|q168582|q168398|q169236|
q169324|q168583|q168562|q169027&_c=sous-
munitions&rch=gs&de=20050327&au=20060327&dp=1+an&radio=dp&aff=sep&tri=p&off=0&afd=p
pr&afd=ppl&afd=pjl&afd=cvn
297 My translation, original text reads: “particulièrement nécessaire de continuer à être dotées de 
certaines armes à sous-munitions. Ces armes répondent de façon particulièrement adaptée à la 
neutralisation d’objectifs de surface (véhicules, batteries, plots logistiques, etc.) et elles restent sans 
équivalent dans ce cadre d’emploi. Décider de s’en passer impliquerait d’accepter une réduction 
importante des capacités de défense terrestre des Etats en général et de la France en particulier.”
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munitions and held to the opinion that the improvement of the reliability rate of 
submunitions was both an effective and realistic way to solve their problems (France, 
2002a). In light of this position, by August 2006, the only practical measures that 
France had undertaken with a view to curbing the incidence of ERW from cluster 
munitions were the destruction of its stock of old and unreliable BL-66 Belouga and 
Rockeye cluster bombs, in addition to the announced intention not to use M26 MLRS 
rockets with DPICM submunitions until they are modernized (HRW, 2006i). 
In spite of the significant NGO mobilization and the accelerated talks between 
them and like-minded countries regarding the possibility of adopting an international 
agreement restricting the use of cluster munitions following the passing of the cluster 
ban legislation in both the Belgian Senate and House in February 2006, the official 
French position on the issue remained lukewarm at best. France insisted on 
approaching the issue of cluster munitions by reducing the humanitarian threat of all 
types of ERW. In March 2006 it still was not ready to call for a specific focus on 
cluster munitions within the CCW, even though it did not intend to work actively 
against such a focus if it were proposed (CMC, 2006g).
Since France regarded the problem created by cluster munitions as no different 
from or graver than that posed by ERW in general, its position remained that IHL was 
sufficient to deal with the dangers of those weapons and no new legal provisions were 
necessary in this regard.298 Thus it focused on the need of correct implementation of 
IHL and the development of preventive technical measures that would diminish the 
risks cluster munitions pose to the civilian population. In its view, the indiscriminate 
effects of cluster munitions could be curbed in several ways, such as reduction of the 
number of submunitions contained in the cluster munition, incorporation of self-
                                                
298 France has insisted on the possibility of solving the cluster problem by technical measures and 
opposed taking up the issue of IHL in connection to ERW since the beginning of the negotiation 
mandate on the ERW Protocol (see, for example, France, 2002a, 2002b).
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destruct and self-neutralization features, improvement of precision targeting through 
guidance mechanisms, improvement of the submunition reliability rate, and retirement 
of the unreliable and dangerous munitions. In short, France did not support a total ban 
on cluster munitions because they remained useful weapons with no alternative to 
replace them (interview 39 GOV).
Despite the lack of responsiveness to its demands, HI kept pressing the issue in 
France. In July 2006 it launched another round of its public campaign against cluster 
munitions that lasted until the end of September. As in 2005, the shoe pyramids were a 
success and gathered an additional 65,000 signatures in support of a ban that brought 
the overall number of signatures to 300,000 (HI, 2006b,f).299 In September, HI 
questioned the 2007 presidential candidates regarding their position on the issue of 
cluster munitions and published in the newspaper Libération a public appeal backed 
by 100 French personalities asking the presidential candidates to support the 
prohibition of cluster munitions. The call resulted in clear positive commitments to a 
ban on cluster munitions from all the presidential candidates, except for Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the candidate of the ruling center-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
(HI, 2006e,g).
Despite the strong NGO campaign domestically and the momentum behind a 
proposal for a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions created at the November 2006 
CCW Review Conference in Geneva, the French government did not move from its 
position. It insisted that the implementation of the ERW Protocol (that had just entered 
in force in November) would be adequate in addressing the post-conflict problems of 
cluster munitions, and that technical improvements in the munitions design could 
solve the other problems related to use. Thus, even though France did not openly 
                                                
299 During the summer, HI also actively reported on the cluster munition situation in Lebanon during the 
Israeli-Hezbollah conflict and supported post-conflict clearance by a number of Lebanese NGOs (HI, 
2006c,d).
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oppose the CCW negotiating mandate, it did not join the 15 EU countries that were 
supporting it (Hi, 2006h, i). It remains to be seen if this “tacit opposition” could be 
turned into at least “tacit support” but currently the main hope for change lies ahead in 
the upcoming presidential elections in 2007.
Conclusion: NGO efforts matter but resonate better with parties on the left
The domestic structure model has some purchase in defining the most conducive ways 
of exerting NGO influence on policymaking but has to be refined with a focus on the 
role of individuals and political parties in power to better understand also the success 
or failure of NGOs to translate their access into effect on policy.
NGOs in France were particularly effective in publicizing the issues of 
landmines and cluster munitions and mobilizing public interest and support of their 
prohibitions. They have been able to make those problems even election issues. 
Access to policymaking has never been an insurmountable obstacle. They have found 
supporting individuals in government at the very top such as President Mitterrand or 
Prime Minister Jospin, as well as in other important positions such as Secretary of 
State for Humanitarian Affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli, and the appointees in the Ministry 
of Defense. Even under a center-right government in the period 1995-97 NGOs had a 
very close working relationship with the government and even became members of the 
official French negotiating delegation. Finding allies in the right government on 
cluster munitions has proven more difficult. This has made the NGOs focus their 
activities on parliamentarians where they have easier access, but where this support is 
also less consequential for actual policymaking. Several law proposals for a national 
ban on cluster munitions have been tabled by opposition party members, but have 
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remained inconsequential. Nevertheless, the NGOs succeeded in institutionalizing the 
issue within the Senate with the creation of an information mission on cluster 
munitions that discusses the problem and should issue a report with recommendation 
for government action. 
In both the landmine and cluster munitions case, it appears that to some degree 
the French position has been shaped by military considerations. Military concerns had 
a role to play in France’s policy-making process due to its status as a second-tier 
power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and significant military 
engagements in different parts of the world, including many peacekeeping operations 
after the end of the Cold War (Boyer et al, 2003: 284). The military could draw on 
various sources of legitimacy given the range of foreign policy roles it could play. 
Whereas public trust in politicians and many public institutions fell in the years after 
the Cold War, the military could actually enjoy enhanced support and prestige in 
France (Boëne and Martin, 2000: 62; Dogan, 2005; Boëne, 2006). Thus military 
arguments carried a weight for French policy makers, but have been more readily 
accepted by governments on the right than on the left of the political spectrum. 
Early on in 1993 under a socialist president and government, HI convinced 
France to play a leadership role and call for a review conference of CCW to address 
the problem of landmines. From 1993 to 1995 in a period of cohabitation between a 
socialist president and a right government, NGOs experienced a setback in their 
relations with the government, which was not prevented by the fact that the president 
had earlier shown interest in their cause.300 From 1995 till spring 1997 under a right 
government and president, the NGOs had a strong ally in the Secretary of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli, but faced with military opposition, he 
                                                
300 However, this could be attributable to the general weakness of NGO campaigning efforts during this 
period.   
267
could not bring French policy in line with NGO demands. Thus for the most part of 
the Ottawa Process till June 1997 France was opposing it and working at cross 
purposes to move discussions on landmines to the consensus-based Conference on 
Disarmament. Only with the coming to power of a socialist government in May 1997 
(cohabitating with a right president) and the appointment of key individuals at the 
Ministry of Defense was it possible to change the course of French policy on 
landmines. Arguably, the change was portrayed as entirely pragmatic and justified by 
military considerations – anti-personnel landmines were not militarily indispensable 
and even endangered the safety of French soldiers (interview 21 GOV). Thus the new 
socialist government could claim that there was no conflict between its humanitarian 
goals and state military interests. Yet, it is doubtful that without a serious commitment 
from the prime minister, the military review could be implemented and military 
thinking about the weapons’ utility changed in the less than a month between the 
coming to power of the government and the announcement of its new policy. In the 
case of cluster munitions, in contrast, despite the relatively strong NGO campaign, 
especially compared with activities undertaken in other countries, the military utility 
of cluster munitions remained a matter of fact for the center-right government (in 
power since 2002) and it insisted that there were other effective ways to deal with their 
humanitarian impact than a ban. 
Thus, military arguments have been a factor defining French policy on 
weapons restrictions, but not the factor that determines it. The military has given its 
opinion but has not lobbied for it actively, used public means to promote it, or tried to 
play the two branches of the executive off against one another in periods of 
cohabitation. Rather, what shaped French positions on the two issues were the visions 
that different parties had about the role France should play and the image it should 
project internationally.
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Belgium: Raising the Stakes Domestically
Domestic Structure
Traditionally, the Belgian political system has been defined as “consociational 
democracy,” characterized by a balance in the relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of government and executive power sharing in coalitional 
governments (Lijphart, 1980: 4-5). Social interest representation is concentrated in 
strong intermediate organizations and political parties, in particular, play a key role in 
political life, so much so, that sometimes the Belgian system is called “particracy”. Its 
political culture and policy networks heavily emphasize the need for consensus and 
compromise in order to keep together a highly heterogeneous society, divided along 
religious and linguistic lines. Thus, many politicians see the de-escalation of conflict 
as a priority over problem solving. The emphasis placed on reaching consensus has 
probably impacted not only the political culture of the country but also the individual 
style of politicians and diplomats – as has been argued – “[p]olitical leadership and 
statesmanship do not come naturally in Belgium” (Houben, 2005: 33; also Willame, 
1999: 252-55).301
Thus according to these features, the Belgian political system can be included 
in the “corporatist” category of the domestic structure model. The predictions of the 
model are that in order to advance their goals NGOs need to work through and 
                                                
301 In Willame’s words, Belgian foreign policy is one of followership (“suivisme”), which is 
characteristic not only of the executive but also of the parliament and political parties. Another of its 
features is the lack of political personalities (“’permanent personalties’ capable d’être des éléments 
intégrateurs des forces politiques dans la société”) (Willame, 1999: 252).  
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“penetrate” the societal and political organizations, especially the parties. Given the 
diverse interests of different sectors of society and the compromise-oriented policy-
making process, it would require effort and a long time before NGOs could succeed in 
this task. If they manage to do so, however, and policies reflecting their demands are 
adopted, this would have a long-lasting impact, since corporatist structures tend to 
institutionalize social and political compromises once achieved (Risse-Kappen, 1995b: 
27). 
The model does not provide explicit specification about the institutional 
channels that would be most conductive to NGO influence. Given the importance of 
parties and party leadership it could be argued that this would be the point of access, 
which NGOs should be targeting. The literature on corporatism, on the other hand, 
suggests that corporatist arrangements result in a process of direct bargaining between 
organized interests and the government and bypassing and weakening of the 
parliament (Schmitter, 1979: 21; Rokkan, 1966: 107). Thus, according to the theory, 
parliament would be a dead-end alley for NGO advocacy unless some of the parties or 
government officials back NGO efforts.
In the Belgian case it has been argued that foreign and security policy is “the 
classic story of a very small group of people that shape it” (quoted in Houben, 2005: 
36). The policymaking power is concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister (PM) 
and a “core cabinet” composed of the PM and four vice-prime ministers from different 
parties, whereas civil servants do not play a significant role in the process of making 
decisions. The Ministry of Defense consists of a very small civilian administration. 
The military follows a strictly non-political line in its dealing with policy makers and 
its efforts are traditionally concentrated on Belgium’s role as a “loyal ally” within 
NATO’s integrated structure (Houben, 2005: 33-34; 36-39).
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On the other hand, in contrast to Lijphart’s emphasis on the sharing of power 
between the executive and the parliament (composed of the Senate and the Chamber 
of Deputies), the latter has been described in Belgium as “a rubber-stamp for decisions 
effectively taken elsewhere” (Fitzmaurice, 1996: 114; also Magnette, 1999: 93). 
Compromises between social actors and the government are made without the 
parliament’s involvement. The core cabinet in consultation with organized interests 
and the political parties work out the details of law proposals that are then transmitted 
to parliament for adoption. Thus, the corporatist structure leads to the marginalization 
of parliament (Magnette, 2004: 97-99). In addition, in the field of foreign policy, the
complexity of foreign relations “has tended to reduce the real influence of Parliament 
and strengthen the executive” (Fitzmaurice, 1996: 113). The involvement of 
parliament in decisions on security policy has also been very low or nonexistent 
(Houben, 2005:55). Whereas the cohesiveness of the Belgian governments because of 
their coalition character is much lower than that of their British or French 
counterparts, for example, this weakness of the executive has not benefited the 
parliament, and in fact, its role is even more limited than that of parliaments in 
majoritarian democracies.302 Thus Magnette (2004) states that any observer of Belgian 
political life is struck by the “impotence of the parliamentarians.”303
In light of the above observations about the Belgian political system and the 
domestic structure model predictions, one should not expect any success for NGOs 
trying to advance their cause through the Belgian parliament. The emphasis should be 
placed instead on working with the leadership of the ruling parties. In addition, given 
the consensual political culture of the country, Belgian leadership on the international 
arena and entrepreneurship by individual government officials could not be expected. 
                                                
302 “[D]ans une démocracie de compromis telle que la Belgique, le Parlement est plus cadenassé encore 
qu’il ne l’est dans les régimes majoritaires” (Magnette, 2004:99).
303 “Quiconque a pu observer la vie politique belge n’a pu qu’être frappe par l’impuissance des 
parlementaires” (Magnette, 2004: 92).
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What will be shown in this chapter, however, is that the expectations of the 
domestic structure model do not hold true and NGOs in partnership with influential 
senators were able not only to set the tone of Belgium’s national policies on landmines 
and cluster munitions, but to a large extent also of its foreign policy on the issues. In 
each case, it took a year or less to translate NGO demands for a landmine and a cluster 
munition ban into domestic legislations, which is probably less than the model’s 
predictions of slow progress. As I will argue, the NGO campaigns in both cases 
brought the problems to the attention of senators whose agendas gave priority to 
human rights and humanitarian issues. The partnership built between the NGOs and 
the Senators reinforced their positions and furthered the interests of both sides, thus 
overcoming the structural constraints imposed by the political system. On the other 
hand, the policy network aspect of the domestic structure model is validated – the 
process of law making and adoption in both cases of landmines and cluster munitions 
was based on reaching compromise among the various stakeholders. Political culture 
also explains the lack of Belgian initiative at the early stages of forming an 
international process on landmines and cluster munitions that would break with the 
established diplomatic practices and consensus-oriented negotiations. 
Belgium and landmines – the first national step in an international process
Belgium was among the countries with one of the strongest public landmine 
campaigns (interview 8 NGO) that combined close work with parliamentarians at its 
outset and government officials later during the Ottawa Process. One of the first 
actions by the Belgian NGOs was to encourage the urgent ratification of the CCW so 
that Belgium could actively participate in the review conference in 1995 – an effort, 
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which met with success in February 1995 when the country ratified the Convention. 
This step was quickly followed by the adoption of a law prohibiting the production, 
procurement, sale, export, use and custody of landmines in March 1995, which made 
Belgium the first country that had legislated a total ban on landmines (Landmine 
Monitor, 1999). The ban was the result above all of the cooperation between Handicap 
International, Belgium and senators Martine Dardenne (Green Party) and Roger 
Lallemand (Socialist Party). 
Even before a national campaign on landmines was launched in Belgium, 
Handicap International, Belgium (HI) decided to focus its efforts on creating 
awareness of the problem among parliamentarians. First, in the summer of 1993 HI 
sent to Senator Martine Dardenne a letter accompanied by the book, Hidden Death: 
Antipersonnel Mines in Iraqi Kurdistan. This was followed by a meeting between her 
and Pascal Simon from HI. The cooperation between the Senator and HI resulted in 
the distribution to all the members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of the 
same publication Hidden Death, accompanied by a cover letter from Dardenne (HI, 
1997; HI, Belgium). Whereas the report proved crucial for stirring interest in the issue 
and eventually for the adoption of the Belgian ban on landmines, at the time of its 
mailing HI had not planned or envisioned such far-reaching outcomes. Indeed, it was 
only after the distribution of the report that HI began setting up a landmine coalition of 
Belgian NGOs to work on the issue. This resulted in January 1994 in a first meeting 
between the Belgian and French sections of Handicap International, the Beglian Red 
Cross and a small number of Blegian NGOs that worked out the terms of the campaign 
call.304
                                                
304 The other organizations included Médecins sans Frontières, Greenpeace, Groupe de Recherche et 
d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), and the Belgian section of OXFAM. The organization 
of the NGO coalition went along with developments in the Senate. The leading Belgian NGO, HI only 
hired a campaign officer on landmines, Pierre Ryckmans, in October 1994 and a steering committee of 
the network was elected only in February 1995.
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The idea to put forth a law proposal to ban landmines came first from Martine 
Dardenne, and independently from Senator Roger Lallemand in February 1994.305 The 
involvement of the latter was of crucial importance for the successful passing of the 
legislation, because of his high political stature and influence in the Senate.306
In March 1994, the Belgian NGO network held a press conference under the 
motto “Time for a total ban on the production and use of antipersonnel landmines” 
with the participation of senators Dardenne and Lallemand who publicly announced 
for the first time their parliamentary initiative. The press conference, and for the first 
the landmine campaign, received wide media coverage, which the NGOs tried to 
sustain thereafter by feeding a continuous flow of information on the issue to the 
media, a visual campaign of posters and spots in movie theaters, as well as a signature 
gathering campaign (interview 26 NGO). 
In the Senate an informal division of labor between Dardenne and Lellemand 
was established. Whereas on the suggestion of HI, Dardenne worked primarily on 
convincing women-senators to support the legislation, Lallemand with the help of law 
professor Eric David devised the law proposal text and Lallemand’s political skills and 
contacts played a large part in its passage in the Senate.307
Even though the military was initially opposed to a total ban on landmines, it 
did not mobilize to fight against the legislation in the Senate. In June 1994, during 
                                                
305 Interviews 25, 26 NGO; HI, Belgium; also Mekata (2000: 149-50). This contrasts with the version in 
Long and Hindle (1999: 252) that HI proposed that legislation be placed before the Senate. At the time 
when the Senators suggested introducing a mine ban legislation, HI was mostly thinking about the 
upcoming CCW Review conference, the need for Belgium to ratify the CCW in order to be able to 
participate in it, and influencing the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview 26 NGO; 
Landmine Monitor, 1999). 
306 Roger Lallemand was the leader of the French speaking Socialist Party in the Senate and had left his 
mark working for the legalization of abortions in Belgium and later stimulated the debate on euthanasia. 
He is also a poet and writer and an emblematic figure in Belgian cultural life.
307 He also made a deal with the president of the House that if they voted the landmine law, the Senate 
would vote in return something else the House was interested in. The support of the Flemish social 
democrats was also very important for the passing of the legislation and Pax Christi’s connections of 
with the party were instrumental in securing it (interview 26 NGO).
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discussions of the law proposal in the Senate’s Justice Commission, the Minister of 
Defense, Delecroix expressed reservations to it and insisted that it should allow the 
Belgian military “to keep their mines for defense purposes, within international 
organizations, such as NATO or UEO,” for fears that the original legislation would 
isolate Belgium from its allies (HI, 1997:53). Nevertheless, several months later the 
Defense Minister announced his support for a worldwide ban on APLs and pledged to 
destroy Belgian stocks instead of selling them to third parties. In addition, he declared 
that mine launchers would not be sold either, a decision that in his words “amount[ed] 
to a loss of ten million of francs, but … justified by a clear ethical choice” (quoted in 
HI, 1997:53). Despite those decisions and public pronouncements, in October 1994 
the Defense Minister introduced an amendment that provided for the use of APLs “in 
case the military needs to defend themselves under exceptional circumstances, and 
when there are no other means available.” 
The NGO response was to lobby parliamentarians to stick to the original 
proposal and a large-scale public campaign on the effects of landmines that called for 
a total ban. After this lobbying and some skillful maneuvering by Lallemand who 
argued that in such a case of self-defense the use of landmines is implicitly understood 
so that it was not necessary to explicitly mention it in the law text, the bill was passed 
by the Senate without changes in January 1995. On 2 March 1995 it was unanimously 
voted by the Chamber as well, making Belgium the first country to adopt a total ban 
on the production, use, export and transfer of landmines. Even though both at the time 
and ever after, the legislation has been hailed as a total ban, in fact it didn’t prohibit 
the stockpiling of landmines and covered only a 5-year period after which it could be 
extended by the Council of Ministers.308 These two provisions were key in gaining 
support from certain MPs and assuaging military opposition, thus making possible the 
                                                
308 A year later in May 1996, a law prohibiting the stockpiling of APMs was adopted as well.
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achievement of consensus on the issue.309
Thus, the NGOs in Belgium served as catalysts by stirring interest in the 
problem of landmines in two prominent senators. They were also able to stoke further 
interest by conferences, public demonstrations, and signature gathering campaigns. 
The degree of HI involvement in lobbying and its effects on parliamentarians are less 
clear, however – whereas according to senator Dardenne, “civil society played a 
crucial lobbying role with Parliament,” senator Lallemand saw the legislation as a 
result of “parliamentary initiative rather than a popular movement”  (cited in Mekata, 
2000:150). In a later statement Lallemand acknowledged that, “Handicap International 
was the decisive inspirer (l’inspirateur determinant) of legislations that banned 
antipersonnel landmines in many countries” (HI, Belgium, 2002), but it is true that the 
law itself was achieved thanks to the initiative and work of senators, supported by the 
Belgian NGOs (interviews 25, 26 NGO). Among the latter, HI played a key role and 
relied almost entirely on its own expertise and connections to develop the campaign in 
Belgium at an early point when the ICBL had just been launched (Mekata, 2000: 151). 
Indeed, the NGO success and the new law in Belgium had probably more important 
consequences internationally rather than domestically. Although it was not technically 
speaking “a total ban,” it was depicted as such and had a huge symbolic significance 
that imparted momentum to NGO campaigning and similar national legislations in 
other states among which, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland. 
The legislation together with the ratification of the 1980 CCW provided the 
Belgian government with a strong position from which to promote an international 
landmine ban. Already in July 1995, at a conference on humanitarian mine clearance 
                                                
309 In addition, the fact that Belgium had not used landmines since 1951 in Korea and had stopped 
producing them in 1990 made the passage of the bill easier (HI, Belgium: 4; ICBL, 1995).
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in Geneva, the Belgian Foreign Minister Derycke stated “that the time has come for an 
initial examination of the timeliness of an international convention banning 
antipersonnel mines” (Landmine Monitor, 1999). Thereafter Belgium participated in 
the meetings with like-minded countries organized by the NGOs in January and April 
1996. At the October 1996 meeting organized by the Canadian government in Ottawa 
to strategize how to achieve a global ban, it supported a total ban and envisioned that 
the first steps to it included a total and immediate ban of production and stockpile 
destruction. 
Ahead of the Ottawa conference, Belgium had also proposed to hold a follow-
up meeting in Brussels in June 1997 (Landmine Monitor, 1999) and Axworthy’s 
appeal to states to come sign a treaty in Ottawa in one year that came by surprise at the 
end of the Ottawa conference made the planned Brussels meeting look just as a part of 
the Canadian initiative and what would become the Ottawa Process. Indeed, it has 
been argued that following Axworthy’s call, “[t]here was some dismay from the 
Belgians that their particular campaign had been hijacked by the Canadians, as 
Belgium and Canada had for some time been rivals for leadership of the 
intergovernmental aspect of the landmines campaign” (Long, 2002: 434). Other 
authors have also made the case that the Canadian decision to take the initiative on 
landmines was dictated by the fear that, “if it did not do so, chances were that 
someone else would [and] [t]he most likely candidate to usurp Canadian leadership 
was Belgium” (Tomlin, 1998: 203). Whereas it is true that the Belgian position on 
landmines was strong, especially in view of the momentum the adoption of its 
domestic legislation created, there are no indications that Belgium was planning 
anything significant on the international level or remotely comparable to the Canadian 
initiative (interviews 25, 26 NGO). Something of similar proportions would have 
required the dedication of considerable financial resources, and more importantly, 
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active and enterprising diplomats willing to take risks. It is far from clear that Belgium 
was in a position to offer either.310
In fact, even though in principle Belgium supported a global landmine ban, the 
position it took at the CCW Review Conference was not particularly ambitious. It was 
limited only to seeking an extension of the CCW landmine protocol to internal 
conflicts, adoption of detectability requirements, and a ban on landmine transfers.311
Belgium has also supported dealing with the issue of landmines at the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) from early on in 1995 before the CCW Review Conference, after 
the failure of the CCW to adopt meaningful restrictions in 1996, and throughout the 
whole Ottawa Process. Despite being aware of how much time it would take before 
any result could be achieved at the CD, Belgium did not mind following that routine 
path, nor did it see a contradiction between the Ottawa Process and the CD and was 
still willing to follow both.312 At the time of the Brussels meeting in June 1997 it 
declared that, “the only true objective is the ban of antipersonnel mines. The paths that 
we take to achieve this objective are a matter of indifference to us” (quoted in 
Landmine Monitor, 1999). In view of this position, one could hardly say that Belgium 
                                                
310 Similarly, during discussions on the subject in 1998, Jody Williams reacted to the suggestion that in 
October 1996 Canadian officials feared that Belgium would take the initiative if they didn’t move, 
stating that, “Belgium could never have taken the lead. In the landmine campaign… Canada’s resources 
and relative influence were the most impressive. There was no other choice.” (English, 2000: 32).
311 The announced position was: “We have a two-pronged political position which is namely in 
international matters, we would like to push every initiative towards a total ban on antipersonnel mines 
but regarding the conference here which was the finalizing of new regulations on the use, the 
production and certain technical aspects of the use of mines, we have aligned our position with the Joint 
Action of the European Union (Joint Action, 12 May 1995) with a specific focus on the extension of the 
scope of the protocol in internal conflicts and on detectability. The third point which was extremely 
important for Belgium and the European Union was the ban on transfers, that is to say, the international 
trade of mines.” (quoted in Landmine Monitor, 1999)
312 At the closing session of the CCW review conference in May 1996, the Belgian delegation declared: 
“We are prepared to devote several years to putting in place a system totally banning antipersonnel 
mines first by passing a resolution (at the General Assembly of the United Nations (and if possible by 
obtaining a mandate which would lead to the negotiation of a worldwide ban treaty at the Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva. This takes time but it is possible, we did it for chemical weapons, we will finish 
by doing it for nuclear tests, we believe that it is possible for mines. But this would not be done 
tomorrow. It is a long-winded issue which requires a great deal of assiduity and which requires 
continuity in the political willingness of which, in Belgium, there is no doubt” (quoted in Landmine 
Monitor, 1999).
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was prepared to offer much leadership on landmines internationally. The Belgian 
conservative diplomatic culture and national consensus-oriented politics made it 
hesitant to assume international leadership and predisposed it to seeking consensus on 
the international level as well.313
Once the international process to ban landmines got underway, however, the 
Belgian government played an active and important role in its implementation. It also 
closely cooperated with the NGOs, and HI in particular (interview 8 NGO), as 
evidenced in the fact that an HI representative was part of the Belgian official 
delegation at each of the conferences that led to the signing of the landmine ban treaty 
in December 1997 in Ottawa (Landmine Monitor, 1999).
Cluster Munitions – a replay of the landmine process 
In Belgium, developments regarding the problem of cluster munitions largely followed 
the lines of the landmine issue. After cooperation between Handicap International and 
a prominent senator, a law banning submunitions was adopted by the Senate and the 
Chamber. Despite the surprising ease with which the national legislation was passed 
by the Senate, the law run into some difficulties in the Chamber and its passage 
required accompanying legislation to specify its scope of application and clarify which 
weapon systems came under its purview. Even though the law was not a total ban 
since a certain type of advanced munitions were arguably excluded from it, it was 
hailed by the NGOs as the first breakthrough national legislation that would lead the 
way to similar laws in other countries.
                                                
313 In the words of an NGO member – whereas Canada and Norway had good resources and diplomats 
to take on the issue, Belgium (and France) lacked good and entrepreneurial diplomats (interview 14 
NGO).
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Even though early on in March 2003, HI Belgium had launched an online 
petition “No to mines. No to cluster munitions!” which asked for the prohibition of the 
use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions (HI Belgium, 2003), 
until early 2005 it had not developed a particularly strong or systematic public 
campaign on the issue. On 2 February 2005, the sections of HI decided to call for a 
ban on cluster munitions but prior to that their focus had been on promoting legislation 
regarding anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices. Only after it became clear 
that attempts to pass such legislation in the Senate had no chances of success, did HI 
call in March 2005 on the Senate to work on cluster munitions (interview 18 NGO). 
The next step was to organize two briefings on 7 April 2005 together with Human 
Rights Watch and Netwerk Vlaanderen for the media and Belgian banks. The briefings 
focused on HRW’s research on countries and companies producing cluster munitions 
and Netwerk Vlaanderen’s investigations of bank investments in controversial 
weapons, and in particular, cluster munitions.314 The three NGOs called for ending 
investment in producers of cluster munitions and gave as positive examples in this 
direction the ING and KBC banks and the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund 
that had instituted restrictions on investment in such companies (interview 18 NGO; 
HRW, 2005a). 
The briefing was not part of a special media campaign but to the surprise of its 
organizers, it received a very strong media response that was additionally stoked by 
denials of cluster munition production by the Belgian industry. The credibility and 
stature of the NGOs together with the fact that Belgian banks were involved in 
investment and companies in production of cluster munitions made the topic 
                                                
314 As part of its campaign, “My money. Clear Conscience?”, aimed at making public bank investment 
decisions and giving savers and investors a say in choosing where their money is invested, Netwerk 
Vlaanderen had produced two reports, “Cluster Bombs, Landmines, Nuclear Weapons and Depleted 
Uranium Weapons: A report on the financial links between banks and the producers of controversial 
weapon systems” (April 2004) and “Banks Disarm(ed)” (April 2005).
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newsworthy and the media interest proved to be the key factor that prompted Senator 
Philippe Mahoux (president of the Socialist Party Group in the Senate, who had 
previously worked as a doctor in Médecins Sans Frontières) to approach HI a week 
later with the intention to introduce a law proposal banning cluster munitions 
(interviews 18 NGO, 22 PARL). 
After the law proposal was introduced in April, it encountered no opposition 
and was passed unanimously in July 2005. HI participated in a briefing of the Senate 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission in June, but senators did not require a lot of
lobbying to be convinced of the need to pass the law and showed support for a total 
ban of cluster munitions315 from the very beginning (interviews 18 NGO, 22 
PARL).316 At the same briefing,317 the Ministry of Defense limited itself to 
underscoring the different types of munitions that existed under the heading of 
fragmentation munitions (the term was used in the initial Mahoux proposal) and 
proposing a definition that would comprise only submunitions without a self-
destruction or self-neutralization mechanism. The Ministry of Defense argued, in 
much the same way as it had done when the landmine ban was debated in 1995, that 
the narrower definition would allow Belgium to meet its international commitments, 
especially within NATO (Belgian Senate, 2005a). Despite these suggestions of 
                                                
315 The used definition is the one formulated by the UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF in March 2005: 
“Any munition that to perform its tasks separates from a parent munition. That includes all munitions or 
explosive ordnance designed to explode at some point in time following dispersal or release from the 
parent munition.” The Belgian law reads: “Doit être considéré comme sous-munitions, toute munition 
qui pour remplir sa fonction, se sépare d’une munition mère. Cela recouvre toutes les munitions ou 
charges explosives conçues pour exploser à un moment donné après avoir été lancées ou éjectées d’une 
munition à dispersion mère.”
316 The law had the strong support of the Green Party whose leader Isabelle Durant was very active and 
had also contacted HI with a proposal to table a law a little later than Mahoux. If anything, some other 
senators were way too active, placing amendments to the law that would have prohibited not only 
cluster munitions, but also anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices and depleted uranium weapons 
(see, Belgian Senate, 2005b). However, in view of the encountered difficulties with legislation on 
AVMs with anti-handling devices, senator Mahoux preferred a step-by-step approach that could ensure 
gradual progress (interview 22 PARL).
317 The briefing focused on statements by four representatives of HI, two representatives from the 
sections of the Belgian Red Cross, and representatives of the Ministry of Defense. 
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limiting the scope of the legislation, as a whole, the Ministry of Defense did not 
mobilize to lobby against the law and maintained a position of noninterference with 
the work of the Senate (interview 22 PARL). 
Representatives of the defense industry were not even invited to brief the 
Senate Commission and only after the law had passed in the Senate, did the industry 
ask to be heard in the parliament – a demand that had no effect. However, by the time 
when the law came up for discussion in the Chamber Defense Commission in 
November 2005, the industry had fully mobilized in opposition to a comprehensive 
ban of cluster munitions. The issue at stake was a specific contract under which the 
company Forges de Zeebrugge had to develop a new, advanced type of cluster 
munitions for the German government, as well as, fears from the arms industry at 
large that the law would put a break on research and development activities and 
undermine the Belgian industry competitiveness with the result that high-tech 
production would be attracted by other countries. Soon, the arms industry was using 
the argument of employment and job losses for the whole region of Wallonia, where it 
is based (see, HI Belgium, 2006a; M. Jean-Claude Lacroix in Belgian Chamber of 
Deputies, 2006a). Its opposition was very strong and its campaign included sending 
letters to all MPs, lobbying the government, and finally mobilizing the unions 
resulting in workers’ protests against the adoption of the new law in front of the 
parliament (interview 22 PARL). 
In contrast, the Ministry of Defense did not even participate it the briefings of 
the Defense Commission and its representatives just said that “it was up to the wisdom 
of the representatives to make the decision” about the new law (interview 22 
PARL).318  Keeping with its role of a non-political institution, the military did not get 
                                                
318 The Chairman of the Defense Commission of the House decided who to invite to brief it, but the lack 
of participation by the Defense Ministry could not only be explained by the line of noninvolvement it 
was following, but also by the fact that in practice its positions were voiced by the industry.
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involved in political debates and was ready to do whatever necessary to comply with 
the new law (interview 33 MIL).
HI, on the other hand, had prepared well for the debates in the Chamber. Just 
before they started, it organized a media trip to Kosovo to show the horrendous effects 
on civilians of the use of cluster munitions. As debates heated up, HI participated in 
the briefing of the Defense Commission in December where it urged Belgian deputies 
to take the initiative and let Belgium lead the way on cluster munitions as it had in the 
landmine campaign – a refrain that was often repeated in the media coverage of the 
issue. It also underlined the fact that similar parliamentary actions were already 
underway in numerous other countries that were ready to follow Belgium’s example 
(Belgian Chamber of Deputies, 2006a). HI also intensively lobbied MPs to support the 
law, and just ahead of the vote in the plenary, held a press conference together with 
HRW, Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), and 
the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society. As the controversy around the new law 
increased, so did media coverage and public awareness of the issue. The HI campaign 
thus gathered force and could induce evidence of public support in its lobbying of 
parliamentarians as signatures in favor of the cluster ban went from 100,000 at the 
time of the Senate vote, to 200,000 when the House Defense Commission started 
deliberations in December 2005, to 300,000 when the law was adopted in February 
2006. At a crucial point in the debates, the contribution from another NGO, GRIP, 
respected for the quality of its independent research and analyses, also provided a 
strong backing for the law advocates (interview 22 PARL).319
The NGOs mobilization was highly instrumental in keeping parliamentarian 
                                                
319 GRIP distributed two analyses of the stakes involved in the production of cluster munitions in 
Wallonia that showed that the loss of employment from the Forges de Zeebrugge’s project that was still 
in a development phase would be negligible and much lower than the industry made them appear. In 
addition, it made the argument that given the trend toward restricting investment in cluster munition 
producers and the high probability of an international ban on cluster munitions, an early restructuring of 
the industry away from their production is actually to the benefit of the sector (see, GRIP, 2005, 2006).
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support for the law and resulted in voting down a couple of amendments, aimed at 
excluding from the definition of cluster munitions in the original law cluster munitions 
with self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanisms and containing less than 10 
submunitions (see, for example, Belgian House, 2006b). Nevertheless, the chairman 
and all of the Socialist Party members of the Defense Commission remained receptive 
to the arguments and demands of the arms industry, since they were elected from the 
Liege region where it is based (interview 22 PARL). In the end, the Commission, and 
later, the Chamber adopted the Mahoux legislation,320 but the price for that was an all-
party agreement to pass a second, complementary legislation that would exclude from 
the definition of cluster munitions certain types of weapons, namely non-explosive 
submunitions and new types of cluster munitions that pose no problems in terms of 
reliability rates or indiscriminate effects.321
The wording of the second law still sounded quite strong,322 allowing only the 
employment of anti-tank munitions that “can only be used … without any possibility 
to indiscriminately saturate combat zones, including by the obligatory control of their 
trajectory and destination, and that if applicable, can only explode at the moment of 
impact, and in any case cannot explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person.”323 This definition gave grounds to HI to declare that “such a weapon does not 
                                                
320 The Defense Commission adopted the law with a vote of 11 for and 5 against on 1 Feb 2006 and the 
House passed it by a vote of 112 versus 22 abstentions and 2 opposed on 16 February 2006.
321 According to the second legislation the following are not cluster munitions or submunitions:
“- dispensers that only contain smoke-producing material, or illuminating material, or material 
exclusively conceived to create electric or electronic counter-measures;
- systems that contain several munitions only designed to pierce and destroy armored vehicles, that can 
only be used to that end without any possibility to indiscriminately saturate combat zones, including by 
the obligatory control of their trajectory and destination, and that if applicable, can only explode at the 
moment of impact, and in any case cannot explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.”
322 The new definition was formulated mainly by the Socialist Party sponsoring the first law. Even 
though HI was consulted on this matter, the definition came from parliamentarians (interview 18 NGO).
323 However, the strength of the text is undermined by the commentary of the same article 2, which 
states that the exigency to control the trajectory and destination of munitions “does not necessarily 
imply that each munition be equipped with a guidance system, but that as a minimum the guidance of 
the device and its opening and distribution mechanism allow to avoid random dispersal and guarantee 
that the munition would impact over a surface that is of reasonable size in relation to the targeted 
objective and its surroundings” (Belgian House of Representatives, 2006c, my translation).
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exist,” (interview 18 NGO) and congratulate the parliamentarians for having resisted 
pressures from the arms industry. The latter, on the other hand, announced its 
satisfaction with new law, which in its view showed the efficacy of the mobilization of 
the industry, workers, and unions (Rogeau, 2006). Finally, representatives of the 
Ministry of Defense felt that the second law did not cover the newest types of 
submunitions being developed by Forges de Zeebrugge (interview 33 MIL). 
Indeed, the second legislation seemed to satisfy everyone and the government 
coalition partners of the Socialist Party and Liberal Party that were bitterly divided 
over the first law finally reached consensus with this compromise formulation 
(RTBF.be, 2006; L’Echo, 2006). Thus the definition in the second law also catered to 
the interests and demands of a diverse group of stakeholders including NGOs, the 
arms industry, unions, and the military, but this consensus was obviously built upon its 
vagueness and the ability of each to interpret it as they saw fit.324 Despite (or because 
of) this vagueness, the new law made possible the achievement of consensus on the 
issue of cluster munitions nationally in a way consonant with Belgian domestic 
political culture. Importantly, it also provided NGOs with the opportunity to project 
internationally the image of Belgium as a trailblazer in banning cluster munitions, 
whose example would ineluctably be followed by other states (while obscuring details 
and nuances in the Belgian legislation).325
By advocating a total ban and securing one in Belgium, HI was also able to 
influence the dynamics within the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and tilt the 
                                                
324 In fact, it appears that the only ones who were discontented with the second law were some 
journalists. Some reactions in the media, especially from the Dutch-speaking press were surprisingly 
negative and harsh to the second legislation (interview18 NGO; for an example in the French press, see 
Le Soir, 2006).
325 Indeed, whereas NGOs announced with enthusiasm that Belgium was the first state to adopt a total 
ban on cluster munitions, they had not mentioned the second law redefining the scope of the ban (e.g. 
HI France, 2006; HI Belgium, 2006b; HI Switzerland, 2006). Interestingly, neither of the other NGOs 
mainly involved in the cluster issue (Mines Action Canada, HRW, Landmine Action, UK, 
Landmine.de, Mennonite Central Committee) mentioned the adoption of the Belgian ban. Only CMC 
provided information on it and the accompanying legislation limiting its scope.
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balance in the direction of public campaigning for a ban, compared to the more 
circumspect language of the CMC call and the positions of organizations such as 
HRW that technically don’t call for a total ban, but demand instead policy and 
technological changes that in practice amount to much the same goal that was 
achieved with the second Belgian law. Whereas so far, HI has not been able to change 
HRW’s reticence regarding the ban and thus the overall position of CMC, it certainly 
reinvigorated the movement with its success and inspired other NGOs to develop more 
publicly oriented campaigns and work on national legislations/moratoria to be used as 
stepping stones for a future international agreement, most notably Landmine Action, 
UK that followed its suit and switched to a ban call in early 2006.  
Whereas the Senate led the way in formulating the Belgian position on cluster 
munitions, in much the same way as it did on landmines in the 1990s, the government 
remained passive during the debates on clusters and took a cautious wait-and-see 
position on this matter. The only sign in which support for the Mahoux initiatives 
could be read was the fact that in May 2005 the Senator was invited to speak at the 
Meetings of the Standing Committees of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva by the 
Belgian ambassador to the UN (interviews 18 NGO, 22 PARL).326 In his statement 
during the briefing of the Chamber Defense Commission, the Government 
representative did not comment on the Belgian law proposal and limited himself to 
highlighting the work of the CCW, and specifically the developments regarding anti-
vehicle mines (AVMs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW). He described the stage 
of current international talks on cluster munitions and ERW and indicated that any 
international attempts to regulate cluster munitions would run into the same kind of 
difficulties encountered in the process on AVMs where states such as Russia and 
                                                
326 However, Mahoux’s speech did not focus on cluster munitions but regarded the Belgian law 
restricting financial investment in landmine producers (see, Mahoux, 2005).
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China opposed measures on self-destruction due to economic concerns (Huynen in 
Belgian Chamber of Deputies, 2006a). Basically, the government had no position 
regarding the parliamentary initiative and refrained from interfering with it (interview 
28 GOV).
When in turn, the Belgian government delegation had to make a statement at 
the CCW session of the Group of Governmental Experts in March 2006 after NGOs 
and other state delegations congratulated Belgium on its bold domestic steps toward 
banning cluster munitions, it confined itself to describing the parliamentary process in 
its country and emphasizing the fact that it had not been concluded and it was difficult 
to predict when the law would enter into force (Belgium, 2006).
Even on the day when the second law was adopted in plenary and had already 
been voted in the Chamber Defense Commission,327 government officials preferred to 
talk about it only in hypothetical terms and their position regarding any international 
steps remained one of caution and non-commitment. Given the attitude of states such 
as Russia and China, they felt there was little chance of achieving a global agreement 
on the problem. There were a host of other factors that made Belgian diplomats wary 
of assuming any international engagements: lack of strong leadership by other 
countries such as Canada on landmines and a critical mass of supportive states; 
expectations of a repetition of the success of the Ottawa Process, which was highly 
unlikely given the differences between the issues of cluster munitions and landmines 
(thus even a moderate success on clusters would be viewed as a failure compared to 
Ottawa); preoccupations that an alternative process out of the CCW would undermine 
its credibility and usefulness at a moment when it has been reinvigorated (interview 28 
GOV). An explicit instruction from the Parliament requesting that the government 
                                                
327 The second law passed in the Defense Commission on 22 March 2006 after one amendment that 
tried to weaken its language was voted down (my notes from commission meeting) and was adopted by 
the House on 30 March 2006.
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work toward an international ban remained a prerequisite for the definition of the 
future government position in this regard (interviews 28 GOV, 32 MIL).
The cautious position of the Belgian government changed only slowly after an 
increasing number of states pledged support for a negotiating mandate on cluster 
munitions at the CCW Review Conference in November 2006. Initially, the Belgian 
delegation pointed out that in the growing number of legislative initiatives on cluster 
munitions in a number of countries, it saw the development of propitious conditions to 
address the problem multilaterally as well. However, it argued for an effective and 
inclusive approach that should advance step-by-step guided by a clear objective but 
also aiming at attracting a “solid consensus” around that objective. The way to do so, 
Belgium suggested, was to continuing the discussion mandate of the group of 
governmental experts on ERW, possibly by adding to it the examination of the 
question of cluster submunitions from the perspective of compliance with IHL rules 
(Belgium, 2006b). Only on the last day of the conference, did Belgium decide to join 
the group of countries that asked more forcefully for a mandate to negotiate a legally-
binding instrument addressing the humanitarian problems of cluster munitions.
Conclusion
There are striking similarities between the two processes that led to the first national 
legislations on landmines and cluster munitions in Belgium. In both cases the NGOs 
serve as catalysts in highlighting the issues but prominent senators assume the major 
role in drafting and passing ban laws in the Senate. Several characteristics of the 
Belgian political system also come to the fore. The importance of the parliament and, 
particularly, of the Senate as a body that not only took the lead in legislating new 
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norms with international resonance, but also set the course of the Belgian foreign 
policy in an area of arms control is a striking exception to its otherwise limited role in 
Belgian politics. In comparison, the military had a limited political leverage in the 
Belgian system and avoided getting involved in political debates even on issues that 
directly affect military capabilities and strategies. Legislating a ban despite the 
existence of important industry interests at stake shows that this was not an entirely 
low cost decision for Belgium to make or for senators to advocate. In order to secure 
consensus on the issue, some compromise formulas in both the landmine and cluster 
munition bans were included, without however diluting their humanitarian focus. 
Finally, the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have maintained 
neutrality and non-involvement in the parliamentary process regarding both landmines 
and cluster munitions. In tune with the state’s political and the Foreign Ministry’s 
organizational culture, Belgian diplomats shied away from taking up leadership roles 
either on landmines or cluster munitions despite the fact that their national position 
was the most progressive compared to that of other countries. Instead they preferred 
the well-established negotiation fora in the area of arms control. It appears that 
Belgian diplomats lacked both the resources and confidence to assume risks in leading 
the way, even though they worked actively within a coalition of like-minded states on 
landmines and after some hesitation got involved in efforts to build a similar group on 
cluster munitions. As a small country, Belgium was not a natural leader even if it was 
a leader domestically and one of the “like-minded” internationally. Public diplomacy 
has never been a source of national prestige and identity. Rather, Belgium has tried to 
achieve a degree of national cohesion by anchoring itself in the European Union and 
NATO and becoming also the center where those institutions are based. 
Thus, the cases of landmines and cluster munitions confirm the importance of 
domestic political culture as a factor in influencing the policymaking process in 
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Belgium and the country’s international role. The two cases, however, challenge the 
domestic structure model’s efficacy in identifying the avenues to channel NGO 
initiatives and the prospects for their success. The partnership between Handicap 
International and Senator Mahoux on cluster munitions helped overcome the obstacles 
that the Belgian system usually imposes on legislative initiative. Indeed, the legislation 
was adopted in the face of protests from the unions and the organization of the 
industry employers – powerful peak organizations that under different circumstances 
manage to work out their differences in interests directly with the government. Thus 
the involvement of NGOs, civil society, and the public in raising important issues 
directly with the parliaments contributes to the reinvigoration of its functions that are 
otherwise circumvented within the corporatist setting (Magnette, 2004: 102). In the 
case of cluster munitions, NGO campaigning in several European countries and the 
successful partnership between Handicap International and Senator Mahoux has also 
given rise to an idea to organize a meeting of European parliamentarians working on 
similar ban legislations to share experience and stimulate a common approach on the 
issue. Thus the success of one European Parliament could contribute to the 
strengthening of parliamentary initiative in other countries where NGOs are 
advocating similar action.
 What other factors could explain some of the features characterizing the 
Belgian legislative processes and positions? Certainly, the geographical position of 
Belgium currently provides it with a high degree of security to which NATO 
membership adds a security guarantee. Indeed, it might be argued that Belgium could 
get rid of landmines, cluster munitions and other controversial weapons such as 
depleted uranium munitions, because it does not use them, and in case its national 
security is threatened, it could always rely on the sophisticated weaponry of its NATO 
allies, unlike some neutral countries with no less humanitarian zeal such as Sweden 
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and Finland, for example. Thus it could be argued that war experience and the 
realization of the atrocity of war have made Belgians more responsive to the needs and 
suffering of others, whereas the security their country enjoys has enabled them to act 
on their values and beliefs, without having to bear the cost.328  
Indeed, it has been argued that the history of the country that had experienced 
severe war devastation in the two world wars makes it a natural supporter of 
disarmament and pacifism. Certainly, Flemish pacifism made easier the adoption of 
the two national bans, even though the initiative for them came from other quarters. 
Yet, different lessons could have been drawn from the checkered Belgian history. As 
victims of German invasion in both the First and the Second World Wars, Belgians 
could have decided that disarmament and giving up weapons is not in their best 
interest and if undertaken should never be unilateral but only in the context of an 
international agreement. Indeed, Belgian active support of and membership in 
international and regional organizations after the end of WWII (UN, NATO, EC) point 
in the same direction (e.g. Reiter, 1994). However, in the case of landmines and 
cluster munitions, Belgian leverage internationally and within those organizations has 
been exercised in an interesting, indirect way – Belgium has undertaken bold measures 
to ban those weapons domestically without expending too much effort to make sure 
that other countries would follow. The lack of international leverage has been 
compensated by domestic assertiveness coming from civil society and legislators. 
Other countries were nevertheless influenced by the Belgian decisions and followed 
suit thus feeding a dynamic of leadership competition. 
                                                
328 Belgium has been a pioneer not only regarding landmines and cluster munitions, but also in adopting 
a law on universal jurisdiction in 1993, and quite probably will be leading the way again on depleted 
uranium weapons in the not-too-far future. It cannot be argued, however, that the decision to ban cluster 
munitions involved no costs for Belgium as the fierce lobbying of the arms industry showed. 
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Norway: Making a difference in the world by developing new NGO partnerships
Domestic Structure
Norway is another example of “consociational democracy” in which consensual 
policy-making is emphasized (Matthews and Valen, 1999: 31; Houben, 2005: 99, 
Neumann, 2002: 108). It is also one of “the most thoroughly organized societies in the 
world” with powerful interest organizations and voluntary associations (Matthews and 
Valen, 1999: 29) including a plethora of NGOs, among which four big organizations 
with humanitarian and aid agendas stand out – the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian 
Church Aid, Save the Children, and Norwegian People’s Aid – that also make up an 
umbrella organization, the Norwegian Refugee Council. Many of the NGOs in the 
field of development have relationships with the government and especially with the 
Norwegian State Directory for Aid, NORAD that channels a good part of the 
Norwegian developmental aid through the NGO sector. In addition, some of the NGOs 
such as Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have a historically close relationship with the 
Labor Party (Neumann, 2002: 109-110). The large and powerful interest organizations 
have regular contact with the government through a network of commissions, advising 
boards, councils, and similar bodies. Thus the corporatist system is also characteristic 
of Norway (Matthews and Valen, 1999: 30). 
However, in terms of balance of power between the executive and the 
parliament, the situation in Norway is somewhat different from the one encountered in 
Belgium despite the similar features of corporatism and the consensual policy process. 
Traditionally, Norway has had a strong executive (Houben, 2005: 103) and at least 
until the mid-1980s scholars described the role of the Norwegian parliament in 
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policymaking as very limited and largely supplanted by the public administration and 
interest organizations (Rommetvedt, 2003: 2-3; Shaffer, 1998:2-5; Matthews and 
Valen, 1999: 58).329 The role of the parliament has changed especially since 1985 
from which point on minority governments, lacking support from the parliamentarian 
majority, have been in power.330 This change, together with an increasing 
heterogeneity of Norwegian society, has been credited as the cause of greater leverage 
of the parliament over government decision-making in subsequent years (Shaffer, 
1998:34). Due to its better research resources and expertise, the executive branch still 
has considerable influence on parliamentary decisions (Matthews and Valen, 1999: 59; 
Christensen and Peters, 1999:85), but nevertheless, compared to its negligible role 
until the 1980s, the Parliament (Storting) has become more powerful in Norwegian 
politics. So much so, that in 1999 the president of the parliament expressed concern 
about “the ‘fundamental and unfortunate shifts’ that may occur in ‘the natural 
interplay between the Storting and the Government’ if the Storting is too active” 
(Rommetvedt, 2003: 6). The shift in the parliament’s role has also been reflected in 
the growing number of interest organizations that establish contacts with 
parliamentarians in contrast to the earlier period when the prevailing view was that 
legislation was shaped within the administration (Christiansen and Rommetvedt, 
1999). Thus at present there seems to exist a certain balance between the executive 
and legislative branches of government. On the whole, however, their relationship has 
been “a relatively cooperative one, characterized by trust and mutual adjustment,” 
rather one of competition over influence (Christensen and Peters, 1999: 63).
                                                
329 In 1985, for example, Egeland (1985: 38) argued that Norwegian NGOs interact mainly with the 
Minstries of Foreign Affairs and Development Aid, and the parliament was not a focus of their 
activities because of perception where real decision were made. Others arguing about the weakness of 
parliament include, for example, Arter (1984) and Hernes (1983), cited in Matthews and Valen (1999: 
56)
330 The last majority government lasted till 1961, from 1965 to 1971 and from 1981 to 1986 there have 
been majority coalition governments (Rommetvedt, 2003: 4).
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The military in Norway can play a rather independent and even political role. 
The Norwegian Chief of Defense is the principal military adviser of the Minister of 
Defense but has significant independence and a mandate to “speak freely” and inform 
the general public, which makes the office of Chief of Defense the center of gravity 
within the government regarding the implementation of security and defense policy 
(Houben, 2005: 104).331 NATO membership and concerns over Norway’s border with 
Russia have been central for its armed force, as well as involvement in peacekeeping 
operations that was seen in Norway as a way of drawing “‘high political’ gains” from 
“‘low political’ issue-areas”.332 The Norwegian military has also enjoyed relatively 
high and stable levels of public trust over the period 1985-2000 (between 70 and 80% 
of  “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence) (Bondeson, 2003: Fig. 13.26). 
However, in contrast to the French case, the other Norwegian social and public 
institutions also enjoyed such or even higher levels of support (Bondesom, 2003:52-4; 
Gulbrandsen, 2005; Christensen and Peters, 1999: 143).
Finally, in terms of domestic culture and diplomatic tradition is should be 
noted that Norway has a humanitarian tradition linked to Protestant missionary work 
and humanitarian relief work (Neumann, 2002:108; Heidar, 2001: 149). A central 
feature of Norway’s foreign policy during (and after) the Cold War has been the 
promotion and contribution to developmental aid. 
As a small country, Norway has always been interested in the promotion of 
international rule of law, human rights and effective international institutions (Heidar, 
2001: 151; Østerud and Selle, 2006: 40). For example, in 1998 the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Knut Vollebaek stated, that “[i]t is in the interest of a small state like Norway 
                                                
331 The extensive prerogatives of the Chief of Defense were granted because of the belief that in WWII 
Norway was not prepared to defend itself against the German invasion because the parliament had not 
heeded military advisers.
332 The commitment to peace operations also shows in these figures – from 1949 till the early 1990s, 
from a population of 4 million over 50,000 Norwegians have taken part in international operations 
(Nustad and Thune, 2003: 154).
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to maintain a strong UN and support the role of the UN and its ability to uphold a 
degree of peace and order in international relations.” His predecessor Bjorn Tore 
Godal similarly argued in 1996 that “Norwegian society’s deep respect for 
humanitarian values had made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone of all our 
policy. This is of special importance to our work for peace, where it combines 
idealism and self-interest. The more respect for Human Rights, the safer the World 
will be for all of us” (quoted in Nustad and Thune, 2003: 170, 173, emphasis in 
original). Thus both commitment to international norms and self-interest have 
motivated Norway’s support of UN peacekeeping missions, as well as its notable 
peacemaking efforts, among which its work for the achievement of the 1993 Oslo 
Peace Accord stands out.333 In those initiatives it has relied on low-profile diplomacy 
and private negotiating channels that have produced high-profile results (Henrikson, 
2005: 79-82). Based on such practices, Cooper (1997) characterized Norwegian 
diplomacy as quiet, low-key, consensus-oriented, and focused on a few distinct issues. 
Given the Norwegian changing political structure, the domestic structure 
model does not have clear-cut predictions about the institutional channels to which 
NGO efforts should be directed in order to be successful. The strong influence of 
political parties both on the government and parliamentarian life could make them the 
center of gravity of the political system. On the other hand, the consensual and 
compromise-oriented decision-making process, coupled with a variety of well-
organized interests and an independent military would suggest that it would take 
considerable amount of time before NGO demands could be translated into policy 
(Egeland, 1985:45). 
                                                
333 During the 1990s Norway has also been involved in peace talks between Communist rebels and the 
Philippine government, Croatia and Yugoslavia, Colombia and the FARC rebel movement, as well as in 
Cyprus, Somalia and Sudan. In 2002 it brokered a power-sharing agreement between the Tamil Tigers 
and Sri Lanka (Henrikson, 2005: 80).
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Argument
In the following sections, I will argue that NGOs followed multiple pathways in trying 
to influence Norwegian policies on landmines and cluster munitions. Their success 
depended on winning the support of the governing parties, but most importantly, on 
the support of key officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It has been 
shown that Norway has the highest scores among West European countries on 
affiliation of ministers to interest groups (such as unions and employer organizations), 
the number of employees from interest groups in the cabinet has also been increasing, 
and ministers, for specialized departments in particular, have been recruited from the 
interest groups (Christensen and Peters, 1999: 83, 82, 91). Following Neumann 
(2002), I argue that this trend has been extended to the recruitment of NGO members 
to governmental posts and the 1990 appointment as adviser to the Foreign Minister 
and then as Junior Foreign Minister of Jan Egeland (who had previously chaired 
Amnesty International, Norway and worked for the ICRC), and the 2005 appointment 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jonas Gahr Støre (previously Secretary General of 
the Norwegian Red Cross) have been important factors in defining the Norwegian 
position on landmines and cluster munitions, respectively. The NGO domestic and 
international campaigns on both issues became a source of strength, harnessed by 
MFA officials in their efforts to improve the Ministry’s organizational capability, 
facilitate Norwegian foreign policy, and ultimately, enhance Norway’s international 
position. However, Norway’s leading role in the processes toward negotiating new 
international treaties on landmines and cluster munitions does not fit within Cooper’s 
(1997) characterization of Norwegian diplomacy. Instead of low-key and consensus-
oriented, it has been public and oriented toward the creation of new humanitarian 
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norms out of the international consensus-based fora and in defiance of major military 
powers. 
The Norwegian involvement on landmines, and especially the Norwegian 
initiative to launch an alternative negotiating process on cluster munition could be 
seen as part of renewed Norwegian efforts at enhancing Norway’s image and 
influence in the world. After studies showed lack of knowledge of the country among 
foreign audiences, in 2003 a new program was launched aiming at “branding” a 
distinct Norwegian image internationally. Whereas big countries such as the US, 
China, the UK, or France have to deal mainly with managing and reshaping their 
images, “Norway’s central public diplomacy problem is that of invisibility” (Leonard 
and Small, 2003:1). And in the words of Norwegian State Secretary Thorhild Widvey, 
“[t]o gain influence, we have to be noticed” (Widvey, 2003a), especially since “[a]s a 
result of globalisation there are ever more actors in the global market place battling for 
attention” (Widvey, 2003b). Hence, the need for “carefully nuanced pictures of 
modern Norway to prevent [it] from being gradually marginalized” (Widvey, 2003a). 
Based on its traditions and comparative advantages in development, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking, the central “brand” that emerged from an academic 
study of Norway’s public diplomacy was that of a “humanitarian superpower.”334 The 
other focus of the Norwegian approach to increasing its international leverage was the 
work with different partners in Norwegian society, including NGOs (Widvey, 2003a; 
Bátora, 2005). Indeed, it has been argued that Norway’s globalization strategy has 
become a new “mode of national corporatism of nongovernmental organizations
                                                
334 “Humanitarian superpower” was presented in this way: “Norway might only be 115th in the world in 
terms of its size, but it is leading the world as a humanitarian power – outperforming all other countries 
in terms of its contributions to aid, its role in peace-keeping and peace processes and its commitment to 
developing new kinds of global governance. This commitment goes far beyond the activities of the 
Norwegian state – infusing every aspect of Norwegian society from NGOs and business to ordinary 
citizens.” The other three more commercially-oriented “brands” were “living with nature,” “equality,” 
and “internationalist/spirit of adventure” (Leonard and Small, 2003: 34-5). The study was carried out 
with input from opinion leaders, NGOs, and government officials.
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consultancy firms, research institutions and the state in the formation and conduct of 
the policy of foreign engagement” (Østerud and Selle, 2006: 33; also on NGOs, 
Bátora, 2005:17). As it will be shown, not only did the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs “harness” the power of national NGOs in projecting a distinct Norwegian role 
internationally (Neumann, 2002). It also established similar links with NGOs from 
other states, supported them, and in turn leaned on their backing and active 
mobilization to launch its negotiation initiative on cluster munitions. It remains to be 
seen if this new more activist and confrontational approach that aims at gaining 
“visibility” and influence for Norway’s internationally would be successful in the 
cluster munitions case and compatible with Norway’s peacemaking and mediation 
roles that are still emphasized as part of its distinctive “brand.”335
Finally, given that peacekeeping and peacemaking are so core to Norwegian 
self-identification and international image, these identity frames have influenced not
only the purposes of the use of force by the military, but its organizational identity as 
well. With the end of the Cold War and the diminished priority given to defense 
against a major land invasion from Russia, the frame of peacekeeping or humanitarian 
soldiering has become even more influential.336 Thus, one could argue that this 
humanitarian frame imposed limits on the ability of the military to argue against the 
ban on landmines and the cluster munitions moratorium since opposition to them 
                                                
335 Norway’s ability to excel at peacemaking and be accepted as an effective mediator depends on the 
perception of its impartiality by the parties involved. In this light, the cluster munition campaign and its 
sharp criticism of the Israeli use of the weapons, even though balanced with similar but fewer criticisms 
of Hezbollah’s use of clusters, may create perceptions of some partiality on the part of Norway as the 
leading state behind the issue.
336 Whereas during the Cold War Norwegian security policy involved three core elements – “support of 
the UN, involvement in peacekeeping, and a strong territorial defense  […] all elements of the same 
policy – securing the Norwegian state (that is, its territory) and securing Norwegian national identity.” 
Since the 1990s the meaning of security has changed – “[f]rom taking as its object the 
nation/state/territory, its object has now become, at least at the level of rhetoric, redefined as universal 
human values” (Nustad and Thune, 2003: 172). However, the relative importance of the humanitarian 
frame is time and context dependent. With the rise of new threats and missions emphasizing rapid 
deployment, specialist forces, or anti-terrorist operations, peacekeeping may become less important for 
the military institution, and thus the frame might lose some of its legitimizing and constraining power.
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would have undermined a core aspect of the military’s basis of legitimacy in 
Norwegian society and gone against its own self-perception as a force for good and a 
force for peace in the world.
Landmines: second on the finish line
They story of the Norwegian decision to ban landmines domestically and give its full 
support to an international ban is a particularly interesting one.337 In contrast to other 
leading countries with negligible security threats, such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, for example, Norway’s common border with Russia has always been a 
source of concern (Otterlei, 2002: 358). Yet, military and strategic arguments were 
sidelined and the military was basically faced with a fait accompli when a ban on 
landmines was adopted domestically and later internationally. The case is also 
interesting, because early on the willingness to work on the problem of mines came 
from the government, whereas the Norwegian NGO campaign for a total ban got 
established only in the fall of 1994, later than in most other leading pro-ban 
countries.338 Despite its later start, the NGO campaign was very successful in lobbying 
parties and members of parliament, creating public interest in the problem of 
landmines and pushing the Norwegian government toward full support of a total ban. 
                                                
337 Most of the section on landmines is based on the excellent case study by Neumann (2002).
338 The Canadian NGO campaign was launched at about the same time; only the Austrian campaign 
started even later - as late as the Vienna CCW conference in September 1995, there was no Austrian 
NGO coalition working on landmines (Liz). In 1996 the Austrian Red Cross, together with a number of 
NGOs, launched a public campaign for a total ban and gathered 120,000 signatures in its support 
(Landmine Monitor, 1999).
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In 1992 the government offered funding to an NGO, Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA),339 to organize a demining mission in Cambodia. The key person who 
established the link between the Foreign Ministry and NPA was Junior Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Jan Egeland, who before going into politics had been engaged in 
developmental issues, had been the chair of the Norwegian section of Amnesty 
International, and importantly, had worked for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) in Geneva and thus had been exposed to its work on landmines 
(Neumann, 2002: 110-11).340  
Whereas internationally the problem of landmines appeared on the 
governments’ agendas through the insistence of NGOs that convinced France to call 
for a CCW review conference, once the process started with a series of four 
preparatory expert sessions working on amendments to the CCW from the fall of 1993 
to January 1995, NGOs’ input in the process was minimal given that they were not 
even allowed to attend the meetings. Certainly, the Norwegian delegation proceeded 
with its work in the sessions without any NGOs involvement on the issue till the fall 
of 1994. In fact, initiative for more active Norwegian involvement on landmines 
emanated from Geneva. According to Jorn Gjelstad, member of the Norwegian 
delegation at the CCW talks “it was indeed this delegation which pushed the MFA 
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs] into action” and “insisted that Norway had to do 
                                                
339 NPA has its origins in the workers’ movement and strong ties to the Norwegian Labor Party. It 
became a large developmental NGO with 125 local divisions and projects in 33 countries (Neumann, 
2002:109).
340 Before Egeland was asked to become the personal advisor (and later junior minister) of Foreign 
Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, he was the head of the international department and media person at the 
Norwegian Red Cross. Prior to that he had also been Chair of Amnesty International, Norway and Vice-
Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International. After leaving the Foreign 
Ministry he became the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Colombia, then the President of the 
Norwegian Red Cross, and finally Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency 
Relief Coordinator (Irinnews, 2006; UN Department of Public Information, 2003). Stoltenberg, who 
brought Egeland in the government was previously the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and after 
leaving MFA became President of the Norwegian Red Cross, which points to the rotation of NGO 
activists in and out of government (and international organizations) and the openness of the Norwegian 
political system to humanitarian issues and NGO people.
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something, because this case might go off” (quoted in Neumann, 2002:115). Certainly, 
the Norwegian Ambassador at the Geneva Permanent Mission and negotiator at the 
CCW, Steffen Kongstad, was actively involved in the issue.341 The other direction 
from which interest in the issue of landmines came was the ICRC, with which junior 
minister Egeland maintained his contacts (ibid, 116). Only later in the fall of 1994 did 
NGO pressure begin to materialize. However, it was the NGO call for a total ban that 
radically changed the terms of the debate in Norway, and together with the momentum 
gathering in other pro-ban countries, determined its position in favor of a 
comprehensive international and domestic prohibition of APLs. 
The stimulus for the creation of the Norwegian landmine coalition itself came 
from the ICBL and the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) – an NGO involved 
in demining and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan where it had come into contact with 
Rae McGrath, founder of the Mines Advisory Group in the UK – one of the six 
founding organizations of the ICBL. After attending a seminar on landmines in 
Geneva in the summer of 1994, the NAC activist Kristian Berg Harpviken, decided to 
organize a meeting of Norwegian NGOs in the fall of 1994 and invited McGrath to 
address it. It was only after this meeting that the Norwegian chapter of the ICBL was 
created and the NPA got motivated by the idea of a total landmine ban. Given its good 
institutional position and connections, the NPA then took over the political work to 
push for a total ban (Neumann, 2002:116). And it was at this point that relations 
between NPA and Junior Minister Jan Egeland, who first got NPA to work on mine 
clearance in 1992 and so far had been seen as actively engaged in humanitarian 
problems, got tense.  In his words: “And then this circle… began to argue in favor of a 
total ban. Suddenly, I was on the defensive” (quoted in Neumann, 2002: 117).342
                                                
341 Kongstad was called by NGOs one of “the fathers of the Ottawa Convention” (interview 18 NGO).
342 The circle Egeland refers to consisted of NPA, the Norwegian Red Cross, their Geneva office, 
Norwegian Church Aid, and their international branches – the Lutheran World Federation and the 
World Council of Churches.
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Nevertheless, Egeland sought to engage the NGOs in a dialog on the issue and 
initiated a series of meetings with them. However, he thought the idea of a total ban 
was unrealistic; it simply “had not existed as such.” Given the Norwegian geostrategic 
situation, he thought the idea was not a feasible option for his country. Moreover, he 
asserted that, “the MoD and the Department for Security Affairs were in the driver’s 
seat” in Norway and he had “no power of instruction over them” (p.118).
Even though the NGO campaign soured their relationship with Egeland and 
made tensions between MFA and MoD apparent as the debate over landmines 
continued, the claim that MoD had the authority to decide on the issue is dubious in 
light of the way and speed with which events in Norway unfolded. Rather, it seems 
that the support of party groups in parliament was key for the adoption of a total ban 
domestically, and hence internationally as well. And getting their support was one of 
the main goals of the NGO campaign.   
Indeed, what the meeting with Egeland made clear to the NGOs was that he 
was opposed to their initiative and “there was little point in trying to convince key 
politicians directly” (Svein Henriksen of NPA quoted in Neumann, 2002:118). Instead 
NGOs directed their efforts toward building momentum by targeting the media and 
getting the support for a total ban from as many organizations as possible. The result 
was that some 120 organizations, including influential church organizations and 
unions, signed a resolution calling for a ban and allowed the Norwegian landmine 
coalition to claim broad-based representation and support. The other two targets of the 
campaign were the top politicians in the parliament and the governing Labor Party 
itself. The breakthrough came in the spring of 1995 when Thorleif Jensen of the 
Working Group against Mines managed to convince their contacts in the Center Party 
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to put forward a motion in favor of a total ban in the parliament (pp.118-19).343 The 
motion then got to the Foreign Committee where NGO representatives made 
presentations and tried to convince the committee members of the need for a ban. The 
work in the parliament attracted growing attention as debates got underway and 
eventually contradictions between the positions of the MFA and MoD became evident 
during the parliamentarian discussions (p.121). 
The efforts to influence the Labor Party during its annual meeting in the fall of 
1994 were unsuccessful because of the opposition from Defense Minister Kosmo. 
Nevertheless, the campaigners decided to turn to the annual meetings of the county 
chapters and have them pass resolutions in favor of a ban. 
Junior Minister Jan Egeland for his part also tried to sway the Labor Party’s 
faction for foreign policy in the parliament. Witnessing activism on landmines in 
Canada, Austria and Belgium in the spring of 1995, he argued that “either we could sit 
there and do nothing, which would mean that we eventually be forced to adopt the 
total ban by public opinion and international actors, or we could bite the bullet and go 
in for a total ban ourselves.” He argued for the latter option “from an interest-based 
perspective” (quoted in Neumann, 2002: 120).  Another motivation to adopt a more 
progressive policy on landmines came from “a need to keep up with the Swedes” 
(Neumann, 117) who were staking out an active position in favor of a total ban at the 
preparatory session for the CCW review conference.344
In the end the Labor Party group in the Parliament came about to support a 
total ban, consensus on the issue was also reached in the Foreign Committee and on 2 
                                                
343 To forward the motion, parliamentarians Arnstad and Lahnstein used the “so-called Document 8 
suggestion which can be used by single representatives of parties regarding all issues which are not 
circulating in the system.” As a follow-up of the motion, they also sent a letter to the Foreign Minister. 
Another letter was sent by Erik Solheim of the Socialist Left Party (fn. 16).
344 Sweden had proposed a total ban at the third preparatory session for the review conference in August 
1994 and the Swedish parliament was asking its government to take measures toward achieving the goal 
internationally and domestically (ICBL, 1994b).
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June 1995 the parliament adopted a total ban on the production, sale, purchase and use 
of AP landmines, which marked an important point in defining Norway’s position 
given its “consensus traditions and the way the enlarged committee of the Storting
[Parliament] acts as a consensus-building clearing-house for difficult decisions” 
(Neumann, 2002:122).
The MoD did see landmines as “a central and legitimate part of the country’s 
defense” (security division official, quoted in Neumann: 120) and gave some 
resistance to the general mood for a ban, but on the whole the military was overtaken 
by the course of events. There were divergent opinions on the need for and utility of 
landmines within MoD. From the military engineers’ point of view, Norwegian mines 
were very old, of limited utility and could be dispensed with. On the other hand, from 
a strategic point of view, Norwegian defense strategy depended on the use of clusters 
of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines against attacking tanks and a ban meant the 
reshaping of this strategy at some cost (p.121). However, the strategic argument got 
more or less lost in the debates on landmines and the MoD policy was left in the hands 
of its juridical division (quote, p. 120). The public interest in landmines created by the 
NGOs and their pressure on parliamentarians were a strong counterweight to military 
arguments. 
Thus, the NGOs were able, on the one hand, to put pressure on the MFA, and 
on the other, when the latter came to embrace the idea of the ban, to provide the MFA 
with the necessary backing in its dealings with MoD. The military was simply not 
skillful in the political game – in the words of a MoD official, “in the MoD, it is only 
Press and Information which has, or is supposed to have, contacts with the outside 
world” (quoted in Neumann, 2002:126) and did not resist the flow once consensus was 
reached on the issue in the Labor Party in parliament.
The military began to appreciate the implications of the total ban only when 
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the definition of landmines for the Ottawa Treaty clearly emerged in 1997 and 
indicated that a range of US smart mines on Norwegian territory would be banned by 
the treaty. Attempts by the military to change the definition of landmines came too late 
and to no effect (quote, p.125). By that time, the NGOs were working closely with the 
government and NGO representatives were part of the official Norwegian 
delegation.345 This access to insider information further helped the NGOs in their 
lobbying tactics toward state representatives at the conferences leading to Ottawa 
(quote, p.124).  
Overall, several important factors/phases regarding the Norwegian landmine 
case can be emphasized: First, the political system was open to government-NGO 
cooperation on humanitarian issues. Indeed, NGOs in Norway are an institutionalized 
part of the process of delivering humanitarian and developmental aid and some of 
them have close connections to Norwegian parties. The system was not only open to 
collaboration by NGOs, but importantly, key governmental posts were open to people 
linked to or from the NGO sector, such as the Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg
and his deputy Jan Egeland. Second, in order that these NGOs assume a more active 
role on landmines, an impetus from the international campaign to ban landmines had 
to be imparted. Third, whereas momentum for the creation of the Norwegian 
landmine coalition came from the international level, their legitimacy domestically lay 
in their expert knowledge of the problem from their field work. The tactics they 
employed were a combination of a public media campaign and lobbying parliament 
and party officials, but arguably it was the latter that yielded best results. Fourth,
despite its interest in the problem, initially the government was prevented from 
adopting a bold position toward banning landmines due to security concerns. Only 
                                                
345 Either Halle Jorn Hanssen or Svein Henriksen of NPA were most often on the Norwegian delegation 
(fn. 18)
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after the NGOs had launched a strong campaign for a ban domestically, and 
internationally other states were taking the lead on the issue, did the government 
perceive the need for a more radical position in favor of a total ban and got the 
necessary arguments to overcome the military opposition. Fifth, key to the 
development of the Norwegian position was the building of consensus domestically, 
which was achieved by the efforts both of NGOs and the MFA to persuade the Labor 
Party group on foreign policy and then the Foreign Committee of the parliament to 
support a total ban. Finally, the international competition for leadership on the issue 
did play an important role in defining Norwegian policy as well. In an apt sports 
metaphor, junior minister Jan Egeland describes the evolution of Norway’s position: 
“We lagged behind on the mine issue. Then we came up with this mine clearance and 
caught up by initiating the work of the NPA. Then we lagged behind on the political 
front due to our defence considerations. We were not amongst the four or five front 
runners in spring 1995. Then we moved up front at the end and finish as a good 
number two right after Canada” (quoted in Neumann, 2002: fn. 25).
The front-runner on cluster munitions
The two organizations that have been active on the issue of cluster munitions in 
Norway are the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the Norwegian Red Cross, 
whereas Norwegian Church Air, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and Save the 
Children have been showing support on the issue. In 2000, NPA was one of the NGOs 
attending the ICRC meeting on explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Nyon that set the 
course for action on ERW at the CCW (ICRC, 2000b). Despite this early interest, for a 
couple of years NPA did not get actively engaged on the issue internationally. 
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Domestically, the Norwegian Red Cross was advocating measures to restrict the use of 
cluster munitions and a more active role for the Norwegian government 
internationally. 
The Norwegian Parliament got interested early on and in June 2001 it adopted 
a decision that required the destruction of all air-delivered cluster bombs previously in 
stock “because of their low level of precision and high dud rate” and prohibited the 
acquisition of munitions with no self-destruct mechanisms and a failure rate above 1% 
(Norway, 2003). It also instructed the government to work actively for an international 
ban against cluster bombs. Pursuant to the decision, Norway has also foresworn the 
use of air-dropped cluster munitions in international conflicts and prohibited their use 
in Afghanistan (HRW, 2004). In addition, Norway has stated that existing IHL 
“obligations and restrictions d[id] not provide sufficient protection for the civilian 
population against the humanitarian consequences related to ERW” and has called for 
further regulations on their use (Norway, 2003).
Whereas Norway was a leader on the issue of cluster munitions within the 
CCW, NGOs and the Norwegian Red Cross, in particular, were pushing it to assume a 
more active role. However, there were not many opportunities to exercise leadership 
within the CCW given the opposition of a large number of states even to discussions 
of the problem of cluster munitions. Thus when in 2003 in media debates the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vidar Helgesen, was pressed by NGOs for not doing 
enough, his response to the NGOs was, “What are you doing through your 
international networks?” (interview 42 NGO). And justly so since at that point the 
international campaign was weak and disorganized and no national campaigns on the 
issue existed. Yet, Norway needed the backing of a stronger international movement 
to be able to take bolder steps internationally. This prompted the Norwegian Red 
Cross to become more engaged in motivating interest in the issue among the Red 
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Cross and Red Crescent societies and start attending the CCW meetings in Geneva. 
Throughout the spring of 2005 the Norwegian Red Cross also ran a large-scale 
advertising campaign on the issue of cluster munitions with popular events organized 
in several cities.
The passing of the cluster ban law in the Belgian Senate gave a boost to the 
NGO campaign in Norway as well. In June 2005, in a demonstration of engagement 
from international NGOs, the Cluster Munition Coalition held a briefing on cluster 
munitions with the opposition Center Party, which was followed by a seminar 
organized in the Norwegian Parliament by the Center Party under the title “What role 
can Norway play in the fight against cluster munitions?” Speakers from HRW, NPA 
and the Norwegian Red Cross participated in the seminar, which concluded with a 
joint briefing of NGOs and the Center Party that included a call for a ban on cluster 
munitions in its platform for the upcoming elections in the fall of 2005 (CMC, 
2005a,b). The NGOs concentrated their lobbying activities also on the other two 
opposition parties – the Labor and Social Left (interview 42 NGO). 
As the international and national campaigns on cluster munitions got 
mobilized, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also became more engaged and 
assumed leadership on the issue. Previously, the Netherlands was most active on the 
issue of explosive remnants of war, and had been gathering NGOs and government 
experts to an annual meeting to discuss the issue prior to the CCW sessions. Now, 
Norway took up this role and in June organized a seminar on cluster munitions and 
possible ways of addressing the issues in the CCW for like-minded countries and 
NGO representatives.346
                                                
346 Among the like-minded group were representatives from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, 
Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The NGOs included Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, 
Landmine Action, UK, Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Red Cross.
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The lobbying of NGOs of the Storting parties over the previous period bore 
fruit when in October 2005 a new coalition government, including the Center Party, 
Labor, and the Social Left Party, came to power on a “government platform” that 
stated, among other things, that it will “work for an international ban against cluster 
bombs.” In addition, the former Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross, Jonas 
Gahr Støre, became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs (CMC, 2005c) – another 
enabling factor for the NGO campaign that paralleled the situation during the 
landmine campaign in the 1990s when the Junior Minster of Foreign Affairs Jan 
Egeland was a former ICRC and Norwegian Red Cross person and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg involved in the NGO sector and later headed the 
Norwegian Red Cross. Another person also gave hopes for Norwegian leadership on 
the issue – Steffen Kongstad who was very instrumental during the Ottawa Process got 
more involved in the cluster munitions issue as well. 
After the Belgian national ban on cluster munitions was passed by the 
Chamber in February 2006, NPA decided to reinforce its domestic lobbying by hiring 
a fulltime staff member to work specifically on cluster munitions and saw this step as 
a way to contribute to the international campaign of the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC) (interview 42 NGO). NPA also stepped up its media campaign and lobbying of 
parliamentarians. A couple of days after the passing of the Belgian law, NPA 
circulated a letter to MPs titled “Belgium has banned cluster bombs – why is Norway 
hesitating?” and called for the introduction of a similar legislation in the Norwegian 
Parliament banning “all cluster munitions with submunitions which are not 
individually guided/target seeking and which do not have empirically proven and 
reliable self-destruction mechanisms.” It also called on the government to live up to its 
election campaign promise and take concrete measures toward achieving an 
international ban (CMC, 2006a). Due to opposition from the military to a “ban” on 
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cluster munitions, the NGOs modified their call in March 2006 and aimed instead at 
the adoption of a moratorium on cluster munition use and the destruction of all old 
types of cluster munitions that presented a humanitarian problem. Its demands 
regarding an international solution to the problem were aimed at preventing an 
agreement that would only lead to the retrofitting of old cluster munition stocks with 
self-destruct mechanisms without addressing their problems of indiscriminateness 
(CMC, 2006b; interview 42 NGO).    
Another breakthrough point for NGO lobbying came when they discovered 
that Norway’s remaining stockpile of ground-launched cluster munitions contained the 
same type of munitions that the British forces had used in the Iraq War in 2003 around 
Basra. Even though these were a new type of cluster munitions with a built-in self-
destruct mechanism that ensured about 98% reliability rate, the Human Rights Watch 
report on the conduct of military operations had documented that their use in Iraq had 
resulted in several dozens civilian deaths. The Norway’s announced policy for its 
stock of cluster munitions, however, required a reliability rate of at least 99%. The 
NGOs used this discrepancy between policy and practice and the issue became the 
focus of intense debate in the media and discussions between the NGOs and the 
Ministry of Defense. Because the issue fell within the purview of the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD), NGO contacts were concentrated on it, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did not get involved in the issue until after most of the differences between 
MoD and the NGOs were ironed out (interview 42 NGO).      
Finally, in May 2006 following the extensive media coverage of the cluster 
munition issue and debates about the future of Norway’s stockpiles of the weapons, 
MPs from the three coalition parties in the Defense Committee organized a closed 
parliamentary seminar for government officials and NGOs to discuss the issue. The 
latter asked for a national moratorium on cluster munitions until an international 
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agreement was achieved and MoD announced that such a moratorium was in fact in 
place until further testing of the reliability rate of stockpiled munitions in the fall 
(CMC, 2006c). The NGOs demanded that the policy be made official, and in June 
2006 at the CCW meetings, the Norwegian delegation announced the moratorium 
officially (interview 42 NGO). It went on to state that “[i]t is imperative to start 
working, without further delay, towards an international ban on cluster munitions that 
cause unacceptable humanitarian problems” and demand a clear negotiating mandate 
to that end at the CCW. It also emphasized that the Norwegian “government wishes to 
work closely with interested states, humanitarian organisations and other relevant 
actors in a concerted endeavour to meet the existing challenges and to prevent a new 
humanitarian disaster caused by certain types of cluster munitions” (Norway, 2006).
In the meantime, the Israel-Hezbollah war that unfolded in July-August 2006 
opened a window of opportunity for the advocates of a ban on cluster munitions and 
UN agencies and NGOs, helped by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
made the best out of the horrible humanitarian situation. Israel used a large number of 
cluster munitions targeted indiscriminately over wide areas in Lebanon, including in 
civilian areas during the last three days before the ceasefire came into effect. UN mine 
action teams on the ground and NGO teams quickly started gathering information on 
strike locations and civilian casualties and made the issue of cluster munitions a front-
page news around the world. Jan Egeland, the erstwhile moving force behind the 
landmine ban in Norway, and current UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian 
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator lent a helping hand as well, decrying the 
cluster munition use as  “shocking and completely immoral” (McCarthy, 2006). MFA 
also financially supported NGOs whose help it needed in generating international 
momentum on the issue. Two reports on the global and Lebanese problem of cluster 
munitions by Landmine Action, UK and Handicap International, which appeared in 
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time for the crucial CCW Review Conference in November 2006, were supported by 
the Norwegian MFA. 
Alerted to national developments regarding proposals for cluster munition bans 
in several countries, the announced willingness by Norway to lead the way on the 
issue, and especially the dangers of cluster munitions use revealed in the Israel-
Hezbollah war during the summer, six states, led by Sweden and Austria proposed a 
negotiating mandate on cluster munitions at the CCW. With each day of the Review 
conference, the number of supporters of the proposal increased to reach 27 just ahead 
of its closing. Norway, however, had made it clear that it did not regard the CCW as 
the forum suitable to achieving a meaningful international agreement on cluster 
munitions. It only joined the countries supporting the mandate on the last day of the 
conference when it was clear that it will be opposed by several countries among which 
the US, Britain and Russia. This failure of CCW to take up the issue provided a 
justification for launching an alternative negotiating process out of it in order to 
address the pressing humanitarian problems of the weapons. Norway seized the 
moment and announced its initiative to “start a process towards an international ban on 
cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences” (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).     
Concluding remarks
Thus, as in the landmine case, Norwegian NGOs have brought up the question of 
cluster munitions at different levels of government, worked with parliamentarians, 
government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Their efforts to 
secure the support of parties in opposition ahead of the 2005 elections paid off when 
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they came to power. In contrast to the landmine case, the Ministry of Defense has been 
more closely involved in the issue from the beginning, and despite its opposition to a 
total ban on all types of cluster munitions, has been responsive to the demands of 
NGOs and concerned about the humanitarian effects of the weapons in its possession. 
Thus, in both cases the military accepted the humanitarian discourse and has 
performed as a “force for peace.” As in the landmine case, the consensus 
policymaking process has been at work in the cluster munitions case as well and NPA 
deemed it necessary to make a concession about the most advanced new cluster 
munition types in order to win the support of the Ministry of Defense for solving the 
humanitarian problem of old munitions. Finally, the Norwegian cluster munition 
campaign was in large measure conceived within the context of the international 
campaign and the passing of the Belgian ban legislation was a key event imparting 
momentum to the activities not only of NGOs but also of government officials in 
Norway.
Junior Foreign Minister Egeland was first to direct NPA toward taking up 
demining operations funded by Norway and he used the landmine issue to reallocate 
funds from the parliament and boost the organizational capacity of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to deal with humanitarian problems. When the NGO demands for a 
total ban got more vocal, he played a “double deal” – he tried “to mediate between the 
NGO pressure and those – inside and outside of the MFA – who insisted on framing 
the question of mines not as a humanitarian issue, but as one of state-to-state 
disarmament policy and Norwegian security policy.” In the process, the MFA 
“harnesse[d] the social power of NGO, and also the military sector” to enhance its 
own role (Neumann, 2002: 128). As Norwegian NGOs became empowered by their 
international networks, the Norwegian MFA used this source of strength to maintain 
its centrality vis-à-vis its own polity as well as increase its leverage in dealing with 
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other states and enhance Norwegian standing internationally (Neumann, 2002: 129). 
Thus, a “symbiotic relationship” between the MFA and NGOs was present, with both 
sides having a stake in pushing the issue forward (e.g. Bátora, 2005:5, 17) From this 
perspective, it is understandable why in 2003 the Deputy Foreign Minister sought 
stronger support from an international NGO network before Norway could 
contemplate more ambitious policies on cluster munitions. As the domestic campaigns 
in several European countries and the international campaign on cluster munitions 
gathered force following the Belgian law, the Norwegian international position 
became more assertive and the MFA sought ways to increase NGO leverage through 
funding. A new Foreign Minister who had presided the Norwegian Red Cross when it 
was campaigning against cluster munitions in 2003-05 also made a difference. Finally, 
Sweden – Norway’s traditional rival on humanitarian issues and contestant for the title 
of “über-Scandinavian”347 – pushed for negotiations on cluster munitions within the 
CCW. Then Norway counted the countries that came to support the Swedish proposal, 
and when it deemed there was a sufficient number willing to follow if it took the lead, 
Norway decided to move into full gear and launch an alternative process on cluster 
munitions out of the CCW. Thus, Norway’s bold step allowed it not only to gain 
international visibility, but also to reposition itself regionally vis-à-vis a country with 
which it shares many features in common.
Conclusion
In these three European countries NGOs followed different strategies and met with 
                                                
347 “Über-Scandinavian” was discussed as one approach of “branding” the Norwegian public image in 
Leonard and Small (2003: 43) and emphasized the common associations of Scandinavia with “equality, 
peace, nature, or self-sufficiency” but on a higher level. However, the danger that this approach might 
result in Sweden’s “crowd[ing] Norway out of the picture” was noted.
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different degrees of success, but in all of them the presence of support from key 
individuals in parliament or government has been conducive to the promotion of their 
cause. In Belgium parliamentarians played the most important role. In Norway both 
parliamentarians and foreign affairs officials made a difference but involvement of the 
latter was crucial in adopting a more active Norwegian posture internationally. In 
France, government officials moved the issue of landmines forward but the coming to 
power of a new left government was key for French support of the Ottawa Process. On 
cluster munitions, parliamentarians have been most interested in the issue but under a 
center-left government the NGOs have not been able to influence French policy 
significantly. 
Thus it could be argued that in Belgium and Norway humanitarian issues and 
weapons prohibitions have drawn more universal support, which has not been 
dependent on party affiliation of the government in power. In those two countries the 
government is often times a coalition of parties, not necessarily from the same side of 
the left-right political divide.348 The military in those countries has accepted the 
prohibitions of landmines and a moratorium on cluster munitions without particularly 
strong let alone public opposition. In both cases, however, its concerns were addressed 
at least to some extent in the adopted laws and thus it support has been secured in a 
way characteristic of the working of those two consensus-oriented political systems. 
In contrast, in France the military has been more influential in posing certain 
limits on French policies on landmines and cluster munitions, but it could find support 
for its arguments primarily when center-right governments were in power. Given the 
strong civilian control over the military, a left government had no particular 
                                                
348 Even though party affiliation does not matter for support of the initiatives to ban landmines and 
cluster munitions in Belgium and Norway, leadership on those issues has come from individuals in the 
socialist party in Belgium and the Labor Party in Norway, but the Norwegian Center Party has also 
been very actively supporting both the landmine ban and restrictions on cluster munitions. 
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difficulties with adopting an actively supportive position of the Ottawa Process.
The three examined countries have also played different roles internationally. 
Belgium was a leader in adopting strong national prohibitions on the two types of 
weapons but refrained from a leadership position internationally. Norway on the other 
hand, was progressive both in terms of domestic policy and particularly 
internationally. France, initially had leadership ambitions on landmines under a left 
government when it could take on an issue on which the US was also vying for a 
leading role, but then under a right government became obstructionist regarding the 
Ottawa Process. On cluster munitions it has been working constructively but has 
showed resistance to more comprehensive restrictions on their use. Thus its positions 
have been quite similar to those of the US and it is difficult to say that there is a 
unified European approach to those issues. To the extent that it materializes, it is the 
result of strong NGO campaigning on these issues both domestically and 
internationally.
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CHAPTER SIX
Canada: Leadership Matters, Partnerships Pay Off
Introduction
Domestic Structure
Canada is another country that falls in the category of “state-dominated” domestic 
structure, characterized by a concentration of power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, including on foreign policy issues, and a weak role for the parliament (e.g. 
Savoie, 1999; Smith, 2000:185). Societal interests are represented in fairly well 
developed social organizations and close links exist between the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) that is in charge of Canadian foreign aid 
and humanitarian and aid NGOs that benefit from CIDA funding to carry out 
humanitarian programs and deliver aid and services in the developing world.
The Military
The Canadian military is non-politicized, civilian control well embedded, and on the 
whole, civilian-military relations “circle about politicians’ concerns about auditing the 
‘expert’ advice they receive from the military and soldiers’ frustrations with 
politicians who seem content to ignore that advice” (Bland, 1996: 42). During the 
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Cold War, national security and defense were not among the main preoccupations of 
the Canadians.349 Indeed, they have been depicted as notoriously “unmilitary” (Stairs, 
1998a), so much so, that “when you make a claim in defence of national defence and 
military expenditure, you are ultimately regarded as some kind of foaming-at-the-
mouth warmonger” (Michael Ignatieff quoted in Kilgour, 2005) – a trend that has 
become stronger following the end of the Cold War and the diminished threat 
perceptions that it brought. Given these attitudes, the military has found it hard to 
receive support for its demands either with the public or the media (Stairs, 1998a; 
Pinch, 2000: 171-2). 
Whereas public support for the military institution and defense spending has 
not been very high,350 Canadians have overwhelmingly supported its peacekeeping 
and humanitarian missions (Dorn, 2005; Hampson, 2003: 132; Pinch, 2000: 163-4). In 
fact, according to a 1993 report by the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, peacekeeping is the “sole military activity that Canadians fully 
support” (quoted in Dorn, 2005:7). As Dorn (2005: 7) has argued, “Canadian support 
for its peacekeeping role has been so strong for so long that it has even become a part 
of the national identity. It is a celebrated part of what Canada is as a nation, and even 
who Canadians are as a people.”351
Even though the military has also embraced its peacekeeping role, it has 
                                                
349 For example, during the 1970s and 1980s only 0.5% of Canadians listed defense as one of their 
major concerns (Pinch, 2000:163).
350 E.g., in 1990 71% of Canadians “saw the necessity for a military” (Pinch, 2000: 163, emphasis 
added).  
351 Almost 90% of Canadians “believe] that Canada should provide troops for peacekeeping when asked 
by the UN,” whereas polls in 1992 and 1997 “showed that Canadians overwhelmingly (90 percent and 
94 percent respectively) identified their country as a world leader in international peacekeeping” (Dorn, 
2005:7). The extent to which peacekeeping has become a part of Canadian identity shows from the fact 
that peacekeeping symbols appear on some Canadian dollar bills and coins; the Peacekeeping Day had 
recently been inaugurated as an annual celebration in most Canadian provinces; the National 
Peacekeeping Monument is one of the three major monuments in the Canadian capital along with many 
memorials to peacekeepers around the country; and the Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal 
instituted in 2000 (Dorn, 2005: 7).
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“consistently remained less enthusiastic about peacekeeping than […] Canada’s 
foreign-policy elites,” which has also shown in its reluctance to take up missions in 
several instances (Hampson, 2003: 132; 135, 137; also Dorn, 2005).352 It has always 
been wary of “the single-minded” focus on peacekeeping that would render the armed 
forces incapable of high-intensity combat. Whereas soldiers see peacekeeping as “an 
important task”, they are reluctant to see it as “the primary task” (Dorn, 2005). In 
practical terms, soldiers have also complained about UN rules of engagement, poor 
coordination, and lack of proper equipment and the military has shown preference for 
the better-organized NATO peace operations. As the latter increased in number, 
Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping correspondingly fell – in 2003 for 
example, Canada contributed to NATO operations 20 times the number of personnel it 
had deployed in UN missions (ibid). Even without this turn toward greater Canadian 
involvement in NATO operations, Canada had lost its leadership position in 
peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War when developing countries became the 
main troop contributors.353 Thus the support, which the Canadian military could 
receive from the public, was mostly based on its peacekeeping role, but the military 
itself never considered it as its core role and recent engagement in NATO missions, 
especially in Afghanistan, have given precedence to more forceful and high intensity 
operations.354
                                                
352 More than 125,000 Canadian military personnel have served in UN peacekeeping operations from 
1947 to 2005 (Dorn, 2005: 7).
353 Pakistan became the leading country and in 2005 Canada fell to 35th place in terms of troop 
contribution to UN peacekeeping (Dorn, 2005; Kilgour, 2005).
354 This is also understandable in view of the fact that Canada had one of the biggest armed forces in 
WWII.
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Middle Power Diplomacy
Peacekeeping was so important to Canadians also because the concept itself was 
Canadian – it was conceived by Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester Peterson in 
1956 as a solution to the conflict between the US and France and Britain over the Suez 
crisis. This achievement stood out in a period of Canadian diplomacy that was later 
looked back upon as the “Golden Era” and thus shaped the aspirations of cohorts of 
Canadian diplomats (Nossal, 2000). As already pointed out, peacekeeping became a 
part of Canadian national identity and thus also served as a tool of national unification 
– bridging cultural and regional divisions. However, it was also part of the Canadian 
strategy to enhance their country’s role internationally and project a distinctive image 
abroad that would distinguish Canada from its dominant neighbor and ally, the US 
(Mingst, 2003: 62; Roussel and David, 1998). Not only peacekeeping, but Canadian 
foreign policy and public diplomacy as a whole served, both before and after the end 
of the Cold War, the double purposes of gaining international leverage and forging 
national unity (Chapnik, 2000: 201; Potter, 2002/03; Axworthy, 2003: 58-9), with 
more importance sometimes attributed to the latter function (e.g. Bátora, 2005; 
English, 2000: 24-5). 
The other traditional features of Canadian diplomacy have been its
commitment to international development and aid for the Third World, support for the 
UN and multilateral institutions, and its role as a conciliator trying to mend relations 
between its European allies and the US within NATO, as an “honest broker” trying to 
mediate between the East and the West, or build bridges between the South and the 
North or the US and the non-aligned countries during the Cold War (Roussel and 
David, 1998). Those international roles were motivated both by Canada’s 
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humanitarian impulses and its self-interest as a state whose security and prosperity 
depended on the preservation of a peaceful world order (Neack, 2000; Roussel and 
David, 1998).355 On the other hand, the performance of these kinds of intermediation 
hinged upon Canada’s ability to engage in compromise seeking, behind-the-scene 
negotiation, and credibility as an impartial and neutral party. Based on that, Cooper 
(1997) has classified Canadian diplomacy as quiet, low-key, consensus-oriented but 
stretched over a wide area of issues. Due to its membership in many organizations 
(NATO, OECD, G-7, the Commonwealth, the Francophonie), Canada was also the 
“quintessential joiner” that could exert leverage through those organizations and create 
linkages between different actors.
Argument
However, the end of the Cold War has brought about structural changes that different 
authors expected to either give a boost to middle power initiatives by opening more 
opportunities for them (Potter, 1996/97), obviating the need for their services due to 
rapprochement between the great powers and their closer involvement in areas where 
middle power expertise was earlier required (Roussel and David, 1998), or curbing 
their freedom action when it went against the wishes of the new sole superpower 
(Neack, 2000). Even though the international system within which Canada had to 
operate changed, its goal of playing a distinctive international role remained. To 
achieve it, Canada had to find new ways to reposition itself in an environment 
                                                
355 For an overview of the debates over the humanitarian or self-interested motivations of Canadian 
peacekeeping, see Dorn (2005).
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crowded by competitors and great powers entering the fields of peacekeeping and 
mediation. Indeed, it has been argued that Canada had adopted a new style of 
diplomacy – one oriented toward public and sometimes confrontational diplomacy 
(vis-à-vis the US) pursued outside of the consensus-based fora of established 
multilateral institutions (Michaud and Belanger, 2000; Cooper, 2000). These new 
developments unfolded during the period 1996-2000 when Lloyd Axworthy was at the 
helm of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but were attributed to structural 
factors (Michaud and Belanger, 2000). The years that followed his stay in office have 
often been portrayed as a period of Canadian decline and certainly lacking in any 
“new diplomacy” initiatives (Kilgour, 2005), in fact Canada didn’t engage in its 
traditional middle power role either. Thus, the middle power approach and its 
modifications don’t offer an entirely clear explanation of Canadian positions 
internationally, or on the two studied cases of landmines and cluster munitions.
On the other hand, the predictions of the domestic structure model are that 
NGOs would experience difficulties in gaining access to top officials who are the chief 
policy makers on the issues of their concern, but if they manage to win their support, 
there is a good chance that NGO demands would be incorporated into state policy. 
Thus, key to NGO success is finding governmental allies, whereas attempts to push 
forward their cause through the parliament would hardly produce good results.  
Whereas the Canadian story largely confirms the domestic structure model 
expectations, the two cases also show the important role of individuals, coupled with 
greater input from NGOs. These two factors I would argue have also to be taken into 
consideration when explaining the ability of middle powers to play prominent 
international roles and engage in “new diplomacy”. In this respect, the role the Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy played in the landmine case was key. He used the 
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partnership with NGOs to enhance Canada’s position internationally and gain 
recognition and renewed prestige for his country. The NGO partnership also allowed 
him to improve his bargaining position relative to other governmental agencies that 
hold resources (such as CIDA), to compete successfully in drawing attention to 
foreign policy issues of interest to him in contrast to commerce and economic issues 
dominated by the other branch of the joined Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (i.e. the Department of International Trade) and thus redefine the 
Ministry’s agenda as a whole, as well as to overcome resistance to his initiatives 
coming from within the conservative diplomatic culture of his own Ministry. Finally, 
the partnership with NGOs also allowed the Foreign Minister to gain a degree of 
independence and freedom of maneuver within the otherwise highly centralized 
political system that privileges the power of the Prime Minister. 
In the case of cluster munitions, the advantages offered by association with the 
NGOs were fewer until 2006 because of the weakness of the NGO campaign. More 
important than that however, was the lack of individual leadership on the issue that 
could have mobilized the NGO efforts and produced synergy effects for both the 
government and its NGO partners. 
Canada – the savvy leader on landmines
Among the like-minded countries, Canada was the last to adopt an active position on 
landmines. Only toward the spring of 1996 did Canada see the momentum created by 
NGOs and several progressive countries on the issue of landmines and took the 
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opportunity to lead it to a successful completion. 
Similar to the Norwegian case, the Canadian NGOs launched a landmine 
campaign rather late in September 1994 (ICBL chronology) and were instrumental in 
tilting the balance between humanitarian and military arguments in the debate between 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the 
Department of National Defense (DND). Unlike Norway, however, the parliament had 
only a secondary, if any, role to play in the decision-making regarding landmines. The 
key actors in the Canadian landmine process were people at DFAIT – both the Foreign 
Minister (first, André Ouellet, and then Lloyd Axworthy) and low- and middle-level 
officials in the Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division (Arms 
Control Division) of DFAIT’s International Security Bureau.
Business as usual: the early NGO campaign and military opposition
Due to financial constraints and traditional tendency not to get involved in 
disarmament issue due to fears of losing their charitable status, Canadian NGOs were 
slow to get involved in the issue of landmines. In 1993 a couple of organizations 
began responding to critiques coming from the ICBL for the lack of action by 
Canadian groups. In the fall of 1994 a loose coalition was formed, and finally in 
March 1995, Mines Action Canada (MAC) was officially launched with the 
appointment of a coordinator and registration of membership in the ICBL 
(Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 48-9).
Right after its establishment, MAC demanded and was granted regular 
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meetings with government officials, during which information was exchanged about 
the Canadian policies and NGO concerns. However, there was very little common 
ground between the positions of MAC and the government. Despite the abundant 
evidence of the severe humanitarian consequences of landmines, the government kept 
arguing that, “it was impossible to address these issues outside of the existing 
Canadian negotiating position within the Review Conference of the CCW” 
(Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 50). The government arguments were based on 
considerations of military utility and assertions that it was possible to use landmines 
responsibly without creating humanitarian risks. Thus, up until the fall of 1995, the 
government response to NGO calls for a total ban and a more proactive Canadian 
position in international negotiations, was that any attempts to push forward 
discussions at the CCW would be counter-productive and more ambitious proposals 
from Canada would only marginalize it and impair its standing and leverage as a 
serious negotiator (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 50, 53). 
What gradually changed the minds of people in DFAIT, in particular, was the 
vigorous NGO campaign that created great media and public interest in the issue of 
landmines.356 In addition to working with the media, MAC was gathering petition 
signatures and launched an intensive letter-writing campaign addressed to ministers 
and members of parliament (MPs). It focused its efforts on parliamentarians in 
particular, sending a series of information packages to all MPs’ constituency offices in 
the summer of 1995 and organizing a press conference on Parliament Hill to launch 
the ICRC study of military effectiveness of landmines in March 1996. Even though 
MAC kept lobbying for a law ban by parliament throughout the summer of 1996 and 
some opposition MPs showed interest in the issue and were asking parliamentarian 
                                                
356 The media interest and requests for information from journalists was so overwhelming that MAC 
could barely cope with it. It even set up a 1-800 line to be able to respond to the incoming demands 
(Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 52; ICBL, 1995b).
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questions on the subject, NGO efforts did not result in any significant parliamentarian 
initiatives on the subject.357
 Given the Canadian centralized political system and the limited involvement 
in and leverage over foreign policy of parliamentarians,358 it is not surprising that the 
NGO campaign did not produce any changes in terms of new policies or legislation. 
Canada is noted for the concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister 
(especially when his/her party holds the majority in the parliament), which is 
strengthened by party discipline (Savoie, 1999; Whittington, 2000: 44-6). Thus, it has 
rightly been argued that “[f]or collective actors seeking to influence government 
policy, then, targeting individual members of the legislature, whether on the governing 
or the opposition side, is not a fruitful strategy” (Smith, 2000:185). The only way that 
NGOs could have affected their government’s position on landmines through the 
Parliament (and one very rarely used at that) was to win the support of the majority 
party, which then could have conveyed its views to the government through the 
caucus.359 In the landmine case, however, the NGO supporters were mainly among the 
                                                
357 Keith Martin from the conservative Reform Party was particularly active on the issue of landmines 
(English, 1998:76) and other opposition MPs such as Svend Robinson and Bill Blakey were asking 
questions about the Canadian position on landmines (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998:52).
358 Historically, the Canadian parliament had very limited involvement in foreign policy. A committee 
on foreign affairs was not established until 1949 and up until the mid-1980s parliamentarian committees 
could study specific questions only with authorization from a minister. However, after the committees 
gained authority to determine their own agenda, their reports were not taken seriously enough and had 
little impact on government policy (English, 1998: 60-70, 77). It has been argued that due to a number 
of factors, including the structure of the Canadian parliament, lack of resources for MPs, and lack of 
constituency interest in foreign affairs, “Parliament acts to push members away from the capital and 
pull them toward their local ridings” (Docherty, 1997 quoted in English, 1998: 72). Even though the 
Liberal Party came to power in 1993 with a Red Book calling for “a participatory foreign policy in 
which members of Parliament played a central role” and established a Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons to Review Canadian Foreign Policy (English, 1998: 70), the actual 
involvement of the Parliament in foreign affairs has been minimal. Indeed, despite the Red Book’s 
statements, at the first National Forum on Canadian Foreign Policy MPs were not initially invited and at 
some sessions of the 1994 forum MPs were not permitted to speak. NGOs, on the other hand, emerged 
as the alternative to MPs in representing and understanding public opinion (English, 1998: 79).
359 The party caucus is a regular meeting of the supporters of government in the House of Commons and 
the Senate and Cabinet members that is held in camera so that everyone can speak openly. During 
meetings the Cabinet briefs MPs on its policy initiatives and receives feedback from MPs that can voice 
their concerns and sometimes opposition to certain measures. In case of disagreements, either the 
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opposition MPs and had few channels through which to exert influence on the 
government policy.360
The NGO campaign, however, led to some changes in the government policies 
that were initiated by Foreign Minister André Ouellet. Initially, Ouellet got interested 
in the problem of landmines in 1994 when the president of the ICRC, Cornellio 
Sommaruga urged the Prime Minister Chrétien to support a ban on AP mines, which 
given Canada’s G-7 membership would lend legitimacy to the movement against 
landmines (Tomlin, 1998: fn. 18).361 Ouellet’s interest in the issue was also 
encouraged by his policy advisor Michael Pearson. However, his attempts to have a 
change in the Canadian policy on landmines in the summer and fall of 1995 were 
faced by strong resistance from DND and Defense Minister David Collenette who 
insisted that landmines could not be eliminated before alternatives were found 
(Tomlin, 191). In the end, Ouellet managed to convince the Defense Minister to agree 
on an export moratorium in October 1995 almost by chance. In 1995 the UN published 
a list of the countries that had instituted an export moratorium, in which Canada was 
mistakenly included. As it would have been an embarrassment to ask for correction, 
DFAIT pressed the DND harder on the issue and eventually it acquiesced to the export 
moratorium (English, 2000: 29-30). However, encouraged by the growing public 
support of a ban reflected in public opinion polls and the heavy flow of mail to his 
office as a result of MAC’s letter-writing campaign, Ouellet went on and in early 
                                                                                                                                            
government convinces its party supporters to back its policies, or in some rare occasions the caucus and 
MPs could block government measures. Both have happened under Chrétien’s government. In 1994 he 
convinced caucus members not to oppose the lowering of tobacco taxes, whereas later in his term the 
Cabinet decided to veto proposals for bank mergers due to the Liberal caucus opposition to their 
approval (Whittington, 2000: 46; Atkinson and Docherty, 2000: 21). For a skeptical evaluation of the 
ability of the caucus to launch new initiatives or change the course of government policy, see, Savoie 
(1998: 91-3).
360 See, Atkinson and Docherty (2000: 17-20) for the opportunities open to opposition MPs to stall, if 
not really shape, government policies.
361 Chrétien responded to this request favorably and raised the landmine issue at the G-7 meeting in 
Halifax in 1995 (Axworthy, 2003: 141).
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November 1995 announced in an interview that “Canada should destroy its stockpile 
of landmines and declare a total ban on the production, export, and use of the 
weapons” (Tomlin, 1998: 192-3). This statement made officials in the Arms Control 
Division suddenly realize that the Foreign Minster was behind the idea of a total ban 
and ready to fight with DND over it.362 And the announcement also prompted the first 
step toward building a common front with the NGOs. Bob Lawson secured a transcript 
of Ouellet’s statement and faxed it right away to MAC that then flooded the minister’s 
office with congratulatory messages. From that point on, ideas and concrete policy 
proposals on landmines emanated from the Arms Control Division - in particular, from 
Robert Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky and the Division’s director Jill Sinclair – that 
would shape Canadian policy and eventually initiate the Ottawa Process.
Immediately after Ouellet’s statement, in November 1995 the Arms Control 
Division advised him to declare a comprehensive moratorium not only on exports, but 
also on production and use of landmines – a position that reflected the influence 
exerted by MAC (Lawson, 1998: 84; Axworthy and Taylor, 1998: 194). Despite its 
discontent with the proposal, DND “acquiesced” and in January 1996 DFAIT 
announced a comprehensive moratorium, even though the moratorium had few 
practical implications since its ambiguous language banned the use of landmines 
unless needed, did not require destruction of stockpiles, and there had been no 
production of landmines in Canada since 1992 anyway (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 
54; Landmine Monitor, 1999).363 Still, the military’s “acquiescence” in the 
moratorium marked the beginning of DND’s losing its say it the decision-making 
process on landmines (Tomlin, 194-5, fn. 28) and the ascent of NGO involvement and 
                                                
362 Earlier, upon his arrival at the Arms Control Division in October 1995, Bob Lawson was told that 
“an outright ban on landmines, however desirable, was not in the cards because DND would not 
countenance further changes in policy” [referring to anything beyond the agreed export moratorium] 
(Tomlin, 192)
363 Canada had also not used landmines since the Korean War (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 50).
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influence on the issue, as also witnessed in the invitation of an NGO representative to 
become a member of the official Canadian delegation to the CCW Review Conference 
in April 1996 (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 55). The DND’s gradual loss of ground 
to the NGOs was probably facilitated by the fact that during this period it found itself 
in the midst of a serious scandal. The revelation that members of the Canadian 
Airborne Regiment on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia had tortured and killed a 
Somali youth in 1993 was followed by media stories of cover-up attempts by higher-
ranking military officials, and in the fall of 1995 this led to the establishment of a 
parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the deployment to Somalia.364 Hence, the 
military’s image during this period was severely damaged, its members and senior 
officials were intensively questioned over their involvement in the Somali mission, 
and this limited the military’s ability to play a more assertive role in policymaking. 
In the same month when the Canadian export moratorium was announced, 
Ouellet was replaced by Lloyd Axworthy as Foreign Minister – someone, as it would 
turn out, even more supportive of the landmine cause, and especially, of the idea that 
Canada play a leading role in achieving an international ban. His active and personal 
engagement in the issue made possible a U-turn in Canadian policy and a break with 
established diplomatic culture. From practicing quiet diplomacy and pursuing 
moderate positions in routine negotiating forums, Canadian diplomats turned to 
launching a bold and ambitious process, defying accepted diplomatic wisdom and 
practice that came to be know as “new diplomacy.”
                                                
364 See, for example, Hampson (2003: 143-7). The Somali debacle came in the midst of other reports 
about practices of hazing new recruits, abuse of female soldiers, and charges of racism (Stairs, 1998a). 
Those  often involved the same elite, “macho” Regiment trained for high intensity missions, which at
the closure of the Commission of Inquiry in 1997 was disbanded (Dorn, 2005; also Pinch, 2000: 172). 
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The emergence of “new diplomacy”
It could be argued that the seeds of the “new diplomacy” were sown by Lloyd 
Axworthy in the years ahead of the Liberal Party’s coming to power in 1993. Between 
1988 and 1993 ideas about consultations with NGOs and greater involvement of the 
public in foreign policy issues grew in the ranks of the Liberal Party – a traditional 
supporter of liberal pluralism (Stairs, 1998b). Axworthy was among the proponents of 
those ideas and closely involved in the writing of the 1993 Party election platform (the 
Red Book), and especially the Foreign Policy Handbook that called for greater 
participation of domestic constituencies in the development and implementation of 
Canadian foreign policy (Hampson and Molot, 1998: 8; Van Rooy, 2001: 263; Stairs, 
1998b). Thus, the foundations for greater NGO involvement in foreign policy were 
laid by the Liberal Party (and to a good extent by Axworthy himself) and its 
assumption of power in 1993. 
Despite this announced party pledge to working more closely with NGOs, as 
already shown, Foreign Minister Ouellet did not make much use of it. During his 
tenure, he honored the form of his party’s commitment to greater engagement of the 
public and NGOs in foreign policy-making, “but for the most part had been careful 
[…] to remain personally aloof from the consultative process in order to preserve his 
own freedom of manoeuvre” (Stairs, 1998b: 25).365 More than that, he was perceived 
as being “notably skeptical” of many NGOs and under his tenure the budget of the 
                                                
365 In other accounts, the lack of initiative from Ouellet has been attributed not so much to his concern 
for preserving independent decision-making power, as to personal traits: “Unlike his phlegmatic 
predecessor, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has seized the initiative on a number of important 
issues” (Hampson and Molot, 1998: 2). He “was domestically oriented and more politician than policy-
maker” (Kitchen, 2001/02: 41) and this nonchalance to foreign affairs had earned him a nickname 
within DFAIT as “Mr. Five-Per Cent,” allegedly the portion of his time spent on foreign policy (Nossal, 
2000:4). Even though the question of landmines caught his attention, he tried to push it forward only in 
the established ways of working with his colleague in the Defense Ministry. 
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Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)366 was reduced (English, 2001: 
99). In particular, the funding for the Canadian Public Participation Program, devoted 
to enhancing public awareness of development issues in Canada, which funded the 
work of numerous, especially community-based, Canadian NGOs, was eliminated and 
the Global Education Program, funding teachers’ associations to incorporate global 
education in school curricula, took deep cuts. Many in the NGO sector attributed the 
elimination of these programs directly to Ouellet’s involvement.367 His successor, 
Lloyd Axworthy, on the other hand, came into office not only open to input from 
NGOs but also determined to build a relationship with them that could help him 
increase his leverage within his more conservatively-minded department, as well as 
within the Cabinet, and thus enable him to follow his policy agenda that included more 
left-of-center issues.368
Thus, within the otherwise highly centralized system of Canadian politics 
                                                
366 The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was established in 1968, replacing a prior 
division dealing with Canada’s development aid within the ministry of external affairs – the External 
Aid Office, which itself was created in 1960 in place of an office dealing with the matter that had been 
under the Department of Trade and Commerce since 1951. Throughout its history, CIDA has been 
situated within the Ministry of External, and since 1993 Foreign, Affairs and enjoyed different degrees 
of organizational autonomy. From 1968 to 1979 it had been headed by a president reporting to the 
secretary of state for external affairs. For a year between 1979 and 1980 the post of minister of state for 
CIDA was created. In 1996, CIDA acquired again its own junior minister of the Ministry of 
International Cooperation that was within the purview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – a situation 
that has been preserved until now (Morrison, 1998). 
367 NGOs argued that Ouellet targeted the Public Partnership Program because of his personal offence at 
criticism directed at him by Quebec-based NGOs in the fall before the cuts were made (in the spring of 
1995). In addition, it has been argued that CIDA had wanted for a long time to pare down this program 
and funding for NGOs that were not supportive of the official government line in the field of 
development (e.g. Ellwood, 1995; Morrison, 1998: 417—18). Ouellet himself asserted that support for 
NGOs, as a whole has not been withdrawn, but only funding for NGOs that are not involved in overseas 
developmental work (Canadian Parliament, 1995). In fact, funding for advocacy and public education 
was cut entirely, whereas NGOs involved in overseas development suffered a cut of 15% (Phillips, 
1995). Of course, the reductions themselves were not the initiative of DFAIT, but a result of budgetary 
constraints imposed by the Finance Ministry in an effort to reduce the budget deficit. In this context, the 
Finance Minister announced that the government approach to interest-group funding would change 
(Nelson, 1995). It is nonetheless true, however, that Ouellet was intimately involved in the distribution 
of the cuts among different programs (Morrison, 1998: 415).
368 Axworthy also made extensive use of outside advisers and connections that would bypass the 
traditional bureaucratic channels and help him promote his “left-agenda” as Minister of Employment 
and Immigration (1980-1983) and Minister of Transport (1983-1984) (Stairs, 1998b: 47).
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where the Prime Minister reigns supreme (Savoie, 1999; Whittington, 2000), including 
in the foreign policy field (Stairs, 2001; Kirton, 1985, 1988, 1997; Burney, 2005: 49), 
Axworthy’s personality and skills, coupled with NGO backing, helped him gain some 
independence and carve a niche within which he could pursue issues falling within the 
area of human security (landmines, child soldiers, peace-building) that did not rank 
high among the priorities of his own ministry (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade), or of the Prime Minister, both focused on trade-related issues 
(Stairs, 1998b: 26).369
In that sense, with the Liberal Party Red Book the institutional framework for 
greater NGO influence was laid down and with Axworthy’s assuming the post of 
Foreign Minister the personal predisposition and commitment to working with NGOs 
were there. Axworthy had a predilection for working on progressive issues, but it was 
up to the NGOs to put the landmine question on his agenda.370 They had to work hard 
before this particular issue captured the attention of DFAIT officials and then work 
even harder together with them to turn the opportunities opened by the new foreign 
minister into a treaty with real and concrete consequences for people suffering from 
the effects of landmines around the world.  
                                                
369 Chrétien’s “tendency to delegate responsibility” also allowed Axworthy freedom of action (Kitchen, 
2001/02: 42). 
370 Indeed, upon his coming to the Foreign Ministry, Axworthy’s agenda looked fairly conventional 
ranking in terms of priority, protection of Canadians abroad, promotion of international trade to 
stimulate domestic employment, defense of Canadian interests, and on the fourth place, support for 
human rights, followed by other “individual security” concerns such as international development, UN 
reform, peacekeeping and youth outreach (Hillmer and Chapnik, 2001: 72). Earlier in this year (1996) 
in a speech at the UN Commission on Human Rights he had emphasized the role of civil society and the 
need for a new agenda on individual security, which had to focus on issues such as human rights, 
terrorism, dissemination of hate literature, violations of the rights of the child (ibid, p.71). Nowhere, 
however, did he make reference to landmines. The issue only appeared in his writing and speeches in 
the spring of 1997 and didn’t really become a central focus of his human security agenda until after the 
Ottawa Convention was adopted. In fact, the emphasis on human security, itself in Axowrthy’s foreign 
policy seems to have crystallized and become much stronger following the landmine success (for an 
overview of Axworthy’s evolving human security agenda, see, Hillmer and Chapnik, 2001, especially 
72-77).
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The idea for a fast-track negotiation by like-minded states: the importance of mid- and 
low-level Canadian officials
After negotiations at the Vienna CCW review conference produced a deadlock on the 
issue of landmines, a series of three sessions was scheduled for January, April and 
May 1996 in Geneva with the aim of concluding negotiations. Realizing the difficulty 
to make any progress under the consensus-based rules of the CCW, people from ICBL 
started thinking about ways to build momentum after the conference and strategize 
about possible alternatives (Williams and Goose, 1998:32). To this end, during the 
January Geneva session Pieter van Rossem of the Dutch campaign against landmines 
suggested that delegates from pro-ban states be invited to an informal meeting with the 
NGOs to discuss possible ways forward. Whereas most people from ICBL were 
opposed to the idea, “fearing that if an attempt to bring pro-ban states together failed, 
it could weaken the momentum and discourage new state initiatives” (Mekata, 
2000:156), others agreed to it convinced that the NGOs had nothing to lose even if 
states did not respond positively (interviews 8, 38 NGO). The meeting was also seen 
as a way of creating a “pro-ban identity” among the supportive governments (NGO 
representative quoted in Mathews, 1997b) and setting them on a course toward the 
establishment of a new strong norm against landmines. In the end, 22 countries were 
invited of which 8 showed up (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, 
Norway, and Switzerland). Interestingly, Canada was not invited to this first meeting 
because at that point, it had not yet pledged its support for a total ban. Nevertheless, 
having learned about the meeting, Bob Lawson volunteered to attend (Mekata, 
2000:157, fn. 34) and left the impression among NGO members that he would try to 
get his government assume a more active role (interview 38 NGO). As it turned out, 
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they were not mistaken. 
In March 1996 the Arms Control Division drafted a Canadian Action Plan to 
Reduce the Global Use of Landmines, one point in which suggested that Canada “host 
a small international meeting of officials and NGOs to develop an action plan on 
landmines” (Tomlin, 1998: 195). In this proposal one can see the same idea as the one 
of the ICBL’s Geneva meeting of NGOs and “pro-ban” states and also the outlines of 
what would later become the Ottawa conference. Indeed, at the second meeting 
between NGOs and pro-ban governments on 22 April 1996, Bob Lawson floated the 
same possibility unofficially and received approval (Mekata, 2000:158; Matthew, 
2004: 8). Following the meeting Lawson reported its results to Jill Sinclair who agreed 
that “this was a leadership opportunity for Canada that they could not afford to pass 
up” and authorized him to officially announce Canada’s intention to host a meeting in 
Ottawa in the fall (Tomlin, 1998: 195), which he did at the closing CCW session in 
May. 
Even though the amended Protocol II of the CCW that resulted from the 
Geneva conference fell short of the expectations of the NGOs and pro-ban states, the 
negotiating process was an excellent opportunity for NGOs to further raise the profile 
of the landmine problem, gradually garner support from more states (41 supported a 
total ban at the end of Geneva compared to the 14 at the end of the Vienna conference 
9 months before), and eventually open the opportunity for the more ambitious 
negotiating process that would eventually come out of the proposed Ottawa meeting 
(Williams and Goose, 1998:33).371
However, the idea for the meeting itself came from the head of the Canadian 
delegation in Geneva, Bob Lawson and was only coordinated with his boss, the Arms 
                                                
371 The Canadian decision to hold the Ottawa strategizing meeting came when there were 31 state 
supporting a total ban stood at 31 (CCW News, 30 April 1996).
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Control Division director Jill Sinclair. Even though Axworthy’s policy adviser 
Michael Pearson and the head of the International Security Bureau, Ralph Lysyshyn 
were informed about its initiatives, on the whole, the Arms Control Division was left 
to handle the landmine issue alone (Tomlin, 1998:195-6).372
The idea to host a meeting in Ottawa did not originate with the ICBL either. 
The NGOs had no clear strategy how to proceed after the end of the Review 
Conference and were not trying to thrust the leadership on landmines in the hands of a 
specific state or Canada in particular. In fact, “some in the ICBL were skeptical [about 
the idea], to say the least” (Williams and Goose, 1998:34). Nevertheless, the ICBL 
began to work with the Canadian officials on the organization of the meeting and a 
close cooperative relationship between them soon developed (Williams and Goose, 
1998: 34; Tomlin, 197-8).
The main question before the organizers was which countries to invite so that 
participation be broad enough and yet prevent strong opponents from undermining the 
whole process. In June 1996 Mark Gwozdecky of the Arms Control Division proposed 
a simple self-selection mechanism: all countries would be invited but their attendance 
should be premised on their endorsement of the draft political declaration stipulating 
the objectives of the meeting that Canada would circulate in advance (Tomlin, 
1998:196). 
The ICBL was closely involved in deciding on the invitation procedure and 
throughout the Ottawa process Lawson would conduct weekly conference calls with 
ICBL members, principally Jody Williams and Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch. 
In fact, the selection mechanism for inviting countries to the Ottawa strategy session 
was first discussed with NGOs at the meetings between them and pro-ban states in 
                                                
372 In fact, Lawson’s announcement of the intended Ottawa meeting took the Foreign Minister by 
surprise and led to his displeasure because a low-ranking official revealed the decision to the media and 
got all the attention (Tomlin, 196).
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Geneva on 22nd and 29th April 1996 (ICBL, 1996: 96-7). Over the summer and early 
fall, Canadian officials “engaged in an intensive series of consultations on the form 
and content of the Ottawa conference with representatives of the NGO community” 
(Lawson, 1998: 84). They also decided to include in the Canadian delegation at the 
conference a member of MAC and to encourage other countries to involve NGOs in 
their negotiation teams – they specifically increased the number of delegates that 
could be accredited to the conference by one if an NGO member were to participate 
(Tomlin, 1998:198), thus aiming at drawing a greater number of NGOs to the 
conference and if possible influencing other states’ decisions through the inclusion of 
NGOs in their delegations.
Despite the fact the Ottawa process that resulted in the 1997 landmine ban 
treaty originated from the Ottawa meeting in the fall of 1996, there was no grand plan 
guiding the actions of the Canadian officials. The Arms Control Division was left in 
charge of organizing the meeting, which was expected to be “nothing more than a 
small planning session” (Tomlin, 198; Axworthy, 2003: 127). In fact, planners 
envisioned that if 20 states attended, the meeting would be a real success (Williams 
and Goose, 1998: 34). However, as states began showing interest in participating, in 
the summer of 1996, the Arms Control people started thinking about what steps should 
follow the meeting. Two options were suggested – a UN resolution and a forum for 
negotiations. Jill Sinclair argued that negotiations would be stalled if they went to the 
UN Conference on Disarmament, and promoted the idea of a “stand-alone forum” for 
like-minded countries similar to the Ottawa strategy session being organized in the 
fall. Mark Gwozdecky in turn suggested that Ottawa could host such a forum, but the 
head of the International Security Bureau, Lysyshyn, based on his experience of the 
“Open Skies” conference held in Ottawa in 1989 rejected the idea because of the high 
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cost it would entail (Tomlin, 198-9).373 Just about a week before the conference, 
Sinclair again raised with Lysyshyn the issue of a fast-track negotiation that Canada 
could initiate and stipulate a timetable for the completion of a treaty in, say, 2 years, 
only to have it rejected again. 
However, as the conference convened Lysyshyn’s calculations began to 
change. Instead of the initially expected twenty, 50 states participated after pledging 
support for a total ban and another 24 came as observers. Lysyshyn estimated that 
probably a half of the 50 full participants supported a total ban, whereas the rest either 
really did not know or didn’t care much about the problem. There was both a threat 
and an opportunity inherent in this situation. Given the American, British and French 
insistence that the problem be dealt with at the Conference on Disarmament, many 
states would simply follow their lead and the momentum would be lost. On the other 
hand, a critical mass for action from a cross-section of developing and developed 
countries had formed (Gwozdecky and Sinclair, 2001: 30-1). Thus, in Axworthy’s 
words, two competing moods were at play at the conference – “an overwhelming 
sense of urgency and a growing feeling of frustration” (Axworthy, 2003: 135). In the 
end, the former prevailed. And combined with the public interest in landmines and the 
active NGO campaign, it created conditions for real change and “an opportunity… for 
Canada to secure its leadership role on the issue. And if it did not do so, chances were 
that someone else would. The most likely candidate to usurp Canadian leadership was 
Belgium” (Tomlin, 1998: 203).374
                                                
373 In September 1989, an international Open Skies conference took place in Ottawa with the 
participation of all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The idea was to negotiate a treaty aimed at 
transparency and confidence-building between the two blocs by developing a program for unarmed 
aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of the participating states that would allow them to 
gather unlimited information about military activities and forces of the other members. Subsequent 
rounds of negotiations were organized over the next three years in Budapest and Vienna, that concluded 
with a signing conference held in Helsinki in March 1992. The Open Skies Treaty entered into force in 
January 2002.
374 As was argued in the chapter on Belgium, the impression of Belgian ambitions to lead the way on 
landmines internationally was above all the result of extrapolating its strong domestic position on the 
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Thus, the perception of competition for leadership was one of the driving 
motives behind Canada’s decision to launch the fast-track negotiation of the landmine 
treaty. And the initiative for this decision stemmed from below, from the people in the 
Arms Control Division who were really devoted to finding a solution to the landmine 
problem. Higher up in the bureaucracy, Lysyshyn was the person the perceive the 
political opportunity the issue had created and based on his experience with “Open 
Skies” to formulate a concrete proposal and funding request for a treaty-making 
conference in Ottawa in 1997. Even though the success of the whole enterprise 
crucially depended on the support of Foreign Minister Axworthy and Primer Minister 
Chrétien, the idea itself did not come from the top. The famous Axworthy invitation to 
the governments at the conference to come back in Ottawa to sign a ban treaty no later 
than December 1997 emerged in the very last moment – the day before the close of the 
conference when Lysyshyn made his proposal, it moved up the ladder and got 
approved and delivered by Axworthy the next day.375
Still, once the gauntlet was thrown, the successful completion of the treaty 
critically depended on the involvement of the Prime Minister, whose support was 
essential in the first place, but whose direct promotion of the treaty with heads of 
states around the world and securing approval of funds to meet Canada’s commitment 
to the fight against landmines in practice greatly helped the success of the bold 
initiative launched by his Foreign Minister (Axworthy, 2003: 141; Axworthy and 
Taylor, 1998: 196).376 The mobilization of the Canadian diplomatic apparatus all over 
                                                                                                                                            
international arena, when in fact Belgian diplomats did not contemplate anything similar to the Ottawa 
Process. 
375 Lysyshyn phoned his boss, Assistant Deputy Minister Paul Heinbecker with the proposal and an 
estimate that $2 million would be needed to implement it at noon on Friday 4 October. Three hours later 
he got the go-ahead and was told that Foreign Affairs deputy minister Gordon Smith would brief 
Axworthy on it. Lysyshyn then moved to draft that speech, which was sent to Michael Pearson on 
Saturday morning and after some editing delivered by Axworthy the same afternoon (Tomlin, 1998: 
204-5, fn. 47).
376 Another point at which the PM’s Office had a very active part to play was when Canada had to adopt 
quickly domestic legislation that would make possible its ratification of the Ottawa Treaty at the 
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the world and the close cooperation with like-minded states and NGOs were among 
the other factors that made the Ottawa Process such a resounding success.377
Finally, consolidating the Canadian position at home so that it could match its 
international commitment was also of vital importance. The Canadian military had to 
be convinced that it had to destroy its stockpiles of landmines. Once, the government 
had embarked upon its course of eliminating landmines this was not an
insurmountable obstacle, even though there was opposition to it among the military 
who also felt “strong counter-influences from the Pentagon” (Axworthy, 2003: 135). 
The Canadian military, however, “doesn’t exercise the same independent political 
influence in government that the Pentagon does in the United States” and its generals 
are responsive to civilian policy-makers and don’t have veto power over their 
                                                                                                                                            
moment of signature. The law adoption had to be speeded up because the Canadians wanted to be the 
first country that had ratified the treaty, but it turned out that Irish signature on a treaty actually 
signified ratification and Canada had to have all the domestic legislation in place before the signing 
ceremony (interview 35 GOV).
In fact, some authors claim that the contribution of the PM Office and the Privy Council in the Ottawa 
Process has been underestimated. According to interviewees from the Privy Council Office “Axworthy 
gets a great deal of the credit, but where the prime minister is largely responsible for the success… 
Without the prime minister’s direct involvement, we would still be trying to get 12 countries to sign [to 
the Ottawa Treaty]” (quoted in Savoie, 1999: 135). An oft-given example showing the limits of 
Canadian human security policy and Axworthy’s ability to promote when it runs against Canadian 
economic interests, is the case of the Canadian Company Talisman that was criticized by NGOs for its 
involvement in the development of an oil field in Sudan and thus its direct or indirect contribution to 
human rights abuses in the country (see, for example, Brown, 2001; Copeland, 2001:163). Whereas 
Axworthy was in favor of placing restrictions on the company’s activity in Sudan, he could not achieve 
it without Chrétien’s support (I thank Liz Bernstein for bringing this issue to my attention).
The PM’s support for any foreign policy initiative of the scale of the landmine treaty is obviously 
indispensable. However, it could hardly be argued that Chrétien deserves the credit for initiating or 
masterminding it (interview 35 GOV). Instead, the people who actually launched and navigated the 
Ottawa Process were mid-level officials from the Arms Control Division that had Axworthy’s active 
support.
377 Certainly, Axworthy’s speech took everyone (but the NGOs and the ICRC who were advised of it a 
bit before its delivery) by surprise and angered many, including pro-ban states, for the lack of any prior 
consultations and what was perceived as Canadian “grandstanding” and an attempt “to hijack the 
process” (Lenarcic, 1998:68). “There was some dismay from the Belgians that their particular campaign 
had been hijacked by the Canadians, as Belgium and Canada had for some time been rivals for 
leadership of the intergovernmental aspect of the landmines campaign… The most overt response, 
though, was outrage, particularly among some of the participating EU states and most especially from 
France” because of the breach of diplomatic protocol and the obvious short-circuiting of the CD 
Axworthy’s proposal implied (Long, 2002:434). The success of the process thus also depended on 
countries swallowing their resentment and contributing their part to the common effort (interview 8 
NGO).
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decisions (Axworthy, 2003: 141-2). Thus, with the help of Defense Minister Art 
Eggleton and promises of funding for research on landmine alternatives, the military 
agreement was secured and in September 1997 the Chief of Defense Staff General 
Maurice Baril even argued in favor of the treaty remarking that landmines “have 
become the weapon of cowards” (quoted in Oliver, 1997).
The role of NGOs for the final shape of the treaty
At the conference itself the ICBL, the ICRC, and a host of NGOs attended378 and were 
“actively involved in drafting the precise language of both the final declaration and the 
action plan” (Williams and Goose, 1998:35; Goose and Williams, 2004: 246). This 
close cooperation between the NGOs and Canada would continue throughout the 
Ottawa Process and would also characterize the relationship between the ICBL and 
national NGOs with the governments of the core countries organizing a series of 
negotiating conferences in 1997 in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Norway (interview 
8 NGO). The ICBL worked tirelessly during 1997 to get governments and regional 
organizations to endorse a landmine ban and build up momentum through a series of 
conferences and seminars in Africa, Asia, and Europe.
How crucial a role NGOs played in the Ottawa Process became apparent when 
shortly before the Oslo conference where the final treaty was to be drafted, the US 
decided to attend and seek several modifications in the treaty text that would address 
the American concerns, which included a new definition of anti-handling devices that 
would exclude from the scope of the treaty US antipersonnel landmines used in mixed 
                                                
378 However, to allay concerns by USA and other countries over the NGO participation, the Arms 
Control Division asked the NGOs to agree to a formula of closed and open sessions, only the latter with 
NGO participation (Tomlin, 198).
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systems with anti-tank mines; an addition of a withdrawal clause that would allow a 
state victim of aggression in breach of the UN charter to withdraw from the treaty; and 
a geographical exception for the use of landmines in Korea that was redefined later as 
a 9-year deferral period for compliance with certain treaty provisions after its entry 
into force. 
Canada really wanted to have the US onboard the treaty and tried to find ways 
to accommodate its demands (Axworthy, 2003: 147; interview 38 NGO). Axworthy
was in constant contact with Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger, while Prime 
Minister Chrétien discussed options with President Clinton. As US pressure was 
beginning to have an effect on the Canadian government, the Canadian delegation in 
Oslo had to answer questions coming from Ottawa as to why it was not possible to 
have an exception for smart mines in the treaty (interview 35 GOV).379 Following 
these consultations, Chrétien offered the US a counterproposal: “to allow up to a nine-
year delay in carrying out the treaty for any signing country that declares it needs 
mines for an urgent defense need” (Sanger, 1997), which the US accepted (White 
House Press Briefing, 17 Sept 1997), but then Canada could not muster support 
among other states for it. 
In these tense hours, the flow of information between like-minded diplomats 
and NGOs was probably what saved the treaty. Having learnt about the US demands 
and Canadian attempts to find ways to meet them, the ICBL was able to mobilize 
public protests against those attempts to weaken the treaty and launch a hectic 
lobbying campaign of official delegations that had to “stiffen the backs of delegates” 
who were under heavy pressure to accommodate the US demands (Hanssen of NPA, 
quoted in Neumann, 2002: 124; interview 38 NGO). As the NGOs got information on 
                                                
379 Indeed, it has been suggested that, “right after the US decision to join, there were concerns about the 
ability of Canada to withstand pressure from its southern neighbour. In the words of one Core group 
member, ‘When an elephant sneezes, the surrounding land feels an earthquake’” (Maslen, 2004, fn. 
200). 
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Canadian deliberations about accommodating the US positions, they quickly greeted 
their governmental partners with signs “Canada – the 51st state of the USA” (interview 
38 NGO).380 When on 16th September the Canadians agreed to prolong the 
negotiations for 24 hours in a last effort to reach some agreement with the US, the 
ICBL quickly denounced their decision “as giving the US time to try and see if it can 
torpedo the treaty” (Williams, quoted in Lenarcic, 1998: 74) and went out in the 
streets to protest and dramatize in theater the tense hours (Williams and Goose, 1998: 
44). 
In the face of statements from the Canadian Prime Minister that “some 
exceptions on the use of AP mines were acceptable because of ‘technical elements of a 
military nature’” (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998:57), his attempts to accommodate the 
US demands, and a degree of pressure on the Canadian negotiating team, the vigorous 
NGO reaction was probably the kind of support Foreign Minister Axworthy needed to
withstand pressure within his own government and preserve the treaty intact. Had it 
not been for this strong response from the ICBL and the possibility of Canada losing 
face in the last moment, the outcome of the Ottawa Process might well have been 
different. As it turned out, however, key states held firm and a strong treaty with “no 
exceptions, no reservations, and no loopholes” was signed even at the cost of leaving 
behind the US angry with its European allies.381
                                                
380 The NGOs learnt about the US demands and internal discussions of the Canadians about 
accommodating from people on the Canadian delegation – either from Lawson and Sinclair (interview 
38 NGO) and/or from the MAC member on the delegation (Valerie Warmington). MAC itself angrily 
reacted to Chrétien’s statements that exceptions for smart mines could be made with a press release, 
entitled “Canada Accused of ‘Selling Out’ Humanitarian Treaty to US Policy” (Warmington and Tuttle, 
1998:57). 
381 There are different accounts as to which states refused to agree to any of the US demands. According 
to an NGO representative, Ireland and Norway saved the treaty, whereas despite the fact that the South 
African chairman of the conference remained firm, he was willing to compromise and had organized a 
meeting between Jody Williams and the Canadians in search of a compromise solution (interview 38 
NGO). Elsewhere it has been stated that “Belgium, Ireland, and Norway are often cited as those that 
held firm with South Africa. What is certain is that the South African delegation felt isolated in the final 
few days of the conference, although President Nelson Mandela gave unequivocal support to them 
when under pressure from the US President and they were confident that they could count on the 
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Cluster munitions – back to “old diplomacy”
The NGO campaign 
Whereas Mines Action Canada (MAC) was one of the two NGOs that started 
organizing an international NGO coalition on explosive remnants of war and cluster 
munitions together with Landmine Action, UK in 2000, it soon became clear that there 
were no chances of securing Canadian leadership at the international level on this 
issue (interview 29 NGO).382 After Axworthy left office, there was no political figure 
to get engaged in the problem of cluster munitions, which moreover, had not attracted 
much attention among the media or even the NGO community. Compounding that, it 
has been argued that after the success of the landmine treaty there had been a tendency 
to return to the routine diplomatic practices and avoid adventures of “new diplomacy” 
in partnerships with NGOs (interview 29 NGO).
Nevertheless, MAC got involved in the issue of cluster munitions, based on its 
mandate to work for ban of all weapons that function like landmines, including cluster 
bombs.383 In 2000, it issued a call for no use of cluster munitions by the Canadian 
forces (interview 29 NGO) and later urged its members and the public to sign online 
petitions to governments to address the issue of unexploded cluster munitions, write to 
their MPs, the PM, Minister of Defense and Minister of foreign Affairs, and get 
                                                                                                                                            
support of other African delegations to block undesirable amendments if the issue were to come to a 
vote” (Maslen, 2004: fn 212).
382 HRW and the ICRC had worked on the issue of cluster munitions before 2000, but had not worked 
on creating an NGO network on the problem. Rosy Cave of Landmine Action, UK and Celina Tuttle 
from MAC began organizing meetings on ERW and cluster munitions at the edges of the conferences 
and meetings on the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICRC and UN agencies got involved in the process as well 
(interviews 29, 34 NGO).
383 MAC’s mandate from September 1999 included commitment to “a complete ban on the use, 
production, stockpiling, and trade of anti-personnel mines and other weapons which function like anti-
personnel mines, including cluster bombs and anti-vehicle/anti-tank mines with anti-personnel effect” 
(quoted in MAC, 2001).
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involved in local campaigning and signature gathering (Tuttle, 2002; MAC, undated). 
However, MAC tied up the issue of cluster munitions with that of explosive remnants 
of war, often mixing the two categories and focusing predominantly on the problems 
of unexploded cluster munitions at the expense of the area effects of the weapons.384
As a network of different Canadian NGOs, MAC had to work out a 
compromise position on cluster munitions. Some of its members had been actively 
engaged in the issue from the time of the Kosovo bombing campaign when they 
expressed their concerns over the use of cluster munitions and demanded an inquiry 
into their status under IHL in a letter to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
examining the NATO intervention.385 Other MAC members had signed the call of the 
Mennonite Central Committee USA for a ban on cluster bomb use, manufacture, sale 
and transfer.386 However, MAC had among its members also demining organizations 
made up of former military officers that did not find all cluster munitions problematic 
and opposed a total ban. Thus, a compromise position agreeable to all had been to call 
for a moratorium and focus on the worst culprits, while trying to identify and define 
which munitions fall into this category (interview 29 NGO).  
Despite the early interest and activeness of Canadian NGOs both nationally 
and internationally, it was difficult to launch a domestic campaign that would stir 
                                                
384 For example, point two in MAC’s 2002 goals was “Encourage Canada and other states to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to ERW by making it clear that AV mines with antihandling devices or 
sensitive fuses, directional fragmentation (Claymore-type) mines and cluster munitions are part of 
much broader problem with unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war” (Tuttle, 2002, 
emphasis added).
385 The letter read: “Cluster bombs need to be examined under principles of International Humanitarian 
Law to determine whether they are inherently indiscriminate (whenever they are used or only when they 
fail), whether they are prone to indiscriminate use, are excessively injurious, whether they cause 
unnecessary suffering, have a disproportionate impact on civilians compared to their military utility, or 
violate the dictates of public conscience. The fact that previous use of the same weapons in the Gulf 
War provided ample evidence of their impact on civilians, friendly troops and post-war recovery raises 
serious issues of negligence” (quoted in MAC, 2001). The MAC members that signed the letter were 
the Canadian International Demining Corps, CARE Canada, COCAMO, Physicians for Global 
Survival, UN Association in Canada, and World Vision.
386 Mennonite Central Committee, Canada, Project Ploughshares, and, Physicians for Global Survival 
were among the signers.
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media interest and resonate with the public, since Canada had not used cluster 
munitions. The participation of Canadian forces in Afghanistan and the reorientation 
of Canadian doctrine from peacekeeping to combat operation has also strengthened the 
position of the Ministry of National Defense and made it more difficult for NGOs and 
government officials in Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) supportive of their goals to overcome the opposition of the military. 
Probably, another factor has also worked to improve the military’s position recently. 
After years of falling defense budgets certain deficiencies began to show that ate away 
at the Canadian image. For example, in 1999 Canadian forces had to take part in 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor. However, before a Hercules transport aircraft 
could leave for the mission, it had to return to base several times due to technical 
problems, which “prompted much ridicule over the deteriorating state of the 
equipment of Canada’s armed forces” (Hampson, 2003:137). As a result the Foreign
and Defense Ministers had to appear before a special joint session of the Standing 
Committees of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defense and Veteran 
Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs to answer questions about the 
readiness of the Canadian armed forces and defense cutbacks (ibid). Thus, after 
considerable neglect to the military, voices began to be heard in favor of more 
investment in the armed forces and argue that “soft power” could not work and 
“human security” could not be ensured unless Canada could rely on some “hard 
power” as well (e.g. Hampson and Oliver, 1998; Nossal, 1998/99; Royds, 2000; Molot 
and Hillmer, 2002; Kilgour, 2005).387 Thus, in such arguments the military could find 
some support to resist attempts at depriving it of yet another weapon.388  
Finally, the domestic problems and financial scandals which had bedeviled the 
                                                
387 Such critiques appearing in the press include Nossal (1998), Cooper and Bercuson (1999); Mills et 
al. (1999), cited in Royds (2000).
388 In addition, scandals involving the Liberal Party from 2004 to its loss of power in 2006, have also 
indirectly improved the relative standing of the military.
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ruling Liberal Party and occupied everyone’s attention over the last two years, 
followed by the coming to power of a conservative government had further diminished 
the chances of NGOs successfully lobbying parliamentarians or government officials 
on the issue of cluster munitions (interview 29 NGO). 
In the face of these obstacles, MAC scaled down its (already rather limited) 
domestic campaign, confining itself to educating the public and raising awareness of 
the issue among parliamentarians, calling for a moratorium on the use, production or 
trade of cluster munitions by Canada until the humanitarian problems created by those 
weapons are adequately addressed (interview 29 NGO), and asking its government to 
ratify the new ERW Protocol of the CCW (MAC, 2004). Instead of trying to work on 
domestic measures and legislation, MAC decided to focus its efforts on strengthening 
the international NGO network and help create some international momentum on the 
issue (interview 29 NGO).389 Under the unfavorable domestic conditions, MAC’s 
choice to put the emphasis on the international level might have been logical. 
However, Canadian action in the 1990s was spurred not only by the international 
momentum on landmines but also by an active domestic campaign. Moreover, 
international momentum cannot be created without domestic pressure on governments 
and the formation of a critical mass of states that have changed their national policies 
first. Nevertheless, in 2004 MAC and the CMC had concluded that the major efforts 
should be focused on European countries where the chances of achieving policy 
changes were greater (interview 29 NGO). 
Nevertheless, the weakness of the NGO campaign in the case of cluster 
munitions is readily apparent when compared to the one on landmines. Whereas it is 
true that the domestic circumstances in Canada have not been very propitious to NGO 
                                                
389 MAC’s goals for the period 2006-2010 include “Increased prohibitions and restrictions on the use of 
cluster munitions; increase in the number of countries that have destroyed their stockpiles; progress 
towards entry into force of CCW Protocol V on cluster munitions; and positive progress towards 
Canada’s ratification of Protocol V” (MAC, 2005: 6-7).
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actions, neither was that the case in the 1990s when NGO also faced considerable 
difficulties from severely downsized federal and provincial funding and a series of 
domestic and international problems that distracted attention from the issue of 
landmines.390 Yet, in the 1990s MAC expended efforts and used every possible 
occasion to build its media and public campaign, work with the government, and 
lobby parliamentarians that eventually brought the issue to the attention of policy-
makers. Certainly, the two issues are quite different and cluster munitions are a much 
more difficult problem to campaign about effectively, but it is also true that until mid 
2006 Canadian NGOs have not been investing enough energy and time into the 
campaign and have even missed the few good opportunities to bring the issue to the 
attention of the media and impart some momentum to the campaign, such as the 
adoption of the Belgian national ban on cluster munitions, for example, that was 
neither mentioned in a press release nor on the MAC website.
Things changed when the Norwegian government showed willingness to lead 
forward a negotiating process on cluster munitions and the NGO international 
campaign intensified thanks to efforts of European NGOs in the summer of 2006 when 
the Israel-Hezbollah war broke out. In July MAC started uploading the updates and 
news appearing on the CMC website on its own website and in August for the first 
time MAC got an op-ed article by its director Paul Hannon published in The Globe 
and Mail. In it he urged Canada to take up the leadership position the way it did on 
landmines and work for a global moratorium on cluster munitions (Hannon, 2006). 
Still, Hannon refrained from calling for a ban on cluster munitions in the article and 
focused exclusively on the aftereffects of unexploded submunitions. In October 2006 
MAC launched a new community mobilization campaign aimed at spurring Canada, 
                                                
390 At the time there was an ongoing inquiry into the torture and murder of a Somali by members of the 
Canadian peacekeeping forces and another inquiry into Canada’s HIV-contaminated blood supply 
(Warmington and Tuttle, 1998: 58).
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called “a superpower on landmines” to work for eliminating the humanitarian problem 
of “landmines, cluster bomblets and explosive remnants of war still threaten millions 
of people worldwide” and provide a “made in Canada” solution to the problems 
(MAC, 2006a). Again, cluster munitions were presented only as part of a clearance 
problem together with explosive remnants of war.
Only at the CCW Review Conference in November 2006 when momentum 
behind the negotiation of an international instrument addressing the humanitarian 
concerns of cluster munitions gathered, did MAC state several reasons in support of 
developing “an effective legally binding instrument on use, transfer, trade, production 
and stockpiling of cluster munitions” (MAC, 2006b). Nevertheless, its position 
remained somewhat vague since a couple of days later it referred to a negotiating 
mandate on “cluster munitions which consistently and constantly become ERW” 
(MAC, 2006c). 
Thus MAC has moved its attention entirely to the international level and 
focused on participating in international discussions of cluster munitions and building 
up the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) network. It provided its potential 
governmental allies with no strengths domestically, and even at the international level 
its cautious position to a call for a ban might have some restraining effects on the 
CMC.
The official Canadian position 
Canada has not used cluster munitions, and reportedly, during the Kosovo bombing 
campaign, it expressed concern over the use of cluster bombs by coalition forces in the 
wake of incidents from their employment (MAC, 2001). It was active in the CCW 
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work on explosive remnants of war391 and remained supportive of further discussions 
of IHL principles and their implementation with regard to munition use after the 
adoption of Protocol V. Together with a number of countries it submitted a 
questionnaire, developed in consultation with the ICRC, that sought state responses 
regarding the principles of IHL applicable to the use of munitions and the measures 
they took to implement them in practice (Canada, 2005). The completion of the three-
step process on IHL and ERW (establishing what IHL principles are relevant in the 
use of munitions; how they are implemented by states; and whether implementation is 
adequate under IHL) remained a priority for Canadian officials in 2006 (Canada, 
2006a), even though they did not plan to oppose talks on cluster munitions within the 
CCW, if such were proposed by other countries. Canadian officials, however, had 
made it clear that no Canadian leadership would be forthcoming on the issue and the 
country remained outside of the group of like-minded states in the making (interview 
29 NGO). The US position has been highlighted as an important factor in defining the 
Canadian policy on the issue (interview 35 GOV) – a fact signaling a return in 
Canadian foreign policy focus to Canada-USA relations that have been an abiding 
interest of the Conservative Party that came to power in January 2006. 
During the Third CCW Review Conference in November 2006, Canada 
praised the NGOs and the ICRC for their work and contributions to the CCW, but 
remained uninvolved in the proposals on cluster munitions. It affirmed its view that 
IHL “if correctly applied and fully respected can provide adequate protection of 
civilians” and suggested that the next step would be to examine “specific weapons 
systems,” noting the various proposals for mandates to work on work on cluster 
munitions either as part of discussions on ERW or on a separate negotiating mandate. 
                                                
391 Canada proposed at the 2000 CCW conference that the April 2001 Preparatory Committee set aside 
time on its agenda to discuss cluster bombs and other UXO. It also cosponsored a non-paper entitled, 
"Explosive Remnants of War" presented by the Netherlands (MAC, 2001).
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Canada declared its openness to such discussions, underscoring that they should take 
place within the CCW (Canada, 2006b). However, it did not support the proposal for a
negotiating mandate put forward by some 30 states. 
Thus even though the Canadian position has been supportive of addressing the 
humanitarian problems of explosive remnants of war and cluster munitions and has 
been slowly pushing the process further within the CCW, it has remained cold to the 
idea of a negotiating process out of it.
Certainly, MAC had lost a great ally when Axworthy left office. Were he still 
the Foreign Minister, the cluster campaign might have looked rather different, given 
his proclaimed support for international action on the issue of cluster munitions, in a 
landmine treaty part two. In his words, “It is time for governments to get on with the 
unfinished business of ridding the world of these civilian-killing machines” 
(Axworthy, 2003: 152) and he urged action in this direction at the 2004 meeting of the 
states signatories of the Ottawa Convention.392 The fact that most of the officials at the 
                                                
392 The lack of the “Axworthy factor” was not the only thing that made a difference. There were many 
changes in the international system, especially after President Bush’s coming to power and 9/11 that 
made more difficult “new diplomacy” and the promotion of a human security agenda on the 
international arena. However, given the odds against which Axworthy worked to create the new style of 
Canadian foreign policy, it is probably fair to say that his personal commitment and resolve were 
crucial factors in making it possible. Axworthy’s successor as foreign minister, John Manley had a 
different background coming from a long service as minister of Industry that probably explained the 
focus on economic foreign policy and Canada-US relations during his term that was marked by a turn 
away from the human security agenda. However, the next foreign minister, William Graham who took 
office in early 2002 shared Axworthy’s interest in a wide spectrum of multilateral initiatives and human 
security issues (Molot and Hillmer, 2002: 3, 4, 21), which was also true of Pierre Pettigrew who 
replaced him in mid-2004 and who had praised the Canadian role in the landmine process and its 
support for the ICC (Goold, 2004). In addition, not unlike Axworthy, the new Prime Minister, Paul 
Martin who came to office in the end of 2003, had “a keen interest in ideas and impatience with 
organizational constraints,” as well as an interest in foreign relations, that led to his involvement in a 
multitude of international initiatives (possibly too many to deliver consistent results in most of them, for 
which he has been criticized) (Cooper and Rowlands, 2005). Thus, one could say that there were some 
opportunities open for NGOs working on cluster munitions in terms of potentially receptive top 
government officials even after Axworthy’s departure from Foreign Affairs. However, the challenges 
Canadian foreign policy faced in the post-9/11 world seem to have thrown it into disarray (e.g. Cooper 
and Rowlands, 2005; Hillmer et al., 2003; Molot and Hillmer, 2002; Hillmer and Molot eds, 2002).    
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Arms Control Division who worked on landmines also changed posts further deprived 
MAC of a close partner in the government.393
At the national level, Canada had not made any spectacular steps either, but 
there has been some progress toward limiting the dangers of old cluster munitions. 
The DND undertook to destroy its stockpiles of old Rockeye cluster munitions by the 
end of spring 2006 and continued its review of the future of DPICM munitions. It did 
not plan the acquisition of replacement munitions for the demilitarized ones, but as a 
matter of current policy, Canada committed to acquire only munitions with a 99% or 
higher reliability (Canada, 2006a). However, the Defense Ministry remained opposed 
to any measures that might lead to a ban on cluster munitions and the destruction of 
Rockeyes could hardly be seen as motivated by the ongoing discussions at the CCW 
or the NGO campaign. Rather, it was a part of a phasing out process for obsolete 
munitions. Indeed, in the wake of the Belgian national ban, the ministry was quick to 
assert its strong opposition to any attempts to undertake similar measures in Canada 
(interview 29 NGO). 
It remains to be seen whether Foreign Affairs officials that had recently 
assumed the lead in its Mine Action Team and have shown personal interest in the 
issue of cluster munitions would be able to overcome military opposition and tilt the 
                                                
393 The close relationship between government officials and NGOs carries its risks for the government 
officials as well. Axworthy has been criticized for leaving foreign policy making in the hands of 
unelected and unaccountable NGOs. The possibility of endangering one’s career prospects by engaging 
in unconventional partnerships with NGOs and advocating too bold policy steps is also present. In the 
1980s officials who were pushing for sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa got their 
careers sidetracked even if the government eventually adopted such policies (interview 29 NGO). That 
doesn’t seem to have happened with officials from the Arms Control Division who orchestrated the 
Ottawa Process. Since 1998, Jill Sinclair has been the Canadian Ambassador for Mine Action, Director 
General of DFAIT International Security Bureau, and finally a special coordinator of the Middle East 
peace process. Mark Gwozdecky was Director of Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Implementation 
Agency before becoming Director of Public Information and Spokesperson of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in 2002. Bob Lawson is currently a Senior Policy Advisor for human security issues 
within the Global Issues Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Foreign Ministry position toward joining the ad hoc process toward an international 
agreement on cluster munitions launched by Norway.394
Conclusion: personality matters, partnerships pay off
Domestic structure limitations and traditional diplomacy 
As already mentioned, Canada is characterized by a state-dominated domestic 
structure that features a concentration of decision-making power (also in foreign 
policy) in the Prime Minister’s office (Savoie, 1999; Kirton, 1997; Stairs, 2001).395 In 
addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffers from a number of organizational and 
financial constraints. On the one hand, as a rule, trade issues and economic politics 
receive priority attention within DFAIT. On the other, DFAIT is a policy and 
representational department but not a “program” department in the sense that it 
administers very few programs, mostly devoted to promotional and public relations 
goals, often vulnerable to budget cuts. In contrast, CIDA has at its disposal most of the 
funds allotted to overseas purposes. In this light, the Foreign Minister faces severe 
limitations in his ability to orient Canada’s foreign policy agenda toward issues that 
don’t belong to its core economic priorities, and even if s/he succeeds in this task, runs 
into the problem of funding such international initiatives and commitments, which 
could lead to interdepartmental rivalries over resources (Stairs, 2001). 
                                                
394 In 2005, Earl Turcotte became director of the Foreign Affairs Mine Action and Small Arms Team, 
after working for the UN Development Program Mine Action team and CIDA before that. He has taken 
part in the NGO-government meetings on clusters in his personal capacity.
395 See, for example, Savoie (1999) on the concentration of power in the post of the prime minister, not 
only in domestic politics, but also in foreign relations and defense policy (pp.134-7). In his words, in 
Canadian politics the prime minister is “Primus: there is no longer any Inter or Pares,” “Canadian 
prime ministers when they have a majority government in parliament, have in their hands all the 
important levers of power” (pp. 71-2).
352
Another feature of the Foreign Ministry institution was the traditional 
Canadian approach to foreign affairs, characterized by routine, quiet, low-key, and 
consensus-oriented diplomacy (Cooper, 1997; Hampson and Molot, 1998: 4) that did 
not leave much space for new ideas and ambitious projects. DFAIT had an “insular 
culture” and its officials saw foreign policy as the realm of professionals where public 
involvement and interference from outsiders were not welcome (Van Rooy, 2001: 
256).396 Indeed, the initial Canadian position on landmines fits this description well. 
Canadian officials feared any steps that could be viewed as going too far from the 
consensual (and lowest-common-denominator) position at the CCW and thus 
compromise Canada’s established role of a serious negotiator. Similarly, Foreign 
Minister Ouellet did not draw directly on NGO support to overcome the Defense 
opposition to more comprehensive restrictions on landmines, even if his position on 
the issue was influenced by the NGO campaign.
Individuals and NGO campaigning 
It is within this context of constraints, institutional culture, and traditional attitudes 
that Axworthy’s policies and the landmine process have to be considered. Despite the 
limitations,397 Axworthy was able to promote a number of human security issues and 
lead policies that placed Canada center-stage on the international arena. 
                                                
396 Senior bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry in the past were notorious for their “Fortress Pearson” 
mentality (Hampson and Molot, 1998: 10).
397 Some authors have argued that actually it was because of these constraints that Axworthy promoted 
the human security agenda as “an easy sell, with manageable risks and the prospect of substantial 
rewards” without considerable costs (Copeland, 2001: 161). There is disagreement, however, on 
whether the human security agenda was a rational choice of directing limited resources and diplomatic 
capital in areas where Canada could make a real difference or a flight from responsibility to work for 
solving difficult problems demanding serious, longtime commitments and financial resources, such as 
global poverty reduction and sustainable development that had been a traditional focus of Canadian 
foreign policy (see, for example, Copeland, 2001; Hampson and Oliver, 1998; Nossal, 1998/99).
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With his coming to power, Canadian foreign policy on landmines was totally 
transformed. It discarded the traditional diplomatic forums and launched instead an 
unprecedented process of fast-track negotiation based upon the partnership between 
like-minded governments and NGOs. Whereas neither the cooperation between 
government agencies and NGOs,398 nor Canadian involvement in broadly defined 
human security issues were an entirely novel feature of Canadian politics,399 the 
change in diplomatic practice was. All of a sudden, “Canadian diplomats, who take 
pride in their skills at quiet diplomacy, provided dozens of backgrounder and on-
record briefings to key journalists in the US, the UK, France, Australia and Japan” and 
got engaged in intensive lobbying of foreign governments (Lawson, 1998:89). The 
Foreign Ministry also used new communications technology – produced and 
distributed two videos and a six editions of a newsletter and set up a landmines 
website that even broadcast live the signing ceremony of the Ottawa Convention in an 
“unprecedented effort at outreach” (Axworthy and Taylor, 1998: 197). An 
extraordinary combination of active and committed middle level officials in the 
DFAIT’s Disarmament Division and a top DFAIT official, open to their ideas and new 
ways of conducting foreign policy, overcame DFAIT’s institutional culture and 
existing constraints on the Foreign Minister’s freedom of action. The entrepreneurship 
and success of these individuals, in turn, was based upon the mobilization and solid 
                                                
398 As long ago as the 1972, the Canadian delegation to the Stockholm Conference on the international 
environment was accompanied by advisers from several NGOs that were involved in lobbying. By the 
time of the Rio Conference 20 years later, NGO personnel were included as members of the Canadian 
delegation itself. NGOs had always had good working relationships on development issues with CIDA 
(Stairs, 1998: 37-8, 42). Before Axworthy, Lester Pearson understood that non-state actors could be 
used to promote state domestic and foreign policies and Pierre Trudeau had argued for democratization 
of the foreign policy making process (English, 2001).
399 Canada was leading on the issue of sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s and had a key role in 
focusing attention at environmental security and sustainable development in the early 1990s (Hampson 
et al., 1999). It was also the founder of the concept of UN peacekeeping missions and the leading state 
in peacekeeping operations till 1990 (Cooper, 2000: 13; English, 2001: 94), as well as one of the 
biggest contributors of development assistance (Pratt, 1990: 14). For an overview of Axworthy’s legacy 
as part of the Liberal Party tradition, see, English (2001).
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support of NGOs and public opinion. The risks they took eventually paid off in the 
adoption of the Ottawa Convention.
Thus, to the extent that the story of the Ottawa Convention is a story of 
Canadian foreign policy, what made it possible was a partnership between NGOs and 
the officials in the Foreign Ministry (the Foreign Minister himself and the staff of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Division) in which both sides equally needed each 
other’s support – the NGOs to achieve an international ban and the Foreign Minister to 
amplify “his diplomatic influence abroad and his political influence within his own 
government (and even within his own departmental apparatus)” (Stairs, 2001: 22, 
1998b).400 Axworthy’s ability to win the Prime Minister’s support was also important 
in this respect, because under the Canadian political system, this virtually ensured that 
military opposition to the landmine ban would be overcome. As already argued, in 
contrast to other countries such as Belgium, in Canada the parliament had a very 
limited if any role in influencing its foreign policy or even setting the tone of Canadian 
domestic policy on the issue.
Thus, Axworthy used the NGOs as an asset and a lever to help him turn the 
cogwheel of Canadian foreign policy in a direction that both he and the NGO 
community favored. In fact, it was the NGOs that to a large degree determined the 
direction and the speed at which the wheel of Canadian diplomacy got rolling. The 
NGO campaign made the landmine problem into a foreign policy issue in the first 
place and lobbied governments to adopt a total ban on the weapon. But in the 
Canadian case, government officials actually approached NGOs and sought after their 
partnership, much to the surprise and initial suspicion of the latter. Back in Geneva in 
January 1996 Bob Lawson took the initiative and came to the NGO-organized meeting 
                                                
400 The international and domestic influence of the Foreign Minister was amplified also by the “ad hoc 
combinations of like-minded sovereign states” (Stairs, 2001: 22).  
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with like-minded governments uninvited; thereafter Canada encouraged and 
welcomed NGO participation throughout the Ottawa Process. Thus, personalities in 
the Canadian Arms Control unit were also key in the landmine campaign and without 
their experience, inventiveness, and dedication it would have never succeeded (see, 
also Kitchen, 2001/02: 44). Thus the success of Canadian foreign policy was the result 
of the ability of the government to draw support and legitimacy from NGOs and create 
a synergy from a joint effort to address the problem of landmines.401
This symbiosis between NGOs, the Arms Control Division, and Axworthy’s 
leadership carried within itself obvious vulnerabilities. Once Axworthy and the Arms 
Control staff left their positions, MAC was deprived of its government connections, 
and given its exclusive focus on landmines and other victim-activated weapons and 
limited domestic constituency, that proved to be a serious drawback in its later efforts 
to mobilize support for the issue of cluster munitions. As has been argued, the 
influence of internationally-oriented NGOs is “heavily dependent for its survival on a 
willing government’s active sympathy” (Stairs, 1998b: 48). Short of that, NGOs need 
to develop transnational links with governments and interests abroad, so that issues 
that can be ignored at home cannot be avoided on the international level (ibid) – a 
strategy that has remained the sole focus of MAC’s campaign on cluster munitions. 
However, the lack of an effective domestic campaign on cluster munitions remained a 
liability. At the same time when NGOs lost their connections in government and let up 
their domestic efforts, the political leverage of the Canadian military relatively 
improved, which created a greater and not less need for a domestic campaign and 
debates on cluster munitions. Without public interest in the issue, voters’ letters, and 
parliamentarian questions and legislative initiative the government did not feel 
                                                
401 For example, Bátora (2005) and Potter (1996/97) point out the increased role of NGOs for the 
promotion of Canadian foreign policy goals.
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urgency to address the problem, and even those few individuals with it that would 
have liked to work more actively on cluster munitions lacked the necessary public 
support to take on their opponents. 
Thus with the end of the “Axworthy era,” more or less came the end of 
Canadian “new diplomacy” as well, despite expectations that it represented a new 
model of Canadian foreign policy resulting from the post-Cold War structural 
conditions (Michaud and Belanger, 2000). As I have argued, in the case of cluster 
munitions this was the result of the lack of new leadership in government and weak 
domestic NGO campaigning on the issue. It remains to be seen whether the Canadian 
position would change after the international process toward negotiations moves 
forward and comes to exert a stronger “boomerang” on Canadian policymakers. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: Leadership and Norm Creation
I have outlined the processes of norm formation in two cases of new weapons 
prohibitions that are the most recent additions to international humanitarian law (IHL). 
I have explored the dynamics through which restrictions on the use of antipersonnel 
landmines and cluster munitions emerged at the international and domestic levels and 
attended to the links between the processes taking place at those two levels. The focus 
on these processes is warranted for two reasons. First, they represent an early phase of 
new norm creation that has received less attention from International Relations 
scholars compared to the study of norm diffusion and socialization. Second, lessons 
could be drawn from these cases regarding international negotiations and IHL 
development in general. 
Factors affecting the international processes of norms formation
Based on the historical case of development of restrictions on certain inhumane 
weapons during the Cold War and the two contemporary cases of emerging 
prohibitions of landmines and cluster munitions, I identify several factors that 
contribute to the achievement of more comprehensive restrictions on the international 
level: first, relatively peaceful international relations that open up space for greater 
state cooperation unrestrained by the confrontations of two rivalry blocs or tight 
alliances; second, negotiation fora that are based on majority voting instead of 
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consensus; and third, clearly defined normative injunctions that place the emphasis on 
prohibiting a concrete weapon on humanitarian grounds instead of seeking more 
complex but partial regulations based on strictly legal interpretations and military 
utility considerations (also, Goose and Williams, 2004; McCarthy, 2005; Borrie and 
Randin, 2005; Cameron, 2002; Gwozdecky and Sinclair, 2001: 34).
1/ International system
Even though, it could be argued that IHL has evolved gradually in the direction of 
greater “humanization” of war, in practice its development has been in fits and starts 
following major wars. After humanitarian principles are challenged in the heat of 
battle, come down crumbling, or new technology and methods of warfare reveal gaps 
in the existing laws, states, the ICRC, and more recently NGOs try to reaffirm and 
strengthen IHL. Thus, an unfortunate catalyst of IHL development has been war itself 
(e.g. Best, 1980; Meron, 2000; Wippman, 2005; Schindler, 2003; Anderson, 2003). 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are the product of the experience of World War II, the 
1977 Additional Protocols and the 1980 CCW – of the Vietnam War, the Ottawa 
Convention – of the legacy of numerous conflicts blazing in the shadow of the Cold 
War, the CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants – largely of the new kind of 
humanitarian intervention practiced by NATO over Kosovo and Serbia that 
highlighted the problem of cluster munitions, and finally the new Norwegian initiative 
to negotiate an international agreement on cluster munitions – of the Israel-Hezbollah 
war in the summer of 2006 that once again revealed the severe humanitarian problems 
the use of those weapons causes.402
                                                
402 A new, slowly proceeding initiative to reaffirm and develop IHL principles started in January 2003. 
It was organized by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Harvard Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research in close cooperation with the ICRC. It gathered together 
military and legal specialists, state and NGO representatives to discuss the current challenges facing 
IHL. Two more meetings were organized in June 2004 and May 2006 with the objective to draft a 
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The other side of the coin is that peace provides opportunities for new IHL 
development. Relaxation of international relations opens up space for initiatives that 
seek to address problems going beyond the narrowly conceived national security of 
states. Improvement of the international climate allows smaller and middle states to 
play a larger role on security issues and form new alliances with countries that share 
their ideas and objectives, as well as with NGOs. As I showed in chapter 2, this 
dynamic worked in the field of weapons restrictions in the years of détente, when the 
1977 Additional Protocols and the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons were negotiated. It was, however, interrupted by the new round of Cold War 
rivalry in the 1980s, only to emerge again in full force following the end of the Cold 
War and find one of its best expressions in the Ottawa Process to ban antipersonnel 
mines. In the post-9/11 international environment, which has become more stringent 
and focused on national security, the issue of explosive remnants of war was the topic 
of discussions in the CCW and produced a new protocol regarding post-conflict 
clearance but did not address the problems inherent in their use. Then, for several 
years NGOs and states favorable to stronger restrictions had not been able to move the 
process forward. In 2006 the US debacle in Iraq became obvious and signs of war 
fatigue began to show among the American electorate that sent new Democratic 
majorities in the US House and Senate. In this new climate and after another war 
caused another humanitarian crisis, Norway decided to launch an alternative process 
aiming at adopting prompt restrictions on cluster munitions. It still remains to be seen 
whether NGOs and like-minded states would be able to mobilize stronger support 
among a larger number of states and achieve an international treaty on cluster 
                                                                                                                                            
manual on IHL applicable to air and missile warfare – the prevalent type of warfare practiced by the 
technologically developed states, as demonstrated by the bombing campaigns in Iraq 1991, Kosovo 
1999, Afghanistan 2001, and Iraq 2003. The ICRC has also brought up the issue of IHL reaffirmation at 
the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in December 2003 (see, ICRC, 
2003).
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munitions in the face of opposition from the major military powers, and with the US 
still bogged down in war. 
2/Negotiation fora and procedures 
The Cold War climate of intense two-block rivalry produced the type of bilateral and 
multilateral disarmament negotiation focused on reciprocal arms limitations agreed by 
consensus and guided by strategic and military considerations. The nature of the 
negotiations required consensus and often involved lengthy discussions of verification 
provisions and compliance. The organizational framework within which most of the 
multilateral arms control talks took place was the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD).403 It included most big military powers with each state holding a veto power 
over any decisions in the CD, including the adoption of a working agenda – a fact that 
ensured that whatever progress could be made in arms control would only come after 
slow and lengthy negotiations.404
In the late 1970s, the issue of inhumane weapons causing unnecessary
suffering or having indiscriminate effects was raised by a number of countries in the 
context of the negotiations on reaffirmation and development of IHL. Those countries 
led by Sweden wanted to have the IHL conference deal with the weapons problem as 
well – a proposal opposed by most NATO countries and the socialist camp. The latter 
preferred to transfer the issue to the CD. The compromise decision led to the creation 
of a separate conference on certain conventional weapons, but the consensus decision-
                                                
403 The Conference on Disarmament is the successor to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament set 
up by France, the UK, US and the Soviet Union in 1959-1960, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament (1962-1969), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-1978), and the 
Committee on Disarmament (1979-1983). From 1978 when its members numbered 31 states, the CD 
has grown to 66 states currently (Goldblat, 2002: 14).
404 For example, negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty started in 1958 only to be 
completed after the end of the Cold War in 1996. Discussions of a ban on chemical weapons began in 
1979 but only after the end of the Cold War in 1992 the Chemical Weapons Convention was finalized 
within the CD. Since 1997 the CD has been inactive for lack of consensus on its agenda (McCarthy, 
2005: 57; Goldblat, 2002: 14-16; 147-150). 
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making procedure was carried over from the disarmament forum, which limited the 
scope of the regulations on inhumane weapons subsequently adopted by the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Similarly, in 1995-96 when the CCW sought to negotiate more stringent 
restrictions on the use and technical characteristics of landmines, progress was 
blocked by the consensual decision-making. Following the CCW failure, controversy 
erupted again between the major military powers such as the US, Britain, France, and 
Russia that wanted discussions on a landmine ban proceed at the CD and the group of 
like-minded countries led by Canada that embarked upon an ad hoc diplomatic process 
for states supporting a quick and comprehensive mine ban treaty that would not be 
burdened by consensus decision making. The Ottawa Process resulted in a strong 
treaty about a year after its start, whereas the CD could not even agree on placing the 
landmine issue on its agenda despite the strong US advocacy to have it included. 
In 2003, after two years of negotiations, the CCW achieved some progress on 
the issue of cluster munitions, with respect to the clearance of unexploded 
submunitions following the end of conflicts. This was as far as this consensus-based 
forum could go. The discussions on preventive measures to reduce the failure rates of 
cluster submunitions or agree to restrictions on their use had not made much headway 
for 3 years. As consensus blocked the adoption of a negotiating mandate on cluster 
munitions in November 2006, in a replay of the Ottawa Process, Norway decided to 
take negotiations out of the CCW in an ad hoc process that would not depend on 
universal consent for moving forward. 
Usually, a trade-off is to be expected between a consensus-based process and 
one relying on majority voting (and to a large extent sustained by NGO involvement 
and public interest). One might expect that modest restrictions would be accepted by a 
greater number of states, whereas an ambitious ban that runs against the security 
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interests of major powers will garner less support. It is not only a question of numbers, 
but rather of relative weight. Whereas there are currently 151 states parties to the 
Ottawa Convention banning landmines outright, only 86 states have joined the weaker 
CCW Amended Protocol II that merely places certain limitations on the weapons’ use. 
However, among those are major military powers such as the US, Russia, China, 
India, and Pakistan. The latter four states are also major landmine producers, and all 
five have declined to sign the more ambitious Ottawa Convention. In fact, when they 
launched the Ottawa Process NGOs and like-minded states were aware that most of 
those countries would likely remain outside of the treaty. What they aimed at was 
establishing a clear prohibition and stigmatizing the weapon in public conscience so as 
to make its use reprehensible. 
3/ Simple message and clear goals
The mobilization of public opinion by NGOs and the stigmatization effect of the norm 
against antipersonnel landmines were to a great degree the result of the simple 
message the campaign carried – “ban mines,” and thereafter, “mines are banned and 
illegal.” The specificity and simplicity of the message was key to the success of the 
landmine campaign – a factor whose importance for the establishment and longevity 
of international norms has been pointed out (e.g. Legro, 1995, 1997; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). Whereas the NGO campaign also employed horrible images of the 
suffering and mutilation of landmine victims, which grabbed public attention, what 
helped the campaign succeed was the simple and effective solution it proposed to the 
humanitarian crisis. Where one could have highlighted and sought to address the 
various causes of irresponsible use of landmines with as many various measures, “ban 
them now” had the advantage of simplifying the problem – the problem was the 
weapon itself – and offering a “cure-all” solution. 
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Whereas campaigns about hunger, health epidemics, and refugee crises in the 
developing world come with no less grisly images and stories of human suffering, they 
have not had the advantage of pointing to a simple approach to dealing with those 
problems, because of the complexity of their underlying causes and respective 
solutions. A similar difficulty has bedeviled the campaign against cluster munitions. 
The deadly and mutilating effects of these weapons actually exceed those caused by 
landmines because armed forces deploy them offensively in combat in areas where 
civilians are at risk of attack, and because, like landmines, many of the widely 
dispersed submunitions remain live long after their use.405 Even though the scale of 
the cluster munitions problem is arguably smaller, because the weapons have not been 
used as extensively or for as long a period as mines, it has been recognized as a 
humanitarian issue that needs to be addressed. However, a major factor that impeded 
quick progress in this direction is the complexity of the issue and the inability of 
NGOs until recently to propose a realistic and yet simple solution that would mobilize 
the public and provide a good objective for state negotiations. In this sense, what 
generates public support for a norm is not only the substantive character of a norm, i.e. 
the fact that it might involve “bodily harm to vulnerable individuals” or “legal equality 
of opportunity,” as has been suggested (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Rather, widespread 
support for the concrete norm is also generated by its problem-solving potential. 
People are indignant that mines maim innocent people, but they are also mobilized by 
the normative injunction “ban landmines!” because it offers a concrete solution to the 
problem.
In addition to the specific and simple goal, a clear timetable for conducting 
negotiations might also contribute to their speedier conclusion (Borrie and Randin, 
                                                
405 In addition, the explosive power and range of cluster submunitions is much greater than that of 
landmines, so a higher percentage of their victims are killed in incidents, a larger number of casualties 
result from a single incident, and the wounds inflicted on survivors are usually more severe than those 
of landmines.
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2005; Cameron, 2002). The sense of urgency imparted by the need to alleviate a 
current humanitarian crisis warrants such an approach. If, however, the end goal of 
negotiations is not clear, a set deadline might lead to adopting a weak instrument 
reflecting the existing agreements and compromises that could be reached, while 
leaving out the thornier issues, which if ironed out after longer negotiations could 
result in a stronger document. Arguably, the CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants 
of War was adopted relatively quickly because it concentrated on the areas where 
agreement could be achieved (Cave, 2006). It remains to be seen whether the 
Norwegian initiative on cluster munitions will result promptly in a strong treaty or will 
get bogged down in discussions of exactly what weapons are to be banned. The danger 
of the latter is inherent in the lack of clarity about the final goals of negotiations that 
aim at banning “cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences” 
– a formula on which all proponents of regulations could agree, but which many 
interpret differently. 
Finally, whether it is preferable to chose a step-by-step approach where 
progress on each step is easier to achieve and solidify before progressing to the next 
level, or to take the time to prepare for a bigger leap that may not succeed, depends on 
the estimate of existing support among states on a specific issue and the ability of state 
leaders to take risks and move the process further. Which brings me to the focus of the 
thesis – the interaction of domestic and international processes that generates support 
for stronger weapons restrictions in national policies, which in turn feed the treaty 
making dynamic at the international level.
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“Chain reaction” model of the dynamics of norm formation
In contrast to most empirical studies on landmines and the literature on “new 
diplomacy”, which examine NGO campaigns and negotiation processes at the 
international level, I have focused considerable attention on the domestic 
developments and NGO campaigns, which have been a necessary precondition for the 
launching of a more robust international process. I have argued that the process of 
developing new weapons prohibitions applicable in these two instances is initiated and 
shaped by NGOs. It starts at the international level with NGOs advocating new 
international prohibitions. Parallel to that, they work on domestic campaigns seeking 
national restrictions on the targeted weapons. As international progress toward 
prohibitions stalls within the traditional consensus-based fora, NGO efforts revert to 
the national levels in an attempt to mobilize a critical mass of state support that could 
then be channeled back toward international action. Thus, the process involves a 
downward “scale shift” from the international stage to the national settings and then a 
shift back upward (Tarrow, 2005). NGOs seek to exploit and leverage all the 
opportunities that national and international structures offer them. In relation to 
Sikkink’s (2004) typology, these processes fall within the box that features relatively 
open access to both domestic and international structures that are conducive to the 
formation of insider-outsider coalitions – an area that has received less scholarly 
attention in comparison to cases where significant blockages exist either in the 
domestic or international sphere.
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NGO roles in norm development 
Agenda-setting and information politics: First, NGOs are all important at the agenda-
setting stage when they point to a problematic practice of warfare, gather information 
about the effects of weapons, and define what the concrete problems are. During that 
phase the provision of reliable and abundant information about the humanitarian 
consequences of landmines and cluster munitions has been very important and field-
based humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, and advocacy groups have cooperated 
in gathering and publishing the necessary data. Without such evidence that a specific 
problem really exists, the process of norm development could not start.
Issue framing: Second, and closely linked to the above, NGOs have often been quite 
influential in defining the nature of the problem, its causes, and even its solutions. 
Both in the case of landmines and cluster munitions the goal of NGOs has been to 
present the issues within a humanitarian frame, backed by arguments from a 
development perspective. The core arguments have been centered on interpretation of 
IHL principles of discrimination and proportionality of force. Those have been 
accompanied by arguments underlining the enormity of the landmine crisis, or in the 
case of cluster munitions, the dangers of a “humanitarian crisis in the waiting” and a 
“looming disaster” unless measures were taken to stop the proliferating use of those 
weapons. Thus NGOs have tried to create a sense of urgency to address the 
problems.406
However, at the stage of issue framing, different NGOs have used different 
                                                
406 Another framing technique has been to focus attention on landmine victims that were women and 
children (even if they comprised about 30% of the victims) (Larrinaga and Sjolander, 1998), and in the 
case of cluster munitions that a disproportionately high percentage of the casualties are children.
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approaches. In the case of landmines from the beginning the NGOs agreed on a simple 
and forceful message that identified the cause of humanitarian suffering and the 
solution to it – antipersonnel landmines and their total ban. NGOs as a whole kept to 
the humanitarian framework and emphasized the indiscriminateness and 
disproportionate harm landmines cause to civilians compared to their military 
usefulness. US NGOs, however, focused on arguments questioning the military utility 
and effectiveness of landmines for the armed forces and thus unwittingly focused the 
debate on technical and tactical issues and moved it to the field of the military. 
In contrast to the landmine case, early on problems with issue framing slowed 
down campaigning on cluster munitions due to the inability of NGOs to decide exactly 
what the problems were, what measures would be adequate to address them, and thus 
what actions they should demand from governments. The way the NGOs initially 
framed the problem of cluster munitions as de facto landmines, had both positive and 
negative effects. On the one hand, it helped place the issue of explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) on the international agenda, but on the other, it directed attention away 
from the indiscriminate area effects of the weapons and thus delayed action on this 
problem. Even though NGOs agreed that the latter problems should also be addressed 
in an international agreement, different NGOs argued for different solutions based on 
their organizational profile and interests. The organizations whose credibility and 
influence depended on sound legal interpretations (and which focused predominantly 
on elite lobbying at the international level) – the ICRC and HRW – could not come 
out in favor of a ban on cluster munitions because they didn’t think it was warranted in 
view of IHL principles. Humanitarian organizations involved in public campaigning 
on the issue – most notably Handicap International (HI), later followed by Landmine 
Action, UK (LMA) – preferred to leave aside the niceties of legal arguments and call 
for a ban on cluster munitions in order to mobilize public opinion. Mine Action 
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Canada (MAC) had been working from the perspective of ERW without developing a 
domestic campaign – hence, it shied away from advocating a cluster ban until 
November 2006.
Campaign tactics: The organizations most actively involved on the issues of landmines 
and cluster munitions could be divided into several categories according to their 
orientation toward the domestic or international arena, and according to their 
preference for public campaigning versus advocacy and lobbying. For example, the
ICRC and HRW engage in advocacy and elite lobbying at the international level; the 
strengths of HI, LMA, and Norwegian People’s Aid are primarily on the domestic 
level (both in public campaigning and lobbying decision-makers) but they are also 
active at the international level; finally, on landmines MAC has concentrated on 
domestic campaigning, whereas on cluster munitions it has moved to emphasize 
international level activities, and VVAF has been focused domestically on landmines 
and non-involved on cluster munitions after some initial interest. The NGO choice of 
tactics has influenced the shape and outcome of domestic campaigns and the 
combination of the strengths that different organizations can bring has shaped the 
direction of the two international campaigns – a point that will be elaborated further in 
the overview of the country cases.
All of the above NGO tactics aim at influencing policy-making from different 
directions. I have argued, however, that the domestic pathway toward norm creation is 
very important at this early stage. When either NGOs are not investing efforts in 
domestic campaigning and establishing relationships with parliamentarians or 
government officials, or their efforts meet with no response, the prospects of norm 
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creation are slim.407 NGO public mobilization in this sense is crucial. One the one 
hand, public interest could often be the stimulus that prompts parliamentarians to get 
involved on an issue, and thus it could make new NGO allies. On the other hand, when 
NGOs face difficulties in establishing close links with decision-makers, public 
campaigning is their only chance to promote their cause apart from moving to the 
international level and seeking to engender a “boomerang” effect. The presence of 
partners in government positions, however, is not a reason to dispense with public 
campaigning, as this would weaken the political leverage of their allies.
Individuals matter 
The NGO success in promoting their cause depends to a large extent on the strength 
and focus of their campaigns but it is also greatly facilitated by the presence in 
decision-making positions of individuals sharing with the NGOs a similar interest in 
humanitarian issues and often times a similar background, whether they are located in 
the executive or legislative branches of government, or in international and regional 
institutions such as the UN or the European Parliament.
Thus, Thus, for example in France, early on President Mitterrand's wife's 
involvement in the NGO community benefited the cause; later the appointment of 
another NGO person, Xavier Emmanuelli, as Secretary of State for Humanitarian 
                                                
407 An alternative, or rather complementary, pathway is to direct NGO efforts to the military officials 
responsible for the use and stockpiling of controversial weapons. This could be done either by 
generating media attention to their questionable policies and practices; establishing informal 
connections with military officials to discuss problematic issues; or both – an approach that was present 
in HRW’s early work on cluster munitions and in the Norwegian case of cluster munitions. 
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Affairs helped the campaign; and finally, Christian Lechervy, who also had a 
background of NGO and development work, was key in securing the military 
agreement to a total ban on French mines. In Belgium, Senator Lallemand’s interest in 
human rights and humanitarian issues led him to embrace the landmine cause and 
work with NGOs for a landmine ban. Similarly, Senator Mahoux – a former Médecins 
Sans Frontières doctor – took up the issue of cluster munitions in Belgium. In Norway, 
Junior Foreign Minister Jan Egeland had worked for both the ICRC and the 
Norwegian Red Cross and later became the UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian 
Affairs; his boss, Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, also had an NGO 
background and had served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Steffen 
Kongstad – a veteran diplomat who has been closely involved in the negotiation and 
implementation of the Ottawa Treaty – and the newly appointed Foreign Minister and 
former president of the Norwegian Red Cross Jonas Gahr Støre were also instrumental 
in energizing the Norwegian position on cluster munitions in 2006. In the USA, 
Senator Leahy had already developed an interest in the landmine problem and set up 
the War Victims Fund to assist mine victims, when NGOs approached him. Finally, 
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy came into office with an academic 
background (and interest in the concept of “soft power”) and the desire to open the 
field of foreign policy to input from civil society and work on broadly defined human 
rights and human security issues. 
In this sense, a certain predisposition toward the issues advocated by NGOs 
was present among the individuals who were key in starting the process of norm 
development. However, NGO campaigning was a necessary condition to open 
opportunities for a more active role of political figures or civil servants working in the 
fields of development and arms control, as well as to give a specific expression of 
their interests. 
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However, the chances that NGOs would find like-minded persons in decision-
making positions are different in different countries. In Norway there has been the 
greatest degree of interpenetration of the NGO community and government, with an 
increasing number of cabinet employees recruited from the voluntary sector 
(Christensen and Peters, 1999; Østerud and Selle, 2006; Neumann, 2002). Whereas in 
Canada there is no similar recruitment pattern and the diplomatic corps has remained 
relatively closed to outsiders, the foreign policy making process has been particularly 
open to input from civil society since the mid 1990s. However, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has provided broad access in terms of accepting advice and opinions 
from various civil society actors, without establishing particularly close relations with 
them (Bátora, 2005). The French foreign policy apparatus has been rather insular in 
terms of recruitment but NGO people could find their way into positions in the 
development, humanitarian affairs, and aid agencies. Finally, networking with NGOs 
is not always an asset for office holders, especially in institutions whose interest run 
counter to the NGO causes, as the case of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations, Timothy Connolly, who was dismissed after advocating the 
NGO positions in the Pentagon, shows.
Some militaries matter more than others
In all of the cases the military was opposed to blanket prohibitions of landmines and 
cluster munitions mostly on the grounds that there were different types of weapons 
within those broad categories and some of them could be used without creating 
humanitarian problems. Even though states had different security concerns and threat 
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perceptions, the latter were not necessarily correlated with the strength of military 
opposition to a landmine ban. For example, despite the minimal risks to Canadian 
security, its military was more strongly opposed to mine restrictions than the 
Norwegian military that could potentially face the need to defend its border with its 
unpredictable neighbor Russia. 
In all of the cases, except in the US, the military did not get involved in overt 
political maneuvering to advance its interests by playing one side of government 
against the other even though they did not lack opportunities to do so. On the whole, 
in Belgium, Canada, France, and Norway the military maintained a non-political 
stance and the NGO campaigns were a factor that enabled decision makers to 
overcome military opposition or assuage their concerns about the loss of a militarily 
effective weapon. 
However, the military in different countries had different strategic cultures and 
their ability to exert political leverage on decision-making within their own countries 
was variable. For example, in France and Canada, despite significant involvement in 
peacekeeping operations, the military did not see peacekeeping as its core function. 
Thus their organizational culture made militaries in France and Canada more resistant 
to attempts at weapons restrictions than in Norway and Belgium where the militaries 
are smaller and primarily devoted to low-intensity peacekeeping missions, and 
national defense in the case of Norway. Of all the cases, peacekeeping has been most 
marginal for and even resented by the US military. Importantly, whereas public 
support for the military in Canada, Norway and Belgium was based in large part on 
their peace supporting functions, in the US the military was praised for being the 
strong defender of the nation. In that sense, the military in Canada and the European 
countries have been limited in their ability to defend weapons that NGOs, public 
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opinion, and policy-makers would describe as causing humanitarian problems and 
civilian suffering. In the US, on the other hand, the debate has revolved around the 
needs of and threats to soldiers if they would be deprived of militarily useful weapons.
Leadership competition
State traditions in the area of development and human rights promotion was a factor 
that NGOs could use to their advantage in generating support for their cause and a 
dynamic of leadership competition. First, NGOs would encourage national actions on 
landmines and cluster munitions by emphasizing the humanitarian crises brought 
about by those weapons and the need for prompt action; appeal to states’ traditions in 
the field of human rights and development, and highlight the prospects for leadership 
national steps would confer upon states. Thus, indirectly even small states could be 
leading when they adopt national measure early on. Once there is a breakthrough 
national action on landmines or cluster munitions, NGOs could point to it and urge 
other states to follow suit in order to live up to their “humanitarian credentials” and 
lead the way instead of following the flow. NGOs could start drawing parallels among 
the positions of different countries and create lists of “the good, the bad, and the ugly” 
to both praise the leaders and shame the laggards in the process. As more states come 
out in support of the NGO cause, others would like to get off the “black list” and 
change their positions. At the same time NGOs would start organizing meetings of 
states that have shown support for their cause in order to strategize about future 
actions, as well as create a sense of common purpose and belonging to a vanguard 
group of like-minded states. At this point, there is an emerging opportunity for a state 
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to take the initiative and move the process beyond planning to implementation. 
“Middle powers” that strive to leave their mark and gain greater leverage in 
international politics are particularly apt at playing the leadership role, because they 
have diplomatic traditions and experience in high-level negotiations and 
intermediation, as well as enough resources to devote to the issue. Entrepreneurial 
individuals willing to use their state’s resources and prestige to move the process of 
norm development forward, and as a result reap the dividends of leadership and 
enhance their country’s international position, are those who push the process over the 
“tipping point” of norm creation.
Domestic structures
To some degree, the domestic structure model was useful in pointing the avenues for 
NGO advocacy, but access to institutions was not the determining factor of NGO 
success. What mattered was how NGOs transformed that access into opportunities and 
coalitions. The predictions of the model were best confirmed in the “state-dominated” 
cases of France and Canada since key individuals in the executive were most 
instrumental in shaping their state policies on the issues. In the lack of such potential 
allies, NGOs have not been able to influence state positions despite support from 
parliamentarians. 
In Canada, NGOs not only used institutional channels to access policy makers 
but together with Foreign Minister Axworthy contributed to the broadening of 
opportunities for the Foreign Ministry to secure more resources and redirect the 
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traditional bureaucracy toward a novel kind of diplomacy. Thus the partnership 
between NGOs and government officials reinforced both sides and opened up new 
avenues for NGO participation in an area that had previously been closed to outside 
involvement. Canadian NGOs created most of the initial interest in the problem of 
landmines in Canada, worked with parliamentarians to raise awareness of the issue, 
made public opinion bear upon the Foreign Ministry and provided backing for Foreign 
Minister Ouellet in his bargaining with the Ministry of Defense in 1995. However, the 
change in the Canadian position came when Lloyd Axworthy assumed the post of 
Foreign Minister and Canadian civil servants from the Arms Control Division 
networked with the international campaign to ban landmines in Geneva. Canada’s 
ultimate decision to become more active was influenced by the momentum created by 
the domestic campaigns in European countries and the international campaign that 
they fed. From that point on, international NGOs, the ICBL, and the ICRC made 
important contributions to the Canadian foreign policy goals by advocating the mine 
ban treaty in countries around the world. In contrast, in the cluster munitions case the 
two important elements – strong NGO campaigning domestically and individual 
leadership from government officials was lacking, and correspondingly, the Canadian 
position remained moderate internationally and stale domestically. 
Pursuant to the expectations of the domestic structure mode, in France policy 
regarding landmines and cluster munitions was made by the executive branch and 
parliamentarian initiatives remained inconsequential when undertaken by members of 
the opposition parties. Whereas France was among the early advocates of international 
restrictions on landmines, it fell behind other states when the stakes were raised to a 
total ban and the French military opposed it. Incremental progress toward a ban was 
nonetheless made with the help of Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs 
Emmanuelli, but after the Canadians launched their challenge for fast-track 
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negotiations, France opted for the tried forum of the Conference on Disarmament. The 
timing of the final French decision to join the Ottawa Process in June 1997 might 
suggest that France jumped on the bandwagon when the international campaign had 
gathered force. However, the change in the French position resulted from the coming 
to power of a new socialist government whose leaders had supported a total mine ban 
for years. The new government also came with a program that placed greater emphasis 
on human rights and humanitarian norms in French foreign policy. Finally, an 
energetic appointee in the Ministry of Defense worked from within the ministry to 
overcome military opposition by gathering evidence that landmines had been avoided 
by French commanders for years and posed more problems in combat than they 
solved. 
Since 2002 the absence of key figures within the center-right government to 
support the NGO demands on cluster munitions has so far prevented any headway on 
the issue. Nevertheless, the French public NGO campaign has been the strongest 
compared to those in other countries and has generated significant support among 
members of the opposition (and even from a small party in the ruling coalition) in the 
French Senate and the National Assembly, who have tabled four law proposals for a 
ban on cluster munitions since 2004. Handicap International also made cluster 
munitions an election issue for the 2007 presidential elections. Thus, it has laid the 
ground for a more active French policy if there is a change in the executive given that 
all the presidential candidates, except for the one from the currently ruling center-right 
party, support a prohibition on cluster munitions.                                                                                        
In Belgium, despite the prediction of the domestic structure model that in 
“corporatist” settings NGO influence would be difficult to materialize through the 
parliamentarian channel, the success of both the landmine and the cluster munition 
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campaigns depended on a partnership between NGOs and prominent Belgian senators. 
Moreover, in the case of cluster munitions, NGOs were able to keep intact the 
legislative focus on the humanitarian effects of the weapons despite opposition from 
organized labor and employer interests in the arms industry. Thus issues brought up by 
NGOs that are not represented in a peak organization have better chances of success in 
parliament than through traditional corporatist channels featuring direct consultations 
between organized interests and the government. The partnership between NGOs and 
senators also helped the parliament strengthen its legislative initiative and assert its 
role in policymaking. 
The domestic structure model had greater explanatory power regarding the 
character of policy networks and the decision-making process. The tendency to work 
out divisive issues by finding compromise decisions was evident both in the landmine 
and the cluster munition case. The adopted bans were not as “total” as they were 
portrayed by NGOs internationally. Some marginal concessions were made in the 
wording and scope of the two laws in order to deflect opposition from the military or 
the arms industry. The domestic culture of seeking and diligently working toward 
consensual solutions was also reflected in the conduct of Belgian diplomats on the 
international level. Despite the progressive national position of their country, they had 
not led the way in promoting similar measures internationally. Their approach remains 
cautious when no other, or very few, countries have come forward with policies 
similar to the Belgian one, but when a group of like-minded countries forms, the 
Belgians are good team players and help the international process move forward.
Even though Norway shares with Belgium a consensual policy-making 
process and strong societal organizations characteristic of corporatism, in recent years 
its parliament has moved from a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis the executive 
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to a more active role in political life that has led to a balance between the two branches 
of government. In that sense, the domestic structure provides NGOs with more than 
one potentially successful avenue to convey their demands to policymakers. If 
attempts at one level fail to bring the desired result, NGOs can try another one. That is 
what happened in the landmine case. Initially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
and in particular the Foreign Minister advisor and then Junior Foreign Minister Jan 
Egeland, got involved in the landmine problem and alerted Norwegian NGOs to the 
possibility to work on it. Norwegian diplomats in Geneva, including Steffen Kongstad, 
also urged Oslo not to miss the case and “do something.” However, when the 
Norwegian NGOs got mobilized by the ICBL and came back home with radical 
demands for a total landmine ban, the MFA found those unreasonable, given 
Norway’s geostrategic location and the opposition that was expected from the 
Ministry of Defense. Not finding the expected support in MFA, NGOs turned to 
parliamentarians and worked through the party structures to move the issue forward. 
Egeland for his part also sought to influence the position of the Labor Party after 
realizing that several countries had moved in the direction of a total ban (including 
Sweden with which Norway traditionally compared itself). In his view then, the choice 
for Norway was either to be a leader and gain some dividends from it or fall behind 
and be forced to accept the ban “by public opinion and international actors” (quoted in 
Neumann, 2002: 120). In the end, the parallel efforts by NGOs and Egeland succeeded 
in passing national legislation on landmines. As in the Canadian case, NGO domestic 
and international mobilization was harnessed by the Norwegian MFA to strengthen its 
positions within the government, vis-à-vis the Ministry of Defense, and above all 
enhance Norway’s international role.
In the campaign on cluster munitions NGOs followed a similar path. Whereas 
the Norwegian Red Cross was active on the issue for several years, Norwegian 
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People’s Aid got more mobilized when it became clear that the international campaign 
needed domestic backing if it were to proceed and the Belgian ban passed in the 
Senate. Again, the NGO campaigning included pressure both on governmental 
officials and parliamentarians. Their collaboration with the Center Party led to the 
inclusion in its election program of a commitment to work for an international ban on 
cluster munitions. In contrast to the landmine case, however, NGOs also engaged in 
direct talks with the Ministry of Defense regarding the Norwegian stocks of ground 
launched cluster munitions. Whereas NGOs decided not to insist on a total ban 
covering the most advanced cluster munitions that might not pose real humanitarian 
problems, the Ministry of Defense agreed to institute a moratorium. As new 
developments toward banning cluster munitions got underway in other European 
countries and the Cluster Munition Campaign gained more visibility internationally, 
the Norwegian MFA also became more active on the international scene. Its 
announcement of the Norwegian moratorium at the CCW in June 2006 gave an 
important signal about its willingness to lead a process toward and international ban. It 
also made clear that even new cluster munitions with a 2% failure rate (which the UK 
had actually ordered in order to minimize civilian casualties in the 2003 military 
campaign against Iraq) might be unacceptable from a humanitarian point of view. 
Finally, after Sweden and Austria took the lead in pushing for a negotiating mandate 
on cluster munitions within CCW and failed, Norway stepped forward and decided to 
initiate a new process for a ban out of this forum.
In the “society-dominated” case of the United States, the model has utility in 
depicting the complex and divided decision-making process regarding landmines on 
which various actors exerted influence. However, it does not fully explain why the 
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Clinton administration decided not to join the Ottawa Process408 given the preference 
of the President and high-ranking NSC and State Department officials to do be part of 
the treaty. As I argued, the cultural context prompted NGOs to engage military 
arguments head on in order to prove that banning landmines was a militarily sensible 
thing to do, and provide the President – widely perceived as “weak” in character and 
in his dealing with the military – solid military backing, based on which he could 
move against the wishes of his commanders and ban the weapons. Yet the result of 
this was focusing the debate within a military and disarmament framework and further 
undermining of the President’s position by reinforcing the image of his weakness and 
antagonistic relations with the military. Thus on the one hand, the NGOs lost their 
advantage of speaking on humanitarian grounds and the opportunity to mobilize better 
this alternative discursive framework. On the other, they limited their efforts to the 
domestic scene, and especially to legislative actions, and failed to bring the 
“boomerang” effect of international mobilization to bear on US policy-making. In that 
sense, political culture and NGO tactics provide more insight into the Administration’s 
decision not to join the Ottawa Treaty than a focus purely on domestic structure and 
strength of the military as an institutional actor. Nevertheless, the lack of success in 
getting the US to sign the treaty is relative when seen in the larger context of norm 
creation. Where the domestic US campaign failed, the international one indirectly 
succeeded in affecting the subsequent Clinton landmine policy of 1998 and the general 
acceptance by the US military of the norm that the use of landmines is reprehensible 
and even illegal despite the lack of any formal arrangements prohibiting it in the US. 
During the period when the problem of cluster munitions was discussed, the 
US domestic structure underwent a process of centralization when the Republican 
                                                
408 This question is different from the hypothetical question of why the US did not decide to ratify the 
Ottawa Convention.
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Party gained control of the Senate, House, and the executive, that was only reverted 
with the congressional elections in the fall of 2006. Whereas access to policy-makers 
has not been totally cut out, NGOs were not able to influence policy directly. The 
impact they could exert was confined to stirring media interest, establishing direct 
links to military officials that were interested in maintaining the image of the armed 
forces (and especially of the Air Force) untarnished by allegations of indiscriminate 
use of cluster bombs, and finally, by keeping the subject on the agenda of the CCW 
internationally. 
However, in both the landmine and cluster munition case, the NGO campaigns 
in the US had significant shortcomings that reflected the organizational biases of the 
NGOs that were most actively involved. On landmines, until late in the Ottawa 
Process, VVAF focused its efforts almost entirely on elite lobbying in Washington and 
influencing the legislative process at the expense of grassroots mobilization and 
without taking advantage of the international mobilization to pressure the US 
government from above. In the cluster munitions case, the opposite was true – HRW 
concentrated its attention on the international level and no domestic campaign evolved 
to exert influence on the government from below. Given the strong military position in 
the US, the combination of a domestic and international strategy might have yielded 
better results at least in these two cases.409
The examined cases suggest that the domestic structure framework offers some 
guidance about the domestic processes that one could expect to take place within 
different environments but no conclusive predictions either about the impact of NGOs 
or the pathways through which they could exert influence. NGOs and individuals in 
                                                
409 In fact, if NGOs wanted to influence US policies on cluster munitions under the Bush administration 
they probably had better chances to do so by going through domestic channels given the 
Administration’s aversion to international treaties.
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the executive and legislative branches can and do shape their own institutional 
surroundings. NGO campaigns provide opportunities to officials in parliaments and 
the Foreign Ministries, in particular, with new platforms from which to project more 
active roles both for their own institutions within the government and for their states 
internationally. What unites the above cases is the presence of committed individuals 
that take up the NGO cause, irrespective of their institutional belonging. 
The developments in the domestic structures examined in the Belgian and 
Norwegian cases might also suggest a trend toward increased influence of the 
parliament on foreign policy issues and fragmentation of government power as has 
already been observed in Norway (Rommetvedt, 2003). A similar trend might also be 
underway in France as has been suggested for other European countries (Costa et al., 
2004). Certainly, the French Senate and National Assembly have been very active on 
the issue of cluster munitions, more so than on landmines in the 1990s, which is also 
witnessed in the establishment of the Senate information mission on cluster munitions. 
If indeed there is a trend toward some reinvigoration of the role of parliaments, 
it could be attributed to societal trends toward increased heterogeneity, which in turn 
lead to increased numbers and diversified profiles of political parties and no clear 
majorities to ensure unified government. Rommetvedt (2003) attributes the gain in 
parliamentarian strength in Norway to the fact that for many years there had been 
minority governments dependent for their survival on parliamentarian support from 
more than one party. I have argued that NGO campaigning and the creation of 
partnerships between NGOs and parliamentarians have also worked in the direction of 
reinforcing the role of parliament. There are good reasons to expect that NGOs 
representing interests that have not been institutionalized in society and other interest 
organizations would encounter the fewest obstacles in approaching parliamentarians. 
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Absent governmental support, NGOs have tried to advance their demands on both 
landmines and cluster munitions through the parliamentarian channel. This is also the 
main strategy on which NGOs counted to mobilize greater European support for an 
international cluster munition ban. 
Thus NGO activities appear to contribute to a degree of decentralization of 
decision-making power by strengthening the parliament vis-à-vis the executive. In the 
cases of Canada and Norway it could also be argued, however, that NGO campaigning 
leads to a shift of decision-making power and institutional capacity in the foreign 
ministries vis-à-vis the office of the prime minister and/or vis-à-vis the military 
establishment. Either way, NGOs have served as a balance weight between 
governmental agencies with opposing viewpoints domestically or among countries 
internationally. Whereas the latter phenomenon gave rise to the study of new 
diplomacy, it has been limited mostly to international level processes (e.g. Rutherford 
et al. eds, 2003; Cooper et al. eds, 2002; McRae and Hubert eds, 2001).410 In my work 
I have tried to highlight the importance of domestic developments and their relations 
to the larger international processes regarding negotiations of prohibitions or 
restrictions on landmines and cluster munitions. 
Future research 
It is difficult to generalize the importance of domestic NGO campaigning for the 
                                                
410 There are several contributions to Cooper et al. eds (2002) that present country studies of “new 
diplomacy” initiatives, without focusing on their relations with the larger international context, 
however. See, Neumann (2002), English (2002) and Maley (2002). There are also several contributions 
in Cameron et al. eds (1998) that focus on the landmine campaigns in the US, France, and Canada. 
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mobilization of an international process toward stricter weapons prohibitions or norm 
creation in general. The study was limited to these two contemporary cases of 
weapons restrictions in an effort to capture a more general dynamic of IHL 
development in this area and the role of the military versus NGO influence on state 
decision-making. 
Broadening the case selection to include negative cases of unsuccessful 
attempts at norm creation could test the generalizability of the model of norm 
emergence at least in the IHL field. Whereas it is not possible to include a detailed 
case where attempts to develop a new norm fail or do not take off at all, the examples 
of NGO activities regarding the use of depleted uranium weapons and attacks on dual-
use targets can shed some light on the relative importance of certain factors for the 
success of norm development. 
One factor that seems to facilitate norm creation is the existence of clear and 
direct cause-and-effect relations between the military practices targeted for 
prohibition and the negative consequences for the civilian population (and military 
personnel). In the case of depleted uranium such a relationship between health 
problems and the weapons use has not been scientifically proven. Whereas the 
negative consequences of destroying the electrical power grid of a country are more 
easily detectable, the fact that they materialize in the longer term, especially through 
the failure of water treatment systems makes it more difficult to attribute civilian death 
to the military strikes alone. For example, the government of the attacked country 
could also be blamed for the ensuing deaths because of its failure to repair the system 
promptly, provide assistance and health care to its own population.411
                                                
411 Here I consider both cases in which dual-use targets are really attacked because of their military uses 
and cases of attacks on dual-use facilities as a means to putting pressure on the civilian population with 
the goal of forcing it to rebel against its own government and end the war (i.e. “duress bombing” as it 
has been called by Thomas, 2006). The latter attacks are illegal under existing IHL even in the opinion 
of some vocal proponents of targeting civilian morale (e.g. Dunlap, 2000; Meyer, 2001), whereas a 
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NGO prestige and expertise in the issue area influence their ability to make 
a difference. The involvement of NGOs with field experience in mine clearance that 
are dealing with the problems of mines and explosive ordnance on the ground and 
provide first-hand credible information about the effects of those weapons has been 
important in the cases of successful campaigning against landmines and cluster 
munitions. Thus those NGOs, joined by others that have legal expertise such as the 
ICRC and HRW, could speak with authoritative voices and be the experts who provide 
the data, based on which discussions on the issues of mines and cluster munitions then 
take place. Whereas human rights NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty International 
have been documenting the impact of infrastructure bombing and decrying the 
destruction of power stations as illegal, no field-based organizations have become 
involved in the issue, probably preferring to keep to their narrower mandates focused 
on mines and other victim-activated weapons. In the case of depleted uranium (DU) 
on the other hand, the most actively involved NGOs have been veteran organizations 
concerned about the health problems of soldiers following conflicts where DU 
weapons were employed. In this case, medical doctors held the expert opinion. They 
had to carry out numerous studies and tests to see if health ailments could be linked to 
DU and thus NGOs were deprived of an authoritative voice on the issue. Another set 
of NGOs that could have made an impact given the potential long-term effects of DU 
on the environment, such as well-known environmental organizations, and Greenpeace 
in particular, had not shown interest in getting engaged on this issue. The lack of 
interest from those groups is possibly linked to the shaky scientific grounds upon 
which the protest against DU use is built and the fact that IHL issues do not fall within 
their domain of activities and expertise. 
                                                                                                                                            
prohibition against bombing electrical power stations should focus on the disproportionate effects of 
such attacks on the civilian population, irrespective of the intentions of the attacker.
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Third, framing is important. In the cases of both DU and dual-use bombing, 
the specificity and technicality of the issues has become a barrier to the mobilization 
of interest among a larger and more heterogeneous group of NGOs, which is a 
condition conducive to the creation of a successful campaign. A similar problem was 
observed in the cluster munition campaign that could not mobilize public opinion 
when it was mainly focused on technical measures toward solving the problems of 
cluster submunitions. 
Basing NGO arguments in general IHL principles and framing of the issue in 
humanitarian terms, with clear focus on the harmful effects of a weapon or military 
practice on the civilian population also makes a difference for success. Instead, 
concentrating on the deleterious effects of the weapon on military personnel could be 
another reason why the DU campaigning has not been able to take off and gain the 
support of more NGOs.412 Similarly, the initial focus on the antipersonnel effect of 
cluster submunitions in the arguments of states willing to ban them during the 
negotiations of the CCW in the 1970s, combined with the lack of NGO interest in the 
issue has affected the outcome of the initiative.
On the other hand, even though the lack of clear and scientifically confirmed 
cause-and-effect relationships makes the creation of new norms banning the purported 
causal agent more difficult, it does not necessarily doom it to failure when NGOs 
mobilize strongly behind an issue. In such a case, NGOs could argue for the 
application of the “precautionary principle,” according to which citizens should be 
protected against potentially harmful effects even if at this point in time it is difficult 
to show beyond doubt that those effects really exist and could be attributed to a single 
agent. This approach has led, for example, to the introduction of a EU ban on the use 
                                                
412 The impact of DU weapons on the civilian population in targeted countries has also been present in 
the campaigning on the issue, but most of the debates especially in the US regarding the Gulf War 
syndrome and in Europe following the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo have revolved around the 
health problems of soldiers.
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of a number of phthalates in children’s toys in 2004, following pressure from 
consumer and environmental organizations, including Greenpeace.413 Some NGOs 
tried to use the same approach based on the precautionary principle in the DU case, 
but those that made up the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons preferred 
to draw a parallel with the landmine convention (e.g. McDonald, 2004), without much 
success so far, however.414 In contrast, while drawing on the landmine campaign, 
recently the cluster munition coalition has moved in the direction of the precautionary 
principle in a series of reports by Landmine Action, UK (LMA) that argued that 
cluster munition use should be banned before it has caused problems of the 
proportions of the landmine crisis and aimed at placing onto governments and the 
military the burden of proof that all precautionary measures to avoid civilian casualties 
are really taken when cluster munitions are used. Thus, instead of NGOs having to 
prove time and time again the extent of the damage cluster bombs cause to civilians, 
governments should show the ways in which they have endeavored to minimize 
civilian harm (e.g. LMA, 2005a,b, 2006a). In addition, drawing on consumer product 
safety campaigns, in the fall of 2006 LMA launched a shrewd “product recall” 
campaign for British cluster munitions with high failure rates that would endanger 
civilian lives more than many defective products recalled by companies each year.
                                                
413 Phthalates are oil-delivered chemicals used in the softening of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), used, 
among others, in rubber and plastic chewing toys. A temporary EU ban was imposed in 1999, which 
was officially extended in 2004 and came into effect in January 2006. The use of three phthalates was 
banned in all toys and that of another three in toys and childcare products that can be put in the mouth. 
The ban resulted from concerns about phthalates’ possible risks to children health ranging from causing 
cancer, endocrine disorders, liver and kidney damage, to reproductive abnormalities, despite the fact 
that, for example, in August 2003 following a risk assessment of the commonly used diisononyl 
phthalate (DINP) (whose use in toys and childcare products that can be put in the mouth has been 
banned), the EU’s European Chemicals Bureau announced that “the end products containing DINP […] 
and the sources of exposure […] are unlikely to pose a risk for consumers (adults, infants and 
newborns) following inhalation, skin contact and ingestion.” Similarly, the Phthalates Information 
Centre Europe still claims that “[p]lasticised PVC has been used for nearly 50 years without a single 
known case of it having caused any ill-health and the environmental effects of phthalates are known to 
be minimal.” (http://www.phthalates.org/yourhealth/childrens_toys.asp)
414 The precautionary principle played a much more significant role in the domestic debates on depleted 
uranium in France, for example (see, Lesna, 2004).
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In this sense, in the domestic and regional arenas NGOs can heighten concerns 
about product safety and lead to certain prohibitions even when irrefutable scientific 
evidence supporting their claims may not be available. Thus framing the issues in light 
of the precautionary principle could be more effective than trying to mold the 
campaign against DU on the ICBL and the arguments employed by it.415 Norm 
“grafting” may not always work, especially when few real parallels between two 
issues exist. Even in the case of cluster munitions where unexploded cluster munitions 
do function as antipersonnel landmines and grounds for drawing parallels between the 
two exist, initially centering the cluster campaign around those arguments has had the 
effect of fencing off attempts to address the other negative, wide-area effect of the 
weapons for several years. 
However, in the area of product safety, NGOs might face weaker opposition 
from producers because safety concerns among consumers can affect the demand for 
products and make companies voluntary change their policies and use of materials 
even without a legislative ban on a chemical or practice.416 In addition, the existence 
of viable alternatives can make the change easier for producers. Thus, the lack of 
strong opposition to new restrictions from the interested parties is also an important 
factor in the promotion of new norms.417 In this light, the stronger the opposition to a 
new norm is, the greater the need for clear and proven cause-and-effect relationship 
between the practice targeted for prohibition and the posited harmful effects.
The importance of domestic campaigning as a way to mobilize international 
and regional action is evidenced not only in the landmine and cluster munition cases, 
but also in the case of phthalates, where the 1999 EU ban was preceded by the 
                                                
415 The precautionary principle also plays an important role in the field of environmental protection. 
416 As has happened, for example, with many rubber toy producers in the USA.
417 The lack of industry opposition (and in fact a confluence of interests on the part of the major 
producer, Dupont in marketing a more expensive alternative) has also facilitated the ban on the use of 
CFC (chlorofluorocarbons) (Kauffman, 1997).
390
introduction of domestic legislations, banning phthalates in toys for children under 
three year old, in 7 of the then 15 EU members (Greenpeace, 1999). On the other 
hand, the international campaign against DU so far has not been able to produce any 
palpable progress in this direction. Proposals for domestic bans on the weapons were 
unsuccessfully introduced in Belgium and France in 1999 and it remains to be seen 
whether a new legislation to the same effect proposed again in 2006 in Belgium would 
garner enough support to be passed and give some boost to other domestic initiatives 
and international campaigning.
The importance of individual and NGO leadership is also highlighted in 
those cases by its apparent non-existence. No major NGOs either internationally or 
domestically have become involved in campaigning against depleted uranium. 
Similarly, no parliamentarians or government officials have made it their priority to 
work on this issue. Things might change if a greater number and better-known NGOs 
decide to take up the issue since a few parliamentarians in Belgium and France have 
shown interest in the problem and there have been signs of concern about the use of 
depleted uranium in the European Parliament and the UN. 
On the other hand, the politicization of the problem of bombing dual-use 
facilities by major NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty has not produced a sustained 
campaign against the practice. This could be explained in part by the highly legalistic 
character of the problem whose solution hinges on interpretations of existing IHL 
provisions and the lack of willingness on the part of those two organizations to work 
for the creation of an NGO coalition on this issue. An alternative approach has been 
undertaken by the ICRC, the Swiss government and a number of experts – a series of 
expert meetings closed to the public and the media that aim at drafting a new manual 
on aerial warfare that should regulate, among other things, the practice of attacking 
dual-use targets. If that initiative succeeds, it will be an example of a different process 
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toward norm creation that does not involve NGO campaigning and domestic 
mobilization, but centers on discussions, legal argumentation, and quiet leadership 
based on expertise alone.
Finally, one could argue that the success of the efforts to place restrictions or 
prohibitions on certain war practices is in an inverse relationship with their military 
utility – the greater the military uses and effectiveness of a weapon or practice, the 
slimmer the chances of its prohibition. However, the military utility of weapons is not 
a given and depends also on the point of view of those who do the assessment. For 
example, in the early 1990s the opinion that antipersonnel landmines were of high 
military effectiveness and indispensable for a country’s defense was widespread, 
whereas most authors today tend to represent them as weapons of limited military use 
and utility – a change that was brought about with active NGO participation, research, 
and campaigning. Similarly, the military insistence on the high military utility of 
cluster munitions and the fact that about 80% of the US Army’s munition inventory 
today consists of these weapons should bode ill for the CMC efforts to restrict their 
uses. Yet, the cluster munition campaign has already made progress toward 
stigmatizing the weapon internationally, outlawing it domestically in a few countries, 
and motivating Norway to step outside of the CCW and work for an international ban. 
The effectiveness of bombing dual-use facilities, on the other hand, is a moot issue. 
The US Air Force, which has resorted to it most often in recent years, deems it a 
highly effective way of forcing the enemy into quick submission (e.g. Tirpak, 1999). 
However, scholars and members of the Army have questioned the utility of 
infrastructure bombing (Pape, 1996, Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000; Horowitz and 
Reiter, 2001; Thomas, 2006). Thus it is difficult to accept that there is an a priori
ranking of the military effectiveness of different types of weapons and methods of 
warfare irrespective of the interests of those who make the assessments and the 
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specific uses to which those weapons and methods of war are put. Moreover, the 
question of military effectiveness cannot be divorced from the moral issues involved 
in waging war and the legitimacy and political effectiveness of military practices. 
Once the ethical side of the equation starts being redefined, it cannot be expected that 
the military side will remain unaffected. If weapons’ acceptability were judged only 
by their military effectiveness, nuclear weapons should have been used much more 
often instead of not at all since WWII (e.g. Price and Tannenwald, 1996; Tannenwald, 
1999, 2005). Thus by changing the perception of the humanitarian costs of a weapon 
or practice, NGOs could redefine the perception of its military effectiveness as well.418
In sum, the examination of the “failure cases” does not seem to invalidate the 
postulated process of norm emergence and the factors that contribute to its success. 
Committed leadership from NGOs, policy-makers, or states is generally lacking in the 
cases of DU and targeting dual-use facilities. Since the two issues are at the very early 
phases of agenda setting where the contours of a problem are identified, the reasons 
why leadership either on the part of NGOs or policy-makers has failed to emerge in 
these two cases are mostly linked to issue framing and specificity – in particular, the 
lack of clear and immediate cause-and-effect relations between the practice targeted 
for prohibition and its negative consequences, and the complexity of the problems or 
highly legal discourses surrounding their characterization. 
Thus, by identifying the important role of leadership and the domestic paths of 
norm emergence, the study has pointed out new processes and dimensions of norm 
development that have been largely neglected by the existing literature. 
                                                
418 The simple logic is that the political cost of using a weapon diminishes its effectiveness even if in 
purely military terms it might be “effective”. An additional, even though unlikely, process might be at 
work – once a weapon is stigmatized or put out of bounds, military strategists might start devaluing its 
military utility as well, following the logic “can’t use it, hence it’s no good using” (the “grape is sour” 
fable). 
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